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ABSTRACT
LEARNING AND UNDERSTANDING IN ABSTRACT ALGEBRA
by
Bradford R. Findell 
University o f New Hampshire, December, 2001
Students’ learning and understanding in an undergraduate abstract algebra class were 
described using Tall and Vinner’s notion o f a concept image, which is the entire 
cognitive structure associated with a concept, including examples, nonexamples, 
definitions, representations, and results. Prominent features and components o f students’ 
concept images were identified for concepts o f elementary group theory, including group, 
subgroup, isomorphism, coset, and quotient group.
Analysis of interviews and written work from five students provided insight into their 
concept images, revealing ways they understood the concepts. Because many issues were 
related to students’ uses of language and notation, the analysis was essentially semiotic, 
using the linguistic, notational, and representational distinctions that the students made to 
infer their conceptual understandings and the distinctions they were and were not making 
among concepts. Attempting to explain and synthesize the results o f the analysis became 
a process of theory generation, from which two themes emerged: making distinctions and 
managing abstraction.
The students often made nonstandard linguistic and notational distinctions. For example, 
some students used the term coset to describe not only individual cosets but also the set
xiv
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of all cosets. This kind o f understanding was characterized as being immersed in the 
process of generating all of the cosets of a subgroup, a characterization that described and 
explained several instances of the phenomenon o f failing to distinguish between a set and 
its elements.
The students managed their relationships with abstract ideas through metaphor, process 
and object conceptions, and proficiency with concepts, examples, and representations.
For example, some students understood a particular group by relying upon its operation 
table, which they sometimes took to be the group itself rather than a representation. The 
operation table supported an object conception even when a student had a fragile 
understanding o f the processes used in forming the group.
Making distinctions and managing abstraction are elaborated as fundamental 
characteristics o f mathematical activity. Mathematics thereby becomes a dialectic 
between precision and abstraction, between logic and intuition, which has important 
implications for teaching, teacher education, and research.
xv
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Mathematics is the science o f order, patterns, structure, and logical relationships.” 
(Devlin, 2000, p. 74)
In a compelling new book The Math Gene, renowned mathematician, expositor, and 
National Public Radio commentator Keith Devlin (2000) claims that everyone has innate 
ability to do mathematics because “the features o f the brain that enable us to do 
mathematics are the very same features that enable us to use language” (p. 2). A key 
point in his argument is that richer representation rather than richer communication was 
the driving force behind the emergence of language.
In order to properly understand how we acquired language, we should view it as 
a representational structure rather than as a medium of communication. In order 
to communicate some concept, you first need to have a mental representation of 
it. (p. 291)
His argument draws on a broad body o f empirical and theoretical work in anthropology, 
neuroscience, linguistics, psychology, mathematics education, and also upon his 
contention that most people do not know what mathematics is. “Modem mathematics,” 
he claims, “is about abstract patterns, abstract structures, and abstract relationships”
(p. 136). And with a sufficiently broad understanding o f “pattern,” the shorter version 
“the science o f patterns” says it all (pp. 73-74), suggesting that patterns reveal structure 
and relationships. In fact, structure, pattern, and relations are mutually dependent aspects 
of mathematical thinking, any of which may be taken as primary. Poincare, for example, 
begins with relations and arrives at structure:
1
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Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations among objects; they are 
indifferent to the replacement of objects by others as long as the relations don’t 
change. Matter is not important, only form interests them, (cited in Gallian,
1994,p . 102)
And I would argue that structure gives rise to relationships and patterns. Thus, when I 
speak of a structural view of mathematics, I mean a view that embodies all o f these 
aspects.
Devlin’s thesis raises a number of practical questions: What are the implications for the 
mathematics curriculum? Should all students experience mathematics as abstract 
patterns, structure, and relationships? If  so, how might such ideas be taught? Just when 
do mathematics students, particularly future mathematicians and secondary teachers, 
have an opportunity to develop such a perspective about mathematics? And what do 
students take from such experiences? To what extent is the representational structure of 
natural language sufficient for reasoning about mathematics? Where does natural 
language fall short?
With the organization o f today’s mathematics curriculum, few students ever have an 
opportunity to develop a structural view of mathematics. Mathematics majors are first 
exposed to such a view o f mathematics in a university course called abstract algebra, 
typically taken in their junior or senior year. The course usually focuses on elementary 
group theory and often also includes introductions to ring theory and other abstract 
structures. It is worth pointing out that examples from group theory form a significant 
portion of Devlin’s description o f what mathematics is.
The structural view of mathematics has been an organizing theme in the mathematics 
research community since the group o f mathematicians known collectively as Bourbaki
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
identified three mother structures: algebraic structure, order structure, topological 
structure, although they allow for the possibility o f additional fundamental structures (see 
Bourbaki, 1950, for an overview). Beginning in 1939, this influential group published a 
collection o f texts under the title Elements de Mathematique, intended to set mathematics 
on a firm footing. In a short expository piece, Bourbaki (1950) simultaneously present a 
description of the structural view and an argument for the formal, abstract, axiomatic 
method upon which it is based, acknowledging explicitly the difficulty o f higher stages of 
abstraction and “the great problem of relations between the empirical world and the 
mathematical world” (p. 231). And, once again, group theory serves as the canonical 
example.
During the 1960s, curriculum developers and some psychologists adopted structure as a 
central theme, though not always with the same motivations. Piaget (1970a), for 
example, was interested primarily in mental structures, and so structure was a 
fundamental characteristic o f his psychogenetic theory. He was subsequently taken by 
the structures suggested by Bourbaki, such as the analogy between his concept of 
reversibility and the algebraic concept of inverse. Ernest (1994) goes so far as to say, 
“Piaget was seduced by the Bourbakian account of mathematics as logically constituted 
by three mother structures” (p. 2). Bruner (1960/1977), on the other hand, took structure 
to be a fundamental characteristic o f the disciplines and suggested that structure must be 
taught. “The task ... is one of representing the structure o f that subject in terms of the 
child’s way o f viewing things” (p. 33). Judging from the movements in the mathematics 
curriculum since the “new math,” it seems that the structure has largely faded in school
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4mathematics, but structure has remained at least a dominant background influence in the 
upper-level undergraduate mathematics curriculum.
Despite this history, little is available in the mathematics education literature about how 
students learn content, such as group theory, that typifies the structural view. And less is 
known about the extent to which learning group theory helps students develop a 
structural view o f mathematics. This study aimed to contribute to the empirical and 
theoretical work in this area o f mathematics education by investigating student learning 
in abstract algebra, or more specifically, group theory. Like Devlin’s book, this study 
was about mathematics, language, and representations, but rather than taking such a 
global and evolutionary view, it was more exploratory, beginning at the level of 
individual students in a college mathematics class.
Rationale
The reasons for investigating student learning in group theory are manifold. First, such 
investigations can contribute to an understanding of advanced mathematical thinking, 
especially because group theory typifies what modem mathematics is about, as discussed 
above. Second, students often find the course difficult, and instructors are often 
dissatisfied with the level o f understanding reached by the students. Third, the research 
in this area is particularly thin. And fourth, because the course is typically required of 
preservice secondary teachers, there are potential implications for teacher education.
These reasons are elaborated below.
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Advanced Mathematical Thinking
Tall (1992) suggests that “advanced mathematical thinking ... is characterized by two 
important components: precise mathematical definitions (including the statement of 
axioms in axiomatic theories) and logical deductions o f theorems based upon them”
(p. 495). Over the past decade and a half, the mathematics education community has 
seen growing interest in the study of advanced mathematical thinking and, 
simultaneously, in research in the teaching and learning o f undergraduate mathematics. 
Although there was some scholarly work in this area in the 1970s and early 1980s, a 
community of researchers was formally established with the creation in 1985 of the 
working group on advanced mathematical thinking within the International Group on the 
Psychology o f Mathematics Education (PME). Since then, accompanying the broader 
curricular and pedagogical reforms in undergraduate mathematics (Dossey, 1998; 
Douglas, 1986; National Research Council, 1992; Steen, 1992; Tucker & Leitzel, 1994), 
scholarly interest in the teaching and learning o f undergraduate mathematics has grown 
and intersected with the broader mathematics community, as evidenced by the increasing 
numbers o f sessions at the Joint Mathematics Meetings devoted to educational issues and 
particularly by the creation in 1999 of the Association for Research in Undergraduate 
Mathematics Education (ARUME), which has since become a special interest group of 
the Mathematical Association o f America.
Literature Is Thin
Despite these developments, the research literature in advanced mathematical thinking 
and undergraduate mathematics education has been and remains sparse, particularly 
regarding the learning of post-calculus mathematics. This is perhaps a particular
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
symptom of a general phenomenon that the amount o f research literature diminishes 
sharply as one proceeds from elementary school to secondary school to undergraduate 
mathematics. One comprehensive survey o f the literature in undergraduate mathematics 
education was conducted in 1995 (Scher & Findell, 1996), at about the time this study 
was conceived. Based on literature published in journals and known collections (e.g., 
Kaput & Dubinsky, 1994) between 1985 and 1994, the survey found 312 research articles 
on the teaching and learning of undergraduate mathematics and categorized them 
according to mathematical content and research outcome. O f those 312 articles, fewer 
than 30 could clearly be described as attending to the teaching and learning o f content 
beyond first-year calculus, and only two concerned the learning o f abstract algebra. The 
research about the teaching and learning of undergraduate mathematics has grown since 
1994, particularly through the publication o f volumes II through IV of Research in 
Collegiate Mathematics Education (Dubinsky, Schoenfeld, & Kaput, 2000; Kaput, 
Schoenfeld, & Dubinsky, 1996; Schoenfeld, Kaput, & Dubinsky, 1998). And although 
there is substantial recent work in linear algebra (Dorier, 2000), the literature specific to 
the teaching and learning o f abstract algebra remains thin. A literature search using the 
same criteria as the previous survey revealed 15 articles on the learning of abstract 
algebra. Eleven o f them had bee published since 1994, o f which 9 grew from the work of 
Dubinsky, Leron, and their collaborators.
Difficulties with Teaching and Learning
Some research has indicated student understanding o f the concepts in abstract algebra is 
less than satisfactory (see, e.g., Dubinsky, Dautermann, Leron, & Zazkis, 1994; Hazzan 
& Leron, 1996). Leron and Dubinsky (1995) go so far as to declare that the teaching of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
abstract algebra is a disaster and to claim that there is wide consensus on this view among 
both instructors and students. This view may be indicative of a larger problem: The 
transition to advanced mathematics courses, particularly those beyond calculus, is often 
problematic.
Harel (1989) proposes several reasons why the learning o f linear algebra is difficult for 
students, which I paraphrase as an initial characterization o f the difficulties with abstract 
algebra. First, the concepts are abstract structures that serve as categories for a broad and 
diverse range o f examples. The objects are defined by their properties, and the properties 
rather than the examples are primary, making it hard for students to conceive of them. 
Second, many o f the examples themselves are unfamiliar to the students. And third, 
many students are not yet comfortable with proof and the axiomatic method. Regarding 
the last point, it is worth mentioning that linear algebra is often studied before abstract 
algebra. But in some mathematics programs, the approach to linear algebra is fairly 
concrete, unlike the abstract approach Harel describes. Furthermore, some mathematics 
programs require that students take a course in “mathematical proof,” before they take 
abstract algebra. Even with such experiences, there is reason to believe that students 
have not yet transcended the difficulties with proof (see, e.g., Moore, 1994).
Abstract Algebra for Future Teachers
There is widespread agreement on the need for improvements in teacher preparation and 
professional development in mathematics, as evidenced in the plethora o f recent reports 
that discuss teacher education. The reports recommend ways to improve the system of 
teacher education (Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001; National Commission on 
Mathematics and Science Teaching for the 21st Century, 2000; National Research
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Council, 2001a), recommend mathematics that should be required o f future teachers 
(Conference Board of the Mathematical Sciences, 2001), and reframe questions about the 
content and delivery o f mathematics teacher education (National Research Council, 
2 0 0 1 b), yet there has been little empirical or theoretical work exploring the relevance of 
particular mathematics courses in the preparation o f future teachers. Most certification 
programs for prospective secondary mathematics teachers require a course in abstract 
algebra. Thus, by exploring what students do learn in an abstract algebra course, this 
study provides some empirical and theoretical backing for ways to implement and 
improve upon the recommendations.
For some time, professional organizations and committees have agreed that the study of 
abstract algebraic structures is an important part o f a secondary preservice teacher’s 
mathematical preparation (see, e.g., Leitzel, 1991; National Council o f Teachers of 
Mathematics [NCTM], 1991; Committee on the Undergraduate Program in Mathematics, 
1971). Although these reports provide little in the way o f rationale, the dominant point of 
view is that the equivalent o f a major in mathematics should be required of prospective 
high school teachers (Ferrini-Mundy & Findell, 2001).
The implicit rationale might be that a major in mathematics is necessary in order to 
understand secondary school mathematics with sufficient depth. And, as elaborated 
below, powerful ideas from advanced mathematics can explain and unite ideas from 
school mathematics. A recent report on the mathematical education of teachers 
(Conference Board o f the Mathematical Sciences, 2001) acknowledges, however, that 
“unfortunately, too many prospective high school teachers fail to understand connections 
between [abstract algebra and number theory] and the topics of school algebra” (p. 40).
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Although the empirical basis for this claim is not stated, there is clearly a perceived need 
to think about ways to improve the content and effectiveness o f the courses that are 
offered to future teachers. Furthermore, there is a need to think deeply about the 
rationale for requiring o f future teachers a course in abstract algebra, and this study 
provides some suggestions there.
What Is Abstract Algebra?
The notion o f a “group,” viewed only 30 years ago as the epitome of 
sophistication, is today one o f the mathematical concepts most widely used in 
physics, chemistry, biochemistry, and mathematics itself. (Sosinsky, 1991, cited 
in Gallian, 1994, p. 68)
School algebra can be seen as a generalization o f arithmetic in which the variables are 
numbers and the expressions and equations are formed with the four arithmetic 
operations. Abstract algebra is a generalization o f school algebra in which the variables 
can represent various mathematical objects, including numbers, vectors, matrices, 
functions, transformations, and permutations, and in which the expressions and equations 
are formed through operations that make sense for the particular objects: addition and 
multiplication for matrices, composition for functions, and so on. This section provides a 
short sketch o f abstract algebra in order to highlight ideas o f structure and to present the 
terms, concepts, notations, and perspectives that undergird the research questions and 
subsequent analysis.
Abstract algebra consists o f axiomatic theories that provide opportunities to consider 
many different mathematical systems as being special cases of the same abstract 
structure. The theories are called axiomatic because the structures are defined by axioms.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
Group theory is “one o f  the oldest (and also one o f  the simplest) o f  axiomatic theories” 
(Bourbaki, 1950, p. 224).
Consider, for example, the following four mathematical systems:
1. The integers {... , -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, ...} under the operation of addition. This 
system is denoted Z.
2. The whole numbers less than a given whole number n, {0, 1, 2, ... , n -  1}, under the 
operation of addition, where addition is given by the remainder after dividing the 
usual sum by n. This system is denoted Zn.
3. The translations of the plane, where the operation is given by composition, that is, 
following one translation by another.
4. The set of 2 x 2 matrices of real numbers with determinant 1, under matrix 
multiplication.
Each o f these examples consists o f  a set o f elements (numbers or translations) together 
with an operation that specifies how to combine two o f  the elements to get an element 
that is also in the set. Because the operation combines two elements, it is often called a 
binary operation. In order to talk about these examples simultaneously, the operation is 
denoted by *, where the interpretations are addition, addition “modulo composition, 
and matrix multiplication, respectively, in the four examples.
With some work, it is possible to see that each o f  these systems satisfies the following 
axioms:
1. Associativity. For any three elements, x, y, and z, in the set (not necessarily distinct), 
(x*y)*z = x*(y*z).
2. Identity. There is an element, e, in the set, such that for any x in the set, e*x = x = 
x*e. (For addition of integers, the identity is 0; for addition modulo n, the identity is 
0; for translations of the plane, it is the “identity” translation that leaves every point 
fixed; for matrices under multiplication, it is the “identity” matrix with 1 s on the 
diagonal and 0s elsewhere.)
3. Inverse. For each element x in the set, there is an element y  in the set such that x*y = 
e=y*x.
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A fourth (or zeroth) axiom, closure, is built into the requirements o f  a binary operation: 
that the combination o f two elements gives an element that still lies in the set. It should 
be pointed out that commutativity is not one o f  the axioms, and it is not hard to see that 
matrix multiplication is not commutative.
Any set and operation that together satisfy these axioms is said to be a group. W hen the 
operation is also commutative, the group is said to be Abelian. The advantage o f  the 
axiomatic approach is that any result (i.e., theorem) that can be proved on the basis o f  the 
axioms alone necessarily applies to all four examples and also to any other mathematical 
system that satisfies the axioms.
The important results in group theory depend upon a collection o f  related concepts. A 
subgroup, for example, is a subset o f  a group, which is itself a group under the group’s 
operation. The role o f  structure again returns to the fore with the concept o f 
isomorphism. On a high level, the group axioms define an algebraic structure that applies 
to a broad collection o f mathematical systems. The axioms create the rudimentary 
structure to which all groups must conform. At a lower level, every specific group is a 
mathematical system with its own internal structure. An important abstraction can occur 
when two groups appear in different settings and yet are “essentially the same.” The 
intuitive idea is that two groups are structurally the same, or isomorphic, if  they differ 
only in the names o f  their elements and operation. Demonstrating that two groups are 
isomorphic requires finding a renaming that preserves the group operation. Such a 
renaming, which is essentially a function that takes elements from one group to the other, 
is called an isomorphism.
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It should be pointed out that the above mathematical systems and other standard examples 
may not be familiar to undergraduates in a first course in abstract algebra. Thus, some o f 
the student’s energy must be spent trying to build some familiarity with the examples. 
Taken together, these examples and the concepts o f  group, subgroup, and isomorphism 
constitute the fundamental concepts o f group theory for the purpose o f this study.
I distinguish as “advanced concepts o f group theory” those concepts that require the 
construction o f  new objects. Given a subgroup H, one can create a left coset o f  the 
subgroup by multiplying an element a o f  the group on the left by each o f the elements in 
the subgroup. The coset is denoted aH. W hen the set o f  left cosets forms a group by 
extending the group operation to the cosets, the resulting group is called a quotient group, 
and the subgroup that gave rise to the cosets is said to be normal.
Other important mathematical structures are rings and fields. In ring theory, there are 
two operations, typically called multiplication and addition. Examples are the arithm etic 
o f  integers, o f  matrices, and o f polynomials in one variable with integer coefficients. A 
field is essentially a ring in which multiplication is commutative and division is also 
possible, except, o f  course, division by zero. Examples are the rational numbers, the 
complex numbers, and the integers modulo p , where p  is prime.
The Big Ideas of Abstract Algebra
A  course in abstract algebra is the place where students might extract common features 
from the many mathematical systems that they have used in previous mathematics 
courses, such as calculus, linear algebra, and school algebra. Students have opportunities 
to develop deeper understandings o f  concepts such as identity, inverse, equivalence, and 
function. W hat is shared, for example, by the identity for multiplication o f real numbers,
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the identity matrix, and the identity function? W hat is the common idea behind the 
inverse o f a function, the inverse o f a matrix, and the multiplicative inverse o f a number? 
In abstract algebra, students can also learn about the importance o f  precise language in 
mathematics and about the role o f definitions in supporting such precision. Mathematics 
is also about noticing when things are the same and being able to describe how they are 
different. In abstract algebra, this naive notion o f  “sameness” becomes formalized in the 
concept o f isomorphism.
Thus, it is clear that the concepts in abstract algebra provide guiding themes, principles, 
and sensibilities that pervade mathematics. It is not so clear, however, what sequence o f 
topics from abstract algebra can be constructed to help students recognize and appreciate 
such themes. And, in particular, it is not clear whether an abstract algebra course 
intended for mathematics majors, as it is typically taught, can serve such a role.
W hen the population o f students in an abstract algebra course includes future teachers 
(which may be almost always), these big ideas, such as inverse and identity, are 
particularly important because they can help teachers connect advanced mathematics with 
high school mathematics in ways that can strengthen and deepen their understandings o f 
the mathematics they will teach. O f course, it is also crucial that future teachers are able 
to employ those new understandings in their teaching, but that concern takes us beyond 
the scope o f  this study.
Conceptualizing the Study
In the previous sections, I provide a rationale for an investigation o f student learning in 
abstract algebra and a short description o f  what abstract algebra is. The remainder o f  this
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chapter describes how I arrived at this particular study and presents the research 
questions.
M y interest in the teaching and learning o f abstract algebra stems from my own 
experiences as a student and as an instructor. I found the subject quite difficult myself, 
both as an undergraduate and as a graduate student in mathematics. W hen I first taught 
abstract algebra to undergraduate mathematics majors at a state college, my hope was to 
provide more conceptual and concrete support for the students than I had been given. 
Upon beginning m y graduate program in mathematics education, I imagined several 
possible thesis topics, but foremost among these was learning in abstract algebra. In 
particular, I was interested in exploring students’ conceptual understandings.
Some o f  the literature on the learning o f advanced undergraduate mathematics focuses on 
students’ difficulties writing proofs (e.g., Moore, 1994; Hart, 1994). While this literature 
confirms that structuring, organizing, and writing proofs presents significant difficulties 
for many undergraduates, there are also significant obstacles in the concepts themselves 
(Dubinsky et al., 1994).
As I began to conceptualize this study, I had an opportunity, as part o f  a graduate course 
in mathematics education, to interview an undergraduate abstract algebra student on 
several abstract algebra tasks. That experience and subsequent pilot activity not only 
served to develop m y interviewing skills but also confirmed that students’ conceptual 
understandings in abstract algebra was a researchable area in the sense that the subtleties 
in students’ thinking seemed interesting and worth exploring.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
Research Questions
In investigating students’ understandings o f  advanced mathematics, my intent was to 
begin building a theory: a representation o f student’s understandings, or, alternatively, an 
understanding o f students’ representations. The central theoretical construct for this 
study was the notion o f a concept image (Tall & Vinner, 1981), which denotes the entire 
cognitive structure associated with a concept, including examples, representations, 
processes, and the relationships among them. The concept image is distinguished from a 
concept definition, which is a form o f words used to specify a concept, and which I take 
to be part o f  the concept image. It is helpful to imagine a concept image as a network in 
which the links indicate relationships between ideas. The metaphor o f a conceptual 
network accommodates the perspective that new knowledge builds on prior 
understandings, and so I investigated not only students’ understandings in group theory 
but also how preliminary mathematical understandings were involved in students’ 
learning.
My interest in characterizing students’ understandings led ultimately to the following 
research questions:
•  What are the prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images 
as they are learning the fundamental ideas o f  group, subgroup, and isomorphism?
• What are the prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images 
as they are learning the more advanced ideas o f homomorphism, coset, and quotient 
group?
•  How do students’ understandings o f  prior mathematics come into play as they are 
learning elementary group theory?
The context for the study was a nontraditional class in which the instruction was based
largely on problem sets that the students completed in collaborative groups o f  three or
four students. In such a setting, and without a comparison group, it was not possible to
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determine the causes o f  many o f the events. The goal o f this study was not comparison, 
however, but rather to begin building a theory supported by a thick description o f the 
issues that students grappled w ith around the mathematical content o f  elementary group 
theory while they were in the process o f  learning.
The following chapter reviews the relevant literature on the teaching and learning o f abstract 
algebra. Chapter 3 sets forth the conceptual and analytical framework that guided this 
study. Chapter 4 describes the context and methodology. Chapters 5 through 7 address 
the research questions in turn. And chapter 8  provides conclusions and implications.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
To synthesize the research on the teaching and learning of abstract algebra, it is useful to 
consider first two categories: those articles connected with Dubinsky’s framework for 
research and curriculum development (Asiala et al., 1996) and those that are not. These 
sections are followed by a brief discussion of research on the learning o f proof. To 
complement the educational research, I include discussion o f historical literature 
describing the genesis and evolution of algebra and also some o f the literature that 
provides suggestions for curriculum or instruction. Much o f this literature takes a 
negative tone, describing difficulties, errors, obstacles, and the ways in which student 
understanding falls short o f expert understanding. Clearly, the field could benefit from 
an approach that begins organically, with students’ ways of thinking.
Dubinskv’s Framework
The work o f Dubinsky and his colleagues is based on a well-articulated framework for 
research and curriculum development in undergraduate mathematics education (Asiala et 
al., 1996), which grows largely from Dubinsky’s (1991) elaboration o f Piaget’s notion of 
reflective abstraction. The core o f framework is the theoretical perspective that all 
mathematical conceptions can be understood as actions, processes, objects, or schemas 
(hence the acronym APOS). The categories may be seen as an extension of the 
process/object distinction that is well developed in the literature and that is discussed in
17
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detail in chapter 3. It is important to keep in mind that the theoretical perspective 
provides ways to categorize students’ thinking about mathematical concepts, not 
categories for the concepts themselves. Thus, one student may have an action conception 
o f coset and another a process conception. The categories are roughly developmental, 
with each new conception requiring new mental constructions.
According to Dubinsky’s theory, an action conception is different from a process 
conception in that in the former, the student is particularly focused on going through 
specific procedural steps and is unable to talk clearly about one o f the steps until all the 
previous steps have been carried out. An action conception can become a process 
conception through a mental construction called interiorization. Then, the student can 
think about the result o f the process without actually having done it and, in particular, can 
imagine reversing the process. A student who has an object conception of a 
mathematical idea can imagine it as a totality and, in particular, can act on it with higher- 
level actions or processes. Processes can be encapsulated into objects, and it is 
sometimes useful that the student be able to de-encapsulate an object to focus on the 
underlying process. Schemas are coordinated collections of actions, processes, objects, 
and other schemas, which can themselves be encapsulated into objects.
Dubinsky’s research and development framework consists o f three activities: theoretical 
analysis, design and implementation o f instruction, and observation and evaluation o f the 
implemented instruction. The theoretical analysis describes the actions, processes, 
objects, and schemas that students might construct in order to develop an understanding 
of the target concepts. Instructional activities are designed specifically to help students 
make the constructions identified in the theoretical analysis and typically include
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computer activities using the programming language ISETL (Interactive Set Language), 
whose syntax closely resembles mathematical notation. Evaluation consists largely of 
interviews and written exams to determine to what extent students made the desired 
constructions. The framework is cyclical in that observation and evaluation inform 
revisions in the theoretical perspective, which informs subsequent instructional design, 
and so on. The research papers primarily report the results o f a particular 
implementation, focusing primarily on characterizing the action, process, and object 
conceptions of students, reporting the numbers o f students in each category, and, 
sometimes, comparing results with classes that had received traditional instruction.
On the learning of abstract algebra, the evaluation o f the first round of curriculum 
development is reported in a research article (Dubinsky et al., 1994) and the resulting 
second version o f the curriculum has been published (Dubinsky & Leron, 1994). 
Dubinsky et al. conclude, not surprisingly, that many of the concepts, especially coset 
and quotient group, seem quite difficult for students, and they offer some explanations. 
They discuss a number o f cognitive obstacles that are common among beginning abstract 
algebra students. Regarding the group concept, the idea o f an abstract binary operation 
poses a significant obstacle for students, who often think of a group as a set and ignore 
the operation. Students are often unable to correctly answer questions about cosets in and 
quotients of noncyclic groups, and they often confuse normality with commutativity. 
Although some o f the students can perform the calculations required for listing the 
elements in a coset, they have difficulty thinking of cosets as objects that can themselves 
be manipulated. It may seem obvious that a set is an object, but sets are often described 
by a process that lists all elements or that would eventually list any element. In this way
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a set is a process. A set is not a full-fledged object in the mind o f the student until the 
student can imagine a set as an element of another set. The researchers isolate certain 
prerequisites for success in abstract algebra, including understanding o f functions as both 
processes and objects.
This research has been criticized by Bum (1996), who characterizes Dubinsky et al. 
(1994) as a report o f a novel teaching procedure using the computer and particular 
activities. He suggests that the fundamental concepts o f group theory may be not group, 
subgroup, coset, and normality, but rather closure, associativity, identity, inverse, 
function, and set. Bum further points out that some o f the interview excerpts that were 
regarded as misconceptions may actually reveal insight on the part o f the student (e.g., 
closure is enough to determine whether a subset o f a finite group is a subgroup). 
Furthermore, quotient groups are quite easy to see in some situations (e.g., even and odd 
integers, rotation and reflection in the transformations of the plane). It should not be 
surprising, Bum suggests, that the concepts in abstract algebra can be described in the 
language o f sets and functions, but that may be twentieth century analysis imposed on 
nineteenth century ideas. (I would point out that in order to implement the concepts in 
ISETL, it is necessary to view them as sets and functions.) Finally, he proposes that 
automorphisms (specifically permutations and symmetries) may be more profitably 
viewed as the fundamental concepts of group theory.
Dubinsky et al. (1997) respond by reaffirming that their previous article is not a report of 
a novel teaching procedure but an attempt to contribute to knowledge of how students 
understand certain concepts in group theory. Regarding Burns’ unsupported claims about
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the ease with which students might understand certain instances o f quotient group or 
permutation, they suggest that Bums conduct a study and report on it.
The second iteration of research and curriculum development using the APOS framework 
to study the learning o f abstract algebra is reported in a collection of articles (Asiala, 
Brown, Kleiman, & Mathews, 1998; Asiala, Dubinsky, Mathews, Morics, & Oktac,
1997; Brown, DeVries, Dubinsky, & Thomas, 1997; see Clark et al., 1997, for an 
overview). The general conclusion of these articles is that the authors’ initial 
epistemological analyses of the various topics are supported by the data, in the sense that 
the analyses describe the important processes, objects, and schemas that students need to 
construct in order to leam the those topics. The authors then typically offer refinements 
o f the epistemological analyses and later offer pedagogical suggestions. Some specific 
conclusions include the suggestion that the crucial idea in calculating a quotient group 
may be constructing the binary operation, the importance o f being able to choose 
appropriately between two binary operations defined on a set (e.g., multiplication and 
addition), and specific misconceptions such as the fact that some students believe Zn is a 
subgroup o f Z.
Student Thinking
Although the literature on the learning of abstract algebra contains a small number of 
research articles, the list of misconceptions identified is not short. Selden and Selden 
(1978) alone list thirteen types o f errors, many o f which might occur in any 
undergraduate mathematics course. Some commonly found misconceptions include 
confusion about the group operation, particularly when the problem involves more than
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one group (Hart, 1994; Selden & Selden, 1978), believing that the only solution to the 
equation x = x ' 1 was the identity element (Hazzan, 1994), using techniques from the real 
numbers in the abstract setting (Selden & Selden, 1978; Hazzan, 1994, 1999), confusing 
a theorem and its converse (Selden & Selden, 1978; Hazzan, 1994; Hazzan & Leron, 
1996), and difficulty managing the distinction between set and element (Hazzan, 1999; 
Selden & Selden, 1978). This last distinction is further complicated by the fact that the 
elements o f the quotient group are themselves sets.
Some of the above misconceptions are tied to the use o f mathematical notation. Selden 
and Selden (1978) found, for example, that students often use the same symbol for two 
different things, and, conversely, they often assume things are distinct because they have 
different names. Hazzan (1994) suggests, regarding the use o f different letters in the 
axiom for inverses, that it is easier to think o f a relation between two different objects 
than of an object with itself.
Other difficulties seem to be tied to other sorts of representations. As part o f a study on 
visual and analytic thinking, Zazkis and Dubinsky (1996) investigated abstract algebra 
students’ ability to represent the elements of D4, the group o f symmetries of the square 
and then to find the product o f two elements. This task can be approached either 
“visually,” using a geometric representation, or “analytically,” using permutation 
representations. They found that most students used a combination of these approaches, 
suggesting that the dichotomy between visual and analytic thinkers may be false. They 
propose an alternative model that assumes visual and analytic thinking to be mutually 
dependent in mathematical problem solving.
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The study also produced some unexpected mathematical results (Zazkis & Dubinsky, 
1996). Eight o f ten students found as they translated between the geometric and 
permutation representations that the groups were not isomorphic, causing Zazkis and 
Dubinsky to conclude that the dihedral groups such as D4 are not groups until some 
structure is imposed on them in the sense that the relationship between the group 
operations in the two representations must be specified appropriately. By careful analysis 
of the ways to translate from the geometric to the permutation representation, they found 
that students could focus on the square and where its vertices traveled (an object 
interpretation) or on the four positions and which vertices they contained after the 
transformation (a position interpretation). In computing the product o f two 
transformation symmetries in the geometric representation, students could imagine either 
that the axes describing the transformations were fixed (a global interpretation) or that 
they traveled with the square (a local interpretation). Choosing either the object/global or 
the position/local pair of interpretations results in the desired isomorphism between the 
geometric and permutation representations. Most students, however, were drawn to the 
position/global pair or the object/local pair, which caused the groups to be anti­
isomorphic, in the sense that the order of multiplication is reversed. Zazkis and Dubinsky 
suggest that the embedding of dihedral groups in permutation groups deserves some 
careful attention in instruction.,
Hannah (2000) pursued Zazkis and Dubinsky’s ideas through a teaching experiment. 
Expecting that students would prefer the global interpretation, he encouraged the object 
interpretation by using additional labels to separate the object from the position. About 
half the students still preferred the position interpretation, although one of these students
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also chose the local interpretation, thus leading to an isomorphism between the geometric 
and permutation representations. In the second trial o f the teaching experiment, after 
making some additional adjustments in his notation to make the object and frame of 
reference more salient, all but one student chose consistent interpretations. Hannah also 
found that permutation notation can lead to the same local/global interpretational issues.
Leron, Hazzan, and Zazkis (1995) discuss the development o f the concept o f group 
isomorphism. Some o f the difficulties, they suggest, may actually be with quantification. 
They note that the naive concept o f isomorphism (same group with the names changed) is 
a good start, but the object isomorphism is defined directionally, with the two groups 
playing different roles, and requires a sophisticated concept o f function. In other words, 
although there is symmetry in the statement that two groups are isomorphic, actually 
finding an isomorphism requires choosing one group as the source (the domain o f a 
function) and the other as the target. When trying to construct an isomorphism between 
two groups, they note that students hope for a canonical (or at least obvious) 
isomorphism and get stuck when there is a choice.
Hazzan and Leron (1996) argue that the standard formulation o f Lagrange’s theorem 
hides its nature and its deep meaning. The standard formulation is:
Let G be a finite group. If H  is a subgroup o f G, then o(H) divides o(G).
The notation o(G) signifies the order of the group , 1 that is, the number of elements in it. 
The authors suggest that the contrapositive of the theorem includes explicit quantifiers 
that make its nature as a nonexistence theorem clearer and reveal its deep meaning:
1 This is Hazzan and Leron’s notation. In the class that provided the context for the present study, we used 
the alternative notation |G| to denote the order of a group G.
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Contrapositive: If k does not divide o(G), then there does not exist a subgroup of
order k.
Deep meaning: If there exists a subgroup o f order k, then k divides o(G).
This analysis of Lagrange’s theorem arose in response to data collected on the question, 
“Is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6 ?” Out o f 113 students, 73 gave incorrect answers. O f these, 20 
gave some version of, “Yes, by Lagrange’s theorem, because 3 divides 6 .” Hazzan and 
Leron suggest that students’ response may be due to a coping mechanism and may not 
really reflect thinking about the theorem and the two groups. The authors explore issues 
of coping more fully elsewhere (Leron & Hazzan, 1997).
In a broader study o f learning in abstract algebra, Hazzan (1999) found that students 
tended to reduce the abstraction level in order to cope with the task at hand. She 
organized her results according to three ways o f looking at the level o f abstraction. 
Regarding abstraction level as the quality of the relationships between the object of 
thought and the thinking person, she found that students tend to make the unfamiliar 
familiar by basing their argument, for example, on numbers and number operations. 
Regarding abstraction level as a reflection o f the process/object duality, she found that 
students tend to personalize formal expressions and logical arguments by using first- 
person language and that they tend to engage a well-rehearsed procedure rather than rely 
on theoretical knowledge. Regarding abstraction level as the degree o f complexity of the 
concept of thought, she found that students sometimes reduce abstraction level by 
replacing a set with one of its elements.
Hirsh (1981) describes an abstract algebra course for preservice secondary school 
teachers that included a “didactical shadow” seminar in which the mathematical concepts 
were followed closely by readings and discussions on teaching K-12 mathematics. These
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readings were intended to encourage preservice teachers to see abstract algebra as 
relevant in their future as secondary school teachers. The study found significant 
improvement in the experimental group in the students’ understanding of the real number 
system and nonsignificant improvement in the control group. On several affective 
measures, no significant differences between groups were found. The most important 
result, Hirsch suggests, was that the study demonstrated the feasibility of such a course.
Proof
As stated in chapter 1, mathematical proof is one o f the defining characteristics of 
advanced mathematical thinking, and proof plays a central role in the learning of abstract 
algebra. Because the role o f proof did not play a central role in this study, this section 
briefly reviews literature that was helpful in framing the study.
One o f the leading expositors o f the role of proof in mathematics education is Gila Hanna 
(1991, 1995). She suggests that constructivist theories have led to a mistaken view of the 
teacher as playing a passive role and o f proof as being unimportant. She argues for 
recognizing and promoting proof in the mathematics curriculum as a key tool for 
promoting understanding. The research on the role o f proof in mathematics education is 
thin and confused by the typical four-year separation between proof in high school 
geometry and proof in undergraduate mathematics.
Hart (1986, 1994) describes a research study in which twenty-nine college mathematics 
majors, taking different abstract algebra courses from beginning undergraduate to 
beginning graduate, were asked to write six standard abstract algebra proofs, each 
“doable in 15 minutes or less.” On the basis o f their performance on three criterion
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proofs, students were classified into four levels o f conceptual understanding. Analysis of 
errors made, processes used, correctness o f proofs, and student assessment o f tasks 
suggested that the journey from novice to expert in a content domain may be an irregular 
and unstable developmental process, rather than the dichotomy often assumed in the 
literature.
In a mathematics course called Introduction to Higher Mathematics, Moore (1990, 1994) 
found seven major sources of student difficulties in learning to do proofs, including 
inability to state the definitions, inadequate concept images, inability to use the definition 
to structure a proof, inability or unwillingness to generate examples, and difficulty with 
mathematical language and notation. He suggests that the concept image/concept 
definition dichotomy was not sufficient to explain his results and suggested the term 
concept usage to discuss how students used definitions to generate and use examples, 
applied definitions within proofs, and used definitions to structure proofs. Although in 
Moore’s work this construct more accurately describes students’ use of concept 
definitions rather than of concepts, thinking about concept usage proved helpful in this 
study in identifying components and characteristics o f students’ concept images, as 
described below.
Taken together, these articles support the idea o f investigating not only students’ 
understandings of concepts but also their personal definitions o f those concepts. Proof, 
after all, involves reasoning about concepts, which must be meaningful to the students in 
order to support such reasoning.
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History
Sfard (1995) gives a detailed a description o f the historical development of algebra with 
strong connections to the teaching and learning o f both school and abstract algebra, 
providing compelling support for the claim that historical-critical and psychogenetic 
studies should converge (Piaget & Garcia, 1989, p. 108). According to Sfard, group 
theory arose out o f the work o f Lagrange and Ruffini, who noticed that methods of 
solving polynomial equations depended on permutations o f the roots. Soon permutations 
and then, with Cauchy, operations on those permutations became objects o f attention. 
Galois defined the notion of a group by declaring interest in the structure imposed on the 
permutations by the so-called substitutions. Cayley freed the concept from any 
commitment as to the nature o f the elements, focusing instead on the manipulations.
With the invention of the concept o f group, the seeds had been planted for algebra to 
become a science o f abstract structures.
Kleiner (1986) describes four lines o f inquiry that coalesced toward the end o f the 
nineteenth century to form the area we now call abstract algebra. First, the techniques 
from classical algebra for solving polynomial equations led to the permutation groups. 
Second, questions in number theory led to the finite Abelian groups. Third, attempts to 
unify and organize geometry led to transformation groups. Finally, roots in analysis led 
to investigation o f continuous transformation groups. One response to this account is to 
use historically important problems to provide pedagogical and intellectual motivation in 
the teaching o f abstract algebra (see Kleiner, 1995).
Nicholson’s (1993) account o f the slow historical development o f the concept of quotient 
group can provide additional sources for cognitive roots to be exploited. She suggests
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several obstacles that were overcome by the mathematics community during the 
development of this concept. First, the community needed an abstract concept of group 
that was not dependent on any particular representation. Second, the community needed 
the concept o f equivalence (modulo a subgroup). Finally (and most importantly), the 
community needed to realize that the elements o f the quotient group are not like the 
elements o f original group, but are equivalence classes— sets. All o f these historical 
developments provide clues about what might be the issues for students learning the 
subject. In this study, I paid attention in particular to the ways in which students develop 
an abstract concept o f group and the sense in which they consider sets to be elements of 
quotient group.
Teaching Suggestions
I close the review o f the literature with a discussion o f articles that informed the 
development o f the course, that provide additional rationale for investigating learning in 
abstract algebra, and that collectively support the decision to investigate learning in a 
nontraditional course.
In “An Abstract Algebra Story,” Leron and Dubinsky (1995) condense the principles and 
research behind their textbook (Dubinsky & Leron, 1994) into a dialogue with an 
“idealized reader.” They begin by asserting that "'The teaching o f  abstract algebra is a 
disaster, and this remains true almost independently o f  the quality o f  the lectures'’
(p. 227). They suggest that the ISETL computer activities provide an experiential basis 
for the abstractions that follow, asserting that “if  the students are asked to construct the
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group concept on the computer (by programming it), there is a good chance that a parallel 
construction will occur in their mind” (p. 230).
In Dubinsky and Leron’s approach, before seeing the concept o f quotient group, the 
students have already explored a construct they call GmodH, which is the set o f cosets in 
G of a subgroup H, independent o f whether H  is normal, an approach consistent with that 
recommended by Benson and Richey (1994). Leron and Dubinsky acknowledge that the 
notation G mo A ll is unorthodox, particularly when H  is not normal, but defend their 
approach by noting that students realize they need to look into the properties o f H  that 
make GmodH  a group and come to appreciate that the main issue is closure.
Furthermore,
by building on the material that the students bring up, the instructor is able to 
state most naturally and smoothly the definition of a normal subgroup, the 
theorem that when H  is normal then GmodH forms a group, and the (now very 
easy) proof o f this theorem. Normality is naturally introduced here as the 
condition which insures that GmodH be a group, and the definition most often 
discovered by students is aH = Ha for all a e G .  Except for the new name, the 
students can really feel that the instructor merely summarizes what they have 
found in their investigations. In the session that follows, the instructor makes the 
final ties with the “standard” approach by explaining that when H  is normal,
GmodH is commonly denoted G/H, and is called the quotient group o f G modulo 
H  and coset product is commonly defined by the formula (Ha)(Hb) = H(ab).
(p. 238)
Freedman (1983) also rejects the lecture method, quoting Halmos, “A good lecture is 
usually systematic, complete, precise— and dull; it is a bad teaching instrument” (p. 631) 
and Moise, “It is simplistic to suppose that people remember what they are told and 
understand the things that are explained to them clearly” (p. 631). He discusses an 
approach he used in London in which students in a small seminar were each required to 
read and lecture on some original papers in abstract algebra. Although this approach may
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seem quite radical to instructors in the United States, he claims that the students worked 
together and were quite successful.
In response to the difficulties students usually have with Lagrange’s theorem, Johnson 
(1983) notes that the traditional proof involves cosets and equivalence relations, both of 
which are new concepts to most students. As Lagrange’s theorem is usually used to 
prove the more intuitive theorem that the order o f an element divides the order of the 
group, Johnson suggests proving the latter result first, for it follows quite naturally from 
the decomposition o f a permutation into disjoint cycles. O f course, this approach 
assumes the students are familiar with permutation groups, and such an assumption might 
be unwarranted.
Holton and Wenzel (1993) describe an abstract algebra course in which Lagrange’s 
theorem is preceded by cooperative learning via examples. Rejecting the traditional 
approach o f “exposition, exhortation and regurgitation” (p. 883), they found that students 
were able to conjecture the theorem and many o f the necessary lemmas. Although it was 
not a formal research study, the description o f the classroom environment was 
compelling.
Conclusion
This review has shown that although there have been few published research studies on 
the learning of abstract algebra, there is a theoretical and empirical base on which to 
build. To complement the work embedded in the APOS framework, this study is more 
exploratory in nature, taking a broader view o f the ways o f thinking that students exhibit
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while trying to make sense o f the concepts in the course. The next chapter describes the 
conceptual and analytical framework designed to support such an approach.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE
This chapter sets forth the conceptual perspective that guided this study and that 
contributed to the design o f the analytical framework. Fundamentally, learning is seen as 
a process o f making sense o f experience and o f building understanding, a viewpoint that 
is consistent with various forms of constructivism. The central theoretical construct is the 
notion of a concept image (Tall & Vinner, 1981). The concept image is contrasted with 
the concept’s definition, which leads to a discussion o f the role of definitions in 
mathematics, in thinking, and in learning. The chapter continues with a discussion of 
other important constructs that are useful in describing the growth and character of 
concept images, particularly in advanced mathematical thinking, including abstraction 
and generalization and the distinction between process and object conceptions of 
mathematical ideas. The chapter also includes a discussion o f the role o f metaphor in 
mathematical thinking, with particular attention to thinking in abstract algebra. Next, I 
discuss issues o f naming and notation, setting the stage for a discussion of semiotics, 
which provides much of the analytical and theoretical backing for the study. These 
various theoretical constructs are then brought together at the end of the chapter in an 
analytical framework that undergirded the analysis of the data.
33
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Learning with Understanding
This study was based upon the following fundamental theoretical assumptions that are 
consistent with a large body o f work in cognitive science, psychology, and mathematics 
education (see, in particular, Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999; Hiebert & Carpenter, 
1992). First, human beings are conceptualizers in that they try to make sense of their 
percepts by developing concepts. People try to understand their experiences by 
organizing them, abstracting from them, creating categories, making connections, 
particularly with prior knowledge, and making distinctions. In high school and college 
mathematics, for example, students create a category called “function” by abstracting the 
common features o f the many mathematical creatures called “function” in their 
experience. These abstracted features are not necessarily the properties that are isolated 
in the formal mathematical definition, as is elaborated below.
Second, knowledge is represented internally in the mind. People create internal 
representations for objects, processes, properties, and relationships; for images, sounds, 
smells, sensations, and impressions; and also for categories and networks of these. These 
mental representations do not match an external world but rather fit one’s experience 
with some degree o f viability (von Glasersfeld, 1990). Because mental representations 
are not observable, discussions o f how ideas are represented in someone’s head must be 
based largely on inference. Such inferences can be facilitated by building and testing 
models o f individual understanding, as is elaborated below. A fundamental goal of 
research in the psychology of learning is to understand mental representations of ideas, 
by building models, describing their features, and so on, based on observation of learning 
situations. It is not necessary that the models match the underlying neural processes
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(Kosslyn & Hatfield, 1984). Rather, the goal is that models fit the observations with 
some degree o f viability, particularly with regard to explanation and prediction. In order 
to build such models, it is reasonable to assume that the external entity being represented 
influences and constrains the internal representation. In mathematics, these external 
entities are often themselves representations, such as symbols or diagrams, because 
mathematical ideas are accessible only through their representations (Duvall, 1999; see 
also Pimm, 1995, p. 119).
Third, internal representations can be connected to one another in useful and hence 
meaningful ways. Successful learning may be described as learning with understanding, 
where understanding is characterized by connectivity. While in the process of learning, 
connections are made internally in the mind of the learner and over time the concepts, 
processes, properties, examples, and the connections among them grow to form cognitive 
structures that might be described as networks. In general, the more connections, the 
more intricate and encompassing are the networks, and the deeper are the understandings. 
In this study, individual conceptual understandings are described via the term concept 
image, which denotes the entire cognitive structure that a particular individual associates 
with a particular concept, as elaborated below. In considering the notion of a concept 
image, it is important to contemplate not only a concept’s structure and connections to 
other concepts but also the boundaries that distinguish the concept from related ideas.
Concept images and other cognitive structures are actively built up over time through 
experience and through active reflection on that experience. The structures, of course, 
depend heavily upon prior experience and also upon the nature and extent o f the 
reflection. Thus, in response to an experience, the actual constructions are personal and
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idiosyncratic, which implies that learning and knowing, too, are personal. It is for these 
reasons that phrases such as “construct personal meaning” or “construct knowledge” are 
helpful in describing the learning process. This is not to say that all conceptual structures 
are equal. Some conceptual structures are particularly weak or fragile or lack long-term 
viability in light of future learning goals. Other structures are strong and persistent.
Some conceptual structures are unproductive and fade as a result. Other structures are 
productive and will support and promote future learning. And, of course, when measured 
against established knowledge, sometimes conceptual structures contain ideas that are 
incorrect.
The real quandary lies with strong, productive, but faulty structures with incorrect 
ideas— often called misconceptions. Independent of whether these are called knowledge, 
such structures are personal conceptions that are held with conviction and are based upon 
some reasoning, however incomplete or fallacious.
Piaget describes two mechanisms by which a subject makes sense of experience: 
assimilation and accommodation (see, e.g., Steffe & Wiegel, 1996). When an experience 
fits within the existing cognitive structures, the experience has been assimilated. If, on 
the other hand, the experience evokes cognitive structures that do not fit with the 
experience, we say the learner has been disequilibrated. To re-equilibrate, the learner 
must reorganize his or her cognitive structures in light o f the new experience. It is this 
reorganization that Piaget calls accommodation.
The point is that new information is not simply received but is actively interpreted and 
filtered through prior experience. The experience must either make sense within the 
existing structure, in which case it is assimilated, or it must be “moderately novel” so that
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the experience creates a disequilibration, which can lead to an accommodation. The 
experience must be only moderately novel, for it must be sufficiently interpretable to 
create some cognitive conflict.
This balance between assimilation and accommodation makes the point that learning is 
sometimes difficult, and thus faultless communication is fiction. Papert suggests that, 
“Anything is easy if you can assimilate it to your collection o f models. If  you can’t, 
anything can be painfully difficult.... What an individual can learn and how he learns it 
depends on what models he has available” (cited in Steffe, 1990, p. 173).
Given the above positions about the nature o f learning, what then are the implications for 
the teaching o f mathematics? First, mathematics itself is a highly structured and 
organized domain. For mathematical knowledge to be useable (or perhaps even 
accessible), it must be organized in some way in the mind. It is clearly not possible to 
transmit whole structures from the mind o f the instructor to the mind o f the student. 
Rather, the student must do some constructing in his or her own mind. Second, it is 
impossible to know in advance what a person will learn from a given activity. Moreover, 
it is impossible to know with certainty what a person has learned, although an instructor 
or researcher can develop approximate models by asking questions. Explicit reflection, 
with the corrective mechanisms of the observations and responses o f the teacher and 
other students, is likely to lead to strong, viable, and productive connections.
Relationship with Constructivism
Many of the above positions are consistent with the assumptions of any of several forms 
of constructivism.
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What the various forms o f constructivism all share is the metaphor o f carpentry, 
architecture, of construction work. This is about the building up of structures 
from preexisting pieces, possibly specially shaped for the task. The metaphor 
describes understanding as the building o f mental structures, and the term 
restructuring, often used as a synonym for accommodation or conceptual change, 
contains this metaphor. (Ernest, 1996, p. 335)
A key expositor o f constructivism in mathematics education is Ernst von Glasersfeld, 
who proposes two principles for radical constructivism :
(a) Knowledge is not passively received but actively built up by the cognizing 
subject;
(b) the function o f cognition is adaptive and serves the organization o f the 
experiential world, not the discovery of ontological reality, (von Glasersfeld,
1989,p . 162)
Adopting only the first of these principles is to take a position that is sometimes called 
“weak constructivism” (Ernest, 1996) or “trivial constructivism” (von Glasersfeld, 1996). 
As Kilpatrick (1987) and others have noted, the first o f these principles is broadly 
accepted and “almost no mathematics educator alive and writing today claims to believe 
otherwise” (p. 7). The second principle, on the other hand, is much more controversial. 
My position is that whether one believes in an objective reality or Platonic ideals or 
denies both is, in a sense, immaterial because the student’s cognitive structures will 
match neither reality, nor an ideal, nor the teacher’s or researcher’s cognitive structures 
but instead will fit each o f these with varying degrees of viability. This is a particularly 
important point regarding the learning o f mathematics, since mathematical concepts exist 
not in the physical world but rather in abstractions from activity in the physical world and 
in the mind.
In order to understand what constructivism provides, it is important to recognize that the 
theories arose in part as a response to what was missing from behaviorism, which refused 
to posit any meaning behind student’s actions. Stimulus-response mechanisms were
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supposed to explain all behavior. Thus, constructivism was one of many efforts during 
the twentieth century to insert meaning and understanding into theories o f knowledge and 
learning. But not all behavior is meaningful.
Vinner (1997) describes some behaviors as pseudo-conceptual and pseudo-analytical 
because they may be taken as an indication that true (i.e., meaningful) conceptual and 
analytical processes have occurred when in fact the behavior is little more than simple 
association and imitation based on superficial similarity. For example, a calculus student 
who immediately responds “2 x” when hearing “x2” is not responding meaningfully if  the 
response is merely a verbalized association. In a calculus class, sometimes this simple 
association will yield the correct answer, and it is impossible to know, without asking 
further questions, to what extent the student can construct (or resurrect) some meaning 
for the response. Students are bound to have such associations. Vinner’s point is that in 
mathematics class, students should evaluate their associations consciously and critically, 
rather than merely verbalizing them in hopes o f getting “credit.” He argues that such 
verbalized associations should not be interpreted as indicating misconceptions or 
anything about a student’s cognitive structures, because cognitive structures are not 
involved.
Part o f the reason many students exhibit pseudo-conceptual behavior in mathematics is 
that they have found such behaviors to be viable in mathematics classes. Many students 
are successful in mathematics by relying almost exclusively on simple association and 
imitation, practicing problems that are just like the ones demonstrated in the textbook or 
by the teacher. Yet the severe filtering effect o f high school and college mathematics
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suggests that for most students, mere imitation fails at some point, in arithmetic, algebra, 
geometry, or calculus.
Thus, learning with understanding requires the development of cognitive structures in 
which the connections are not simple associations but relationships that are rich in 
meaning.2 Mathematical learning is rarely effective without such meaning, in the sense 
that it is unlikely to be durable, flexible, and supportive o f future learning. Mathematical 
learning that is based only on simple associations is not mathematics at all, not to 
mention that such skills are fragile and essentially useless today.
There are certain meta-cognitive behaviors that may support learning even if  they are 
simple associations. For example, my students learn that in response to their statements I 
am likely to say, “Okay. Why?” Some o f them internalize this behavior and begin to ask 
the question themselves. Deborah Ball’s class learned that she was likely to ask, “Are 
these all the solutions?” (Ball & Bass, in press; Suzuka, 2001). And many of Polya’s 
(1957) suggestions (Can I think of a similar problem? Can I simplify the problem?) can 
be seen in a similar light. The list of desirable behaviors also includes many so-called 
habits o f  mind  that describe successful mathematics knowing and learning. Cuoco, 
Goldenberg, and Mark (1996) provide a compelling list o f such habits, suggesting, for 
example, that students should leam to look for patterns, to watch for things that change, 
and also to watch for things that do not change.
2 When I asked my 19-month-old daughter, “When will you be two?” she responded, “November.” But 
how much meaning might have been behind her response? It is rather overwhelming how much conceptual 
knowledge she will need to construct before she will be able to give a detailed account of the meaning 
adults might take from her response.
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Thus, investigations o f mathematical understanding must look at behavior, because that is 
all that is observable, but should also address meaning, which requires probing beneath 
the simple associations to explore and make inferences about the meaning that students 
bring to the situation. My goal as a researcher is to understand how meaningful 
mathematical understanding is built and how meta-cognitive behavior can help.
Concept Image
The assumption that learners build up cognitive structures as they learn mathematics 
requires some terms to discuss these structures. I borrow a term from Tall and Vinner 
(1981):
We shall use the term concept image to describe the total cognitive stmcture that 
is associated with the concept, which includes all the mental pictures and 
associated properties and processes. It is built up over the years through 
experiences of all kinds, changing as the individual meets new stimuli and 
matures, (p. 152)
In this seminal paper, Tall and Vinner contrast the concept image with the term concept 
definition, which is a verbal description of the concept and about which I say more 
below. Because only part o f a cognitive structure is brought into consciousness during a 
particular task, the term evoked concept image refers to that portion o f the concept image 
that is evoked in response to a given task (Tall & Vinner, 1981).
The ideas o f concept image and evoked concept image are consistent with the work of 
Hart (1994), who found that when students approach mathematical tasks, “strategies are 
evoked [rather than chosen], based on the interaction between the task at hand and the 
current conceptual schema” (p. 61). Furthermore, he explained his results by suggesting 
that “processes, metacognition, and misconceptions are actually part o f one’s conceptual 
schema” (p. 62).
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Characterizing Concept Images
Concept images consist of examples and nonexamples, representations (symbolic, 
graphical, pictorial, verbal, enactive, iconic, etc.), definitions and alternative 
characterizations, properties, results, processes and objects, contexts, and impressions 
from previous experiences. Solving a mathematical problem (or any mathematical 
activity) involves recalling or reconstructing examples, representations, objects, or 
processes and establishing connections to other examples, representations, objects, or 
processes.
Concept images are not monolithic, for the various examples, properties, and 
representations play different roles. Michener (1978), for example, distinguishes among 
start-up examples, reference examples, model examples, and counterexamples. Some 
properties hold for all examples of the concept (e.g., all groups have an identity element). 
Other properties, on the other hand, are useful for categorizing examples (e.g., some 
groups are Abelian). For many concepts, there are also lists of key properties for 
describing examples (e.g., when making computations or deriving results about a group, 
it is useful to know the group’s cardinality, a set o f generators, or an alternative 
representation).
Because individuals are sometimes more able than at other times to make particular 
connections or to reconstruct particular examples, representations, or processes, concept 
images not static entities but rather are always in a state o f flux as one thinks about a 
concept, focusing and refocusing one’s thought on various aspects o f the concept image. 
Thus, it is useful to consider not only the components o f a student’s concept image but 
also the students’ concept usage (Moore, 1994), which in turn can provide
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characterizations o f a concept image. Concept images, for example, can be dominated by 
particular examples, representations, or ways of thinking. Dubinsky et al. (1994) 
observed, for example, that some students focused on the process o f computing a coset, 
whereas more successful students were also able to conceive of cosets as objects that 
themselves could be acted upon by other processes. Thus, concept images can be 
limiting when they inhibit an individual from making certain constructions or 
generalizations.
A concept image is built through all previous experiences with the concept. Experiences 
that are assimilated make sense within the evoked concept images. Experiences that 
require accommodation, on the other hand, cause structural changes in an individual’s 
concept images such as the construction o f a new concept, the creation o f new 
connections to other concepts, or the reorganization o f the connections within or among 
concepts
A key theme that emerged in this study is the complicated relationship between a concept 
and its name. I make only two points here and provide additional theoretical discussion 
below. First, a student’s concept image might not reasonably be described as a subset of 
a mathematician’s concept image. A student’s concept image may instead include 
misconceptions or may even be of a different character entirely. Second, the notion of 
concept image presents something like a chicken-and-egg problem: Which comes first, 
the concept or the name? One might begin with the name of a concept and then gradually 
build experiences underneath. On the other hand, as individuals gain experience, they 
build mental structures that are not necessarily part o f a named concept but at some point 
subsume those structures (and experiences) under a single name. In either scenario, at
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what point is there a concept image? The resolution o f the problem lies in the realization 
that the notion o f concept image is merely an analytical tool. People do not have concept 
images in the same sense that they have internal organs. Thus, in the analysis I try to 
maintain a notion o f concept image that is flexible enough to accommodate all of these 
possibilities.
Relationship to Schema
The term concept image shares some similarity with the term schema, used by Piaget and 
many researchers in both the constructivist and cognitive science traditions (see, e.g., 
Bransford et al., 1999; Piaget, 1970a). In the problem-solving literature, particularly in 
cognitive psychology, schemas are associated with problem types, and each schema has 
“slots” that are filled by the specific information provided in the problem. (For an 
overview of this literature see Mayer, 1992.) This view is problematic because it seems 
to suggest that learning consists of constructing a new schema for each new problem 
type.
For Dubinsky (1991), “A schema is a more or less coherent collection of objects and 
processes” (p. 102), which typically might be named as a concept. For example, “The 
concept o f group can be understood as a schema that consists o f three schemas: set, 
binary operation, and axiom (Brown et al., 1997, p. 192). For Skemp (1987), on the other 
hand, a schema is a suitably connected collection o f concepts.
For the purposes of this study, I was primarily concerned with the ways that students 
think about particular concepts. Thus, a concept image was associated with a particular 
concept, typically given by name. And with the term, I considered both the way it is 
structured and the ways it connects to other mathematical ideas.
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Concept Definition
As described above, Tall and Vinner (1981) introduced the term concept image to 
contrast with a concept definition, which is a form o f words used to specify a concept. 
This distinction serves as a reminder o f two simple ideas about students’ learning of 
mathematics. First, around any (mathematical) concept, students’ thinking is strongly 
influenced by the examples, nonexamples, representations, and contexts in which they 
have previously experienced the concept. Second, students do not typically employ (or 
naturally adopt) the mathematical habit o f consulting a formal definition in response to 
mathematical tasks but rather rely entirely on their concept image. Furthermore, Vinner 
(1992) found that even when students can recall a concept definition, the concept 
definition and the concept image might conflict or contradict one another. He calls this 
phenomenon compartmentalization, suggesting that the concept definition and the 
concept image are not evoked at the same time.
Perhaps because of the phenomenon o f compartmentalization, Vinner and Tall often 
separate the concept definition from the concept image, in describing cognitive structure 
(see, e.g., Vinner, 1992), and even go so far as to discuss a “concept definition image” to 
describe a concept image built up around the definition (Tall & Vinner, 1981). For 
successful mathematicians, however, a formal concept definition constitutes an integral 
part o f the cognitive structure built around that concept. The definition is routinely 
consulted and is well integrated into the rest of the concept image. Thus, for this study, a 
concept definition (personal, formal, or otherwise; see below) was considered a subset of 
a concept image. In the analysis, I explored the definitions that the students provided as a 
means of making inferences about the nature and connectivity o f their concept images.
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Theoretically, including the definition as part of the concept image is reasonable even 
when the definition is compartmentalized, because the term concept image implies 
nothing about the connectivity o f that structure. In fact, an individual’s concept image 
may include several essentially separate components, each evoked for different kinds of 
problems.
Definitions are not easily remembered verbatim. And in everyday life, a definition’s 
precise wording is often forgotten shortly after it is used, introduced, or consulted. When 
terms are introduced via a definition, the definition sometimes provides only scaffolding: 
When the construction is sufficiently complete, the scaffolding is taken away. To 
overcome this tendency, some instructors, in mathematics as well as other subjects, 
recommend that students memorize definitions. But it is not at all clear to what extent 
mathematicians or other experts recall rather than reconstruct definitions that they use in 
their professional work.
Because definitions are not easily remembered, it seems likely that they are constructed, 
and this is the point of view that informed this study. According to Tall and Vinner 
(1981), a student, when asked to define a concept, may respond with a person a l concept 
definition, which may not agree with a mathematically acccptable /orm a/ concept 
definition  but which instead might be described as an ad hoc description of his or her 
concept image. Thus, some parts o f the concept image function as definitions. For 
example, in Deborah Ball’s third grade classroom, Cassandra shows that six is even by 
pointing to the number line: “Six can’t be an odd number because this is {sh epo in ts to 
the number line, starting with zero) even, odd, even, odd, even, odd, even” (Ball & Bass, 
2000, p. 213). For her, the alternating pattern provides the definitions o f even and odd.
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For other students in the class, grouping by twos serves to provide the definitions. Still 
other students prefer to separate numbers into two groups. As another example, the 
literature on the learning of functions is replete with examples o f students defining 
function  as synonymous with formula  or equation (see, e.g., Vinner, 1992; Ferrini-Mundy 
& Graham, 1994). Students implicitly use personal concept definitions when asked to 
determine whether a particular thing is an example or a nonexample o f a concept. This is 
reasonable behavior in contexts— including many mathematical contexts—where precise 
definitions are not necessary for the task at hand, particularly when one’s concept image 
is sufficiently rich and robust.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, pp. 117-125) point out that from a cognitive point o f view, 
definition is not a matter o f giving a list of necessary and sufficient properties for a 
concept, although this is sometimes possible. Instead, concepts are defined by prototypes 
and by types o f relations to the prototypes, and there need be no fixed core of properties 
o f the prototypes that are shared by all instances o f the concept. Furthermore, some 
properties of a concept are not part o f the thing itself but are functional, purposive, or 
otherwise involve interaction with an instance of the concept. And finally, concepts are 
not fixed but can be systematically modified by metaphors and by hedges such as 
“technically” or “loosely speaking.”
In advanced mathematics, on the other hand, the definition of a concept becomes 
primary; the definition becomes the touchstone whose role is to ensure rigor (i.e., 
precision and consistency) within, between, and among concept images. Because this 
perspective on definitions is unusual outside of mathematics and the hard sciences, it 
represents a significant adjustment for students. The nature and role of definitions in
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mathematics did not play an explicit role in the course that is the subject of this study, but 
because these ideas inform my analysis, the topic deserves more attention here.
Types of Definitions
Linguists distinguish among several types of definitions (see Kemerling, 2001). A lexical 
definition  is an attempt to describe the meaning o f a word as it is commonly used. These 
are the kinds of definitions found in dictionaries, which, contrary to some beliefs, portray 
current usage not timeless truths, in full acknowledgement that languages evolve. A 
stipulative definition, on the other hand, specifies what a term is to denote. Such 
definitions are commonly found in technical, legal, and scholarly writing. From the 
viewpoint o f some writers, a stipulative definition freely assigns meaning to a new term 
and thus is intended to be the touchstone for all subsequent uses o f the term.
Nonetheless, the expositor is somewhat constrained by what the reader might be willing 
to accept. Thus, one common approach is to use a prec isin g  definition, which begins 
with a lexical definition o f a term, and then proposes to sharpen it by stipulating more 
narrow limits on its use.
Theoretical definitions are stipulative definitions made within the context of a broader 
intellectual framework. It is worth noting that the validity of a theory depends upon the 
definitions on which the theory is built. Thus, an appropriate interpretation of Newton’s 
laws o f motion, for example, depends upon imposing particular definitions o f terms such 
as mass, inertia, and force onto experience. For example, I presume that separating the 
concept of weight into mass and acceleration due to gravity was a major conceptual 
advance. When they were introduced, Newton’s particular set o f definitions provided an 
extremely elegant description of objects in motion. But one should recognize that the
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precise definitions were required for the creation o f the theory. It seems backward to 
teach students the theory only to conclude later that they have misconceptions about 
some o f the terms. Why not instead try to provide them with experiences that will help 
them see the importance o f precise definitions and the usefulness o f particular definitions 
and o f the distinctions among them?
Formal definitions in mathematics are, in a way, peculiar precising definitions—peculiar 
because o f the inflexible totality o f the implied precision (i.e., no more, no less) and 
because the formal definition sometimes bears little relationship to the term’s informal 
usage (e.g., “cycle”). This use o f definitions may be peculiar to mathematics and the 
hard sciences. In the social sciences, precise definitions are hard to find. Rather, an idea 
is given a name (often a common word), and then the researcher spends paragraphs 
describing what does and does not fit under the name.
In the analysis of the data in this study, I followed Vinner (1976) and restricted my 
attention to formal and lexical definitions to discuss the two primary roles that definitions 
play in mathematics and mathematics learning, but it is worth pointing out that in the 
above discussion I have presented stipulative definitions of several terms including 
concept image and stipulative definition itself. None of these, however, carries the 
precision of formal mathematical definitions. I believe that such precision is not possible 
because ideas about language and cognition are messy, fuzzy, and dependent upon the 
phenomena that the definitions are intended to describe. Mathematical ideas, on the other 
hand, are ideal— abstracted from phenomena and no longer dependent on the “real 
world,” at least in formal mathematical practice.
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Definitions in Mathematical Practice
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it means 
just what I choose it to mean— neither more nor less.” (Lewis Carroll, Through 
the Looking Glass)
In the words o f Polya (1957), the “definition of a term is a statement o f its meaning in 
other terms which are supposed to be well known” (p. 85). But this seemingly innocuous 
statement hides four crucial aspects o f the role of definitions in mathematics: the creation 
o f meaning, the need for undefined terms, the substitution criterion, and the use o f mental 
or physical models. These are discussed, in turn, below.
“The mathematician is not concerned with the current meaning o f his technical term s.... 
The mathematical definition creates the mathematical meaning” (Polya, 1957, p. 86).
This view o f definitions, embodied in the character o f Humpty Dumpty above, reached 
its height in the formalism of Russell, Whitehead, Peacock, Hilbert, and others, but in 
fact, has its early roots in Kant.3 Formalists maintain that mathematics involves 
manipulating meaningless symbols according to the formal rules o f the system, and the 
primary criterion is that the system is consistent. O f course, this point of view requires 
certain ontological and epistemological commitments or at least changes in perspective. 
Hamilton, for example, insisted that the symbols must stand for something ‘real’— if not 
material objects, then mental constructs (Kleiner, 1987). Nonetheless, some 
mathematicians were reluctant to adopt a formalist view. Graves, for example, on 
Hamilton’s invention o f the quaternions, responded, “I have not yet any clear view as to 
the extent to which we are at liberty to create imaginaries, and to endow them with 
supernatural properties” (quoted in Kleiner, 1987, p. 233). By 1844, however, less than a
3 This was the fundamental idea behind Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori statements. “Whereas, therefore, 
mathematical definitions make their concepts, in philosophical definitions concepts are only explained” 
(cited in Beth & Piaget, 1966, p. 13).
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year after Hamilton had published his work on quaternions, Graves and other 
mathematicians begin creating new mathematical structures almost without restraint.4
It is well known that in any mathematical system some terms must be taken as primitive, 
that is, left undefined, for the only alternatives are circular definitions or infinite regress, 
neither of which is logically tolerable. If  one accepts that definitions create the meaning 
of terms, where, then, do undefined terms acquire their meaning? Just as the axioms of 
natural numbers form implicit definitions of natural numbers (Beth & Piaget, 1966, p.
68), the axioms o f any mathematical system give implicit definitions o f the undefined 
terms o f that system. Couturat made this point by distinguishing between direct 
definition and definition by postulates, the latter applying not to a single notion but a 
system of notions (cited in Poincare, 1946, p. 453).
To adhere to the principle that all assumptions must be made explicit in the axioms and 
definitions, Pascal was apparently the first to put forward the criterion o f substitution: 
that the definition permits us “to substitute the definition in place of the defined” (cited in 
Beth & Piaget, 1966, p. 38). Thus, the substitution principle is a way of ensuring that 
every theorem and every proof could, in principle, be written using only the undefined 
terms, the axioms, and the laws of logic. Mariotti and Fischbein (1997) clarify the 
implications o f this view:
In the new theory, it is not possible to prove anything which was not already 
possible to prove in the old one. From the formal point o f view, a definition does 
not enlarge the power of the theory. A definition is rather a correct definition just 
because it can be eliminated, (p. 222)
4 This approach is not without its failures. There is one apocryphal story, for example, of a mathematician 
who proved all sorts of theorems based on a set of axioms that, it turned out, were satisfied only by the 
empty set. See Wilensky (1991, note 4) for a similar example.
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And although this extreme formalism is rarely carried out, the first substitution is a 
standard mathematical practice. In other words, when proving theorems about a newly 
defined mathematical concept, the standard approach is to replace the term by its 
definition. Polya (1957) calls this process “the elimination o f technical terms” by “going 
back to definitions” (p. 89).
I f  the axioms and the definitions are to be the source of meaning within a mathematical 
system, then the implication is that all proofs and formal reasoning should proceed from 
the axioms, definitions, and previously proven theorems. This is what is meant by 
mathematical rigor. Because physical and mental models o f the system might carry 
meaning that does not follow from the axioms and definitions, such models cannot be 
trusted and thus are inadmissible in proofs. The validity o f a proof is independent of the 
meaning of the descriptive terms. To emphasize this point, Hilbert once said, “One must 
be able to say at all times— instead o f points, straight lines, and planes— tables, chairs, 
and beer mugs” (Reid, 1986, p. 57). The implication is that no matter how the terms are 
interpreted, a counterexample will never be produced (Lakatos, 1976, p. 100). Taken to 
an extreme, the formalist approach identifies mathematics with metamathematics and 
with logic, resulting in a rather bleak picture:
The subject matter of metamathematics is an abstraction of mathematics in which 
mathematical theories are replaced by formal systems, proofs by certain 
sequences o f well-formed formulae, definitions by “abbreviatory devices” which 
are “theoretically dispensable” but “typographically convenient.” (Lakatos,
1976, p. .1, drawing on Church, Peano, Russell, Whitehead, and Pascal)
But even Russell (1938) admits:
It is a curious paradox, puzzling to the symbolic mind, that definitions, 
theoretically, are nothing but statements o f symbolic abbreviations, irrelevant to 
the reasoning and inserted only for practical convenience, while yet, in the
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development o f a subject, they always require a very large amount o f thought, 
and often embody some o f the greatest achievements o f analysis, (p. 63)
Thus, despite the formalism and the claim to disregard meaning, thinking and meaning 
remain crucial characteristics o f mathematical activity. It is true that the words are 
symbolic abbreviations, but the concepts for which they stand (and hence the meaning 
that they are intended to carry) took time to formulate and constitute significant human 
achievements.
When one acknowledges the importance of both rigor and meaning, perhaps it is not 
surprising that most mathematicians are Platonists on weekdays and formalists on the 
weekends (P. J. Davis & Hersh, 1981), seeking to discover timeless mathematical truths 
and simultaneously adhering to meaningless formalism.
Definitions in the History of Mathematics
The history o f mathematics is full o f examples where the definitions changed in order to 
correct for unintended consequences, including such “simple” concepts as function, 
continuity, and polyhedron (see Lakatos, 1976). Much of the history o f mathematics has 
been spent trying to figure out what the concepts are, trying to “get the definitions right,” 
so that they correspond to the intuitions that the mathematicians had in mind.
We begin with a vague concept in our minds, then we create various sets of 
postulates, and gradually we settle down to one particular set. In the rigorous 
postulational approach the original concept is now replaced by what the 
postulates define. This makes further evolution of the concept rather difficult 
and as a result tends to slow down the evolution o f mathematics. It is not that the 
postulation approach is wrong, only that its arbitrariness should be clearly 
recognized, and we should be prepared to change postulates when the need 
becomes apparent. (Hamming, 1980, p. 86)
The process o f “gradually settling down” on a definition deserves elaboration. Drawing 
on Lakatos (1976), the process goes something like this:
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• Get a mathematical idea that can form the beginning of a concept.
• Create an informal definition that seems to describe the concept.
• Formalize that definition.
• Reason from that definition to determine what it implies: Create some examples; 
prove some theorems; look for equivalent or closely related characterizations o f the 
concept.
• Modify the formal definition to exclude undesired consequences.
• Alternatively, enlarge or otherwise alter one’s understandings and intuitions o f the 
concept to accommodate these newfound possibilities.
There are several points to make about this process. First, sometimes the modifications 
to the definition amount to little more than eliminating undesirable examples through ad 
hoc redefinitions, a seemingly nonmathematical practice Lakatos (1976) called monster 
barring.
Second, the process incorporates apparent contradictions on the role o f definitions: On 
the one hand, the definition is taken to create a mathematical object and to give a term its 
meaning. And on the other hand, the definition is carefully chosen to capture a specific 
meaning and with an instrumental or expository purpose. Because both of these roles are 
mathematically indispensable, their relationship is better viewed as dialectical.
Third, once agreement is reached, a definition can be taken as primary—as though it had 
been handed down on stone tablets. In the deductivist, definition-theorem-proof format 
of much mathematical presentation and exposition, the dialectical evolution o f the 
concept and its definition are subsequently ignored.
In deductivist style, all propositions are true and all inferences valid.
Mathematics is presented as an ever-increasing set of eternal, immutable 
truths.... Deductivist style hides the struggle, hides the adventure. The whole 
story vanishes, the successive tentative formulations of the theorem in the course
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of the proof-procedure are doomed to oblivion while the end result is exalted into 
sacred infallibility.5 (Lakatos, 1976, p. 142)
Such strict adherence to formalism is to ignore the history o f mathematics, rendering the 
teacher and students blind to important epistemological obstacles and ignorant of 
required changes in perspective. And not only are students deprived o f opportunities to 
see and benefit from the growth of particular definitions, they are thus also deprived of 
opportunities to appreciate the evolution o f the role o f definition in mathematics.
It should not be at all surprising that students have difficulty accepting the role of 
definitions in modem mathematics when it was not fundamental in until the nineteenth 
century.
Definitions and Mathematical Intuition
By relaxing the demands o f pure formalism, one can adopt a position in which intuition 
and meaning are central to mathematical activity but where logic and rigor are available 
as tools for verification. As Hadamard said, “The object of mathematical rigor is to 
sanction and legitimize the conquests o f intuition, and there never was any other object 
for it” (cited in Ahlfors et al., 1962, p. 192). Despite the rhetoric of formalism and rigor, 
it seems that metaphorical thinking (Sfard, 1994) and intuition remain central:
It is significant that when a mathematician reads a theorem which conflicts with 
his intuitive expectations his first move is to doubt not his intuition but the proof.
He trusts his intuition more. If after having checked the proof carefully he 
becomes convinced that it is correct, he then inquires into what may be wrong 
with his intuition. (Kline, 1973, p. 160)
Thurston (1994) acknowledges putting “a lot o f effort into ‘listening’ to my intuitions and 
associations, and building them into metaphors and connections” (p. 165). He discusses
5 Lakatos condemned mathematics and science education as a hotbed of authoritarianism and as the worst 
enemy of critical thought (Lakatos, 1976, pp. 142-143, note 2).
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the relationships among definition, understanding, and intuition by presenting several 
characterizations o f  the concept o f  derivative:
(1) Infinitesimal: the ratio o f the infinitesimal change in the value o f a function to 
the infinitesimal change in a function.
(2) Symbolic: the derivative ofx" is nx"_1, the derivative o f sin(x) is cos(x), the 
derivative o f f  ° g  is f ' ° g  * g ' , etc.
(3) Logical: / ' ( x )  = d  i f  and only if  for every s there is a 8 such that when 
0 < |Ax| < 5 ,
/ ( x  + Ax) -  / ( x )
Ax
< 8 [sic\.
(4) Geometric: the derivative is the slope of a line tangent to the graph of the 
function, if  the graph has a tangent.
(5) Rate: the instantaneous speed of/f?), when t is time.
(6) Approximation: The derivative o f a function is the best linear approximation 
to the function near a point.
(7) Microscopic: The derivative o f a function is the limit o f what you get by 
looking at it under a microscope of higher and higher power.
This is a list of different ways of thinking about or conceiving o/the derivative 
rather than a list o f logical definitions. Unless great efforts are made to maintain 
the tone and flavor of the original human insights, the differences start to 
evaporate as soon as the mental objects are translated into precise, formal and 
explicit definitions.
I can remember absorbing each o f these concepts as something new and 
interesting, and spending a good deal o f mental time and effort digesting and 
practicing with each, reconciling it with the others. I also remember coming 
back to revisit these different concepts later with added meaning and 
understanding....
The list continues; there is no reason for it ever to stop. A sample entry further 
down the list may help illustrate this. We may think we know all there is to say 
about a certain subject, but new insights are around the comer. Furthermore, one 
person’s clear mental image is another person’s intimidation:
37. The derivative o f a real-valued function/in a domain D  is the Lagrangian 
section of the cotangent bundle T*(D) that gives the connection form for the 
unique flat connection on the trivial R-bundle D  x R for which the graph o f / i s  
parallel, (pp. 163-164)
Despite the fact that Thurston’s 37 characterizations are not definitions, for him they may 
function as definitions in reasoning within certain problem settings, though perhaps 
without the precision o f  a formal definition. From his use o f  words such as fla v o r , tone,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and insight, it is clear that these characterizations are full o f  meaning for Thurston. And 
it is worth emphasizing that attempting to formalize these ways o f thinking runs the risk 
o f changing their character and perhaps their usefulness in reasoning.
Definitions and Learning Mathematical Concepts
Drawing on the history and expository literature discussed above, I take the position that 
meaning is central to mathematical learning and mathematical thought and that careful 
reasoning from precise definitions is an important capability to be cultivated in 
mathematics majors. What, then, is the relationship between definitions and learning?
Skemp (1987) proposes two principles for teaching mathematical concepts:
1. Concepts o f  a higher order than those which people already have cannot be 
communicated to them by a definition, but only by arranging for them to 
encounter a suitable collection o f  examples.
2. Since in mathematics these examples are almost invariably other concepts, it 
must first be ensured that these are already formed in the mind o f  the learner.
(p. 18)
Skemp does not indicate how or when he came to these sensible conclusions or what sort 
o f  empirical data support them. But from the preceding discussion, it should be clear that 
mathematicians are distinguished by their ability to violate the first o f these principles, 
and it appears that Halmos, at least, transcends the second principle by constructing his 
own examples: “A  good stock o f  examples, as large as possible, is indispensable for a 
thorough understanding o f  any concept, and when I want to learn something new, I make 
it my first job to build one” (cited in Gallian, 1994, p. 34).
Thus, learning to violate or transcend these principles is a requirement for entering into 
the mathematical community. Specifically, a student pursuing a degree in mathematics 
must leam to build understanding (and perhaps create the examples) by reasoning from a
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definition. But here we have a conflict: On the one hand, students must learn to reason 
from the definitions rather than exclusively from their concept images because pictures, 
metaphors, and informal understandings are sometimes unreliable. On the other hand, 
the source o f their reasoning may continue to be the models and metaphors that they keep 
in mind.
Conflicts between the empirical (lexical) approach and the theoretical approach 
can represent a real obstacle for the students’ understanding. That is the reason 
why the problem o f introducing pupils to the mathematical process of defining 
constitutes a crucial point in mathematics education, which needs to be faced 
directly. (Mariotti & Fischbein, 1997, p. 226)
Adopting a formalistic approach to definitions may require epistemological and 
ontological changes in perspective. Suffice it to say that these changes in approach and 
perspective are rarely made explicit to the student. It is possible that successful 
mathematicians learned to reason from the definitions without ever being aware o f these 
changes in perspective. And by the time they are teaching courses to undergraduates, this 
approach has become so natural that they do not realize that nothing has changed for the 
student.
From the naive student’s point o f view, definitions are lexical: They are used to describe 
or explain ideas that already exist (Vinner, 1976). But as concepts expand, become more 
general, and allow inclusion o f never-before-imagined examples, the natural meaning 
gets lost. What does it take to understand the importance o f formal reasoning, which 
includes reasoning from definitions?
Students do not understand the role of mathematical definitions in general and, in 
particular, do not know how to reason from definitions. Mariotti and Fischbein (1997) 
found, like Vinner, that students may know the definition and yet fail to correctly identify
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whether objects satisfy the definition because the “concepts are often, implicitly or 
explicitly, distorted by gestalts” (p. 244). These distortions can take the form of 
additional conditions that remain implicit. They suggest that “in empirical domains, one 
tends to adapt the definitions to the empirical data— and exceptions are admissible”
(p. 245).
Borasi’s Work
Some of the most fully elaborated work on learning the nature and role o f mathematical 
definitions comes from Borasi. In Learning Mathematics Through Inquiry (Borasi, 
1992), she presents a detailed analysis o f a “mini-course” with two high school students. 
Although she had broad mathematical goals, she chose to focus on the notion o f 
definition because it “presents a beautiful example o f the more humanistic and 
contextualized aspects o f mathematics” (p. 7).
Before presenting any o f the data or analysis, she sets forth five criteria for definitions:
• Precision in terminology. All the terms employed in the definition should 
have been previously defined, unless they are one of the few undefined terms 
assumed as a starting point in the axiomatic system one is working with.
• Isolation o f the concept. All instances of a concept must meet all the 
requirements stated in its definition, while a noninstance will not satisfy at 
least one of them.
• Essentiality. Only terms and properties that are strictly necessary to 
distinguish the concept in question from others should be explicitly 
mentioned in the definition.
• Noncontradiction. All the properties stated in a definition should be able to 
coexist.
• Noncircularity. The definition should not use the term it is trying to define.
(Borasi, 1992, pp. 17-18)
She then points out that these criteria stem, in part, from the fact that we want a definition to:
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1. Allow us to discriminate between instances and noninstances of the concept 
with certainty, consistency, and efficiency (by simply checking whether a 
potential candidate satisfies all the properties stated in the definition).
2. “Capture” and synthesize the mathematical essence of the concept (all the 
properties belonging to the concept should be logically derivable from those 
included in its definition), (p. 18)
During the mini-course the students wrote, created, and modified definitions, extended 
definitions to new domains, and constructed definitions in new contexts, such as taxicab 
geometry. In one of the activities, inspired by Lakatos’s (1976) example of the evolution 
o f the definition o f polyhedron, Borasi asked the students to construct a definition of 
polygon, believing that such an experience “could help students appreciate that 
definitions are really created by us, even in mathematics, where everything may seem 
rigid and predetermined (at least to most students)” (Borasi, 1992, p. 44).
Based upon her analysis, Borasi concludes that the students changed their conceptions 
not only o f mathematical definitions but also of mathematics. Through the experience, 
she also changed her view o f mathematical definition, realizing a deeper understanding of 
the role of context and purpose in the creation and evaluation o f mathematical definitions. 
Furthermore, she reconsidered the role o f her five criteria set forth above, for those 
criteria are satisfactory only in specific mathematical contexts when it is reasonable to 
imagine the definition is fixed. When the context changes, however, the criteria must be 
relaxed, at least for a moment, and the definition may change.
Which Definition?
Which of the various equivalent formulations of a concept is chosen as its definition?
The choice is not arbitrary, despite the formalist claim to the contrary. In a formal 
presentation o f a concept, the definition that is chosen is usually the one that is most
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elegant or most useful in proofs concerning the concept, which implies that it is formal 
and often that it is minimal and otherwise concise. In a pedagogical presentation, a 
definition is chosen with a particular pedagogical purpose. Poincare (1946) makes it 
clear that the choices should not be the same:
What is a good definition? For the philosopher or the scientist it is a definition 
which applies to the objects defined, and only those; it is the one satisfying the 
mles o f logic. But in teaching it is not that; a good definition is one understood 
by the scholars [students], (p. 430)
This view toward formalism was echoed by 75 mathematicians who, responding to the 
excesses o f the new math, warned that “premature formalization may lead to sterility” 
(Ahlfors et al., 1962, p. 190).
From the mathematics education community, Mariotti and Fischbein warn that “the 
formal approach does not grasp the very process o f defining” (p. 222) and suggest, 
instead that definitions have a constructive and creative role and actually bring new 
concepts into existence. They propose that “a definition is to be considered a ‘good’ 
definition as far as the new object starts to live by itself and may become the subject of a 
new theory” (p. 223).
There seems to be very little discussion in the literature about the problem of conflicting 
definitions, other than occasionally mentioning that parallelograms are sometimes but not 
always included as trapezoids. What is rarely acknowledged is that there are also 
conflicting definitions o f natural number (including vs. omitting 0), ring (including vs. 
omitting 1), and integral domain (including vs. omitting commutativity). Thus, although 
a particular definition may be chosen with a particular expository or pedagogical purpose, 
there is a certain arbitrariness in which objects are thus defined.
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Definitions in Textbooks
How are definitions treated in mathematical texts? Explicit definitions can send implicit 
messages about the role o f definitions in mathematics. Raman (1998) found that texts 
send conflicting messages about the purpose and use o f mathematical definitions. Vinner 
(1991) suggests that mathematics textbooks and classroom practice are partly based on 
the following assumptions:
1. Concepts are mainly acquired by means of their definitions.
2. Students will use definitions to solve problems and prove theorems.
3. Definitions should be minimal.
4. It is desirable that definitions will be elegant.
5. Definitions are arbitrary, (pp. 65-66)
What conclusions do students draw from such implicit messages? Rin (1982) found that 
students do not understand that the definition is to be the official source of information 
about the concept and that textbooks sometimes compound the problem by burying 
definitions in the text or the exercises, or by leaving implicit the quantifiers or the 
appropriate range of the variables.
Would it be better if  texts were explicit about the nature and role o f definitions in 
mathematics? Textbooks are rarely explicit about the role o f definition, although some 
texts emphasize that all definitions are “if  and only i f ’ statements (e.g., Fraleigh, 1989, p. 
3; Bittinger, 1982, p. 40), and a few point out that a definition is an abbreviation (e.g., 
Bittinger, 1982, p. 40). But these are statements about what a definition is, which is 
singularly unhelpful to students, who believe they already know what definitions are and 
implicitly operate on this basis (Vinner, 1976). Instead, students need to leam what to do 
with definitions.
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Summary
Definitions play opposing roles in mathematical thinking and learning, serving 
simultaneously to describe and support informal mathematical intuition and meaning and 
to create meaning through the imposition o f formalism. These opposing roles are evident 
in the history of mathematics, in the evolution o f definitions o f key concepts, in 
mathematics textbooks, and in research into students’ use o f definitions in mathematical 
learning. In order to accommodate both o f these roles into descriptions of students’ 
understandings o f concepts in abstract algebra, I took a broad view o f definitions, with 
the aim o f capturing both meaning and level of precision. Thus, the analysis included not 
only students’ attempts at formal definitions but also the ad hoc personal definitions they 
provided when I asked for the meaning o f a term or statement.
Abstraction Versus Generalization
Mathematically, a definition creates meaning for a new concept, but psychologically, new 
concepts are created through processes of abstraction and generalization. Abstraction and 
generalization are fundamental human activities that become critically important in 
advanced mathematics. Dreyfus (1991) suggests, for example, that the ability to 
consciously make abstractions from mathematical situations “may well be the single most 
important goal o f advanced mathematical education” (p. 34). I begin with abstraction, 
which played a central role during the new math era. Here is one view from that era:
The process of abstraction is defined as the process of drawing from a number of 
different situations something which is common to them all. Logically speaking 
it is an inductive process; it consists o f a search for an attribute which would 
describe certain elements felt somehow to belong together....
For example the forming of the concept of the natural number two is an 
abstraction process, as it consists mainly o f experiences o f pairs of objects o f the 
greatest possible diversity, all properties of such objects being ignored except
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that o f being distinct from each other and from other objects. The essential 
common property o f all such pairs of objects is the natural number two. (Dienes,
1961, p p .281-282)
Piaget distinguishes between empirical abstraction, which starts from perceived objects, 
and reflective abstraction, which starts from actions and operations (Beth & Piaget, 1966, 
pp. 188-189).
As an adjective, abstract is usually contrasted with concrete. Wilensky (1991) points 
out, however, that concreteness is not a property o f an object but a property of a person’s 
relationship to an object. Concreteness, he suggests, measures the degree of our 
relatedness to the object (the richness o f our representations, interactions, connections 
with the object), how close we are to it, or the quality o f our relationship with the object. 
Thus, any object can become concrete for someone. He notes that this point o f view 
turns the old definition o f concrete on its head, so that thinking concretely is not narrow 
but rather opens up a whole world of ideas and relationships. Frorer, Hazzan, and Manes 
(1997) agree with Wilensky and suggest two additional themes in abstraction: ignoring 
details and thinking of things in terms o f properties rather than actual components.
As for generalization, it should be mentioned that generalization and abstraction are often 
confounded in the literature (e.g., Dreyfus, 1991) and are sometimes treated as essentially 
synonymous (e.g., Beth & Piaget, 1966; Vygotsky, 1934/1986).6 Tall (1991) suggests, 
however, that generalization simply involves an extension of familiar processes whereas 
abstraction requires mental reorganization. Thus, generalization is the application o f an 
existing process or structure to a broader class o f objects (see also Dienes, 1961). 
Generalization may be contrasted with specialization, where the scope o f a process or
6 Piaget speaks mostly about abstraction and Vygotsky mostly about generalization, but it is possible that 
these choices were made by the translators.
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structure is restricted in some way. Abstraction, on the other hand, creates a new 
structure on a higher level, which is not a deduction but a construction process. 
Abstraction may be contrasted with exemplification, which creates a specific instance of 
the abstract structure or idea. A mathematical metaphor may help make the distinction 
more clear: Generalization and specialization are about creating supersets and subsets; 
abstraction is about constructing a new kind o f set and exemplification involves choosing 
an element of that set. In mathematical thinking, o f course, abstraction and 
generalization may be operating simultaneously or consecutively. It is not always 
possible, however, to separate the two processes, such as in the introduction of the 
notation of an asterisk to serve generally for an abstract binary operation.
Processes Versus Objects
One of the central theoretical themes in advanced mathematical thinking is the distinction 
between process and object conceptions o f mathematical ideas. Although the 
terminology is diverse, the primary distinction is that a process is an activity carried out 
through some sort o f procedure, whereas an object can be conceived o f as a single entity. 
Many mathematical ideas can be conceived both as processes and as objects, so the 
distinction is psychological. Sfard (1991) distinguishes between operational and 
structural conceptions. Harel and Kaput (1991) distinguish between a process and a 
conceptual entity. Dubinsky and his colleagues (Dubinsky, 1991; Breidenbach,
Dubinsky, Hawks, & Nichols, 1992) also distinguish between processes and objects and 
offer additional categories described above. In reviewing this literature, Tall, Thomas, G. 
Davis, Gray, and Simpson (2000) suggest that it is possible to ascertain whether students 
have constructed a mental object based on the way they talk and write about the concept.
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Object conceptions allow for descriptive discourse and attention to structural features of 
the mathematical ideas. Process conceptions, on the other hand, are confined to narrative 
discourse.
There are some differences among the perspectives o f these researchers, but they are in 
agreement that a learner cannot meaningfully act on a process with another process until 
the former has become an object in his or her mind. This kind o f mental construction is 
called encapsulation (or reification, or entification). For some concepts, encapsulation 
seems to be extremely difficult for most students, and coset may be one such concept, as 
suggested in the literature review above.
On the other hand, there are “natural,” implicit instances of encapsulation. For example, 
from a process of counting, a young child creates an understanding o f “4” as an object 
that describes what is the same about the wheels on a car, the legs on a dog, and the sides 
of a rectangle. To emphasize the ambiguity in the symbolism for mathematical ideas, 
Gray and Tall (1994) coined the term procept. Thus, “4 + 5” is a symbol that 
simultaneously denotes both the process o f addition and object that results. In abstract 
algebra, given a subgroup H  and a group element a, the notation aH  simultaneously 
specifies the process for calculating the cosets o f / /a n d  the result o f one of those 
calculations for the particular value a.
Gray and Tall (1994) further distinguish between a procedure, where the focus is on step- 
by-step details, and a process, where the concern is with the result (as dependent on the 
initial state). A procedure, in other words, refers to a specific algorithm for carrying out a 
process. The process o f addition, for example, can be carried out by many different 
procedures, including counting all, counting on, or pressing buttons on a calculator.
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Similarly, there are many procedures that can be constructed to determine whether a 
subgroup is normal, but any (or all) of them may be conceptualized as the process for 
determining normality.
Metaphor
Drawing on the work o f Lakoff and Nunez (1997, 2000), I take the position that 
mathematical concepts are predominantly metaphorical in nature. Despite the central role 
o f precise formal definitions, mathematical thinking is usually guided by metaphors.
This recent work in the cognitive science o f mathematics is based upon a large body of 
empirical work in cognitive science that has produced three major findings: “The mind is 
inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely 
metaphorical” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 1). In identifying the metaphors that support 
particular concepts, most of the evidence comes “from language— from the meanings of 
words and phrases and from the way humans make sense of their experiences” (p. 115).
Lakoff and Nunez (2000) elaborate the metaphorical nature of mathematics, 
concentrating first on arithmetic and later on concepts such as the real numbers, limits, 
and continuity, building up to a case study o f the equation e™ +1 = 0. In their analysis, 
some mathematical concepts are based upon grounding metaphors, such as Sets Are 
Containers,7 that grow out of bodily experience in the world. Other concepts link to, 
build upon, or coordinate previously established metaphors, so that “much o f the 
‘abstraction’ of higher mathematics is a consequence o f the systematic layering of 
metaphor upon metaphor, often over the course o f centuries” (p. 47). A metaphor “A is
7 Throughout this section, I have adopted Lakoff and Nunez’s convention of capitalizing the names of the 
metaphors.
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B” is a mapping from a source domain B to a target domain A, where the source domain 
is typically more familiar. The inferential structure o f the source domain gives structure 
to the target domain, often introducing new elements or relationships in the target 
domain. The Arithmetic-Is-Object-Collection metaphor, for example, provides 
grounding for the commutativity of addition; the Arithmetic-Is-Motion-Along-a-Path 
metaphor provides grounding for the concepts of zero and fractions.
Between their detailed treatments of arithmetic and real analysis, Lakoff and Nunez 
provide a short discussion o f metaphorical nature o f abstract algebra. A key construct in 
their analysis is the Fundamental Metonymy of Algebra, which allows us to reason about 
numbers or other entities without knowing which particular entities we are talking about. 
This mathematical notion depends upon its everyday version, the Role-for-Individual 
metonymy, by which we are able to imagine carrying out actions with whoever (or 
whatever) fills the required role.
Because algebra in general and abstract algebra in particular are about essence, Lakoff 
and Nunez (2000) discuss the Folk Theory of Essences, which includes such notions as 
“everything is a specific kind of thing” (p. 107), “kinds are categories” (p. 108), and “the 
essence o f a thing is an inherent part o f that thing” (p. 108). Essence is characterized by 
three metaphors: Essences Are Substances, Essences Are Forms, and Essences Are 
Patterns o f Change. The Folk Theory o f Essences was behind Aristotle’s definition of 
definition as a “list of properties that are both necessary and sufficient for something to 
be the kind o f thing that it is, and from which all its natural behavior flows” (p. 109) and 
also behind Euclid’s axiomatic (or postulational) approach.
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Building on the metaphor Essences Are Forms, Lakoff and Nunez (2000) put forward a 
foundational metaphor for abstract algebra: The essence o f a mathematical system is an 
abstract algebraic structure, which is taken to include the elements in the structure, the 
operations used on those elements, and the essential properties o f the operations (p. 111). 
I accept their guiding principles and much o f their analysis, but regarding abstract 
algebra, their analysis falls short on two counts. First, their notion o f a mathematical 
structure is too restrictive because mathematical structures do not always have operations. 
Second, some o f their metaphors are backwards in the sense that the source domain is 
less familiar and more abstract than the target domain it is intended to describe.
For example, they claim, in effect, that Z3 is the abstract group with three elements.
While this is a true statement, it is not a helpful metaphor. Furthermore, their description 
o f the abstract group with three elements uses the set {/, A, B} with the expected 
operation table. This group, it is important to note, is not the abstract group itself but a 
particular representation of it—a representation, moreover, that does not easily support 
calculation. If  abstract concepts are metaphorical, as they claim, then the appropriate 
metaphor is that the abstract group with three elements is Z3, thereby providing a familiar 
instantiation of the abstraction. This metaphor does not provide a complete 
characterization o f the abstract group, however, because it leaves out the necessary 
abstraction. Where do abstractions come from, and by what process do they come about? 
Unfortunately, the process of abstraction (abstracting) is conspicuously missing from 
their analysis, although the results o f abstractions are covered in their Folk Theory of 
Essences.
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To remedy the analysis provided by Lakoff and Nunez, it is necessary first to broaden the 
notion of structure. Rickart (1995) suggests that there is “not much hope for stating in a 
few lines a precise and complete definition o f structure” (p. 11). In its place, he suggests, 
puts forward “an admittedly imprecise approximate definition, which is then elaborated 
and made increasingly more complete through examples and explanations” (p. 11). 
Rickart’s definition is the following: “A structure is any set of objects (also called 
elements) along with certain relations among those objects” (p. 17, emphasis in original). 
The advantage of this definition over that o f Lakoff and Nunez is that it can 
accommodate topological and order structures. Furthermore, it is consistent with the 
notion of structure in fields outside mathematics, such as linguistics, psychology, 
biology, and anthropology (Rickart, 1995; see also Piaget, 1970b).
Algebraic structures fit this definition by way o f an appropriate interpretation o f the 
relations among the objects. A group is a structure, for example, in that the objects are 
the elements and the relation is a ternary relation defined in terms o f the group operation: 
The group elements in an ordered triple (g, h, k) are related if gh = k. (Rickart, 1995, 
p. 53) The group axioms can be also be specified as relations.
Analysis o f the concepts in group theory, focusing primarily on language, leads to the 
conclusion that group theory is guided primarily by two metaphors:
• Groups Are Sets
• Groups Are Structures
At first sight, these do not appear to be metaphors at all but would be more accurately 
characterized as obvious statements of fact. A group, after all, is a set. But sets and 
structures are themselves metaphors, which may be traced back to metaphors that are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
grounded in bodily experience. With the above definitions o f structure as a set of 
elements with relations among them, it is possible to reduce this to one metaphor: Groups 
Are Structures. A guiding principle behind the concept o f structure, however, is that a 
structure is independent o f the elements themselves, depending only on the relations. For 
this reason and because the Groups-Are-Sets metaphor is so predominant, it makes sense 
to consider it separately.
The metaphor Groups Are Sets is quickly grounded through the Sets-Are-Containers 
metaphor, hence groups are containers. This metaphorical thinking becomes apparent in 
expressions such as “an element g in  a group G.” When a set is closed under an 
operation, as all groups are, the container is metaphorically closed, preventing the 
elements from escaping. The Groups-Are-Containers metaphor takes a slightly different 
character in the question “Where does this element live?” suggesting a Containers-Are- 
Territories metaphor that becomes particularly apparent when the group is the domain or 
codomain o f a homomorphism.
The metaphor Groups Are Structures becomes apparent in the etymological derivation of 
the term isomorphism as meaning “same form.'" The metaphor of structure also suggests 
that the form is in some sense incomplete, providing only the framework that is the 
relations among the elements. The elements themselves are unimportant details. When a 
particular set under a particular operation is said to be a group, it is the operation that 
provides the structure, by sitting metaphorically above the elements and imposing form 
on the relations among them.
In constructing the above definition o f structure and structuralism that applies across 
diverse fields, Rickart (1995) observes, “The objective of a structuralist approach to a
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subject is to extract the essential information from the background o f irrelevant or 
unimportant information” (p. 19). Thus, structures are also essences. And since 
“essence” and “essentially” share the root essens (Latin present participle o f esse, “to 
be”), the merged concepts of structure and essence is revealed in the semantic 
equivalence between the statements “the groups are essentially the same” and “the groups 
have the same structure.”
By building metaphors on top o f metaphors, abstraction on top o f abstraction, it is 
possible to create hierarchical chains o f metaphors that ultimately depend upon 
grounding metaphors. What, then, is the metaphorical relationship between essence and 
structure in mathematics? On the one hand, structures are essences, but on the other 
hand, the essence of a mathematical system is its structure. This is not circular reasoning, 
however, but an example of a conceptual blend, where two concepts combine to form a 
deeper unified concept while also contributing to a more flexible understanding of each 
o f the concepts individually. The conceptual blend Numbers Are Points on a Line, for 
example, beginning with Descartes, paved the way for profound connections between 
geometry and algebra. Thus, structures are essences and vice versa. Saying structures 
are essences highlights the push toward abstraction that is a guiding principle behind the 
structuralist approach. Saying mathematical essences are structures, on the other hand, 
gives body and form to an otherwise ethereal concept.
Consider the definition o f a structure as a set with relations, along with the metaphor 
Structures Are Essences and the three metaphors that characterize essence: Essences Are 
Substances, Essences Are Forms, and Essences Are Patterns of Change. Taken together 
these metaphors reaffirm the point made in chapter 1 that mathematics can fit under any
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of the three themes in Devlin’s (2000) characterization that “modem mathematics is 
about abstract patterns, abstract structures, and abstract relationships” (p. 136).
This discussion provides but a preliminary analysis of the metaphorical nature o f the 
concept o f group. Group theory involves many more concepts, some o f which are 
discussed metaphorically in the analysis that follows. I note here only a few key 
metaphors that informed this study: Subgroups are subsets, homomorphisms are 
functions, cosets are sets, and sets are objects.
Naming and Notation
Thus far, I have discussed concepts and their definitions, and certainly mathematical 
thinking and discourse require concepts and definitions. But students often use language 
and notation incorrectly. Rin (1982) suggests that students’ linguistic misbehaviors are 
interpretable as reflective o f deficient understanding or of deficient expressive powers 
(p. 10). Mathematical learning requires not only constructing concepts but also learning 
the standard names and notations for those concepts and the appropriate verbal and 
mathematical syntax for referring to those concepts in mathematical discourse. In this 
study, issues o f naming and notation were central, as they are key components of the 
larger issues of language and representation.
One commonly advocated approach for teaching that promotes understanding is to 
provide opportunities for students to explore concepts before giving the concept a name 
(e.g., Leron & Dubinsky, 1995). After the students have had sufficient experience and 
have noticed certain regularities, the relevant concepts can be given names. The naming 
itself is seen as unproblematic. As the mathematician John H. Conway (1995, April 13)
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once said when discussing whether spherical geometry is a non-Euclidean geometry, 
“This is the sort o f question that bugs me! Being about names, it’s not a mathematical 
[s/e], so ‘the answer’ really doesn’t matter.”
But this study and at least one other (Lajoie & Mura, 2000) suggest that attaching the 
name is sometimes not as simple as supposed. As part o f a larger study into the learning 
of abstract algebra, Lajoie and Mura found that when asked about cyclic groups, students 
seemed to focus on metaphors of coming back to the start, cycles, and images of circles. 
Most students did not consider infinite cyclic groups to be cyclic because “you don’t 
come back.” Lajoie and Mura propose several sources o f confusion: inappropriate use of 
mathematical definition, semantic contamination from everyday language (a la Pimm, 
1987), confusion with cyclic permutations, and nonstandard definitions o f powers and 
generators. They point out, first, that incorrect conceptions can lead to correct answers 
for many questions about Z„ and, second, that in the history o f group theory, Ruffini, 
Cauchy, and Jordan used similar imprecise “circular” language and excluded infinite 
cyclic groups. As possible solutions, they suggest drawing students’ attention to 
differences between mathematical and ordinary uses of words and explicit teaching o f the 
role of definition in mathematics.
The question here is, What is the relationship between a concept and its name? What is 
gained by giving a collection of physical or mental entities a name? How is thinking 
constrained by the particular name chosen? Given the name of a new concept, what 
understanding do students associate with that name and how? These uncertainties imply 
that the notion of concept image must be applied flexibly in the analysis to allow for the 
possibility of nonstandard connections between concepts and names.
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Similar questions may be asked regarding mathematical notation. As mentioned above, 
students often use mathematical notation improperly in abstract algebra (Selden & 
Selden, 1978; Hazzan, 1994). Mason and Pimm (1984) suggest that students’ difficulty 
may be caused partly by ambiguity in the notation itself. What, for example, does 2N  
stand for? Is it any even number or all even numbers? Is it specific, particular, generic, 
or general? Perhaps it is not an even number at all, for it would never appear in a list o f 
even numbers. Is it shorthand for {2N: N a whole number}? In this case, 2N is not an 
even number but an instruction to carry out a calculation. Mason and Pimm suggest that, 
for students, 2N  sometimes represents any even number and that as a result they may 
show that the sum of two even numbers is even by writing 2N  + 2N  = 4N. What is 
missing is awareness o f 2N  as a particular even number. Any has two interpretations: 
generic and general, and the latter implies “every.” Recognizing that in fact “2N ” is 
merely marks on the paper, they point out that the meaning has to do with perception.
Durkin and Shire (1991) suggest that some difficulties with language arise from 
ambiguities in the language itself, pointing in particular to polysemy, the property of 
some words to have distinct but related meanings. There are many examples, such as 
function  or group, in which an everyday word takes on a specialized meaning in 
mathematics. Durkin and Shire suggest that the words some and any may be similarly 
confounded, providing additional insight into the observations of Mason and Pimm 
(1984) above. What is more problematic is when words take on multiple but related 
meanings within mathematical discourse itself. Zazkis (1998) suggests, for example, that 
the term quotient takes on different meanings depending upon whether one is dealing
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with whole numbers or rational numbers. In abstract algebra, it appears that the term 
cycle is mathematically polysemous (Lajoie & Mura, 2000).
Taken together, these studies suggest that attaching names and notations to ideas involves 
subtle distinctions and ambiguities in language to fit with subtle conceptual distinctions 
among mathematical objects. Thus, empirical and theoretical work must allow for and 
explain the possibility that students might take words and notations to carry nonstandard 
meanings. For this study, the analytical tools were furnished by semiotics.
Semiotics 
Figure 1. Ceci n’est pas un groupe
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To paraphrase Rene Magritte regarding his painting Ceci n ’est pas une pipe [This is not a 
pipe] (see Foucault, 1983), the table in Figure 1 is not a group. To be precise, it is a 
representation— a sign. The sign is certainly not itself the abstract group with three 
elements. A central theme in this study is the relationship between mathematical notation 
and language, concept definitions, and conceptual understanding. This is essentially the 
relationship among signs, objects, and meaning, which is the province o f the field of 
semiotics, or the study of signs. Whereas semantics is the study o f meaning in language, 
semiotics is the study o f meaning in signs, which includes language as a subset.
Semiotics is generally recognized to have been founded in the work o f Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and independently in the work o f American
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mathematician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). This section 
presents the influential distinctions made by Saussure and Peirce on the nature of signs 
and o f sign systems and their relationship to meaning. These basics o f semiotics are then 
connected to the work of Vygotsky, with particular attention to learning and the 
relationship between personal and social meaning. Additional theoretical background is 
then provided on various types of signs and on the semiotics o f mathematics. The section 
closes with a discussion o f the analytical framework that was used to guide and organize 
the analysis for this study.
The Sign
Saussure’s (1959) fundamental contribution was the distinction between the two 
inseparable components o f the sign: the signifier (e.g., a sound or symbol) and the 
signified (the concept represented). The signifier itself is meaningless, for the same 
signifier can represent a different signified in a different context. Saussure also 
distinguished between speech (sound patterns) and writing, seeing writing as a separate, 
dependent sign system. Such a distinction was not necessary for this study, and Saussure 
himself arrived at many o f his principles by analyzing words and not sound patterns. I do 
distinguish between mathematical language and notation, however, as there are clear 
psychological differences for mathematics students. The term multiplicative identity and 
the symbol 1, for example, do not necessarily have the same meaning.
The fundamental unit o f semiotic analysis is the sign, which includes the signifier, the 
signified, and the crucial connection between them. The sign, it should be recognized, is 
arbitrary, in the sense that the bond between signifier and signified is essentially 
circumstantial, cultural, conventional, and historical. It is tempting to conclude that
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meaning is contained in the sign. But signs have no meaning except as they relate to and 
are distinguished from other signs:
In Saussurean linguistics, words do not refer to things themselves. Rather, they 
have meaning as points within the entire system that is a language— a system, 
further, conceived as a network o f graded differences. (Harkness, 1983, p. 5)
Thus, Saussure’s “conception of meaning was purely structural and relational rather than 
referential1 (Chandler, in press, emphasis in original). The structure o f a language 
system or any system of signs depends upon its network o f graded differences. The 
network is built from semantic distinctions that create concepts, for a concept is not a 
concept until its boundaries are specified. These semantic distinctions, as well as the 
supporting phonological, syntactic, and symbolic distinctions, are ontologically arbitrary, 
as evidenced by the fact that translation between languages is sometimes problematic. 
Anthropological linguists Sapir and Whorf found, for example, that “Eskimo has many 
words for snow, whereas Aztec employs a single term for the concepts o f snow, cold, and 
ice” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1999). In other words, different languages provide for 
different concepts. This observation puts a twist on Shakespeare’s aphorism “a rose by 
any other name would smell as sweet.” The validity of the statement depends, after all, 
upon a language that distinguishes roses from objects that smell less sweet, and also 
distinguishes “smell” and “sweet” from related concepts.
Semiotics is concerned not only with what signs mean but with how signs mean what 
they mean (Sturrock, cited in Chandler, in press), which requires studying the structural 
relations among signs, as mentioned above, and also the relationship between signs and 
interpreters. But what is meaning? And where is it? There is a long history of 
philosophical debate about the meaning o f meaning (see, e.g., Zemach, 1992). For the
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purposes of this study, I point out one particularly influential approach, proposed by 
Wittgenstein (1973):
For a large class of cases— though not for all— in which we employ the word 
“meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language.
And the meaning o f a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
(pt. 1, set. 43)
Wittgenstein’s solution contrasts sharply with that of Saussure (1959), for whom “the 
linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image”(p. 66). 
For Saussure, meaning was a psychological phenomenon in that the signifier was a 
mental representation o f sensory impressions and the signified was also a mental 
construct. Wittgenstein’s statement, on the other hand, has a decidedly social or cultural 
sense, a point o f view that fits with Matthews (2000), who argues that “meanings are in 
the public domain; they have to be enculturated” (p. 171). In the analysis for this study, I 
considered both psychological meaning and social meaning in mathematical discourse, 
focusing, in particular, on the relationships between them.
Charles Sanders Peirce developed a semiotic theory that takes into account both the 
psychological and social planes. Asserting that nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as 
a sign, Peirce (1955) proposed, “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (p. 99). This is essentially a 
material version o f Saussure’s signifier. This sign addresses somebody, creating in the 
mind of that person an equivalent or more developed sign, which Peirce calls an 
interpretant. These are complemented by the object to which the sign refers, creating a 
triadic relationship. It is important to point out that there is not necessarily any direct
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relationship between the representamen and its object, and in fact the only relationship 
may be through an interpretant, which requires an interpreter.
The semiotic models o f Saussure, Peirce, and Wittgenstein are compared in Figure 2.
The vertical alignment is intended to indicate correspondences, though the 
correspondences, particularly between the psychological and social planes, are not direct. 
Moreover, the fit among the models is not perfect, precisely because Saussure, Peirce, 
and Wittgenstein were using different categories as well as different names. In particular, 
an interpretant for Peirce could be either a mental recreation o f the representamen or a 
more developed sign, perhaps approaching a concept.
Figure 2. Comparison of meanings of meaning
signifier _____ signified





representamen m ► object
Wittgenstein: name •+-------- ► thing
Figure 3 illustrates a semiotic model that blends each of the models described above and 
expands on them as well. A signifier is a symbol or a word or anything external that is 
taken to signify something else. A concept is a mental entity, which may be considered 
the core of a concept image, as described above. A referent is a mathematical object, 
process, or property, taken to be external in some sense. I make no ontological claims 
about whether or where the referent exists but say merely that it is useful in the analysis 
to suppose that it is distinct from the concept and from the signifier. This model of a
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sign, then, is what I mean by the meaning o f a mathematical word or symbol, with the 
added stipulation that the meaning must be considered within a system o f language and 
symbols.





In this study, signs provided access to the students’ concept images. The students’ use of 
signifiers provided insight about the meanings and understandings that the signs held in 
their thinking. The principles of semiotics make clear, however, that signs (and hence 
meanings) must be interpreted within a system of signs. Thus, the notion of concept 
image must be sufficiently flexible to pay attention to the ways that the students’ concept 
images related to each other.
Within a system o f signs, the meaning of an individual sign is determined, in large part, 
by its relations to other signs and, in particular, by the distinctions between it and closely 
related signs. The structure and categories o f a system o f signs lead those who use the 
signs to impose a conceptual grid on experience, specifying the way that the experience is 
cut up and hence shaping the way the experience is perceived. The crucial content in a 
system is the set of boundaries that are placed around and between the categories, and 
thus the essence o f the system is independent of the particular symbols and names that 
are attached to the concepts it delineates. The categories, however, are not inherent in the
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experience but arise in the way the world is represented in the structure of the system. 
Different systems provide different categories that give rise to different concepts. Those 
differences manifest themselves in the particular grid that is used to organize an 
experience. A semiotician can gain insights about concepts and their meanings by paying 
attention to distinctions in the use o f the signs—by trying to infer the conceptual grid.
Thus, language and other sign systems play a crucial role in shaping the concepts that are 
available. This position is supported by empirical work in linguistics:
The “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language 
habits o f the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be 
considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different 
societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels 
attached. (Sapir, 1929/1949, p. 162)
We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, 
largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way— an 
agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the 
patterns o f our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated 
one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY-, we cannot talk at all except by 
subscribing to the organization and classification o f data which the agreement 
decrees. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
The above theoretical perspectives led to what is known in linguistics as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, which in its extreme form is called linguistic determinism, indicating that 
language determines the framework o f perception and thought. Although few linguists 
accept the hypothesis in this form, its weaker formulation—that language influences 
thought—is generally accepted (Chandler, in press).
Semiotics and Learning
As stated above, I consider in the analysis both psychological and social meaning, 
focusing particularly on the relationship between them. What is missing from all o f the 
above treatments is acknowledgment that personal and social meanings may not fit.
Unless an individual makes the same conceptual distinctions as made by the community,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the conceptual grids imposed on an experience will be different. In educational research, 
the critical question concerns the relationship between personal and social meanings 
during learning.
Much of Vygotsky’s work can be viewed as describing the process o f personal 
acquisition o f social meanings, which is essentially the acquisition o f speech and 
language. In developing his research methodology, Vygotsky (1934/1986) was critical of 
methods o f analysis that analyzed psychological processes into components, such as 
thought and word, to be studied separately, when what is most crucial is to understand 
how they operate together. In considering a method for analyzing the acquisition of 
language, he asked:
What is the unit of verbal thought that is further unanalyzable and yet retains the 
properties o f the whole? We believe that such a unit can be found in the internal 
aspect o f the word, in word meaning, (p. 5)
Although it seems that Vygotsky (1978) did not explicitly draw on semiotics in his work, 
his perspective fits with semiotics. “The sign acts as an instrument o f psychological 
activity” (p. 52), and by sign he generally meant a word, which is but one kind of 
signifier. By comparing the use of signs in thought to the use of tools in physical 
activity, he maintained that the sign and the tool both mediate activity indirectly, the tool 
being externally oriented and the sign being internally oriented.
Borrowing from French psychologist Paulhan, Vygotsky (1934/1986) also proposed a 
distinction between the meaning and the sense o f a word, which are roughly its 
denotation and connotation, respectively:
The sense of a word, according to [Paulhan], is the sum of all the psychological 
events aroused in our consciousness by the word. It is a dynamic, fluid, complex
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whole, which has several zones of unequal stability. Meaning is only one o f the 
zones o f sense, the most stable precise zone. (pp. 244-245)
Note the striking similarity between this definition o f sense and Tall and Vinner’s (1981) 
definition of concept image as the total cognitive structure associated with a concept.
And so, the distinction between meaning and sense may be considered to be roughly the 
distinction between a concept and a concept image.
Constructing personal meaning requires establishing a conceptual bond between the 
signifier and the referent. This necessity is well recognized in mathematics education and 
is seen in the metaphor o f attaching or gluing names to ideas (see, e.g., Hewitt, 2001).
The fact that the signifier is arbitrary and thus needs to be taught (Hewitt, 1999) fits well 
with many explicit and implicit theories o f mathematics teaching and learning.
What is seldom recognized in mathematics education, however, is that the signified also 
is arbitrary, in the sense that the conceptual grid is not predetermined. In emphasizing 
the role of language in creating conceptual grids, Sapir and Whorf seem to have ignored 
the learning that is required to build the intended distinctions into one’s own cognitive 
structure. I accept the weak version o f the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in the sense that the 
conceptual grids that are used by the community certainly influence, and to a great extent 
limit and constrain, those o f the learners. But one must also recognize that students’ 
conceptual grids do not always fit with the ones used in the mathematical community. 
Social and personal meanings will not match but will fit with some degree of viability. 
Students do not learn social meanings whole and unproblematically but instead make 
successive approximations, adjusted via accommodation.
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Typology of Signs
In addition to his seminal contribution on the nature o f the sign, Peirce (1955) also 
provided a detailed typology o f signs. For the purposes o f this study, it is sufficient to 
mention only his distinction between icon, index, and symbol. An icon bears a 
resemblance to its referent, “such as a lead pencil streak as representing a geometrical 
line” (p. 104). An index bears a direct connection to its referent, such as smoke to fire or, 
in mathematics, as a letter used in text following a figure to refer to a labeled portion of a 
figure. The label itself, however, is not an index. Finally, the connection between a 
symbol and its referent requires establishment by convention.
Bruner (1966, pp. 10-11) distinguished three ways in which human beings model their 
experience: enactive, iconic, and symbolic representations, the latter two of which are 
similar to Peirce’s categories. Enactive representations embody experience in action and 
are, in a sense, prior to the other types o f representations. Enactive representations, I 
would suggest, are helpful in describing the gestures that accompany certain metaphorical 
conceptions o f mathematical ideas such as function.
Regarding the signs (or representations) in abstract algebra, it is important to point out 
that Peirce categorized algebraic equations as icons, in the sense that they are compound 
signs, composed o f symbols and indices, in which the relationship o f the signs to one 
another iconically represents the mathematical expressions and relations they are to 
represent. But as Peirce pointed out, a sign is not a sign unless someone interprets it as 
such. Thus, whether a sign is an icon, index, or symbol depends upon the individual 
using or interpreting the sign. Therefore, when (but not until) an individual has
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established a conception o f set, element, and set arithmetic in a group, the symbol aH  can 
function as an icon for a coset.
A Semiotics of Mathematics
In a initial semiotic analysis of mathematics, Rotman (1988) identifies three aspects of 
mathematical discourse: the referential aspect, the formal aspect, and the psychological 
aspect, which have rough parallels in the mathematical philosophies o f Platonism, 
formalism, and intuitionism, respectively. Each philosophy captures, in part,
an important facet o f what is felt to be intrinsic to mathematical activity.
Certainly, in some undeniable but obscure way, mathematics seems at the same 
time to be a meaningless game, a subjective construction, and a source of 
objective truth, (p. 6)
Thus, through semiotics, we are back to the metamathematical issues that arose in the 
discussion o f definitions above.
Drawing on Peirce, Rotman distinguishes between the Mathematician (the “se lf’), who 
imagines and conducts reflective observations, the Agent (a skeleton diagram and 
surrogate o f the self), who metaphorically constructs objects and carries out processes as 
demanded by the Mathematician, and the Person (the subject), who operates with the 
signs of natural language and participates in nonmathematical discourse. The distinctions 
become clear in Rotman’s (1988) observation:
A mathematical assertion is a prediction, a foretelling o f the result o f performing 
certain actions upon signs. In making an assertion the Mathematician is claiming 
to know what would happen if  the sign activities detailed in the assertion were to 
be carried out. (p. 13)
The Mathematician cannot directly verify claims that would require infinitely many 
operations, so she or he sets up a thought experiment in which it is the Agent who 
performs the necessary actions. The proof o f the assertion is presented via the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
mathematical Code, which consists o f “the discursive sum of all legitimately defined 
signs and rigorously formulated sign practices that are permitted to figure in 
mathematical texts” (p. 15). The proof is guided by an underlying idea, which Peirce 
called a leading principle. Discussion o f neither the leading principle nor knowledge of 
the Agent are permitted in the Code. Rather, they are part of the metaCode, which 
consists of “informal, unrigorous locutions within natural language involved in talking 
about, referring to, and discussing the Code that mathematicians sanction” (p. 15). Thus, 
it is not the Mathematician alone but the Mathematician in the presence of the Person, the 
natural language subject o f the metaCode, who can be persuaded by a proof, for 
conviction depends upon knowledge o f both the leading principle and the actions o f the 
Agent.
Rotman (1988) then uses this model to provide compelling critiques o f the three 
mathematical philosophies, largely based upon the aspects of mathematical experience 
that they ignore. I will not discuss the substance of these critiques except to mention the 
Platonic nature of naming. In present-day mathematical Platonism, the principal function 
of language is naming aspects of a pre-existing world—of assigning names to 
prelinguistic referents. Rotman argues instead that mathematical language creates reality. 
Furthermore,
what present-day mathematicians think they are doing— using mathematical 
language as a transparent medium for describing a world of pre-semiotic 
reality— is semiotically alienated from what they are, according to the present 
account, doing— namely, creating that reality through the very language which 
claims to “describe” it. (p. 30)
Rotman’s point here suggests that the preceding discussion of semiotics, particularly the 
Peircian version, suffers from what might be a serious philosophical problem: the
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ontological status o f the mathematical object that serves as the referent in the model of 
the sign. In mathematical discourse, the various signifiers exist as marks on paper or 
perhaps merely as ephemeral vibrations in the air; the concepts exist in the minds of the 
students or in the collective mind of the mathematical community, as reflected in 
discourse. But in what sense does the object exist and, more particularly, where does it 
exist?
This is an age-old philosophical problem that was present in the work of Plato, Russell, 
Frege, Godel, Hilbert, and many others. Rather than choosing among the various 
solutions to this problem, I suggest that for this study (and, I believe, for the semiotic 
study of mathematical cognition more generally) it was necessary only to suppose that 
mathematical objects exist in some sense. In particular, this assumption is all that is 
necessary for semiotics to be a useful analytical tool. From my understanding of 
philosophies o f mathematics, this assumption and the general sign (Figure 3) fit with all 
the major philosophies o f mathematics, with the exception o f Hilbert’s strict formalism, 
which maintains that the symbols are themselves the mathematical objects. In particular, 
this approach can satisfy both Platonistic and anti-Platonistic philosophies (see Balaguer, 
1998).
The point is mathematical cognition is primarily a psychological problem, not a 
philosophical problem, and, as such, theoretical explanations must be psychologically 
plausible. In other words, psychological considerations must trump philosophical ones. 
Whether one supposes that mathematical objects exist in an abstract Platonic realm or 
exist only as fictions, whether abstract objects are created by the community or by an 
individual’s thought, mathematical discourse— including all extemalization of
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mathematical thought—proceeds as though abstract objects exist, and thus the analysis 
proceeded on this basis.
Unfortunately, this assumption is not sufficient to establish the psychological and 
philosophical grounding of my version of Peirce’s semiotics. There is also the problem 
o f whether the concept is distinct from the object. From a psychological perspective, it is 
clear that the concept and the object are not identical. A concept o f a rock is certainly not 
identical to a rock that exists as an object in the world. Similarly, it is useful to consider 
that a concept o f the group o f integers is distinct from the object that is the set o f integers 
under addition. If  the object exists physically, then there is no question that a concept of 
the object is distinct from the object itself. Thus, once again, independent of where, how, 
or even whether mathematical objects exist, it was useful in the analysis to suppose that 
the concept and the object are distinct.
To complete this discussion, I must address the question of whether the signifier is 
distinct from the referent. In the case of a rock, there is no signifier; the rock is the object 
and Peirce’s triadic structure fails. This is not surprising, however, for Peirce’s semiotics 
is a theory of signs, not of physical objects. One approach, due to Hilbert, is to suppose 
that the symbols are the objects, simultaneously solving the ontological problem above 
and rendering the current question moot. Hilbert’s solution to this problem strikes me as 
a desperate attempt to construct a coherent, anti-Platonic philosophy of mathematics.
The approach is both counterintuitive and anti-psychological, for it ignores the nature of 
mathematical activity and discourse. Mathematicians feel as though they are working 
with real objects that exist independent o f the symbols and independent of their own
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thought, and mathematical discourse suggests such a perspective (see, e.g., P. J. Davis & 
Hersh, 1981).
Nonetheless, there is sometimes a sense in which students treat symbols as though they 
are the objects. Nemirovsky and Monk (2000) suggest the construct offusion to describe 
how some children behave when symbols are used to model something in the world, such 
as marks on a page to represent people getting on and off a bus, or when a stick becomes 
a horse during a child’s play. This construct is not immediately helpful for noncontextual 
mathematics, when there is neither a physical object nor a physical activity that the 
student is attempting to model with the symbols. In the case o f a physical object or 
activity, the student is always able to step back and agree that the stick is not really the 
horse and the marks on the page are not really people on a bus. In the case o f abstract 
mathematics, the phenomenon is more complex. Sfard (2000) points out that a crucial 
event in learning about a mathematical concept is when an individual separates a signifier 
from its referent. At first, the symbol (perhaps an operation table o f a group) is the object 
o f thought, much as a particular rock may be an object o f thought. The students begins to 
develop a concept of the symbol by developing some familiarity with it, perhaps relating 
it to other symbols, transforming the symbol in various ways, and particularly translating 
it to what is to be another symbolic representation o f the same object. Eventually, as the 
student begins to see the symbol not as a thing-in-itself but as a representation, then the 
student has a concept o f an abstract object and the Peircian triadic sign applies.
Semiotics in Mathematics Education
Because this version o f semiotics and the semiotic framework below is not identical to 
anything currently available in the literature, it is important to point out some similarities
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and differences. I have already discussed ways in which this semiotics is similar to the 
work of Sfard (2000) and others. Several other mathematics education researchers use 
Lacan’s (1977) modifications o f Saussure’s version of semiotics to describe chains of 
signifiers that arise in mathematical discourse. For example, Sfard (2000) suggests that 
“in Lacan’s writings, one finds the idea of a sign turning into a signified of another sign” 
(p. 45). Proceeding in this way, one can create a hierarchy o f signs o f increasing 
abstraction. The literature describes how students use chains such as candies —» unifix 
cubes —» pictured collections —» verbal enumerations (Cobb, Gravemeijer, Yackel, 
McClain, & Whitenack, 1997) and double-decker bus passengers -»  beads -»  
nonstandard notations —> conventional notations (Gravemeijer, Cobb, Bowers, & 
Whitenack, 2000). Such chains of signifiers typically proceed from some real-world 
situation to be modeled, to abbreviated (iconic or essentially indexical) signifiers, to 
conventional symbols. The trouble with this description is that any chain o f signifiers 
creates a hierarchy that implicitly privileges some signifiers over others. In studying 
advanced mathematics, where what is important is moving flexibly among the various 
important signifiers, including names, definitions, and several symbolic representations, 
one needs a framework that allows more flexibility. The Peircian approach is preferable 
because it allows consideration of the concept and the object separately, as discussed 
above, and because it allows a nonhierarchical perspective on the various signs that might 
come into play during mathematical discourse.
Analytical Framework
The goal o f the study was to characterize students’ images for concepts in elementary 
group theory. The preceding sections have described a number o f theoretical constructs
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that inform the characterizations. In particular, I have discussed the role of definitions in 
mathematics, the role o f metaphor in mathematical intuition, the distinction between 
processes and objects in mathematical thinking, the distinction between abstraction and 
generalization in the creation of mathematical concepts, and the role o f naming and 
notation in mathematical thinking and communication. The primary analytical tool, 
borrowed from semiotics, is the sign, embodied as the distinction between a signifier, a 
concept, and a referent.
In this section I describe how these theoretical constructs and analytical tools are brought 
together in an analytical framework. For the purposes o f this study, I was interested in 
the relationship between a concept and three types o f signs: symbols, names, and 
definitions, including informal ones. That symbols and names are signs is obvious; that 
definitions are signs follows from the substitution criterion described above. A primary 
activity of thought is replacing one representation with another, and substitution of a 
definition for the defined accomplishes exactly that.
The theoretical constructs discussed above are partially synthesized in the semiotic 
conceptual framework shown in Figure 4 for a conceptual object. It is important to note 
the framework is but a mere skeleton intended to highlight the main relationships for this 
analysis. The two front-most faces of this pyramid and the vertical cross-section through 
the vertices labeled concept, name, and referent each constitute a sign in the Peircian 
sense, in that they are triadic relationships between a concept, a signifier (a name, 
symbol, or definition), and a referent. Furthermore, the framework suggests 
consideration o f mediating role (in Vygotsky’s sense) of the name, symbol, or definition 
in mathematical activity.
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The framework in Figure 4 is not a concept image but rather an organized collection of 
slices of the concept image that serves as a tool for semiotic analysis. Separating these 
various signifiers from the referent and from each other provides lenses for looking at 
students’ use of language and notation for the purpose o f making inferences about the 
conceptual structures that the language and notation represents. By paying attention to 
structural relations among signifiers, one can gain insights on structural relations among 
concepts.
As for the concepts themselves, they are likely to be metaphorical in nature, and semiotic 
analysis can serve to reveal some o f the operative metaphors. As for the referents, they 
may be objects, processes, properties, or some combination o f these, though in view of 
the process/object duality of many mathematical concepts, perhaps the nature o f the 
referent is in the relationship between the concept and the referent. Taken as a whole, 
this framework for analysis can be seen as an elaboration of Gray and Tail’s (1994) 
notion of procept, where the semiotic nature o f the analysis is made explicit. 
Furthermore, the analysis takes advantage of the observation that it is possible to 
ascertain whether students have constructed a mental object based on the way they talk 
and write about the concept (Tall et al., 2000).
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The above framework serves to guide the analysis o f individual concepts. But what 
about collections o f concepts and the relationships among them? Here I use the metaphor 
of a conceptual grid that organizes experience into concepts. The grid is not in an 
individual’s cognitive structure but rather is created because o f one’s cognitive structure 
and is then imposed on experience. In other words, a conceptual grid is not something 
one has but rather something one uses. There is a potential conflict, it should be pointed 
out, between the notion of concept image, which assumes the concepts to be primary, and 
the metaphor o f a conceptual grid that manifests itself in the way experience is cut up and 
organized into concepts. Thus, one needs a sufficiently flexible notion of concept image 
to accommodate not only the possibility that students might have the right concepts but 
attach the wrong names but also the possibility of having entirely different concepts. In 
general, this accommodation requires an analysis that gets at the concept without the 
name (via an activity) and also analysis that tries to determine what is organized under 
that name. Furthermore, the analysis must provide for the possibility of multiple 
meanings in the language itself (polysemy or lexical ambiguity) and the analogous 
phenomenon of compartmentalization in thought, wherein an individual holds two 
aspects of the same concept under the same name in such a way that they are not evoked 
at the same time and therefore do not interact.
Summary
On the fundamental assumption that mathematical learning is meaningful learning, the 
ideas expressed in this chapter combine to create a conceptual and analytical framework 
intended to support the investigation of the meaning behind students’ utterances. The 
notion of a concept image, as distinct from a concept definition, served to organize the
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analysis o f learning and using the various concepts in elementary group theory. To 
characterize the students’ concept images, I paid attention to issues o f abstraction and 
generalization, to the sense in which they treated the concepts as processes or objects, and 
to the metaphors they used explicitly or implicitly. To study the students’ use of 
language and notation, I borrowed constructs from semiotics, focusing in particular on 
the sign as a relationship among a signifier, a concept, and a referent, such as a 
mathematical object.
The conceptual perspective evolved over the course o f the study. Early versions helped 
to frame the initial research questions, to inform the design and implementation o f the 
course, and to ground the research methodology and data collection. Later versions 
served to guide the analysis of the data. These contextual aspects o f the study and the 
evolution o f the research questions and methodology are elaborated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV 
CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY
The participants in this study were enrolled in a junior-level abstract algebra course at the 
University o f New Hampshire (UNH) during the spring term o f 1996. The class was 
taught by Dr. Steve Benson, a visiting faculty member, and I served as his teaching 
assistant. The curriculum was designed collaboratively by Dr. Benson and me. The 
instruction was unusual in that there were no formal lectures, although there were whole- 
class discussions at least weekly that were led by Dr. Benson or me.
This setting was chosen for the study based, in part, on my theoretical stance and my 
research questions. They might be paraphrased as, What does students’ understanding 
look like in abstract algebra, and how does it build on their prior experience? Because 
this was essentially an exploratory study, I wanted to be able to observe some o f this 
knowledge building in a rich, example-driven environment in which the students were 
encouraged to make their thinking overt and explicit.
The analysis and results are based largely on interviews with five key participants. The 
methods of analysis were designed to provide characterizations o f the students’ concept 
images. This chapter describes the context, curriculum, and instruction in more detail, 
followed by descriptions o f the participants, the data sources, and the methods of 
analysis.
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The Context
UNH is a land-grant institution with about 10,500 undergraduate and 2,000 graduate 
students. The mathematics department consists o f 23 full-time faculty, 3 faculty emeriti, 
4 adjunct faculty, and 34 full-time graduate students.8 The department offers 10 
undergraduate major programs: a Bachelor o f Arts (BA) in Mathematics; a Bachelor of 
Science (BS) in Mathematics; a BS in Mathematics Education, with Elementary, Middle, 
and Secondary School options; and a BS in Interdisciplinary Mathematics with options in 
Computer Science, Economics, Electrical Science, Physics, and Statistics.
The Course
The class that provided the setting for the study was an abstract algebra course intended 
to be taken by most mathematics majors at UNH and required by the BA in Mathematics, 
the BS in Mathematics, and the Middle and Secondary School options o f the BS in 
Mathematics Education. The course was offered in only one section in the spring term of 
1996.
The class met for 50 minutes, four times per week, for 15 weeks. (See Appendix A for a 
syllabus.) There were two midterm exams, the first consisting o f an in-class and a take- 
home portion and the second entirely take-home, and a two-hour final exam (see 
Appendix B). A standard text (Gallian, 1994) was used as a resource for examples, 
problems, and explanations. The bulk of the class was devoted to collaborative problem 
sets (classwork) and individual assignments (homework), written by Dr. Benson and me, 
with Dr. Benson taking the lead role. Problem sets with homework assignments were
8 These data are from 2000 and are reasonably representative of the situation in 1996.
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distributed (sometimes separately) approximately every week, though more frequently at 
the beginning o f the course (see Appendix C). Some o f the classwork was completed 
using the computer software Exploring Small Groups (Geissinger, 1989), which was 
available in the department’s computer laboratory. The classwork and homework were 
periodically collected for comment or grading. Although I provided comments on the 
students’ work, I had no responsibility for grading.
Mathematical Content
This course focused on group theory, including the concepts o f group, subgroup, 
isomorphism, homomorphism, coset, and quotient group. This focus is in contrast to 
some beginning abstract algebra courses that include introduction to rings and fields. To 
provide an experiential basis for the group axioms, these concepts were preceded by 
some exploratory work in number theory, particularly modular arithmetic. The course 
was highly example driven, focusing especially on the following:
Z: The group o f integers. The elements are the integers, {... , -2, -1, 0, 1,2, ...},  
and the operation is addition. Sometimes the operation o f multiplication was also 
considered to illustrate the failure of the inverse axiom.
nZ\ The group of multiples o f n. The elements are the integers, {... , -In. -n, 0, n,
2n, . . .},  and the operation is addition.
Z„: the group of integers modulo n. The elements are the integers {0, 1, ... , n -  
1} and the operation is addition modulo n. Sometimes multiplication modulo n 
was also considered to illustrate the failure o f the inverse axiom.
U„: the group o f units modulo n. The elements are the integers in {0, 1 -  
1} that have inverses under the operation multiplication modulo n. An equivalent 
characterization is the integers i n { l , . . . , « - l }  that are relatively prime (i.e., 
share no factors) with n. Thus, for example, Ul0 = {1, 3, 7, 9}.
D„: the dihedral group o f order 2n. The elements are the symmetries of a regular 
n-gon and the operation is given by thinking o f the symmetries as 
transformations and composing them; that is, carrying out one transformation 
followed by the other. The elements o f D„ were represented both geometrically 
(as transformations) and as permutations o f the vertices.
S„: The symmetric group of degree n. The elements are the permutations o f a set 
with n elements, and the operation is composition of permutations, thought o f as
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functions. The elements were usually represented as arrays notation or in cycle 
notation. For example, a permutation a , where a ( l )  = 3, a(2) = 2, a(3) = 4, a(4)
= 1, is represented by the array
1 2 3 4'
3 2 4 1
where the elements in the second row indicate the images o f the elements in the 
first row. In cycle notation, this same permutation would be written (134), 
indicating that 1 goes to 3, which goes to 4, which goes (back) to 1. The fact that 
2 is missing implies that 2 remains unchanged. The identity permutation is 
denoted (1) in cycle notation, specifying explicitly that 1 goes to 1 and implying 
that everything else remains unchanged as well.
We also considered the real, rational, and complex numbers; sets o f matrices; and various 
groups and nongroups given by operation tables. During class and on problem sets, these 
examples were notated as sets, leaving the operation implicit (see chapter 5).
These examples were used to motivate the concepts treated in the course, which included 
group, subgroup, isomorphism, center, centralizer, order o f an element, cyclic subgroups, 
subgroups generated by elements, homomorphism, coset, Lagrange’s theorem, and 
quotient groups. These concepts are described in more detail in the description o f the 
problem sets below.
Instruction
As was stated above, this class included no lectures. Most o f the time for this class, both 
in class and out, was devoted to working on activities and problem sets designed by Dr. 
Benson and me. The students worked through most of the activities and problem sets 
collaboratively, usually in groups o f three or four, although some assignments, 
particularly the take-home exams, were to be completed individually. During class time, 
Dr. Benson and I worked with the groups and periodically brought the whole class 
together to discuss common issues, to encourage synthesis o f the various results, and to 
point toward important themes and ideas. Both individually and when working
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collaboratively, the students were expected to justify their claims. In this way, student 
thinking was expected to be overt and explicit. Both Dr. Benson and I held office hours, 
both regularly and as needed, and students attended both individually and in groups, 
usually to get help with specific problems on the problem sets.
Aspects o f the theoretical perspective described in chapter 3 implicitly and explicitly 
informed the instruction and the design and implementation of the problem sets. In 
particular, Dr. Benson and I tried to pay particular attention to what the students were 
thinking because what they learned might not be what we intended. The class was 
somewhat like a teaching experiment in that our planning tried to take into account the 
experiences, including both difficulties and insights, that students were having with 
previous problem sets. Moreover, because reflection is key to building strong and 
productive understandings, we encouraged overt reflective activity whenever possible, 
meaning that the students were expected to explain their thinking, orally or in writing, to 
us or to other students.
Problem Sets and Homework
The problem sets were designed to provide experience with examples that could be used 
to motivate the key ideas. Often, concepts were introduced not by a definition, statement, 
or theorem, but by a problem. Then, as students developed solutions, key features or 
properties o f the problem were drawn out, defined, and given standard names and 
notations. Often the key terms, definitions, and notations were provided again in 
subsequent problem sets. In this way, the students might see some o f the concepts as 
growing naturally from the problems they were trying to solve. A sampling of the 
problem sets is included in Appendix C.
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The course initially focused on modular arithmetic, which was used the primary example 
o f a system in which to solve equations. For example, the students were asked to find 
solutions o f 3 + x = 5 mod 7, 3x = 5 mod 7, and 3x = 5 mod 6 , and to investigate when 
such equations had a unique solution, no solutions, or multiple solutions. The students 
also spent time solving equations o f the form ax = b, a + x  = b, or a*x = b in other 
mathematical systems such as subsets o f the real numbers, sets o f matrices, and also in 
finite systems for which the operation was given by an operation table. The group 
axioms were then presented as a generalized consolidation o f what the students suggested 
needed to be true about a system in order for such equations always to be solvable.
The students were asked to find all possible Cayley tables with 2, 3, and 4 elements in 
order to motivate the ideas o f isomorphic groups, which they initially called congruent 
groups. The isomorphism itself was not explicitly a function, at first, but instead resulted 
from a renaming process based on looking at the group table.
In order to provide experience for making sense of addition and multiplication o f cosets, 
set addition (and multiplication) were introduced early through examples such as 
{1, 3, 4} + {2, 6 } = {3, 7, 5, 9, 6 , 10} and by comparing the sets 3Z, 3Z +  1, ... , 3Z+ 7. 
Later, the students were asked to make operation tables for {0, 4, 8 }, {1, 5, 9}, {2, 6 , 10}, 
and {3, 7, 11} in Z 1 2 . And to motivate the usefulness of the normality o f a subgroup after 
introducing the concept of coset, the students performed coset arithmetic at first without 
concern for whether the subgroup was normal. Additional detail is provided in chapter 6 .
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Participants
All 29 students enrolled in the class were participants in the study for the purposes of 
field observation. All were mathematics majors: 24 o f them were juniors, and 22 were 
pursing a Bachelor o f Science in one or more of the Mathematics Education options.
This high concentration o f mathematics education majors is typical in the spring semester 
offering of this course. They had previously taken an average o f seven mathematics 
classes, typically including a four-course calculus sequence, courses in mathematical 
proof and statistics, and another course such as geometry or linear algebra. Because the 
mathematical proof course is a prerequisite for abstract algebra, it is reasonable to assume 
that all students had taken it previously, although two did not list it on the questionnaire 
distributed on the first day of class. O f the 29 participants, 25 allowed collection of their 
written work, 21 were willing to be interviewed, and 19 consented to both. Blank 
consent forms and Institutional Review Board Approval are provided in Appendix D.
Almost all o f the students who completed course evaluations said they found the problem 
sets and the collaboration helpful in their learning. Some students even said they found 
the take-home exams particularly helpful.
Key Participants
For key participants, I wanted students who might be considered typical students in the 
course. I did not want students who were struggling so much that the interviews would 
not be able to reveal their understanding of the key ideas in the course. On the other 
hand, I did not want students for whom many of the abstractions and generalizations were 
quick and obvious. Thus, based on discussions with and observations o f the students 
over the first two weeks of the course, I chose six students who had given permission for
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full participation and whom I expected to perform at an average level in the class. As it 
turned out, their grades were above average, with 3 A, 2 A-, and 1 B in the following 
distribution: 13 A, 4 A-, 9 B, 2 B-, and 1 D. The study was based primarily on an 
analysis o f the interviews with the five students for whom I was able to collect a full set 
o f interviews: Carla, Diane, Lori, Robert, and Wendy . 9  These students are described 
briefly below.
The data for these sketches come from three sources: questionnaires distributed to all the 
students at the beginning of the course, moments in the interviews when the students 
chose to describe themselves, and conversations with the students after the completion of 
the class.
Carla. Carla was a junior and was majoring in mathematics education in both the middle 
and secondary school options. She planned to teach eighth grade. She had taken seven 
college mathematics courses previously, including calculus, and was taking linear algebra 
concurrently. Two of these courses were among those taken primarily by preservice 
elementary teachers.
Carla described herself as follows: “I am a visual learner. So I remember, like, a 
sequence o f letters if  I see them” (Interview 1, line 34). She said she was a very 
successful mathematics student, though she admitted mathematics had not always been 
easy for her. When a mathematics course was very challenging, she often looked back 
later and appreciated the struggle. Looking back on this abstract algebra class, she 
indicated that the class had been stressful and she did not like the fact that that Dr.
9 The key participants have been given pseudonyms that preserve their gender.
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Benson and I often answered questions with questions. Nonetheless, she felt that she had 
learned a lot.
Diane. Diane was a junior majoring in mathematics education under the secondary 
school option. She had taken six mathematics courses previously, including calculus.
She hoped to teach high school mathematics, particularly algebra and calculus.
On her questionnaire, Diane expressed some apprehension: “Because o f the approach of 
this class I ’m a little concerned with how I ’ll do. It’s different working through a 
problem, exploring possibilities and then reaching some conclusions, not just begin told 
that something is right and here’s how to do it.” During her second interview, she 
indicated some frustration with the exploratory approach, which she described as “just 
playing around with it like this. There has got to be a better way” (line 101). After all, 
“this is math. There are always rules to follow, and it’s always very neat.... But this has 
already been established somewhere, so I know there’s rules” (lines 235-240).
Lori. Lori was a junior pursuing a BA in mathematics and not intending to teach. She 
was repeating the course. She had been advised to take abstract algebra in the fall 
because o f a perception that the sections offered in the fall were typically geared more 
toward the mathematics majors and those in the spring were geared more toward the 
mathematics education majors. Because she had received a poor grade in the fall, she 
was taking the course again in order to improve the grade on her transcript. She had 
taken five other mathematics courses previously.
Lori was the weakest student among the key participants. She was the only one who 
received a B in the class; all of the others received an A or an A-. She indicated that she
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appreciated some aspects o f the approach of this class: “I don’t think that I necessarily 
understood the concept o f closed until we made charts and tables and stuff, and we never 
made tables last semester” (Interview 1, line 5).
Robert. Robert was a junior and a mathematics education major under the secondary 
school option. He had taken five mathematics classes previously, including calculus. He 
intended to teach high school mathematics and was considering a graduate degree in 
science education.
Robert claimed on his questionnaire that he had had uneven success in his mathematics 
classes: “I find that I do all right w/ computational math, but I find the theory classes very 
difficult. Perhaps due to my lack of intuition.” When struggling with an unfamiliar 
problem or concept, he said that he often look at various texts, examples, definitions, to 
“see if I could make heads or tails out of it, which, typically, I probably couldn’t. It’s 
written in mathematics, not English” (Interview 1, line 162).
Wendy. Wendy was a senior and was majoring in mathematics education in the 
elementary and middle school option. During her program she had decided that she 
would prefer to teach secondary school, so she was planning to attend graduate school for 
secondary certification after graduation. She had taken thirteen mathematics courses 
previously, including calculus. Three o f the courses were among those typically taken by 
preservice elementary teachers.
After the class was over, Wendy indicated that her favorite part about the class was all 
the writing. She explained that she got a lot out of doing the problems and said she got 
even more out of explaining the problem and trying to write her solution carefully.
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Instructor
Dr. Steve Benson is a mathematician who was a visiting faculty member at UNH and 
who, at the time, had recently decided to devote his attention to mathematics education. 
He received his doctorate from the University of Illinois in 1988 and then held a two-year 
postdoctoral teaching position at St. O laf College. He taught at Santa Clara University 
and another year at St. O laf before coming to UNH in the fall o f 1995. His research area 
was algebraic number theory. While working in mathematics, he published two research 
papers, two expository papers in journals of the Mathematical Association of America, 
and one paper on teaching suggestions in abstract algebra (Benson & Richey, 1994).
Dr. Benson had a temporary faculty appointment in the mathematics department at UNH, 
which he saw as an opportunity to learn about and begin working in mathematics 
education by interacting with the faculty and graduate students in the Ph.D. program. His 
teaching was always a priority in his work, as evidenced by a graduate student teaching 
award at the University o f Illinois and by consistently excellent teaching evaluations. In 
fact, teaching was a primary reason that he pursued and accepted the postdoctoral 
position at St. Olaf College, which is known for valuing and encouraging quality 
teaching. He had taught the content of this abstract algebra course three times before, 
although previously his approach had been more traditional.
T eacher/Researcher
In my interactions with students, I played two roles—teacher and researcher—which 
brought both opportunities and pitfalls. Ball (2000) suggests that such an approach 
“offers the researcher a role in creating the phenomenon to be investigated coupled with 
the capacity to examine it from the inside, to leam that which is less visible” (p. 388).
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Simultaneously, the dual roles create challenges with respect to the validity and 
generalizability o f the results, and particularly with respect to causation. Here I pause to 
discuss how I managed and coordinated these roles.
By assuming the roles o f both teacher and researcher in this study, I gained considerable 
inside knowledge. In constructing the problem sets, I provided some o f the ideas and 
served as a sounding board for some of Dr. Benson’s ideas. Like Dr. Benson, I helped 
and guided groups o f students as they worked in class on their problem sets. I led some 
of the whole-class discussions, and I provided office hours in which students sought extra 
help. In this way, I provided another pair o f ears and eyes to help Dr. Benson learn about 
the students and their thinking. These duties not only provided detailed knowledge o f the 
context for the interviews but also helped me get to know all the students much better 
than if  I had merely observed from the back of the class and selected a few for interviews.
In class as well as in office hours, the students’ thinking was expected to be explicit and 
was valued, no matter how nascent. Dr. Benson and I rarely told students that they were 
right or wrong, an approach that served to encourage their own thinking and discussion, 
although, in retrospect, our implementation o f this approach may have been too extreme, 
as it occasionally led to unproductive discussions (see Chazan & Ball, 1999). It is 
plausible that the atmosphere we had created in the classroom was partially responsible 
for the fact that key participants often required little prompting in the interviews.
Many of the pitfalls of being a teacher/researcher arise when the purpose of the research 
is to study teaching. The problem is gaining sufficient objectivity to ensure the reliability 
o f observations and the validity of conclusions about one’s own thoughts and actions.
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Such pitfalls were not present in this study, however, because the purpose was to study 
learning.
Some of the challenges arise in any research that relies on cases. In such research, 
generalizations must be made carefully and are often only tentative. Any generalization 
depends upon the extent to which the case resembles other situations. Yet 
generalizability depends also upon the nature of the claim. When the goal is to establish 
an existence proof or theory building, as was the case for this study, generalizability is 
determined outside and after the study and thus is not really an issue.
The most potentially problematic issue for a study such as this is the evaluative role of 
the teacher. Ball hints at the issue when asking, “What might [the students] not want to 
say to her? What might it be risky to disclose?” (p. 389). Although it is plausible that 
this issue is not serious when the students are third graders, as in Ball’s research, I am 
quite convinced that it merits careful consideration when the students are undergraduates. 
This is why I chose to make it clear to the students, with Dr. Benson’s support and 
assistance, that I was to play no direct evaluative role in the class. I was particularly 
fortunate that Dr. Benson was comfortable with this arrangement.
The goal o f this study was to describe student thinking and, to the extent possible, to 
build theoretical explanations for the descriptions without necessarily attributing cause as 
part of the explanations. With such goals, validity and reliability are ensured during 
analysis through the constant comparative method, as described under methods of 
analysis. In summary, the conduct o f the study and the methods o f analysis were 
designed to take advantage o f the opportunities and mitigate the pitfalls of my dual role 
as teacher/researcher.
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Data Sources
The primary source of data was the interviews with five key participants. Some exams 
and other written work were also collected, including final exam and second midterm 
papers from all the students, to provide a broader view o f the ways students understood 
the material. Contextual data were provided through a questionnaire distributed on the 
first day o f class (see Appendix A), from field notes I took on 20 occasions, from the 
problem sets and explanatory handouts, and from audiotaped planning discussions with 
Dr. Benson.
The Interviews
The interviews took place outside of class, and the students were compensated for their 
time. All interviews were simultaneously videotaped and audiotaped to aid subsequent 
transcription and analysis. Each of the five key participants took part in four interviews 
organized roughly around mathematical content, as described below. To provide some 
perspective on how the students were working together in the collaborative setting, Lori 
and Diane were usually interviewed together. (Their third interviews occurred separately 
because of scheduling difficulties.) Thus, a total o f 17 interviews provided the core of 
the data. The interview schedule is given in Table 1. Two of the interviews took place 
after the final exam, which was administered on May 10, 1996.
The interviews were intended to address the initial versions of my research questions, 
which all fit under the guiding question, “In what ways do these students understand the 
mathematical content o f the course?” The interviews were not highly structured but 
rather were exploratory and contingent. To provide sufficient data on each of the key 
concepts in the course, the four interviews were organized around mathematical content:
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(1) groups and subgroups, (2) isomorphisms, (3) homomorphisms and cosets, and 
(4) quotient groups. Each interview typically began with a common question and 
proceeded from there, guided by the student’s responses.
Table 1. Interview Schedule
Diane and Lori Interview 1 04/05/96
Robert Interview 1 04/05/96
Wendy Interview 1 04/06/96
Carla Interview 1 04/12/96
Robert Interview 2 04/15/96
Diane and Lori Interview 2 04/17/96
Wendy Interview 2 04/18/96
Carla Interview 2 04/24/96
Diane Interview 3 05/01/96
Carla Interview 3 05/02/96
Diane and Lori Interview 4 05/03/96
Carla Interview 4 05/07/96
Robert Interview 3 05/07/96
Wendy Interview 3 05/08/96
Robert Interview 4 05/09/96
Lori Interview 3 05/13/96
Wendy Interview 4 05/13/96
The interviews were opportunities for me to observe the issues that the students were 
struggling with during their early learning of these new concepts. Thus, most o f the 
interviews were conducted during the several days after which key concepts had been 
introduced, sometimes immediately following the class. My aim was to try to understand 
students’ utterances as sensible and meaningful from their individual perspectives.
During all my discussions with students (during interviews, office hours, and class), my 
predominant method was to pose problems, ask questions, and encourage students to 
explain their thinking, so the students were accustomed to nondirective interaction. 
During the interviews, however, because I was trying to understand students’ 
understanding, I was typically more probing and less directive than in class or in office
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hours, at least until I thought I understood what a student was saying. Then, when I did 
move on, I typically posed a leading question intended to provide opportunities for the 
student to correct errors or make new connections among new and old ideas.
The interview tasks and questions were essentially o f three varieties: tasks from the 
literature, open-ended questions such as “What is a homomorphism?” intended to get at 
the meaning the student had developed, and questions intended to probe the key concepts 
through standard examples. The key questions and topics in the interviews are given 
below.
Interview 1: Groups and subgroups. The first interview began with the question, “Is Z3 a 
subgroup o f Z6?” During the students’ responses, I paid particular attention to the role of 
the operation. When the students had resolved the opening question, I asked them to find 
subgroups o f Zg and then to compare those subgroups with Z3 and Z2 to look for the 
beginnings o f the concept o f isomorphism.
Interview 2: Isomorphisms. The second interview approached the concept of 
isomorphism by comparing different groups o f order 4, beginning with the four operation 
tables the students had identified on their take-home exam. Carla’s second interview was 
largely about the concepts o f function, domain, and range, prompted by discussions 
during the class that had preceded the interview. With Robert, we began with a follow- 
up to the first interview and spent the remainder o f the interview representing the 
elements o f D 4 .
Interview 3: Homomorphisms and cosets. The third interview began with the question, 
“What is a homomorphism?” and I asked for examples. Then, I gave the students a
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homomorphism from Us to Z4  and asked how they would check whether it was a 
homomorphism. After checking a few specific examples, I asked them to find the kernel 
o f the homomorphism and the cosets of the kernel. I asked Robert also to find the cosets 
o f the subgroup generated by 3 in Z\i. I asked Wendy to try to make a group out o f the 
cosets.
Interview 4: Cosets and quotient groups. The fourth interview was based on comparing 
the cosets o f the subgroup generated by (12) in D 3 with the subgroup generated by (123). 
The students computed right and left cosets and then tried to construct a group using the 
cosets. Wendy also computed cosets and the quotient o f 4Z in Z, and Carla also 
constructed the cosets and quotient of {0, 3, 6 , 9} in Zn- Much of each interview was 
spent sorting out the students’ uses of the terms coset, normal, and quotient group to 
describe the results o f their calculations.
Conventions in Transcripts and Figures
All the interviews were transcribed. In the transcripts, I tried to capture all abandoned 
phrases and restatements, although “ahs” and “urns” were mostly ignored. Because I 
wanted the analysis to be guided as much as possible by complete thoughts, I chose the 
paragraph as the smallest unit o f coding, although I refer to these paragraphs as “lines” in 
the transcripts and provide line numbers for all direct quotes. In order to improve the 
coherence and completeness of paragraphs in the transcripts, I did not interrupt a 
statement from one speaker to insert inconsequential statements such as “Okay” from 
another speaker when the statement seemed to have no effect on the train of thought.
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Instead, I inserted such statements inside the paragraph o f the primary speaker, enclosing 
the statements in square brackets to signal the change o f speaker.
Numbers were written as numerals in the transcripts except when the use of the numbers 
did not seem relevant to the mathematics. In long lists of numbers, semicolons were used 
to indicate slight pauses. The notations x, +, - ,  and = were used only for the words times, 
plus, negative, and equals, respectively; similar expressions such as “added to” or “is 
equal to” were written out as words. Notations for standard groups were used throughout 
the transcripts, so that “Zee six” was transcribed as “Z6,” for example. Functional 
notation was used when the argument o f the function seemed clear, so that, for example, 
“f  of x” was transcribed as/(x). Set notation was used when the context or the written 
work suggested, either explicitly or implicitly, that the students were thinking about sets. 
Similar conventions were used for permutation notation, transcribing “one two three” as 
“(123),” for example. These transcriptional conventions helped me read and analyze the 
data more fluently than if  I had written out each word in full. Importantly, each of these 
conventions is reversible by reading the transcript aloud. The students’ written work was 
typeset as figures rather than scanned, on the judgment that the essential characteristics of 
that work could be more clearly conveyed this way. Thus, it is my conviction that these 
conventions improved the clarity o f the transcripts and the written work without 
influencing the data or analysis by imposing notation inappropriately.
Methods of Analysis
Essentially three types o f analysis were employed: detailed analysis o f each interview 
transcript; global analysis to confirm, refine, and refute the initial hypotheses generated
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by the detailed analysis; and conceptual analysis o f the mathematical content. Because 
both the research questions and the methods of analysis evolved as the study progressed,
I begin this section with discussion o f the fits and false starts that led to the methods. 
Then I provide a detailed description of the methods and the ways that each type of 
analysis informed the others. I close with a discussion o f the relationship between the 
methodology o f this study and the methodology o f constant comparison and grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Evolution of the Method
In my proposal for this study, the research questions included the following: “In what 
ways do these students understand the mathematical content o f the course? How do these 
understandings emerge from their experiences?” These broad questions were sufficient 
to guide the interviews, but, as will become clear, they were initially unhelpful in guiding 
the analysis because they neither suggested a scheme for coding nor helped me decide 
what to look for in the transcripts.
Before coding any o f the data, I developed a preliminary coding scheme that included 
categories o f mathematical content, such as coset and commutativity; categories from the 
research literature, such as the proof schemes o f Harel and Sowder (1998); categories of 
student action, such as choosing an example or giving a justification; categories about 
affect, metacognition, and the nature of mathematics; and categories that described the 
types of errors that students made, along with categories that described how errors were 
resolved. The scheme was, from my perspective, exhaustive (and exhausting), including 
all possible dimensions and aspects o f mathematical experience that I could imagine 
might be present in the interviews. My attempts to use this scheme to code the transcripts
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statement by statement proved unsuccessful not only because the scheme was unwieldy 
but also because the salient portions o f a transcript were typically extended exchanges 
that fell entirely under one or two codes. Simultaneously, other exchanges were 
straightforward calculations that were not particularly interesting. The fact that both 
kinds of exchanges received equal emphasis in the coding was clearly not satisfactory. 
Furthermore, large portions of the scheme did not seem pertinent to the available data.
I temporarily abandoned coding and instead carried out a detailed analysis o f each 
transcript. By comparing the audiotape with the student’s written work and, when 
necessary, with the videotape, each transcript was annotated to clarify the referents of 
pronouns and what the student was writing. At the same time, the transcripts were 
segmented into episodes, providing both a chronology and a table of contents for each 
interview. Additional annotations were inserted to highlight episodes, events, and 
statements that struck me as interesting or significant, typically because of the use of 
nonstandard language, an error that seemed nontrivial, a hint o f an unusual way of 
thinking, or a change that suggested learning. Guided by very general questions such as 
“What was the student doing? What was the student using?” I developed short 
descriptions o f these interesting events. The table o f contents and the significant events, 
together with my description, provided an initial “bottom-up” analysis that also served as 
a summary of the interview.
During the above processes, the research questions evolved, eventually arriving at 
questions such as, “What concept images do students demonstrate as they are learning the 
fundamental ideas o f group, subgroup, and isomorphism?” Using the summaries o f the 
interviews, I began the next phase o f analysis with an eye toward answering the research
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questions. Intending to delineate various components o f concept images, I developed a 
coding scheme that was short, focused on describing concept images, and more relevant 
to the data. The scheme had categories such as representations, properties, and examples 
o f concepts, as well as definitions, results, and associations about concepts. Once again, 
however, when I tried to code the transcripts, I had trouble making the scheme fit. It 
became clear that the most salient features o f the interviews were issues of language, 
notation, and meaning, and the relationship between signs and the concepts that they 
were intended to represent. These issues still were not sufficiently prominent in the 
coding scheme.
I again abandoned explicit coding. Reviewing the interview summaries, I instead asked 
directed questions such as “What can I say about this student and her concept o f group?” 
that led to answers such as the following: “She reasoned from the table; she confused 
related words; she used idiosyncratic language and syntax; she was confused about the 
operation in Z„.” The resulting long list o f observations about student thinking was then 
examined for emergent themes. In continuing the episode-by-episode analysis and 
synthesis, I elaborated the observations with examples of dialogue from the interviews, 
regularly asking myself, “What is this an example of?” thereby keeping the goal of 
describing student understanding at the forefront of my thought. As is described in detail 
below, I also looked for regularities and overarching themes that could be developed into 
theoretical explanations.
In summary, the method of analysis evolved from line-by-line coding to detailed 
description of significant episodes and events. Another way to describe the transition is 
as follows: The unit o f analysis was originally the concept, as indexed (not in the Peircian
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sense) by the concept name. The students’ language use was so unusual and 
idiosyncratic, however, that it became clear that the unit o f analysis needed to be the 
episode. This change is analogous to Wertsch’s (1985) observation that although 
Vygotsky began with the word as his unit of analysis, many o f his colleagues and 
students (e.g., Davidov, Leont’ev) moved to using the activity as the unit of analysis (see 
also Wertsch, 1981).
Detailed Description of the Method
The goal o f the analysis was, of course, to provide answer to the research questions, 
which meant describing students’ concept images for the key concepts in the course and 
also describing the ways that preliminary mathematical ideas came into play. In the 
analysis, I considered both personal and conventional meanings o f the concepts and 
focused on the differences between them, for that is where clues to learning problems lie. 
Thus, the main fodder for the descriptions o f students’ concept images was episodes, 
events, and statements that struck me as significant because o f potential differences 
between personal and conventional meanings. Events were pursued through detailed 
analysis when my observations about the event seemed sufficiently robust, such as when 
similar events occurred elsewhere with the same student or with a different student. In 
this section, I describe some technical and theoretical aspects o f the method and also 
provide additional detail.
Most of the data were managed via N5, the fifth major revision o f NUD*IST qualitative 
research software (QSR International, 2000). The annotated transcripts and their 
summaries were imported into N5 along with excerpts from the midterm and final exams 
of the five key participants. To provide some context for the interviews and exams, the
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discussions with Dr. Benson were summarized, including some verbatim transcription, 
and imported into N5. The field notes were also imported. All electronically available 
data were coded for mathematical content. In particular, I coded for the following 
concepts: modular arithmetic; function; binary operation; properties o f operations, 
including the four group axioms and commutativity; group; subgroup; isomorphism; 
homomorphism; kernel; coset; normality; and quotient group. These mathematical 
categories formed the primary headings under which I sought to describe students’ 
concept images.
In trying to create descriptions of students’ concept images, I found that one of the most 
puzzling aspects was explaining or even describing students’ idiosyncratic and seemingly 
inconsistent use o f language and notation. I was initially at a loss and for a long time 
found little in the mathematics education literature that helped me understand the 
students’ statements and actions. Eventually, I was led to literature in linguistics, 
philosophy, and particularly semiotics, from which I borrowed and adapted theoretical 
constructs that helped explain what I saw and that led to a theory that ultimately 
connected back to the mathematics education literature.
With these additional theoretical constructs, the analysis o f the episodes became 
essentially semiotic in character. Although semiotics holds no widely shared theoretical 
assumptions or methodologies, a consistent feature is looking beyond specific signs to 
discern the relationships between signs and the systems o f distinctions operating within 
them (Chandler, in press). For analyzing student thinking, the approach might be 
described as looking at the students’ language rather than through it (Sfard, 2000). 
Lacking direct access to the personal meanings o f the students, I relied on semiotic
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analysis to help me make inferences about those meanings and to build a theory that fit 
the data. In the detailed analysis o f the significant episodes, I tried to discern meaning in 
students’ utterances and tried to understand their use o f mathematical signs, particularly 
words, notations, and definitions, using the analytical framework described in chapter 3. 
Not all significant episodes were so analyzed; instead, I focused on those episodes that 
either spoke to the use o f language, notation, and representations; suggested 
consideration o f relevant objects, processes, or metaphors; or raised issues o f abstraction 
and generalization.
To complement the detailed analyses of episodes, I also took a global view, searching for 
additional uses o f words or notation that might confirm, refine, or refute the working 
hypotheses. For example, I coded and collected the various formal and informal 
definitions that the students gave of the key concepts in the course. Some o f these were 
in response to very direct prompts such as “What is a homomorphism?” as in the 
interviews, or “Provide complete definitions for the following terms and phrases” as on 
the final exam (Appendix B). Other definitions arose without a direct prompt, typically 
as part of an explanation o f something else.
In the global analysis, I used N5 to search the transcripts and other electronically 
available data for other instances of the signs (i.e., words and notations) that the students 
and I were using to discuss the particular concept. On the basis of my familiarity with the 
data and with the aid of the interview outlines, I also carefully examined portions o f the 
transcripts that were likely to speak to the particular ideas under analysis. The excerpts 
identified by these searches were considered first for relevance and then for fit with the 
emerging hypotheses, which were modified to accommodate data that did not fit.
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Because the study aimed to characterize students’ concept images, the hypotheses were 
often about a nonstandard conception that a student had during a particular episode. 
Sometimes the search identified excerpts that suggested that later in the course the 
student had developed a conception that fit better with standard mathematical usage. I 
saw such excerpts not as discontinuing evidence o f a hypothesis but rather as partial 
evidence o f learning.
The detailed and global analyses produced preliminary descriptions and representations 
o f students’ concept images for the key concepts in the course. These were compared 
with what I took to be standard language usage and descriptions o f the concepts in the 
mathematical community. This comparison was implicit, at first, in the sense that during 
the analysis, I was particularly interested in language or understanding that did not fit 
with my own, which I took to be a fair representation o f standard mathematical usage. 
Because both my interview technique and the method o f analysis took as a guiding 
principle the pursuit o f that which was interesting, unusual, or unexpected, many 
discrepancies with standard usage were explored in detail during the interviews 
themselves, thereby providing substantial supporting data to confirm or disconfirm both 
the implicit hypotheses that I was generating during the interview and the related 
hypotheses I was developing during the analysis.
To make explicit the concept images that implicitly guided my analyses o f student 
thinking, I also completed conceptual analyses o f the key concepts in the course, as 
described below. The various analyses were conducted iteratively. By reflecting on the 
students’ statements, I was often better able to conceptualize and articulate what the 
conventional concepts are and the distinctions between them. Conversely, with a detailed
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conceptual analysis I was better able to characterize students’ concept images. In this 
way, comparisons between students’ personal meanings and accepted mathematical 
meaning became increasingly explicit. Because these versions of the accepted 
mathematical meanings were largely my own creation, some explanation is in order.
In mature discourse, particularly within a professional community, meaning is often 
“taken as shared” in the sense that individuals converse as though their personal meaning 
is shared by the community (see, e.g., Cobb, Yackel, & Wood, 1992; Ernest, 1991). 
Because no one has direct access to the shared meaning o f the mathematical community, 
it was not possible to import conventional concepts directly into my analysis. 
Furthermore, traditional mathematical exposition would not have been appropriate for 
this study, because, as Pimm (1995) observes, mathematicians use words as though they 
are the concepts, as is apparent in mathematical discourse, and symbols as though they 
are the objects, as is revealed in the metaphor o f manipulation. Instead, I created 
descriptions o f the mathematics based on a conceptual analysis that aimed at careful 
semiotic description o f the meanings of the words and representations o f the mathematics 
under study. Guided by my own thinking, frequently consulting resources such as 
mathematical texts (e.g., Gallian, 1994; Herstein, 1975; Hungerford, 1974), and with 
careful consideration of accepted formal definitions, I arrived at a particular elaboration 
o f the meaning of a concept, highlighting its semiotic nature and including process, 
object, and metaphorical characterizations. I take these meanings to be shared by the 
community, in the sense that the descriptions fit with, though they are not identical to, 
descriptions I found in texts I consulted.
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As the detailed, global, and conceptual analyses proceeded, my preliminary observations 
about student understanding were combined, reworded, and sometimes dropped, leading 
to working hypotheses that were categorized eventually under two broad themes: the use 
o f language and notation and the mathematical meanings that students gave to their 
activity. Although my intent was originally to describe students’ concept images for a 
list of concepts, these themes became increasingly prominent as the analysis continued, 
eventually overtaking the mathematical content categories in importance. Furthermore, it 
became clear that these emergent themes provided not components but rather 
characteristics o f concept images. Thus, the research questions were adjusted to reflect 
this observation, resulting in the versions given in chapter 1 .
Characterizing the Method
The working hypotheses evolved over the course of the analysis into a theory that was 
organized under the two themes. Analysis, synthesis, and theory generation were 
conducted iteratively and sometimes simultaneously. In other words, by frequently 
returning to the initial analyses and to the data themselves to judge the faithfulness of the 
emerging theory and the accompanying explanations, I established the theory in an 
empirically grounded way.
Very late in the process, I realized that the detailed summaries functioned as codes, the 
preliminary observations served as initial categories and hypotheses, and the synthesis of 
the working hypotheses formed the core o f an emergent theory. It is now apparent that, 
disregarding the false starts, the method is consistent with the constant comparative 
method of Glaser and Strauss (1967; see Cobb & Whitenack, 1996, for a similar 
discussion). Theoretical constructs were developed as part o f the data analysis, and the
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constructs are grounded in the sense that they are rooted in the data. The inferences made 
while analyzing the episodes formed working hypotheses that were constantly compared 
to the data and modified in light of new data and analysis, and the theory emerged via this 
process. The methodology also emerged as I abandoned unproductive approaches and 
instead focused on what the data afforded. Explicit description o f the method was made 
only retrospectively.
What was hardest about the process that eventually led to this method was coming to the 
realization that there was no need to be apologetic about the fact that my initial research 
questions were vague and that I could not stick to a coding scheme. From the start, the 
goal o f this study had been to develop new understandings o f the ways that students learn 
abstract algebra. When the study began, the only extant theory had been grown out of 
Dubinsky’s (1991) APOS framework, and I suspected right away that the APOS 
framework missed and even obscured important issues for the learning and teaching of 
advanced mathematics. Now it is apparent that my aim all along was theory generation, 
which is precisely what the constant comparative method is intended to support.
As for the coding, by thinking up the coding scheme in advance, the subsequent attempts 
at statement-by-statement coding required that I impose (or force) preconceived 
categories onto the data. The coding did not work precisely because the codes did not fit 
the data. What I should have done instead was let the codes and categories emerge from 
the data, and that was the end result, despite the several dead ends that were explored.
To be precise, however, not all of the codes emerged from the data. In particular, coding 
and categorizing by mathematical content was intended in the early conceptualization of 
the study and remained important throughout. The fact that these categories were
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imposed on the data seems reasonable because they are natural in a sense, because I was 
interested in the learning o f specific mathematical content, and because these categories 
organize important learning goals. Thus, because o f these preconceived categories, the 
resulting theory is not entirely grounded in the sense o f Glaser (1992).
Relationship with Grounded Theory
I have mentioned that the method o f this study is consistent with the constant 
comparative method of Glaser and Strauss (1967), but that seminal book is more often 
cited (with little detail) for the methodology o f grounded theory. In this section, I fill in 
some of the oft-missing detail and explain the relationship between the constant 
comparative method and grounded theory. This discussion is particularly important 
because Glaser and Strauss themselves later disagreed about the methodological 
requirements o f constant comparison and grounded theory (compare Strauss & Corbin, 
1990; Glaser, 1992). I follow Glaser’s account because it seems to me to be more faithful 
to the notions o f groundedness and emergence.
The constant comparative method forms the methodological backbone in the 
development of grounded theory. Regarding the formulation of a research problem, 
Glaser (1992) suggests, “Remember and trust that the research problem is as much 
discovered as the process that continues to resolve it” (p. 21). As for reviewing the 
literature, Glaser dictates that the researcher not review any of the relevant literature in 
the field o f study (p. 31), because the theoretical constructs in the literature may 
contaminate the analysis, steering the researcher toward imposing preconceived 
categories on the data. Any theory that grows through the constant comparative method I
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will call an emergent theory, usage that fits with the work o f Glaser and much of the 
work of Cobb and his colleagues (see, e.g., Cobb & Whitenack, 1996).
How do the constant comparative method and an emergent theory satisfy the traditional 
research ideals o f validity and reliability? Glaser (1992) suggests that the criteria by 
which to judge the theory are not verification and reproducibility but rather fit, work, 
relevance, and modifiability. When the goal o f a study is theory generation, verification 
is not necessary if  the theory fits, although future studies might undertake verification. 
Furthermore, it matters not whether another researcher would have produced the same 
theory but rather whether the theory fits the data, works to explain the variation in the 
data, is relevant to the context from which the data came, and is modifiable to 
accommodate the integration o f additional concepts.
In the following chapters, I have tried to include enough detail in the analysis to 
demonstrate that these four key criteria are satisfied. The final analysis and the emergent 
theory for this study also essentially satisfied Glaser’s prohibitions about the formulation 
of the research problem and the influence of the relevant literature, if  the false starts and 
missteps are disregarded. Certainly, the original statement o f the research problem was 
sufficiently vague, and the statement of the research problems underwent revisions 
throughout the process in response to what was available in the data. Regarding the 
review of the literature, although I read much of the literature ahead o f time and did try to 
force some categories on the data, in the final analysis only the process/object distinction 
was helpful, and that formed but a small part of the resulting theory. O f course, I also 
used the notion of concept image, but that construct served mostly as a reminder that I
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aimed to describe students’ understandings broadly, and the construct carried little 
theoretical baggage that could have been imposed on the data.
Thus, the methodology of this study was consistent with the constant comparative 
method, and I call the result an emergent theory. A grounded theory, on the other hand, 
requires additional methodological commitments. For example, in Glaser’s version of 
grounded theory, data analysis and data collection are iterative so that emerging theories 
can inform and guide subsequent data collection. I do not see this discrepancy as very 
serious in this study, although I readily admit that the theory could have been developed 
further and in more detail if  I had been able to alternate analysis and data collection.
There are two senses, however, in which the design o f this study could not lead to a 
grounded theory. The first sense concerns the imposition o f codes for mathematical 
content, as described above. That was unavoidable. Because the goal was to understand 
learning in abstract algebra, it was necessary to keep the mathematical content available 
in the analysis.
The second discrepancy with the tenets o f grounded theory is more fundamental, though 
it also arises from the attention to mathematical learning. In formulating a research 
problem, Glaser suggests that the researcher enter the substantive area wondering what 
the main issue is for the subjects and the processes by which it is handled. Furthermore, 
it is essential that issue be relevant for the subjects from their perspectives. At least in his 
field o f sociology, it seems that Glaser hopes that the researcher’s findings might actually 
be directly useful to the subjects who participate in the study. Thus, in grounded theory, 
the subjects’ meanings are primary, whereas I was concerned not only with the subjects’ 
meanings but also with the community meanings and the fit between them. As both a
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researcher and a teacher, I want not only to understand students’ conceptions but also to 
understand how to guide and direct students toward important mathematical ideas and 
conventional concepts. This perspective was always in the background in the interviews. 
In the analysis, this perspective took a different form: How might we improve the 
teaching o f abstract algebra in particular and advanced mathematics in general?
It is hard to imagine a grounded theory that is committed to describing students’ 
conceptual understanding and its relationship with conventional concepts as they exist in 
the mathematical community. In studying students’ conceptual understanding, I would 
suggest that the criteria o f fit and relevance are with respect to teachers and researchers 
primarily and only secondarily with respect to the students. The fact that a theoretical 
construct is useful for teachers and researchers does not necessarily imply that it will be 
directly relevant for students, although it is possible to imagine recasting some constructs 
in ways that might assist students in reflecting on their own thinking and learning. The 
point is that in judging the theory, fit and relevance for students is at most a secondary 
consideration. After all, who would suggest that first graders should begin the year with 
some lessons on assimilation and accommodation?
Summary
This chapter provides a detailed description of the context for this study, including the 
curriculum, the instruction, and the participants, and the methodology employed. Briefly, 
this study consists o f a semiotic analysis o f interviews with students to support the 
development of theoretical descriptions of their understanding and learning in elementary 
group theory. The next three chapters provide the results o f that analysis, organized
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according to mathematical content and addressing the three main research questions 
individually.
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CHAPTER V
GROUPS AND ISOMORPHISMS
This chapter presents analysis of students’ concept images of binary operation, group, 
subgroup, and isomorphism, which were the mathematical foci o f the first and second 
interviews. The chapter is organized around the mathematics and thus essentially follows 
the chronology of the interviews. The bottom-up analysis of these interviews revealed 
two themes that are threaded throughout this chapter: use o f language and use o f the 
operation table. Because these themes are well illustrated by Wendy’s interviews, a 
detailed case study of Wendy’s concept images forms the bulk of the chapter, with 
supporting data from other students and other interviews providing corroborating and 
contrasting evidence. Each section begins with a description o f the interview task, which 
is followed by an analysis of the mathematics. Then portions o f the Wendy’s interviews 
are presented and analyzed, followed by related evidence from other students and other 
interviews. But first, I provide a short description o f Wendy’s language and reasoning as 
an introduction to the chapter’s main themes.
Wendy’s Language and Reasoning
Wendy often misused words. The analysis of the transcripts o f Wendy’s interviews was 
complicated by the fact that many o f her misstatements were mere slips of the tongue.
She would say one thing but meant to say something else. Such an inference is clearly 
reasonable in two kinds of situations: when Wendy immediately corrected herself and 
when she restated the idea differently moments later. Because these occurrences were
129
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rather frequent, Wendy’s language inaccuracies were also interpreted as slips of the 
tongue when both the context and W endy’s typical usage strongly suggested she intended 
to say something else. In cases where I do not otherwise call attention to her 
misstatement, I enclose in brackets what I believe she intended. Not all of Wendy’s 
misstatements were so categorized, however. In particular, her use o f the words inverse, 
identity, commutativity, associativity, and isomorphism indicated conceptual issues that 
are explored in this analysis.
Wendy’s images of the fundamental concepts in group theory were dominated by the use 
of operation tables. She often relied on the operation table to provided support for her 
reasoning and seemed to require that the table be visible in order to begin. The operation 
table played a metaphorical role in her explanations, appearing to substitute for the group 
in her reasoning and thinking. Wendy drew conclusions and generalizations from her 
consideration of the operation tables but also was constrained by her reliance on the 
tables and found it hard to separate her thinking from them. A related and perhaps 
consequential phenomenon was that Wendy often considered the group axioms 
individually, seldom engaging more than one of them at a time in her explanations. 
Wendy’s use of the operation table is explored in detail below.
Groups and Binary Operations
As stated in chapter 4, the first interviews began with a question from the literature: “Is 
Z3 a subgroup of Z6?” The short answer to this question is no because the operations in 
the two groups are different. More specifically, because Z3 is the set {0, 1, 2} under 
addition modulo 3, and Zg is the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} under addition modulo 6 , the
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operations are not the same. For example, 2 + 2 is 4 in Z& but 1 in Z3 . Nonetheless, the 
subset {0, 2, 4} o f Z(, is simultaneously a subgroup o f Z(, and isomorphic to Z3 , so there is 
a sense in which the answer is yes. Both of these ideas were explored in the interviews.
The literature suggests two reasons for students’ difficulties with this question. First, 
although students think o f a group as a set, they are not always sufficiently aware o f the 
operation (Dubinsky et al., 1994). The second finding in the literature is that some 
students use a powerful result inappropriately, saying that Z3 is a subgroup of Z6 by 
Lagrange’s theorem because 3 divides 6  (Hazzan & Leron, 1996). Because the students 
had not yet been introduced to Lagrange’s theorem at the time o f the first interview, my 
intent was not to explore the students’ understanding o f Lagrange’s theorem but to 
explore the role o f the operation in their conceptions o f group and subgroup.
Nonetheless, by exploring subgroups of Ze in the interviews, I intended to get at some of 
the divisibility ideas that are behind Lagrange’s theorem. Before providing a detailed 
description and analysis o f the interviews, I offer an analysis o f the mathematical 
concepts of binary operation, group, and subgroup. The analysis is semiotic in the sense 
that I pay particular attention to names, notations, and other representations, particularly 
those that were used in this class.
Conceptual Analysis
As described in chapter 1, a group is a set and a binary operation that together satisfy four 
axioms (closure, associativity, identity, and inverse). The operation gives the group its 
structure. In other words, a group without its operation is merely a formless collection of 
elements. In some textbooks, this point is sometimes made notationally, but it is more 
common to use the set to denote the group, thereby leaving the operation implicit.
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Fraleigh (1989), for example, at first uses the notation <G, *> to denote the group 
composed o f the set G and the binary operation *. Almost immediately he adopts the 
shorthand notation:
At some point, all authors give up and become sloppy, denoting the group by the 
single letter G. We choose to recognize this and be sloppy from the start. We 
emphasize, however, that when you are speaking of a specific group, G, you 
must make it clear what the group operation on G is to be, since a set could 
conceivably have a variety o f binary operations, all giving different groups.
(p. 40)
Using Fraleigh’s first notation, <Z„, +„> denotes the group consisting of the set {0, 1, ... , 
n — 1} under the operation addition modulo n. In this class, the instructors and students 
adopted the shorthand, denoting the group merely by Z„. Because the most obvious 
operations to consider are addition modulo n and multiplication modulo n and because 
the set Z„ is not a group under multiplication modulo n, it is reasonable to say that, for 
many mathematicians, the phrase “the group Z„” or “the group o f integers modulo n” 
carries the implication that the intended operation is addition modulo n (see also Gallian, 
1994; Hungerford, 1974). Nonetheless, this implication was not always obvious to the 
students.
The operation on a set may be given in a number o f ways, such as by a formula, by a 
table, or by inheriting an operation from a larger structure in which the set sits. In subsets 
o f the integers, for example, the operations of addition and multiplication may be 
inherited from the familiar operations on integers. For the sets Z„, however, the 
operations addition modulo n and multiplication modulo n are not inherited from Z 
because, for example, 3 + 5 = 8  in Z, but 3 + 5 = 2 in Zv
For sets with only a few elements, the table was the predominant representation o f binary 
operations for this class. Even with sets such as Z3 and Z 5, for both addition modulo n
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and multiplication modulo n, the students typically created tables that served to support 
their reasoning.
Just as a group is a set with structure provided by an operation, a subgroup is not merely 
a subset o f a group but rather a substructure, and the structure is provided by the 
operation o f the group. General insight into the structure can be provided by Lagrange’s 
theorem, which says that in a finite group the order o f a subgroup (the number of 
elements in the subgroup) must be a factor o f the order of the group. The converse o f the 
theorem is false in general, as discussed in chapter 3, although it is elegantly true for Z„: 
For each divisor d  o f n, there is a unique subgroup of order d, which consists o f the 
multiples of n/d. In the task at hand, although Z3 is not a subgroup o f Z&, the multiples of 
2 in Z(, are the subset {0, 2, 4}, which is a subgroup o f Z(, and which is isomorphic to Z3 , 
as mentioned above.
Wendy. Groups, and Binary Operations
The beginning o f Wendy’s interview was marked by uncertainty. She first tried to 
understand the question:
5 Wendy: Okay. Well on the first question I look at, is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6? From.... Z6 is 
just mod 6 , right? Mod 6 ? So first of all I’d want to.... I am assuming Z6 is a group if 
you are going to ask that Z3 is a subgroup o f Z6.
11 Wendy: I am taking Z6 to be integers mod 6 . And I don’t know what’s leading me to
think that. But, so, but if it is .... Can I just say, “if  it is ... ”?
12 Brad: Sure.
13 Wendy: A total table. It would consist of 6  items or elements, and for.... It has to be 
mod 6 . Z6. It has to be integers mod 6 , because.... Well, we have to also figure out an
operation, also, too. So now you have the elements, you know Z6. We have to know the
operation because that will be [inaudible] whether or not it’s going to be a subgroup.
Wendy was unsure of what Z6 was, what the operation should be, and whether it was a 
group. Nonetheless, she made some assumptions. Using the wording of my question,
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she assumed Z6  to be a group. She also assumed Z6  to be integers mod 6 , but her 
statement “Z6  is just mod 6 ” (line 5), with its odd syntax, suggests she may have been 
thinking as much about the process o f calculating the remainders as about the set of 
remainders. Later in the interview, she confirmed this impression, saying, “I ’m assuming 
Z6  means it’s integers mod 6 , which means you look at the remainders after dividing by 
6 ” (line 32). The students’ under standing of modular arithmetic is considered in detail in 
chapter 7.
Wendy’s phrase “a total table” (line 13) suggests she wanted to create a table, but she 
quickly realized she would need to figure out what the operation should be. To resolve 
this issue, she referred back to the question at hand:
17 Wendy: So, therefore you have to find.... That would help you to determine what 
operation, because maybe if  you tried multiplication and if  Z6 wasn’t a group under 
multiplication then you would know that Z3, you are not talking about whether Z3 is a 
subgroup under Z6 because Z6 isn’t a subgroup [group]. But maybe under addition Z6 is a 
group and therefore you can look at the case under addition.
Thus, although Wendy’s concept images of group, subgroup, and binary operation were 
insufficient to provide a quick answer to the interview question, her concept images were 
sufficient to provide general framing of the question at hand. In particular, she saw that it 
would be helpful to determine first whether the operation in was addition or 
multiplication. The fact that she didn’t say “addition modulo n” suggests that she may 
not have been distinguishing between addition and addition modulo n, and similarly for 
multiplication. I did not pursue this distinction in the interview but merely suggested that 
she try both possibilities. She started with multiplication.
2 0 Wendy: Okay. Well, Z6 is not going to be, when I start with my chart, and I do the first 
row, 0 times any element is going to equal 0, so if you look at that.... Actually, okay.
Let me just.... It’s not going to have.... You have to.... I’ll just finish it. Okay, now it 
has to hold four properties to be a group. Let’s write these down. It has to have an
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identity, an inverse, it has to be closed, and it has to be associative, which we’re going to 
leave for last. [Laughs]
During this statement, Wendy set up an operation table and filled out the “0” row and 
column (see Figure 5). She also wrote down the names o f the four group axioms to assist 
her, it appears, in the process o f checking whether Zg is a group under multiplication.
Figure 5. Wendy’s table for multiplication in Z&
X 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( i 0 1 2 3 4 5)




Wendy continued filling out the table, checking the identity and inverse properties as she 
went along:
2  2  Wendy: So it has an identity, which is 1, which is the identity ... which is the identity for
every element, identity equals 1. But inverse ...
2 3 Brad: Every element identity? What do you mean?
2 4 Wendy: An identity means when you multiply the identity by itself, like say if  you have
the letter m and you multiply it by the identity i, it’s going to equal m. [Writes m{i) = m.] 
It is going to give you back the same thing. The identity is ...
2  5 Brad: Okay. So how does that fit in here?
26 Wendy: Ifyou look at this row, you multiply.... If I I am calling 1 the identity. If
you multiply 1 by every element, you get the element back, get the original element back. 
So, like 1 multiplied by this row gives you the same row back.
2  8  Wendy: So Z6 does have an identity. Now, inverse. Inverse means when you multiply....
If you have a number in Z6, there has to be a number in which when you, a number so that 
when you multiply it, you will get the identity.
3 0 Wendy: So m times the inverse. I don’t know how I should represent the inverse.
Identity is usually.... I am going to change it so that my identity being represented as e, 
and then I am going to change the inverse as i. So when you multiply some number m 
by, it has to have an inverse i, so that when multiplied, it will equal the identity. [Writes 
inverse = m(i) = e].
This excerpt provides the first clear hint that Wendy was thinking about the identity and 
inverse properties in similar ways. She struggled to articulate each of the concepts and
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arrived at definitions (lines 24 and 28) and notations (lines 24 and 30) that were similar. 
Furthermore, her syntax suggested that to some extent the names o f the concepts had 
been swapped in her thinking. For example, when talking about the identity, she used the 
phrase “for every element” (line 2 2 ), which is more typical when talking about inverses. 
Similarly, her phrase “m times the inverse” (line 30) employs syntax more typical of 
statements about the identity element. A more correct phrasing would be “m times its 
inverse,” which makes the dependence on m explicit. A search o f the transcript reveals 
that Wendy had used similar syntax for the two concepts when listing the group axioms 
earlier in the interview: “It has to have an identity, an inverse” (line 20).
Wendy explicitly used the table to verify the identity property (line 26). Similarly, after 
explaining her calculations for the row labeled “2 ,” she used the table to explain how the 
inverse property failed:
3 4 Wendy: So if  you look at the second row [the “2” row], there is no number when you
multiply.... If you take m equalling 2, if  you take a number equalling 2, when you 
multiply, there is nothing to multiply by 2  to get— in mod 6 , cause it has to be an element, 
to be closed, you can only work with the elements within mod 6 . And I have tried every 
element, 0, 1 ... 0 through 5, multiplied by 2 to see if I can get the identity, 1, and I can’t 
get it. So therefore, Z6 is not a group under multiplication. So, I don’t think we should 
look at it, check to see if  Z3 is a subgroup o f Z6 when Z6 isn’t even a group under 
multiplication.
Wendy was about to begin considering addition but stopped herself to make a comment 
about multiplication:
3 8  Wendy: Actually, up here, in multiplication, I didn’t even have to look at the second row
[the “2 ” row] because if  you look at 0  there is nothing you can multiply by 0  to get the 
identity element back, 1 , because 0  times every element is going to equal 0 .
It seems that at this point, Wendy had reduced the process o f checking the inverse 
property to a process of looking for the identity, 1 , in a particular row in the table, for not 
only was she able to see from the table that the element 1 did not appear in the “2 ” row,
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but she also noticed that 1 did not appear in the “0 ” row, which provided a more 
immediate reason for the failure of the inverse property under multiplication. This 
process either provides a partial explanation for or is partly explained by the close 
relationship between the identity and inverse properties in Wendy’s thinking. The word 
inverse was not present in her justification, however. I asked her to explain:
3 9 Brad: So what does that say about 0 there?
4 0 Wendy: 0 cannot be an element in Z6.
41 Brad: 0. But you are saying it is an element though, because ...
4 2 Wendy: Oh yeah; 0 is an element in Z6, but it doesn’t have an inverse.
4 3 Brad: Oh, okay.
4 4 Wendy: Because you can’t . ... There’s not.... When you multiply 0 by anything, you
can’t get the identity element. And this doesn’t help. So that just doesn’t seem.... Like, 
if you are going to have a group, you couldn’t, 0 couldn’t be in it. A group under 
multiplication, it couldn’t include 0 .
Thus, Wendy’s statement that “0 cannot be an element in Z6” (line 40), was a specific 
instance o f a general principle: A group, under multiplication, cannot include 0. It is not 
surprising that Wendy wanted to exclude elements that did not satisfy desired properties, 
because this is essentially the idea behind the construction o f the groups of units modulo 
n. In the introduction to the groups U„, the class used a more general version of this 
principle: Include only elements from Z„ that have multiplicative inverses.
Wendy next began considering whether Z6 is a group under addition. She constructed a 
new operation table (Figure 6 ), checking the axioms as she went along.
4 7 Wendy: Now if you look at addition, I am going to fill out the table the same way, except
with addition. I’m going to just look at the remainders when divided by 6 . We can see, I 
can see by filling out the first table [row] that the identity.... Also, I think it is a global 
property, that since integers, the identity is going to equal zero. That, if  you take a 
subgroup o f.... But then we are going to go into another issue, whether Z6 is a subgroup 
of, in the integers. But I think if integers has an identity o f 0 under addition, that Z6 will 
also have the identity 0. It works.
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Figure 6. Wendy’s table for addition in Zf,
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 3 4 5 0
2 2 3 4 5 0 1
3 3 4 5 0 1 2
4 4 5 0 1 2 3
5 5 0 1 2 3 4
In class, the word global was often used to describe the associative property when 
checking whether a subset o f a group was a subgroup. The term is based on the idea that 
if  an operation is associative on an entire set, then the property must hold for any subset. 
The term is nonstandard, although the idea closely resembles the meaning of the more 
conventional phrase “associativity is inherited from the group.” This excerpt shows that 
Wendy had expanded her use o f the term to describe a similar idea for the identity 
property. She was correct, in a sense, in that when verifying the identity property for a 
subset of a group, it is sufficient to show that the identity element is in the subset, rather 
than showing that it serves as the identity for all elements in the subset. It is not clear, 
however, whether she had in mind this precise use o f the word. In any case, the “global” 
idea was not appropriate here because addition in the integers and addition in Z(, are 
different operations. Thus, this excerpt suggests imprecision in Wendy’s concepts of 
global and of addition. These issues are explored in more detail below.
Wendy continued verifying the group axioms:
5 0 Wendy: So next I am going to check the inverse property. And 0 has an inverse so 0 + 1, 
or.... Excuse me. Since 0 is the identity we have to check that when you add 0 to 0 you 
get the identity 0. So 0 is the inverse element for itself. And then 1. When you multiply, 
when you add 1 and 5 it equals 6 , but that equals 0 (mod 6 ) cause 6  is divisible by 6 . 
That’s pretty obvious, but.... So 1 has a inverse. 2 has an inverse because 2 + 4 = 6 , 
which equals 0. 3 + 3 has an in-.... equals 0 (mod 6 ). 4 + 2 = 0 (mod 6 ). And 5 + 1 = 0  
(mod 6 ). So each element has an inverse. So you know that Z6 is a group under addition.
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Here, Wendy correctly verified the inverse property by using the table to find the inverse 
o f each element. She supported this process by making a check mark alongside each row 
of the table as she identified the corresponding inverse. She momentarily considered 1 as 
the identity but corrected this on her own. Apart from her self-corrections, she used 
appropriate language throughout this verification, which culminated in the statement 
“each element has an inverse.” Wendy’s language and calculations, taken together, 
suggest that she could distinguish identity and inverse properties according to the 
conventional meanings, although the distinction became less clear again later in the 
interview.
Although Wendy’s verification o f the inverse property was essentially correct, she was 
premature in declaring that Z(> is a group under addition because she had not yet checked 
all the properties. Because she immediately went on to check closure, however, it seems 
likely that she had in mind a preliminary rather than final conclusion. In verifying the 
closure and associative properties, Wendy explicitly referred to the table to support her 
reasoning:
51 Wendy: And then it’s closed. You can see that there are no elements other than 0 through 
5, looking at the chart, because we have all possible combinations on elements in Zg. So 
it is closed also.
52 Wendy: And associative. You can see, because the chart has symmetry, that the group 
will be, is associative. This is how I look at it, anyway, because if  you look at 2 x 5 you 
are going to get 1 and if  you look at 2 + 5 you get 1. But also you know it is Z6, is also 
because it’s a global property, because addition is associative, for integers, and you know 
that this carries over to subgroups and so Z6 will be associative under addition. Do you 
want me to explain that further?
Wendy made several errors in her attempt to verify associativity. First she stated that she 
was comparing 2 + 5 and 2 x 5  when, based on her statement about the symmetry in the 
table, she probably was comparing 2 + 5 and 5 + 2. A more significant error was that she
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
was describing commutativity but calling it associativity. Furthermore, the penultimate 
sentence implies that she thought that Zf, is a subgroup o f Z. During the interview, I 
pursued the first two errors.
53 Brad: I want you to explain how you said.... What was it you said, 2 + 5 is the same ...? 
5 4 Wendy: 2 + 5 is the same as 5 + 2.
5 5 Brad: Oh, okay. So that means it is associative?
5 6  Wendy: Well that is an example of associative.... No, that’s not. That’s the
commutative property. So we have to check 1 + 2 + 3 is going to equal 1 + 2  + 3. That’s
the associative property. So in a sense we have to .... But w e’d have to go through all of 
the different combinations including 0 through 5 and all o f the different elements, which 
takes a while. But because we know that the associative property holds under integers, 
for addition, we know it holds. And that’s one o f the good things that, good facts about 
that global property because associativity is so hard, difficult to check. Would you like 
me to try just to see if  this checks?
Thus, Wendy was able to correct both errors on her own. Because it took her a moment 
to realize that her description was about commutativity, it appears that the commutative 
and associative properties were closely related, perhaps even overlapping, in Wendy’s 
thinking.
Wendy used the idea that associativity is a global property to complete her verification, 
but again the idea was not appropriate because addition in the integers and addition in Zs 
are different operations. I did not pursue this issue explicitly in the interview but instead 
asked Wendy only to verify the property for the example she gave.
At this point, I put aside the case of Wendy to extend the analysis to other students, 
discussing, in particular, the concept of binary operation, the relationship between 
associativity and commutativity, and the notion o f global properties. In this section, I 
further develop some of the themes that have emerged thus far, including language use 
and the use o f the operation table.
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Operation confusion. One o f the most persistent occurrences throughout the interviews 
was a phenomenon I initially called operation confusion, where students were unsure of 
the appropriate operation on a set. As might have been expected, operation confusion 
was more likely to occur when more than one operation was available, such as in Zn, 
where there are two natural operations. All the key participants experienced operation 
confusion during the first interview, and most had at least momentary confusion in the 
third interview when dealing with a function from U% to Z4 . All these groups, it should be 
pointed out, have elements that look like integers but that do not behave quite like the 
integers with which the students were familiar.
In the first interviews, none o f the key participants was immediately sure about the 
operations that would be appropriate for answering the question “Is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6?” 
Carla, for example, stated at first that the operation must be multiplication “because the 
addition wasn’t a group mod n . ... Something about multiples o f «” (line 12). She then 
verified that the group axioms are satisfied under addition modulo n, showed that the 
group axioms are not satisfied for multiplication modulo n, and realized that she had 
remembered incorrectly.
Robert, on the other hand, was at first convinced that Z(, is not a group under 
multiplication, “because the inverses aren’t in Z6” (line 9), a statement that was 
essentially correct and might have led him quickly to consider addition modulo 6 . 
Moments later, however, he stated that the inverse of 1 would be “ 1 over 1, just 1” (line 
15), demonstrating that he was thinking of inverses as fractions. Then he used analogous 
reasoning for addition in Zg.
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2  0  Robert: So, but that’s not a group either because in Z6 if  each inverse is itself, the
negative o f itself, which isn’t in Z6.
2 1  Brad: What do you mean?
22 Robert: Like 1 + -1  will equal 0, so -1  is l ’s inverse, but-1  isn’t in Z6.
At this point in the interview, Robert was unsure whether Z6  is a group at all. By making 
operation tables for both operations, he was able to resolve these issues, although he first 
stated that 3 is the inverse o f 2 under multiplication because the product is 0, 
demonstrating some difficulty keeping his additive and multiplicative thinking separate.
It is likely that the students’ operation confusion was caused in part by the fact that the 
class had spent time at the beginning of the course solving both multiplicative and 
additive equations in Zn. It may also be, however, that the notational convention of 
writing the group operation multiplicatively when is not specified promotes 
multiplicative thinking in additive situations such as this.
During the first interviews, resolving operation confusion consumed considerable time 
for all of the key participants, but as the semester progressed, the students developed 
more efficient and accurate methods of determining and keeping track o f the operation. 
For example, they used either the identity or closure properties to deduce that the 
operation in U% is multiplication and not addition:
3 4 Carla: Let’s see U% is a group under... [pause]... I am trying to think if  it is a group under
addition or multiplication. But it must be multiplication, because if  it was addition then 0 
would be in there. (Interview 3)
17 Lori: Okay. So, [inaudible]. Is it multiplication? Oh, I was thinking it was addition. 
‘Cause I’m like 1 + 1 is 2.
18 Brad: And, why wouldn’t that work?
19 Lori: Because 2 ’s not in t/8. I don’t know why I was thinking that. (Interview 3)
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One might hope that determining a group’s operation would become a matter of recall. 
But the evidence suggests some subtlety in the learning process: The students developed 
increasingly efficient strategies for determining a group’s operation. This hypothesis is 
analogous to the development o f proficiency in other areas o f mathematics, most notably 
in the learning o f the basic number combinations: Rather than moving from slow object- 
based procedures to recall, young children proceed along a trajectory of increasingly 
efficient procedures until the combinations are based either on recall or on procedures 
that are indistinguishable from recall (see, e.g., Kilpatrick et al., 2001, chapter 6 ). Thus, 
the phenomenon o f operation confusion may be viewed as a natural stage in the 
development o f proficiency with group theory and its standard examples.
Diamond and star. Another explanation for operation confusion may be an inevitable 
consequence o f one of the goals for the course: an abstract concept o f binary operation.
So that all binary operations, including familiar additions and multiplications, might be 
seen as instances o f a single idea, Dr. Benson and I chose sometimes to use a neutral 
notation for the operation. Clearly the notations +, x, or ■ would not provide such 
neutrality. Thus, we often used 0 (diamond) or * (star) to denote an unspecified 
operation. One could argue that * does not provide the intended neutrality because the 
symbol is often used in computer programming languages to denote multiplication. This 
is certainly a concern, although it is no more problematic than the common practice in 
abstract algebra texts of leaving the operation implied, as in ab, a convention that clearly 
carries overtones o f multiplication. Even the more neutral 0 (diamond), however, was 
problematic, as is illustrated by Diane and Lori as they tried to determine the operation in 
Z3.
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2 0 Diane: Z3 you would have addition, multiplication, or a diamond. And 0, 1, 2, 3 ...
[inaudible]. No, it only goes up to 2.
21 Lori: All right, yeah let’s make a table o f Z3 and let’s make a table o f Z6.
2 2 Diane: You need to make 3 tables because we don’t know what operation we are talking
about.
So for Diane, at least, diamond was not a generic operation that could stand for either 
multiplication modulo 3 or addition modulo 3; it was another operation entirely. Upon 
questioning, Diane reiterated her list o f three operations, so I asked her to write out 
operation tables for all three. Lori interrupted:
2 8  Lori: Like it’s integers. What’s diamond? Can’t you only really have these two? That’s
what I am thinking.
Diane had begun to construct operation tables but quickly reconsidered:
31 Diane: But I don’t know how to do a diamond because I don’t know what the operation 
is.
32 Lori: I don’t think that you can do diamond, because we are in Z3 and it’s integers, and 
what is diamond?
3 3 Diane: Yeah, that’s what I am saying. I don’t know what diamond is.
3 4 Lori: So you can only do like addition and multiplication.
3 5 Brad: Where does the diamond ... ?
3 6  Diane: Diamond comes in when you don’t know what the operation is.
3 7 Brad: Oh, so you mean when you don’t know what you call the operation you just use
diamond instead? Do you agree with that?
3 8  Lori: Yes, definitely. But we kind o f know that it’s integers. So we know how to add
integers. It’s not like it’s a and b, you know. Then I would probably use diamond 
because I don’t know how to add a and b elements.
Thus, despite their momentary disagreement, Lori and Diane both saw diamond not so 
much as a label for an abstraction under which a number of familiar operations could sit 
but rather as a device to use when the operation was unfamiliar or unknown. 
Furthermore, it seems that Lori had similar thinking about the notational uses of a and b, 
in the sense that the letters were not generic labels for group elements but rather
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unfamiliar objects that she did not know how to add. Thus, even the most neutral 
notation did not necessarily lead students to the desired abstraction.
The abstract concept o f binary operation continued to be problematic for Lori. During 
her third interview, while determining whether a particular function/ from U% to Z4  was a 
homomorphism, Lori described an appropriate verification formula, j[a*b) =f(a)*f(b), 
and seemed to know that the operation * on the left was to take place in U%, whereas the 
operation * on the right was to take place in Z4 . Nonetheless, she spent a good deal of 
time determining what the operations were in each o f the groups. She first called both 
operations addition (line 15), yet after deciding that the operation in U% was 
multiplication, she thought that both operations were multiplication (line 30). Finally, 
because she could not find multiplicative inverses in Z4 , she decided, “This [L/g] is 
multiplication, and this [Z4] is addition” (line 34). I asked her whether it was okay that 
the operations were different.
38 Lori: If we prove it’s a homomorphism, yes. [Okay, but....] Right now I am not sure.
[Okay.] So I don’t, I guess star right now is just going to have to remain generic until I, if 
I prove it is a homomorphism, then.... It’s neat that they call it star because it could be 
representing two totally different things. [Oh, Okay.] Do you know what I’m saying? 
[Okay] Like in U% it’s multiplication, in Z4 it’s addition. [Okay.] So maybe I should just 
keep it star.
Thus, Lori continued to prefer to use * when there was some uncertainty about the 
operation, yet she was becoming comfortable with the idea that * could stand for various 
known operations. It is not clear why or to what extent these impressions were dependent 
on whether/ was indeed a homomorphism. Would Lori have made better sense of the 
task if  the two operations had been notated differently? In class, the verification formula 
was typically written as f[a*b) = j{d) *'fib), thereby making it more apparent that the 
operations might be different. Lori and Diane were unusual in denoting both operations
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as *. Because Lori had taken abstract algebra previously, a reasonable hypothesis about 
her use of notation is that she stuck to notation she had first learned rather than adopting 
the class’s notation, and, furthermore, her usage had rubbed off on Diane.
Regarding Lori’s concept of binary operation, it seems unwise to speculate about the 
source of her confusion and delayed abstraction. Nonetheless, because most textbooks 
leave both operations implicit, as in jiab) =J(a)/(b), it is worth considering the 
relationship between the notation used in introducing the concept o f homomorphism and 
students’ concepts o f binary operation. If  this was a significant moment in Lori’s 
construction o f an abstract concept o f binary operation, for example, to what extent did 
ambiguity o f the notation * support or constrain this construction?
Late in the course, some students had developed a reasonably robust concept o f binary 
operation, as evidenced by the fact that they were able to switch effortlessly between 
additive and multiplicative notation and language. Wendy, for example, compared the 
expression a*a between U% and Z4  by noting, “Here w e’re squaring it, but here w e’re 
saying 2a” (Interview 3, line 156). This ability led sometimes to problematic or awkward 
syntax. Robert, for example, called 6  a power of 3 because “If  you operate 3 with itself 
you get 6 ” (Interview 3, line 272).
Sometimes, however, the switch between multiplicative and additive notation and 
language was not so effortless, and multiplicative language seemed to dominate. In one 
interview, for example, I asked Carla to find the subgroup generated by 3 in Z\ 2 .
15 Carla: There would be 3, and 9 would be in it because 3 squared is 9. And 0 would be in
it because.... Well, actually, Zn is a group under addition. So it’s not.... I can’t really 
think of it as 3 squared.... So 9 is in it, but not because it’s 3 squared. 9 is in it because 
it’s 3 cubed when you are adding. So, in other words three 3s. (Interview 4)
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It took Carla a moment to establish additive thinking, and still she maintained some 
multiplicative language, leading to awkward phrases such as “3 cubed when you are 
adding.” Later in the same interview, when explaining the sense in which {0, 3, 6 , 9} can 
be an identity element, she indicated some discomfort with the broad use of 
multiplicative language:
65 Carla: Okay if  you add ... We have often called it multiplying, but I don’t like that term 
because to me it doesn’t ... I just don’t like the idea of multiplying; it doesn’t make 
sense. So I prefer to think o f combining them.
In summary, the notion o f an abstract binary operation presented notational, conceptual, 
and even linguistic issues. Coming to view various operations as instances o f the same 
idea was a slow process. Standard notations such as + or ■ have associated language and 
thus associated meaning. New notations, such as diamond, were sometimes seen not to 
represent new abstract categories but rather new operations.
Regarding the concept of binary operation, the students demonstrated on the one hand 
that they didn’t sufficiently distinguish between various operations called addition. On 
the other hand, they demonstrated that they imposed nonstandard distinctions between 
notations for generic operations such as * and notations for familiar operations such as • 
or +. The students also had trouble maintaining the standard distinctions between 
associativity and commutativity.
Associativity and Commutativity
It should not be surprising that Wendy sometimes confused the concepts of 
commutativity and associativity, for the concepts are indeed closely related. And in fact, 
other students also demonstrated similar confusion. Conceptual analysis, supported by a 
closer look at the data, provides several possible explanations for the close relationship
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and the confusion between the concepts. This section builds an explanation out of 
description of the definitions, distinguishing examples, and verification processes for the 
concepts o f associativity and commutativity.
Definitions. First, the definitions are quite similar in form. On their final exams, all the 
key participants except Diane gave largely correct definitions o f associative operation 
and commutative operation, such as the following, provided by Carla:
assoc, operation - the operation where, for any a, b, c, a*{b*c) = (a*b)*c. 
comm, operation - the operation where, for any a and b, a*b = b*a.
Not all students were careful about the quantifiers. Wendy, for example, stated on her 
final exam that “an operation is commutative if  for 2  elements a and b, a*b = b*a.” 
Students’ definitions and statements often noted that commutativity is about two 
elements and that associativity is about three elements, suggesting that this was a salient 
distinction between the two concepts. In fact, this is the most obvious difference in the 
definitions.
Few distinguishing examples. Second, although associativity and commutativity are 
often discussed in high school mathematics, most elementary examples of 
noncommutative operations, such as subtraction and division of real numbers, are also 
nonassociative. Experiences in high school mathematics might lead to concepts of 
associativity and commutativity that are merged into an “order doesn’t matter” property. 
Wendy said almost exactly this in her fourth interview: “Because it’s associative, you can 
move it all around” (line 213). Furthermore, Diane’s final exam included similar claims 
about commutativity: “This property allows us to switch around the elements in an 
expression so that it doesn’t matter which elements will operate first.” Unless students’
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commutative, this abstract algebra class may have provided students their first 
opportunity to separate their conceptions of the two properties. Separating the concepts 
might require at least a few distinguishing examples, but the group axioms suggest an 
asymmetry: Associativity is more important. In fact, it seems to be difficult to create an 
operation that is commutative but not associative, particularly via an operation table 
(Zaslavsky & Peled, 1996; Benson, in press).
Verification. There are other important differences between the concepts of associativity 
and commutativity, particularly regarding their verification processes. Commutativity is 
often easy to infer from a description o f an operation, and when the operation is given via 
a table, commutativity reveals itself as symmetry about the main diagonal. Students 
often used commutativity to help them reason about groups and subgroups, particularly 
when filling in an operation table. Thus, commutativity is tied closely to the 
phenomenon o f reasoning from the table.
Associativity, on the other hand, is hard to see in an operation table. When an operation 
is given via a table, the number of calculations required to verify the property is 
prohibitively high even for groups with as few as 4 elements. When an operation is given 
via a description or a formula, there are a number of possible approaches, each with its 
own subtleties. In class, we took essentially three approaches to the problem of 
associativity. For operations given via operation tables, we often used Exploring Small 
Groups (Geissinger, 1989) to let the computer perform the tedious calculations. At other 
times, we verified associativity via symbolic proof. Perhaps the most common approach, 
however, was to argue that associativity was inherited from a larger structure in which
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the desired structure lived. In class, this approach was used uncritically and incorrectly 
by many students and took on a life o f its own under the label “Associativity is global.” 
This phenomenon is discussed in more detail below.
These differences between commutativity and associativity provide a third reason for the 
confusion and also explain the fact that the confusion was essentially one directional: 
Students sometimes said associative and meant commutative, but I found no evidence of 
the opposite. I do not contend that the opposite confusion never occurs but suggest 
instead that commutativity is more likely to be present in a student’s mind. First, it is 
easier to think about two elements at a time than it is to think about three. Second, 
commutativity is such a useful property and such a prominent visual feature of an 
operation table, students are likely to focus on it rather than associativity, despite the fact 
that commutativity is not one of the group axioms.
Global Properties
Verifying that a set and an operation satisfy the associativity axiom requires particular 
attention to the operation. As mentioned above, sometimes the associativity of an 
operation on a set is inherited from a larger structure in which the set and operation are 
situated. All key participants applied this “global property” idea inappropriately at some 
point during the interviews, typically by paying insufficient attention to the operation. 
Furthermore, many of the key participants uncritically generalized the idea to other group 
axioms.
Both Lori and Robert, for example, claimed that associativity in Z& was inherited from Z:
8  3 Lori: And it’s associative because addition is associative and that’s inherited from the 
larger group Z under addition. So that’s why it’s a subgroup.
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6  9 Robert: We are talking about Z6. These are integers, and integers fall in the associative
law, so it’s associative.
Carla demonstrated similar thinking but with more generality and with idiosyncratic 
language, calling the set Z„ “mod «.” (See chapter 7 for detailed discussion o f Carla’s use 
o f the phrase “mod n .”)
7 9 Carla: So the next thing to check would be associativity. But mod n is a subset of Z
because all of your elements in mod n are integers and Z under addition is associative, so 
therefore mod n under addition is associative. So therefore mod n under addition is a 
group.
Earlier in the same interview, Carla had similarly claimed that Z3 inherits associativity 
from Z&:
1 Carla:... All right, so then Z6 would be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Okay. So we can see that Z3
is a subset of Z6 because 0, 1, 2 are elements within 0, 1,2, 3, 4, and 5. So because of 
that we know that the associative property holds because the associative property is 
global. And if  the associative property works on this larger set then we know it is going 
to work on the smaller set because it is, just has fewer elements to work on.
Carla’s description of the idea is essentially correct. In this statement, however, she 
made no mention of the operation and, in fact, had not yet mentioned operations at all in 
the interview. This suggests that the notion of global or inherited properties may have 
been mostly about subsets, with little connection to the operation.
Lori provides additional support for this hypothesis. On her midterm exam she stated, 
while showing that a subset o f a group was a subgroup, “We need not show associativity 
since it is inherited from the larger group.” Similarly, on her final exam, she asserted, 
“Associativity is a global property, so it is inherited from the group.” Thus, Lori was 
able to use the terms global and inherited with proper syntax. Elsewhere on her final 
exam, however, Lori incorrectly claimed that Z4  is a subgroup of Z and also a subgroup of 
Zg. Such statements do not make sense, o f course, if one is paying attention to the
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operation. This suggests that Lori’s other statements about associativity were not 
properly supported by consideration of the operation, despite their correctness.
Like Wendy, other students broadened the idea of global or inherited properties beyond 
associativity. The notion that the identity is global was perhaps implicit in many 
students’ claims that 0  is the identity for addition, in the sense that the statement holds for 
a wide variety o f representations o f groups, with many distinct operations called addition. 
O f course, the same can be said o f 1 as the identity for multiplication.
Diane and Lori argued explicitly that the identity in Z3 is inherited from Z6 (lines 78-80). 
As in the case with Wendy, it is possible that Diane and Lori intended merely that they 
did not need to show that 0 behaved as an identity in the subset. This simple explanation 
seems particularly unlikely, however, in light o f Diane’s subsequent claim that an 
element’s inverse need not be the same in a subgroup as it is in the group:
94 Diane: The only thing that it says about inherited inverses is that you get the inverse o f 1 
is 2 here and 2 is an element of this Z6. It doesn’t say that the inverse o f 1 has to be 2 in 
here; it just says that 2  is in this, it doesn’t say that it has to be the same.
Diane’s concept o f inverse seems especially problematic here in the sense that the inverse 
of an element is unique and thus will not change when restricting to a subgroup. On the 
other hand, on the assumption that Diane had a broad notion o f inherited properties—a 
notion that did not pay much attention to the operation—then it follows that she would 
say something about inverses in Z„ being inherited from Z. Then, because the inverse of 
5 is -5  in Z but 1 in Z6 , her statement would make sense. This hypothesis is made more 
plausible on the basis of additional evidence o f Diane’s broad use o f the idea o f inherited 
properties. Particular compelling evidence is provided by an earlier claim of some kind 
of inheritance by Z3 from Z„:
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4 4 Diane: Well Z3 isn’t a subgroup of Z6, it’s at least a subgroup o f Z„ and we know that Z„ is 
a group under addition, so it would have inherited property.
Unfortunately, there was insufficient data to make much sense out o f what Diane meant 
by Z„ here. Nonetheless, it is clear that her notion o f inherited properties was broader 
than associativity and was insufficiently tied to the operation.
One potential explanation for students’ improper generalization o f the idea of global 
properties is that that term itself is nonstandard and lacks a formal definition. The data 
suggest, however, that the more standard term inherited was also problematic. 
Furthermore, formalizing either of these terms would have been essentially the same 
exercise.
Subgroups and Binary Operations
At this point, the discussion returns to the case o f Wendy to present detailed analysis of 
Wendy’s concept image o f subgroup. Again, the main themes are Wendy’s use of the 
operation table and her use of language. Following the detailed presentation, I broaden 
the analysis to include other students, discussing first the concepts of identity and inverse 
and the relationships between them, as these concepts became prominent in students’ 
reasoning about subgroups. Then, following a brief discussion of the students’ 
understanding o f the concept o f closure, the section closes with a presentation of the 
findings about their concept of subgroup, focusing particularly on the ways that students 
answered the main interview question, Is Z3 a subgroup of Z(p. The central issues are the 
ways that the students distinguished among various operations called addition and the 
ways that they used the operation table to support their reasoning.
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Wendv and Subgroups
When Wendy returned to the question o f whether Z3 is a subgroup o f Zti, she used the 
addition table to support her reasoning.
7 6  Wendy: Now is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6? Now, we have to check that Z3 is going to be a
group because it has to have all o f the elements [axioms] o f a group, which means it has 
to have identity and inverse; it has to be closed. So I am going to start checking Z3. Z3 
would consist of 0, 1, and 2 under addition. But Z3, the table is going to be different. See 
I am going to have to explore right now whether or not.... When you say Z3 is a 
subgroup of Z6, whether it means you are taking Z3 out of Z6, or if you are just looking at 
Z6 [Z3] and seeing whether it’s a group. See when you say something is a subgroup of 
something else [pause] I am not quite sure what way to look at it. Like how it exactly, 
like how Z3 ties into Z6, like to be a subgroup o f Z6. What, that.... Like I know how to 
check whether or not Z3 itself is a group and whether Z6 is a group, but to check whether 
Z6, Z3 is a subgroup o f Z6,1 don’t know exactly what to look at.
Wendy had a sense that the operation table for Z3 would be different, depending upon 
whether it was constructed on its own or taken out o f the Ze table. Consistent with the 
emerging hypothesis that Wendy’s reasoning was highly dependent on looking at an 
operation table, it seems that her statement “I don’t know exactly what to look at” meant 
she didn’t know what table to look at.
This excerpt suggests a much stronger observation than has been drawn thus far. Rather 
than saying the operation in Z3 is different, Wendy said, “But Z3, the table is going to be 
different” (line 76), suggesting that the table was not merely supporting her reasoning but 
rather was substituting for the group in her thinking. The phrase “taking Z3 out o f Zf,” 
(line 76) suggests again that, for Wendy, Ze was not merely a list o f elements that 
appeared on the edges of the table but was in fact the table. This conjecture is further 
supported in the following explanation in which Wendy referred not to the group Z(, but 
again to the table:
7 8  Wendy: Because if  you use the elements o f Z3, which is 0, 1, and 2— are the elements of  
Z3. But if  you look at them in terms of Z6, like if  you just look at this section o f the table
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Z6 (see Figure 7), this isn’t going to be a group.
7 9 Brad: Why?
8  0 Wendy: Because it is not closed.
81 Brad: Why?
82 Wendy: Because 4 isn’t an element of Z3.
8  3 Brad: And where did the 4 come from?
8  4 Wendy: 2 + 2 from Z6 because it’s mod 6  in Z6, but when you look at Z3 it is mod 3.
Figure 7. Wendy’s table for addition in Zb, second version
i + 0 1 2 3 4 5
10 0 1 2 3 4 5
i 1 1 2 3 4 5 0
! 2 2 3 4 5 0 1
3 3 4 5 0 1 2
4 4 5 0 1 2 3
5 5 0 1 2 3 4
Thus, through her reliance on the table, Wendy had correctly identified the central issue 
behind the interview question: whether the addition was to take place based on the 
operation in Z3 or in Zb. Nonetheless, she was not ready to come to a conclusion:
8  6  Wendy: See, it doesn’t make sense. Like, I started over here to do, to look at whether or 
not Z3 was a group itself, but that didn’t make sense to me.
8  7 Brad: What didn’t make sense?
8  8  Wendy: To look independently to see whether Z3 was a group under addition. Actually, I
think for the same reasons it is going to be a group under addition, just like Z6. I think 
any Z group under addition is going to be a group because 0 is going to be.... Well, I 
guess it depends what elements are in there, but.... Like Z3 is going to be a group, it’s 
easy to see after looking at Z6. But if  you just look at it separately, it doesn’t really make 
sense whether, like, to tell whether or not Z3 is a subgroup of Z6 to just look at whether Z3 
is group because it has no connection with Z6.
It is surprising that Wendy was not able to make general statements about “any Z group” 
but instead stated “it depends what elements are in there.” Perhaps this is merely 
evidence that she needed to see the operation table in front of her. Nonetheless, she was 
concerned that there should be a clear connection between a subgroup and the group that
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it was supposed to come from. Earlier statements indicate that she thought the 
connection should come via the operation table.
To provide some clarity, I first asked Wendy to compare the two different versions of 
2 + 2 that she had discussed. She explained:
92 Wendy: This is going to equal 1 in Z3 mod 3 because that equals, 2 + 2 = 4. In mod 3 that
is going to equal, the remainder’s 1. But here it’s only, it’s still going to be 4 because it’s 
mod 6 .
Next, I checked briefly why Wendy had not pursued multiplication as the operation in Z3. 
(Misused words are set in bold to help call attention to them in the following discussion.)
95 Wendy: Well Z3 isn’t going to be a subgroup, isn’t going to be a group under
multiplication because if  you look at the first row it’s going to equal the same thing as it 
was up here. Like, they have very similar relationships, the Z tables. Like, Z3 under 
multiplication has a similar relationship to Z6 multiplication table, as does Z3 under 
addition and Z6 under addition. Like they are going to have the same identity under 
multiplication and division [addition]. So if  you look at Z3 under multiplication I’d know 
that the first row is going to be— I’m going to fix this— is going to be 0 ’s and from here 
you know that 0  does not have a, doesn’t have an identity element, or an inverse, excuse 
me. So you know already.
9 9 Wendy: There are no elements in Z3 when multiplied by 0 will give you the identity 1.
That’s why you know that, again, for the same reason, Z3 is not going to be a group under 
multiplication.
Wendy had trouble saying what she meant here, correcting her language twice (group for 
subgroup and inverse for identity) and also meaning addition but saying division. 
Nonetheless, it seems that she was reasonably confident about the fact that Z3 is not a 
group under multiplication (mod 3). But to get some clarity on the extent to which 
Wendy associated an operation with Z„, I asked her about Z\ o.
104 Wendy: Like, I automatically know when you say Zi0 that, under addition now it’s not
going to have an inverse element.
105 Brad: Under addition?
10 6  Wendy: I mean under multiplication it’s not going to have an inverse element. Under
addition it probably will be a group; it will be a group.
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Thus, Wendy still had trouble using the words she meant, saying addition when she 
meant multiplication. Furthermore, her syntax “not going to have an inverse element” is 
more appropriate for talking about the identity.
Then we returned to whether Z3 is a subgroup o f Z&.
I l l  Wendy: Like a subset o f.... I think we have to look at it as like part o f the set o f Z6,
which, like subgroup, like as a group in Z6. So if  you look a t ... which is why I kind of 
choose the elements Z3 out of the Z6 table.
Wendy was clearly thinking o f Z6 as more than a set and as Z3 as more than a subset. She 
was choosing not “elements Z3 out o f the Z6  table,” but rather entries out of the Z(, table 
that corresponded to the restriction o f the binary operation to the subset Z3 . On the 
conviction that this was the appropriate method, Wendy decided that Z3 is not a subgroup 
of Z6  because the subset was not closed under the operation.
The fact that she had answered my question was apparently o f little concern, however, for 
she immediately began focusing on the manner in which closure had failed. In particular, 
she looked at the 3 and 4 that appeared in top left quarter o f the Z& table (see Figure 7).
123 Wendy: If you just looked at, are, is the subgroup 3 .... Well, I don’t know really what 
you’d call that.... But if you kind of just look at the, like, elements 3 and 4 .... Actually 
4 doesn’t have, forget it. 4 doesn’t have an inverse.
125 Wendy: I was trying to look. This is closed. Like I was going to say, if you only look at 
the elements 3 and 4 in Z6,1 was going to say under Z3 it was going to be closed, but I 
was just kind of thinking. But I’m not, that doesn’t make sense at all.
Wendy may have been considering {3, 4} to determine whether it was a subgroup but 
saw that 4 doesn’t have an inverse in {3, 4}. She may also have seen that 3 is its own 
inverse. She continued looking for a subgroup.
127 Wendy: Well, I was just kind of looking. Cause 4 isn’t an element o f Z6, element of Z3.
So therefore it wouldn’t be closed. But the problem are these elements right here: 3, 3 
and 4, and 4. So like if  you looked at Z2, it is going to consist o f these first two elements. 
The problem here again is going to be this last multiplication, or addition o f 1 and 1,
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cause that’s going to equal 0 .
It seems Wendy abandoned looking at {3, 4} and instead was trying to exclude the 
problematic entries in the table by considering Z2, both as a subset o f Z& and as a group 
on its own. I asked her to explain what she was doing:
12 9 Wendy: I am just relating to what subgroups would be. What subgroups, what Z mod n 
subgroups would be a subgroup of Z6.
132 Brad: And you were trying specifically ...
133 Wendy: Z2. But the problem is, if you look at Z2, this 2.... Like lx l [ 1  + 1] in Z2 equals 
0 and that causes ... or that gives you the identity [inverse] element in 1, for 1. But here 
if you just look at it under Z6, it doesn’t, 1 doesn’t have an identity [inverse] element.
Just like here [the {0, 1, 2} subset of Z6], 1 and 2 don’t have an identity [inverse] element 
also, besides it not being closed, there are a lot of reasons why it’s not going to be a 
subgroup.
Once again, Wendy was saying identity and meaning inverse, and she confirmed this 
moments later. But this excerpt provides something o f an explanation for her confused 
language: She was using the operation table for Z(, to support this reasoning. In 
particular, she was checking the inverse property for various subsets by looking for the 
identity inside the appropriate subset o f the operation table. Because her process 
involved looking for the identity, it is not surprising that Wendy said identity rather than 
inverse.
This process was in service of a larger question that Wendy was pursuing. She had 
generalized the question “Is Z3 a subgroup o f Z^T' to consider whether Z„ might be a 
subgroup for other n. This provided a natural transition to ask Wendy whether she could 
find any subgroups o fZ 6 .
144 Wendy: See Z6, it’s hard to take a subset because you have to make sure you include the 
identity element in the set that you pick. So let’s, just for instance, I’m going to take this. 
Because if I am looking in the fact that you have to have an identity element. Here, if 
you look at 1, 2, and 3 they each have and 3,4.... You can’t do that. ‘Cause now it’s not 
closed, really. You can’t take 3, 4, 5 and 1, 2, 3. It wouldn’t work.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
159
Wendy saw that she needed to include the identity, but she was simultaneously 
considering “blocks” in the operation table, and she saw that this would not work. I 
suggested that she think more broadly and consider subsets with nonadjacent elements, 
such as {1,4}.
14 6  Wendy: 1 and 4. Like, what I was saying before, 3 and 4? Like looking just at 3 and 4?
14 7 Brad: Yeah, or maybe not two that necessarily that are right next to each other. Like
what about 3 and 5? Could that work? Or.... Do you know what I am saying?
14 8  Wendy: It’s just easier for me to see [inaudible].
14 9 Brad: So, what are you doing there? Oh, you’re covering up 4.
150 Wendy: 4. It distracts me.
At first, Wendy persisted looking for blocks in the table (line 146), and so I suggested 
once again that she consider subsets more broadly. This excerpt suggests that she was 
looking at blocks in the table partly for visual reasons. Because it was hard for her to see 
the operation table for subsets that were not blocks, it was therefore hard to think about 
subsets that weren’t blocks. A related possibility is that she looked for blocks in the table 
because o f an overly limiting interpretation o f the Groups-Are-Containers metaphor. If 
groups are containers, then subgroups must also be containers, but it is difficult to 
imagine a container that holds every other element from the group table, for example. 
Wendy tried to overcome this limiting view as the interview continued.
Figure 8 . Wendy’s table for Z&, annotated version
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 2 3 4 5 0
2 2 3 4 5 0 1
y y . . . . . y ( o '; 1 (?)
4 4 5 0 1 2 3
5 5 0 1 (?) 3 @
N o te: c ir c le s  a d d e d  to  c la r ify  tra n scr ip t 
150 Wendy: ... Technically you are only looking at the 0, 2 ... 2, 4 [circled in Figure 8 ].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
Right? Because, in other words, you can make that table.... You can’t look at the other 
elements. You can’t look at the whole row, 3 and 5. You know what I mean? Because 
you can only look at the addition of those two. You can’t start including 0, 1, 2 added to 
three, because you have to restrict it to three if  you are to restrict it to 3 and 5, in order for 
it to be closed. So if  I am going to look at the addition o f just 3 and 5 [pause] 0 [5] 
doesn’t have an id-, a inverse element.
151 Brad: What do you mean?
152 Wendy: Nothing [incomplete thought].... When you add 3 or 5 to 5, you can’t get 0. 
Like, 3, when you add 3 to itself you get 0. So that wouldn’t be.
153 Brad: So 3 has a ...
154 Wendy: It is kind o f hard. Like, what if  you took 1 and 3. Oh, no. Not land  3. You 
have to make sure you pick 1 and 5. What if  I tried three, picking three numbers?
Wendy described how she was restricting her view o f the table, describing precisely those 
entries inside the table (0, 2; 2, 4) that were relevant to whether {3, 5} is a subgroup. 
Furthermore, she justified this view by noting that “you can make that a table” (line 150). 
From this view, she noticed that 5 does not have an inverse in {3, 5}, although she said at 
first that 0  does not have an inverse, perhaps because she had been looking for a 0  in that 
row. Then, perhaps prompted by the fact that 5 lacks an inverse in {3, 5}, Wendy 
decided to begin with the set {1, 5} to see whether it was a subgroup of Z6.
As the interview continued, she focused on the inverse property.
15 6  Wendy: Let me pick 1 and 5. 1 and 5, and that would give you.... I’ll tell you how I am 
going to do this. 1 and 1 is going to give you 2. 5 and 5 is going to give you 4. And 1 
and 5, and 5 and 1, is going to give you 0.
157 Brad: Okay.
158 Wendy: You see that 1 and 5 both have an inverse. So, ooh.
15 9 Brad: Ooh what?
160 Wendy: 1 and 5 work, so far. It hasn’t.... They both have a inverse element. You see 
what I mean?
161 Brad: Uh huh.
162 Wendy: 1 and 5 are their own inverse, are each other inverse elements. So if  you took 
those two separately, it upholds the inverse property. Identity ...
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Although the previous excerpt suggested that Wendy had chosen {1,5} so that it would 
satisfy the inverse property, it seems in this excerpt that she was unsure whether this 
choice would work until she had considered the operation table. Her syntax about the 
relationship between 1 and 5 was somewhat confused and inconsistent, however, 
evolving from “have an inverse” to “are each other inverse elements.”
At the same time, it is apparent that Wendy was thinking only about the inverse property. 
If  she had been thinking about closure, she would have noticed during her calculations 
that closure was not satisfied. Furthermore, she was ready to consider the identity 
property only after she had completed her verification o f the inverse property.
164 Wendy: It has.... However, it doesn’t have an identity element. Like, you have to get 1
and you have to get 5. Like you have to.... If you take something, you kind o f have to 
build from it. Kind of like what we did in abstract class. They gave us, like, one—this 
confuses me, but— one element o f a subset, of a subgroup and they said, “Is this a 
subgroup?” It wasn’t. Well then you kind of have to see what it’s missing, and you have 
to kind o f build the subgroup.
165 Brad: Oh, okay, well try that here then. It’s a good idea.
166 Wendy: Okay. So, I need.... Well I picked two numbers so that it upheld the inverse 
property. But now it doesn’t have the identity property, which means when added to 
itself, or when added to another number it gets itself. And that’s 0. It has to have 0 in it. 
So I am just going to move this over. Move this down.
Drawing on a procedure developed in class, Wendy considered adding elements to the set 
in order to build the subgroup one element at a time. Here she realized that she needed to 
include the identity element in order to be sure that the identity property was satisfied.
This seems to be a significant moment regarding the identity, for from this point on, 
Wendy always included the identity early when constructing a subgroup. But at this 
point, she was ignoring closure and was having trouble reasoning about the set {0, 1, 5} 
because the table for Z& was cluttered with other elements. Thus, she decided to “move
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over” the relevant portions of the table into a smaller table containing only the three 
elements she was interested in (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. Wendy’s table for {0,1, 5}
+ 0 1 5
0 0 1 5
1 1 2 0
5 5 0 4
17 0 Wendy: Okay. So, here everything has an ... 1 has, everything has.... There is an
identity element in here, because 0  is in the table, and therefore 0  added to anything is 
going to equal the number itself. So zero is everything’s identity.
171 Wendy: So now everything has an inverse, even though you added 0, 0 is its own inverse. 
So, therefore, you didn’t have to worry about changing the inverse, like disturbing the 
inverse property when you added 0 .
172 Brad: Oh, okay.
17 3 Wendy: It’s not closed. [Laughs.] Oh, no. It’s got 2 and 4 in it. This is just getting
really difficult. Like, you’re going to have to keep on.... You’re going to have to add 2 
and 4 now. So the only thing you are missing is 3, and if  you ... I am sure if  you add 2 or 
4 you’re going to get.... So if  you just do away with 3 .... 2 times 1 is going to equal 3.
2 + 1 is going to equal 3. And therefore you’re going to need to add 3 in there. So it 
doesn’t work.
There are two points to make here. First, Wendy had been considering the group axioms 
one at a time and did not move flexibly among them. From her laughter and frustration 
in noticing that the set was not closed, it is clear that she had not considered the closure 
axiom earlier in this example. Second, this excerpt reinforces the hypothesis that Wendy 
began constructing the set with 1 and 5 because together they satisfied the inverse 
property and then added 0 to the set so that there would be an identity element. When 
she returned to check the inverse property (line 171), she still was thinking of the process 
by which she had constructed the set, but her reasons for choosing 1 and 5 as a pair were 
not explicit. This omission may be significant because she seems to have forgotten her 
reasons only a few minutes later when, taking advantage of her idea to “build up”
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subgroups, I asked what would happen if  she had started with different elements or with 
only one element:
18 6  Brad: If you just started with 1, would you need 5?
187 Wendy: I don’t know. You have to see after you add 2. If you add 2, 2 and 1 is going to
equal 3. Then you’re going to need 3. 3 and 1 is going to equal 4, and you’re going to 
need 4. And then 4 and 1 is going to equal 5 and you’re going to need 5. [inaudible]
18 8  Brad: Okay. So in other words, if you start with 1, what else do you need?
18 9 Wendy: 0 for the identity element.
191 Wendy: You need 2 for closure, 3 for closure, [laughs] 4 for closure, and 5 for closure. 
Wendy was no longer thinking of the inverse property, or she would have responded (in 
line 187) more quickly that 5 was necessary. Instead, she was thinking about closure, 
which is why 2 needs to be in the subgroup. Continuing the processes o f adding 1, she 
decides that 3, then 4, and eventually 5 must also be in the subgroup.
At this point in the interview, the identity axiom was fairly immediate and salient, but the 
inverse axiom had faded into the background, obscured by the closure axiom. Closure 
remained dominant as the interview continued. Despite Wendy’s frustration, she had 
built up some ways o f thinking that allowed her to proceed more quickly. I asked her to 
try starting with a different element.
196 Wendy: If you start with 2 you are going to need 0. You are always going to need 0,
‘cause, like you said. Okay. So, things are getting kind o f messy. I need a new piece of 
paper. If you start with 2, you’re going to need 4.
198 Wendy: And when you’re doing 4, you need 0. W ell.... Ooh.
19 9 Brad: Ooh what?
2 00 Wendy: You need 0, anyway. You need 4 though, [inaudible] So, 2 ... ‘cause 2 and 4 is 
going to equal 0. Uh oh.
2 01 Brad: Uh oh what?
202  Wendy: It works! You don’t.... It’s closed. It’s got an id-, everything has an identity
elem ent... 0 is the identity element for all, each element. Well, they have to have the 
same identity element, but.... And it’s got an inverse.
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Figure 10. Wendy’s table for {0, 2, 4}
+ 0 2 4
0 0 2 4
2 2 4 0
4 4 0 2
Wendy had found a subgroup, and, for the first time in the interview, she considered 
several axioms in quick succession. Her explanations were somewhat muddled, however. 
In particular, her syntax for the identity and inverse was mostly reversed, suggesting once 
again that these two properties were closely related in her thinking. She did clarify that 
all elements have the same identity. I asked for clarification about inverse:
2 03 Brad: What’s got an inverse?
204 Wendy: Every element has an inverse. So that’s a subgroup.
Because Wendy corrected her syntax regarding the inverse property, it seems that she 
could distinguish the inverse property from the identity property, even if  the distinction 
was not automatic.
Again, it is remarkable that Wendy considered three o f the group axioms almost 
simultaneously, suggesting growing fluency with the axioms. She had said nothing, 
however, about the associative property.
2  05 Brad: Did you check all of the properties?
206  Wendy: No, I did not check associative. [Laughs.] No! [Her tone suggests she’d rather
not check the associative property.]
2  07 Brad: And why? Do you think you need to check it?
2 08 Wendy: No, because it’s a global property. And if it’s . ... Addition is associative. So no
[matter]... If addition is associative, doesn’t, under integers.... Taking any integers, it’s 
still going to be associative. So there’s no need to check it.
20 9 Brad: Okay. So what do you have here?
210 Wendy: A subgroup of Z6.
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Wendy’s response to my question indicated some frustration that all her work had not yet 
produced something that she could be sure was a subgroup. Nonetheless, she overcame 
this frustration quickly upon remembering that associativity is a global property. Wendy 
did not correctly use the idea that associativity is global, however, basing her conclusion 
on the associativity o f addition in Z rather than in Z(,. Nonetheless, she was correct that 
{0, 2, 4} is a subgroup.
Next, I asked Wendy whether there are any other subgroups o f Zg.
212  Wendy: I don’t know I’d have to play and try. I just found one; I didn’t think that we 
could find one, but I just found one.
21 3  Brad: Okay. What do you think? Another one?
21 5  Wendy: Let me try 3, starting with 3. You need 0. You always need ... [Whistles.]
Found a group!
21 6  Brad: You found a group?
217 Wendy: Yeah. Because it’s got a identity element. Whoops, I made a little mistake in
my calculation, but.... It’s got an identity element, 0. It’s got an inverse because 0 + 0 =
3 [0] and 3 + 3 = 0, so it’s got an inverse. It is closed between 0 and 3 and it’s 
associative. So here’s another subgroup.
Again her syntax regarding the inverse property is more appropriate for talking about the 
identity, yet her calculations indicate that she did know that each element must have an 
inverse. And again she considered the inverse, identity, and closure properties in quick 
succession.
I asked whether there were any other subgroups.
22 0  Wendy: No, because 4 you would need 2.
221  Brad: Why?
222 Wendy: Because if  you have 4, 4 and 4 is 2. And therefore you need 2.
22 5 Brad: Well, what if you had 5? What if you started with 5?
22 6  Wendy: 5 is the same thing as 1.
227  Brad: Why?
22 8  Wendy: Because 5 and 5 you are going to need 4, and then 4 and 5 are going to need 3.
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Okay? And then 3 and 4 you going to need 1, you are going to need 0, and 4 and 4 is 
going to equal 2. So you need everything.
For both o f the examples in this excerpt (starting with 4 and starting with 5), Wendy’s 
arguments were based on the closure property, not the inverse property. The inverse 
relationship between 5 and 1, which had earlier been quite present in her thinking (see 
lines 154 and 158), had faded into the background. Instead she focused on the need to 
satisfy the closure property.
Next, I asked Wendy whether she saw any relationship between Z3 and the subgroup {0, 
2, 4} in Z(j. She paused for a moment and then responded:
235  Wendy: You multiply Z3 by 2, all o f the elements by 2, and you get this subgroup. I 
don’t know what you call it. I don’t know.
Taking advantage o f this relationship, Wendy decided to call the subgroup 2 Z3 . She 
asserted that Z3 and 2 Z3 are not the same but are related by multiplication. Wendy was 
not satisfied with this description, however, and wanted to find a deeper explanation.
24 9 Wendy: Yeah, but if  you take every element in Z3 and you multiply it by 2 .... I can’t
really make that connection yet, like, why that exactly works. I know it definitely has 
the.... Like, I think it definitely affects the fact that 2 and 4 are factors of 6. Not 
factors.... Oh, no. They’re.... Like 3, when added to itself is going to equal 0. When2 
and 4 are added to each other, you’re going to ... it’s going to keep it closed. Like when 
you start adding 1 you’re switching.... Like, these are two even numbers. The fact that 
they are two evens, two evens are going to equal an even number. I don’t know if  it has 
to do with the evens, but.... I see a definite pattern why these two are going to be 
subgroups. Because 2 and 4 .... 2 and 2 is going to equal 4. 4 and 2 is going to equal 6 , 
and 6  is going to be, 6  is equal to 0. So all these.... Like 2 and 4 when.... I’ve explained 
this to you [inaudible] four times. I can’t explain.... I don’t know, [inaudible]
250 Wendy: Like it makes total sense to me that these two are groups. And I can see why this 
isn’t. So can I re-ask a question or can you re-ask me a question?
Wendy considered factors and evenness to explain why 2 Z3 would be a subgroup, but 
neither of these provided a clear explanation. To assist her in searching for the 
explanation, she sought a new question, suggesting that she saw questioning as a useful 
means for developing insight and explanation. She continued looking.
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254 Wendy: Well, I want to sort o f look at 4 Z3, for no reason at all [inaudible]. If I’m looking
at 2Z3, why not look at 4Z3. And you’re going to get.... Actually, w e’re adding here. 
This is going to equal 4.
Wendy calculated 4 Z3 to be the set {0, 4, 2} and began constructing the operation table, 
using that order. Because she was not explicit about how she was doing the arithmetic, I 
asked her whether she was still doing arithmetic modulo 6 :
2 58 Wendy: Yeah, just as I did here [in the 2Z3 table].
2 60 Wendy: Ooh, wait a minute. But here I said this was a subgroup. This is a subgroup of
Z6, but that’s because in Z3, w e’re restricting our elements to 0, 1, and 2. Here we are 
allowing for higher numbers.
2  62 Wendy: So, technically, this isn’t 2Z3. Cause it’s not in mod 3.
2 63 Brad: Oh, I see.
2 64 Wendy: This is definitely not 2Z3, 2 x Z3.
2 65 Brad: But it is the set {0, 2, 4}, which.... I can see why you want to call it 2Z3. I’m not
sure.... I mean, maybe that’s a good notation [inaudible],
2 6 6  Wendy: Well, I guess if  you say Z3, Z3 has to hold.... Like, if  you take all the members
of Z3 and multiply them by 2, who said they still have to hold the stipulations o f Z3? It
has to be divisible, like you look at their remainder after dividing by 3. So I guess you
could still say 2Z3. But I still don’t know the connection between 2Z3 and Z3 and why 2Z3 
is a member, is a group of, a subgroup of Z6 [inaudible], I know why Z3 isn’t. But I just
don’t know why 2 x Z3 would work. This isn’t a. ... 2 x 1  equals 2. 2 x 4 is 8  equals 2.
Wendy was uncomfortable with her notation. She was sometimes adding and at other 
times multiplying, sometimes modulo 3 and at other times modulo 6 . This inconsistency 
caused confusion that she was not able to resolve. Nonetheless, without prompting from 
me, Wendy saw a relationship between the tables that she had called 2Z3 and 4Z3.
2  72 Wendy: I think this is just a different arrangement o f this. Do you see what I mean? This
is just a different arrangement o f this.
273 Brad: So the thing you’re calling 4Z3 and the thing you’re calling 2Z3 ...
27 4 Wendy: Are the same, just a different arrangement.
The fact that Wendy called two different tables the same suggests that, by the end o f the 
interview, she had begun to separate the table from the group. The question is whether 
she saw the table (and various rearrangements) as the object of investigation or,
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out that “the transition from signifier-as-object-in-itself to signifier-as-a-representation- 
of-another-object is a quantum leap in a subject’s consciousness” (p. 79). Such a 
distinction between signifier and signified might mark the creation of an abstract object— 
in this case the group Z3 . This sort o f separation between the table and the group paves 
the way for the concept o f isomorphism, which gives rise to the idea o f an abstract group 
that is independent not only o f the arrangement o f its elements in the table but also o f the 
names o f the elements as well. It is not clear, however, to what extent Wendy had made 
this conceptual leap by the end o f the interview. Because isomorphism was the theme of 
the second interview, this issue is explored in more detail below.
W endy’s reasoning about groups and subgroups was largely external, often requiring that 
relevant portions o f the table be present before her eyes without extraneous information 
interfering with her perception. When considering whether {3,5} was a subgroup, she 
covered up the 4, and when building a subgroup with {1,5}, she created a new table 
separate from the Z& table. In large measure, the operation table was the group for 
Wendy, although she had begun to separate the group from the table, as evidenced by her 
suggestion that the table she called 4 Z3 was a rearrangement of the table she had called 
2 Z3. The operation table both supported and limited Wendy’s ability to reason about 
groups and subgroups. On the one hand, the table helped her see quickly the problem 
with considering Z3 to be a subgroup of Z(,. On the other hand, her reliance on the table 
made it difficult for her to find subgroups.
A symptom of the external, table-based nature o f Wendy’s reasoning was that she often 
considered only one group axiom at a time when reasoning about groups and subgroups.
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Toward the end of the interview, however, she had developed more fluency and was able 
to move quickly among the axioms. Moving toward considering the axioms multiply and 
flexibly might be described as a matter of increasing proficiency and fluency with the 
group axioms and with the particular examples, which may be a result o f internalization 
of some o f the external processes that were based in the table.
The above case demonstrates some o f W endy’s difficulties with language and also the 
ways that her language use shed light on the ways she was thinking about some of the 
concepts. The case also demonstrates some o f the ways that Wendy used the table to 
support her reasoning. In the sections below, I further illustrate these themes by 
broadening the analysis to include characterizations o f the concept images o f other key 
participants. The theme o f language use is particularly prominent in the discussion o f the 
concepts of identity and inverse. The theme of the use of the operation table is Central in 
the discussion o f the concepts o f closure and subgroup.
Identity and Inverse
Like Wendy, the other key participants demonstrated that their concept images o f identity 
and inverse were closely related. In this section, I first present a synthesis o f the 
definitions and informal meanings that students associated with the concepts, followed by 
a description o f the notational, linguistic, and conceptual expectations that the students 
seemed to have for each o f the concepts. Then I provide some additional examples of 
confusion between the two concepts and some explanations based in procedures and 
operation tables.
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Definitions and meaning. On the final exam, several students provided definitions of the 
identity and inverse as part o f their definitions o f group. Lori, for example, wrote the 
following:
There must be the existance [sfc] of an inverse: a 0 a'1 = e (where e is the identity 
element).
There must be an existance [s/c] of an identity: a 0 e = a (e is the identity 
element).
The syntactical similarity between the definitions suggests that the two concepts were 
closely related in Lori’s thinking. Furthermore, the quantifiers and other specifications 
are missing, yet the formulas are correct in the sense that correct definitions could be 
crafted around these formulas. This characterization fits many of the definitions that 
students provided.
There were also important differences between students’ definitions o f identity and 
inverse. In particular, the definition of identity seems to have been more difficult to 
formulate than the definition of inverse. Compare, for example, Robert’s definitions:
identity - an element e such that a 0 e  = a = e 0 a .
inverses - for each a e  G there is a 1 e G such that aa'[ = e = aAa.
Though Robert’s definition o f inverse was essentially correct, including the quantifiers,
his definition o f identity lacked quantifiers entirely. Wendy’s definition of identity was
also problematic:
There is an identity element for the group so that every element in G, when 
multiplied by this identity element, e, will give you back the original element:
{x e  G \xe = xj.
Wendy’s informal characterization was essentially correct and included the quantifier 
“every element in G.” The formalization at the end, however, is incorrect. A standard 
mathematical reading o f Wendy’s symbolism would be, “The set o f x  in G such that xe =
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
x” or, more informally, “All x in G such that xe = x.” This is not far from the correct 
condition, “For all x in G, xe = x.” Thus, Wendy had specified a set rather than a 
condition on G, and her unusual symbolism may be interpreted as difficulty with correct 
symbolic use o f quantifiers.
Informal characterizations such as “giving back the original element” were common for 
the identity element. On her final exam, Lori noted, “The identity o f Z4  is 0 because 0 
plus any element in Z4  gives back that element.” Wendy called the identity the “do- 
nothing element” (Interview 2, line 306). Carla elevated this characterization to a 
definition: “So you could call 0 the do-nothing element, which is the way we’ve defined 
identity” (Interview 1, line 8 8 ). Robert combined these characterizations: “Ro, which 
doesn’t do anything to them. Ro composed with any of them leaves them the same. So 
there is an identity” (Interview 2, line 178).
Informal characterizations o f inverse were more difficult to formulate. Lori, for example, 
was quite vague: “Because the inverse o f something is when you operate two things to 
equal the identity” (Interview 1, line 87). Recall that Wendy struggled and eventually 
came to an approximate characterization: “So when you multiply some number m by, it 
has to have an inverse i, so that when multiplied, it will equal the identity” (line 30). 
Carla, on the other hand, was more precise in her language, even in her first interview. 
She stated, “To get the inverse you have to find something that adds with your element 
that results in the identity, which is 0 in this case” (line 39). In the same interview, she 
used similar syntax when she described that for something to be an inverse o f 2: “It 
means that 2  times that thing equals the identity” (line 1 2 0 ).
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Expectations about the identity. The students’ images o f the identity property seemed 
partly tied to what the identity was called. In other words, the symbol that was used for 
the identity (e.g., 0, 1, or e) seemed to support and facilitate the students’ thinking. In 
fact, the students’ use of 0  and 1 (and eventually e) was so flexible that it was not 
possible for me to distinguish between the symbol and the name. Not surprisingly, there 
were also strong connections between the name of the operation and the expected name 
of the identity. When the operation was called addition, for example, students expected 
the identity to be called 0. Then, when determining whether a set was a group or a 
subgroup, they needed only determine whether 0 was in the set. Similar statements can 
be made about multiplication and 1. Carla, for example, was explicit about this process:
168 Carla: So then you want to check the identity. We already said that the identity for
integers under addition is 0. So we know that the identity for Z3 is 0. The question is, Is 
0 in Z3? And yes, it is. So therefore we have an identity.
This statement suggests that Carla was not necessarily distinguishing between addition in 
Z and addition in Z3 and that 0 being the identity was a global property. Both o f these 
issues are discussed further below. Here I wish to suggest that students also had a sense 
that the 0 in Z3 is the same as the 0 in Z. This point brings into question the practice of 
calling the elements o f Z3 the integers 0, 1, and 2. The alternative is to construct Z3 as 
equivalence classes in Z so that the elements of Z3 are subsets of Z and 0, 1, and 2 are but 
convenient representative elements. When using representative elements to name 
equivalence classes, some texts use a bar over the representative element, as in 2 , so as to 
distinguish the equivalence classes from elements themselves (see, e.g., Bhattacharya, 
Jain, & Nagpaul, 1986). This approach might solve the problem of failing to distinguish 
between 0 in Z and 0 in Z3 but might also create a different collection o f conceptual and 
notational issues.
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In addition to natural facility with identities called 0 and 1, the students also developed 
facility with calling the identity e. When groups were given by tables with elements 
named by letters, Diane and Lori seemed to prefer that the identity be called e and 
hesitated when the identity was called something else. Yet they also seemed to know that 
the names o f the elements do not matter. I asked them whether it mattered that the 
identity was called e.
422 Diane: That’s just convention. I mean we could make it i if  we want it to be and just say i 
is the identity. That’s just conventional.
423 Lori: When we renamed and reordered, we looked at the table after we renamed and 
reordered. We said, “Okay, what acts like the identity?” And that’s what we have to set 
equal to the identity so that we make sure we get back one o f our tables. (Interview 2)
Whatever names were given to elements in a group, most students were able to notice 
when elements acted like the identity even when the elements were themselves sets, such 
as in a group consisting of two elements, {1,3} and {5, 7}. In this group, Wendy called 
{1, 3} the “identity set.” Often this sort of reasoning seemed to arise out of the operation 
table, but the students also were aware o f distinguishing characteristics of the identity. 
Wendy, for example, noted on her midterm exam, “The only element that when 
multiplied by itself, gets itself is the identity element.”
Expectations about inverses. In some representations, particularly when the 
representations looked like integers, the students sometimes drew on their experience 
with integers and rational numbers and expected inverses to be negative numbers or 
fractions, depending upon the operation. Carla, for example, suggested that “the inverse 
o f 2 mod 3 would be 1/2 mod 3, and 1/2 is not an integer, and it is not in mod 3. And the 
only elements o f mod 3 are 0, 1, 2” (Interview 1, line 118). Similarly, Wendy stated that 
“multiplication is not a group, because there’s no inverse ... because they’re, under
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multiplication they’re going to be, like a fraction” (Interview 3, lines 36-38). In his first 
interview, Robert expected multiplicative inverses to be fractions and also expected 
additive inverses to be negative: “Like 1 + -1  will equal 0, so -1  is 1 ’s inverse, but -1 
isn’t in Zd' (line 2 2 ).
This phenomenon of expecting negatives and fractions for inverses is analogous to 
expecting that 0  is the identity for any operation called addition and 1 is the identity for 
any operation called multiplication. In the case of the identity, this phenomenon rarely 
caused difficulty because 0 and 1 often continue to behave as they do in the integers. In 
the case o f inverses, however, the tendency is potentially more problematic because, for 
example, -3  and 1/3 do not have obvious meaning in Z„. The concept o f inverse provides 
the meaning by which these symbols may be interpreted in Z„. The students, on the other 
hand, used their understandings o f the rational numbers -3  and 1/3 as the source of 
meaning, and those meanings did not fit with their images of Z„.
Confusing identity and inverse. Wendy’s linguistic confusion between inverse and 
identity continued at least into the second interview. When she was investigating the 
powers of a specific permutation a , for example, I asked her what a 0  would be. She first 
called it E  and later explained:
30 8  Wendy: The identity. It’s the do-nothing. It doesn’t do anything. When you put
anything to the power of 0 it doesn’t ... Like, any number to the power 0 is going to 
equal 1. Okay? Because... And 1 is the multiplicative inverse? You know, like, it 
doesn’t do anything. Multiplicative inverse is the identity. Or not multiplicative inverse. 
I’m not talking ... I’m n o t... I don’t know why I just said that, [laughs] But any power, 
any number to the power of 1 [0 ] is going to equal 1 , which is the multiplicative identity, 
not inverse. Right? [inaudible] multiplicative identity. So, alpha to the 0 is going, in 
cycle notation, has to be the cycle identity, which is the do-nothing cycle, which is 1 .
Wendy was able to correct her language, though not without a struggle. Other students 
also sometimes mixed up identity and inverse and corrected themselves. Lori, for
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example, said, “Under multiplication there’s no identity. I am sorry; there’s no inverse 
for 0” (Interview 1, line 71). Similarly, when discussing {0, 3} in Z6 , Robert noted, “3 
was its own identity. Was its own inverse, I should say” (Interview 1, line 232). He also 
sometimes used confused syntax, such as, “3 plus itself is an inverse. 3 is an inverse of 
itse lf’ (line 189). And sometimes the syntax for the inverse was more appropriate for the 
identity, such as, when discussing Z3, he concluded, “So now I find it has an inverse” 
(Interview 1, line 114). Moments later, however, he was clearer: “Let me say that again, 
the whole group has an identity 0 , and each element in the group, 0 , 1 and 2 , have an 
inverse” (line 116).
The confusion between identity and inverse is probably best explained by the close 
procedural relationships between the concepts. In particular, finding the inverse of an 
element necessarily involves the identity. As mentioned above, when operations are 
presented through tables, finding the inverse o f an element involves looking for the 
identity in the appropriate row or column. More generally, checking whether a binary 
operation satisfies the inverse property is a matter o f checking every row and column. 
Robert was explicit about this procedure: “0 doesn’t appear in every row and column, so 
not every element has an inverse” (Interview 1, line 93). The idea o f looking for or 
creating an identity in order to find an inverse leads to procedures in other mathematical 
contexts as well. For example, a standard method of finding the inverse of a matrix 
involves performing row operations on an augmented matrix until part o f that matrix 
looks like the identity.
Another reason for the strong connection between identity and inverse is that it seems to 
be natural for students to think in terms o f inverse pairs, such as {1,5} in Z6, or in terms
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o f  triples that include the identity, as is described for W endy above and for Robert below. 
In this kind o f  reasoning, elements that are their own inverses are something o f  a special 
case that becom es particularly salient when working with operation tables.
Several students noticed that an identity occurs in the diagonal when an element is its 
ow n inverse. For example, Carla demonstrated this connection when she described how  
she knew that a particular table was a group:
3 94 Carla: So if  we rename {1, 3} to e, the set {1, 3} as e and the set {5, 7} as a, we will
create a table that looks like e along the diagonal that goes like this and a along the 
opposite diagonal, which is a group because that’s . ... Well, for one thing it is one o f the 
tables we came up with when we talked about possible groups for a two element set. And 
for another thing, we see that each o f the elements appears only once in each row or 
column, which tells us it’s group. And we see that it contains the identity, that a is its 
own inverse, e is its own inverse. So, w e’re all set. (Interview 3)
As is discussed in the section on W endy and isomorphism below , W endy discriminated 
among groups o f  order 4 according to the appearance o f  the identity element along the 
diagonal. Diane and Lori took longer than W endy to notice this discriminating feature, 
but their description makes clear this fundamental connection between identity and 
inverse.
3 94 Diane: All the elements squared is e. Each element is its own inverse.
3 97 Lori: They are all their own inverses.
3 98 Diane: Well that’s just definition. If you take a x a = e, b x b = e, c x c = e, the only way
you can get an identity element, if  these aren’t the identity elements themselves, these 
have to be inverses o f each other, cause that’s just the definition [of inverse].
Assuming that e is the identity under multiplication, Diane was saying, “I f  a  x a  =  e  then
a  is its own inverse.” B y calling this a definition, Diane was either trivializing her own
reasoning or demonstrating that she did not distinguish this statement from the definition,
which might instead be given by “I f a x  b =  e then b is the inverse o f  a .”
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The connection between the identity and inverse became even more apparent when the 
students looked for the inverse of the identity. As Carla remarked, “The identity’s 
inverse is itse lf’ (Interview 4, line 133). This observation helped her verify that a group 
containing only the identity was indeed a group.
In summary, although the students often confused the terms identity and inverse in their 
language, they often corrected that language on their own. The frequent confusion 
between the terms is explained by procedural connections between the concepts. In 
particular, using an operation table to find an inverse is really a matter o f looking for the 
identity element in the table. The confusion is further explained by the fact that the 
students thought in terms o f inverse pairs, for which the product is the identity. Elements 
that are their own inverses form a special case when thinking about inverse pairs, and the 
identity element is always its own inverse.
Closure
The students’ concept images of closure were similar to those of other group axioms in 
that the students’ reasoning was often tied to operation tables. On the other hand, the 
students’ concept images o f closure were different in that there seemed to be fewer 
linguistic and conceptual confusions. Closure became prominent in service of the 
concept o f subgroup, both in determining whether a subset was a subgroup and in 
constructing subgroups o f a given group. A firm understanding o f the concept o f closure 
also relied on distinctions between operations, such as between addition and addition 
modulo 6 . Because all o f these issues are treated in detail in the section on the concept of 
subgroup, here I make only two observations.
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First, the students’ formal definitions were usually correct. For example, on her final 
exam Wendy stated that a group must satisfy the property o f closure: “For all a and b in 
G, a * b is also in G.” Informal characterizations were quite close to the formal 
definition. Lori, for example, wrote on her final exam, “So pick any two elements in S, 
namely a and b and operate them together to see if  the answer is in S'.”
Second, operation tables helped the students see whether or not closure was satisfied. 
Lori, who had taken the course previously, explained in her first interview that tables 
helped her understand the concept: “I don’t think that I necessarily understood the 
concept o f closed until we made charts and tables and stuff, and we never made tables 
last semester” (Interview 1, line 5).
More on Subgroups
The students’ concept images o f subgroup were dominated by the idea that a subgroup is 
a subset that is a group in its own right. The students often did not explicitly mention the 
operation and often made no distinctions between various related operations. These 
themes characterized the students’ formal and informal definitions of subgroup, as well 
as the ways they solved problems involving the concept. In reasoning about subgroups, 
the students relied on operation tables, on thinking about the processes underlying the 
operation, and on considering each o f the group axioms individually.
After providing the students’ formal and informal definitions o f subgroup, the bulk of this 
section presents an analysis and synthesis of students’ responses to the question, “Is Z3 a 
subgroup of Zg?” Results of similar questions on the final exam are also presented. The 
section continues with discussion o f two central phenomena that arose during these 
interviews: the sense that a subgroup should be a block within an operation table and the
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belief that addition in Z3, addition in Z6 , and addition in Z are all essentially the same 
operation. The section closes with analysis o f the ways that the students looked for 
subgroups o f Zg and, more generally, how they constructed subgroups generated by 
elements o f groups.
Definitions. On the final exam, the students’ definitions mostly characterized a subgroup 
as a subset that is a group, and the operation was not always mentioned. Robert’s 
definition was typical: “A subgroup is a subset o f elements from a larger group G, which 
form a group under G’s operation.” Some students did not state explicitly that the 
subgroup would be a group but rather listed the four group axioms as conditions that the 
subset must satisfy. Some students mentioned that it was not necessary to check 
associativity. These formal definitions were consistent with the students’ informal 
definitions found throughout the data. What varied was the kind of attention they gave to 
the operation.
Is Z-\ a Subgroup o f Z<P. When considering whether Z3 is a subgroup of Z&, most o f the 
key participants were seduced by the fact that Z3 is a subset that is a group in its own 
right. Carla, for example, after verifying that Z3 is a group, concluded that Z3 is a 
subgroup o f Z6  “because Z3 is a subset o f Z6. That is what makes it a subgroup of Z6”
(line 173). Robert, Lori, and Diane came to similar conclusions. Wendy was alone in her 
early conviction that it did not make sense to consider Z3 separately from Z(,. For most 
students, overcoming this initial conclusion required a coordination of resources and 
depended upon concluding that addition mod 3 and addition mod 6  are different 
operations.
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As the students continued to ponder the question at hand, the operation tables and the 
processes behind the operations created suspicions that Z3 is not a subgroup o f Z&, but the 
suspicions were usually not sufficient to convince them of that fact. Instead, the notion 
that a subgroup is a “subset that is a group” was strong enough to create the simultaneous 
belief that Z3 ought to be a subgroup. This belief may explain the fact that the students 
had a strong sense that “addition is addition” despite differences between addition mod 6  
and addition mod 3.
Diane and Lori, for example, knew that a subgroup must use the same operation as the 
group and also saw the operations in Z3 and Z6 as different, but that was not sufficient to 
lead them to a conclusion.
103 Diane: They are both modular arithmetic, they are both modular addition, they are just 
different mods. So it’s kind o f weird what you would think o f mods, if you are talking.... 
If you take into consideration the different mods here and still consider it the same 
operation, then these could be subgroups. This could be a subgroup of this. But you are 
saying that this and this are different, then you have say they are different operations.
104 Lori: Do we define mod 3 under addition a different operation than mod 6 ?
Diane and Lori also considered the operation table for the subset {0, 1,2} in Z&, which 
Diane said “would definitely be a subgroup” (line 105). I asked them what the table 
would look like.
110 Lori: Oh, it’s the same as Z3.
111 Diane: No it’s not exactly the same, because you are going to have 0, 1, 2; 1, 2, 3; 2, 3, 4 
[in the table].
112 Lori: You can’t have 3 and 4. They are not in the set, and then it’s not closed.
113 Diane: You’re right.
Thus, Diane and Lori had at least two kinds of evidence that the operations are different. 
Despite this evidence, Lori still wanted Z3 to be a subgroup o f Z&. She enumerated the 
group axioms to support her point o f view:
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118 Lori: I think it is a subgroup o f Z6 under addition because, kind o f like.... We were on a 
roll here with these things, these being, they’re both closed, they both have an identity, 
they both have inverses, they both are associative, so that makes them both groups, and 
this is in here.
Diane was a bit more skeptical. She was still willing to consider Z3  to be a subgroup of 
Z(, but only if  “dividing by 3 and dividing by 6  [is] just a characteristic of mod and you 
are going to say that it’s all right to kind of ignore that” (line 122). In other words, she 
was unwilling to conclude that Z3 a subgroup o f Z(, without confirmation that “all mod is 
fine” (line 124).
Soon thereafter, Lori and Diane went back to considering the tables:
131 Lori: Yeah, that’s what I was saying because when I think o f something being a subgroup 
of something else, its table can almost fit right into it since it’s the same operation, and I 
don’t see this anywhere down here.
132 Lori: I don’t think they are subgroups of each other anymore. I was getting confused 
with ...
133 Diane: I say no.
Thus, no simple piece o f evidence was sufficient, but rather an accumulation of evidence 
and consideration was necessary for Diane and Lori to conclude that Z3 is not a subgroup 
of Z6.
Robert was similarly hesitant to come to the same conclusion even in the face of 
evidence. He first used the table for Ze, to show convincingly that the subset Z3 was not a 
subgroup because the inverse and closure properties failed. Nonetheless, he went on to 
create a separate table for Z3 , and on the basis that Z3 was a group concluded that it was a 
subgroup of Z(,. He was unsure whether to call the operations different: “Are we talking 
addition mod 6  and addition mod 3, or are we just talking addition?” (line 148). 
Interestingly, Robert was also the only student who was unable to resolve the issue by the 
end o f the first interview. This fact may be partly explained by Robert’s sources of
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authority for making mathematical claims. At the beginning o f the second interview, he 
announced that he had determined that Z3 is not a subgroup o f Zg, because the operation 
is not the same. “For one thing, I read it in the textbook last night. And, for a second 
thing, Steve told me that today. He mentioned that in class” (Robert 2, line 12). Thus, 
Robert required evidence, consideration, and external authority to come to the correct 
conclusion.
For some o f the key participants, the conclusions they reached during their first interview 
were not as enduring as their expressions seemed to indicate. On the final exam, students 
were asked whether Z4  is a subgroup o f Z8 and whether Z4  is a subgroup of Z. Carla, 
Robert, and Diane all pointed out that the operations were different and therefore Z4  is a 
subgroup o f neither Z% nor Z. Wendy and Lori, on the other hand, both wrote that Z4  is a 
subgroup o f both Z% and Z, arguing, essentially, that Z4  is a group and also a subset of 
both Z% and Z. Lori’s misjudgment was not surprising, for her reasoning had seemed 
uncertain and ambiguous throughout the discussion o f whether Z3 is a subgroup o f Zf, and 
throughout her interviews more generally. W endy’s response, on the other hand, is a 
stark contrast to her thinking in the interview. The most plausible hypothesis for the 
discrepancy is that, without a table in front o f her, it was not readily apparent to Wendy 
that the operations were different.
Subgroups o f Z and Z„. The prominence of the idea o f subset in the students’ definitions 
of subgroup explained not only the sense in which the students considered Z3 to be a 
subgroup o f Z(, but also the sense in which they considered them both subgroups o f Z. 
Lori, for example, asserted, “Z3 is a subgroup o f Z. We all agree on that, right? So if 
they are both subgroups of Z, then maybe they are subgroups o f each other” (line 142).
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What was harder to explain, however, was Diane’s belief that although “Z3 isn’t a 
subgroup o f Z6, it’s at least a subgroup of Z„, and we know that Z„ is a group under 
addition” (line 44). From the first half o f Diane’s claim, it is clear that she did not mean 
that Z3 is a subgroup o f Z„ for any n. What is puzzling, then, is what kind o f object Z„ 
was for Diane and in what sense Z3 could be a subgroup. Clearly, Z„ was not an 
unspecified group that could be Z3, Z(,, or any o f a number o f other groups. Instead, Z„ 
was a different group, distinct from Z3 and Z(,, but somehow situated so that Z3 could be a 
subgroup. Unfortunately, I did not pursue this unusual idea further in the interview. 
Diane’s final exam indicates, however, that, at least at the end o f the course, her 
conception of Z„ was more typical.
Z„: Is a group under modular addition, n is a positive integer and tells which mod 
we are in and which elements are contained in the group (0, 1). For
example Z4 is a group under addition mod 4 that contains the elements 0, 1, 2, 3.
Portions o f the table. Like Wendy, most of the key participants tended to think of 
subgroups as blocks within the operation table o f the larger group. Robert, for example, 
focused on the top left quarter o f the Z& table and concluded (momentarily, at least) that 
Z3 is not a subgroup o f Z6, because “0 doesn’t appear in every row and column, so not 
every element has an inverse” (Robert 1, line 93). Robert, like Wendy, also initially 
ignored my suggestion that he pick individual elements from the table and instead 
continued to focus on blocks such as {0, 1, 2} and {3, 4, 5} (line 176). Later, after he 
had identified {0, 3} as a subgroup, I asked him whether that constituted a portion of the 
table. He replied, “Not in the sense that you are just drawing a box around part o f the 
table. This is taking different elements out of the table and putting them into a new table” 
(line 199). Thus Robert, like Wendy, preferred “blocks” in the table or wholly new 
tables. Lori’s language also suggested that she was thinking o f blocks: “When I think o f
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something as being a subgroup, if you look at its table, you can fit in into a larger table” 
(Diane/Lori 1, line 129).
By the third interview, Carla’s thinking seemed more flexible, although it was still tied, 
to an extent, to the order o f elements in the table. When I asked Carla about the 
relationship between a table for {0, 2} in Z4  and the table for Z4, she first called it a 
portion o f the table. She described how she would reorder the table as 0, 2, 1, 3, so that 
“in the top left comer w e’d have an imitation o f the table that we just created” (line 125). 
Then I asked again what she would say about the relationship between {0, 2} and Z4.
127 Carla: I would think it would say it’s a subgroup of it, for two reasons. One would be, if  
you just looked at ... “sub” means a smaller part.... If you do the Z4 group table, then 
you have a group table and a comer o f it is what you are talking about then that... it 
would be a good guess to say that that would be a subgroup. But also you know that 0, 2 
that table is a group table, and it is a subset o f Z4, so that means it is a subgroup of Z4.
When the students used operation tables, they sometimes paid too much attention to the 
order in which elements were listed in the table and too little attention to the binary 
operation underlying the tables. This phenomenon may be related to the strong sense that 
a subgroup is a subset that is a group, coupled with an overly limited Groups-Are- 
Containers metaphor that made it difficult for the students to think about nonconsecutive 
subsets. Nonetheless, the tables served a useful purpose in organizing calculations when 
the students were constructing subgroups or verifying that a set was a group or subgroup.
Addition is addition. This study supports the finding in the literature that students 
sometimes do not pay sufficient attention to the group operation (Dubinsky et al., 1994). 
The above analysis shows, however, that even when they do pay attention to the 
operation, there is still a tendency to say that two operations are the same if  they are both
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called addition, and there is reason to believe that analogous results would hold for 
operations called multiplication.
Dubinsky et al. (1994) suggest that students’ progress from thinking o f groups and 
subgroups as sets, to considering them as sets with operations, to considering a subgroup 
as having the same operation as the group in which it sits. This developmental 
progression makes good sense and partially describes the data in this study. A key 
question that emerged in this study is, What is involved in making the second transition? 
Dubinsky et al. suggest that students need to consider the binary operation to be a 
function on ordered pairs from the group and then restrict the function to the subset.
Then students recognize that the operations need to be the same on the group and the 
subgroup by coordinating their function concept with their emerging group concept.
This description, quite simply, does not fit the data in this study. First, there was no 
indication that the students thought o f binary operations as functions. Moreover, there is 
no reason to believe that such a conception was necessary for success, as many students 
seemed to be successful without it. Regarding the sameness o f the operations, all the key 
participants recognized that the operations needed to be the same, though not always 
immediately. The issue was that many of the students were willing to call operations the 
same despite evidence that they were different. All the key participants saw—by looking 
at operation tables, by considering the processes underlying the operations, or both—that 
the operations are in Z3 and Z& are different. Nonetheless, they all concluded at various 
times that the operations are the same because they are both addition.
The issue concerns making distinctions, not only between addition in Z3 and in Z6 but 
also with addition in Z. The above analysis suggests that making such distinctions
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requires coordination of evidence and careful reasoning. Furthermore, even after such 
distinctions have been made, they can become blurred in students’ minds moments, days, 
or weeks later. These findings should not be surprising in view o f the fact that addition in 
Z3 , Z6 , and Z are very much the same. This sense of sameness is not a misconception that 
must be overcome. On the contrary, this naive idea, although incorrect, has a grain of 
truth that can be firmly established only through the concept o f quotient group, which is 
introduced much later.
Constructing subgroups. In constructing subgroups, the students reasoned both from the 
table and from thinking about the operation. They typically began with a small number 
o f elements and then constructed an operation table to determine whether the elements 
constituted a subgroup. Most participants stated, either immediately or while reasoning 
during the process, that any subgroup must contain 0. Robert, for example, chose {0, 2,
4} and {0, 1, 5} as possible subgroups because “0 has to be in there. And we need things 
that are inverse o f each other” (line 230). Diane, on the other hand, initially chose {0, 2, 
4} because she “went for the even numbers” (line 224). Diane and Lori were not able to 
find the subgroup {0, 3}, however, until having considered, as Wendy had, what else 
would need to be in a subgroup that began with all elements other than 3. Like Wendy, 
Diane reasoned largely from closure: “If  you have 1 you have to have 2, and if  you have 
1 and 2 you have to have 3” (line 251). Lori also reasoned from the inverse property, 
noting that if  you have 5, “you have to have 1” (line 272). Although we did not use the 
phrase “subgroup generated by” until much later in the course, Diane, Lori, and Wendy 
all seemed to pick up this sort o f reasoning quite naturally.
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In their fourth interview, Diane and Lori used a tabular method o f finding the subgroup 
generated by one or more elements. They developed the method in response to such 
questions on the second take-home exam. I asked them to explain the method for the 
subgroup generated by (123) in £>3 .
4 9 Diane: Well I know I need an identity, and I know I have the element (123), so I would
go ahead and fill this in as far as it lets me. [Makes an operation table with (1), (123).]
51 Lori: That’s going to give her a different element, and she does (132) (132). And then
she is going to add it next to it, to keep i t ... It’s going to get bigger.
61 Diane: And now our table is done because we didn’t generate new elements in our
[table].
In other words, beginning with the identity and the generators, they constmcted a table 
and filled in its interior. Then they expanded the table, when necessary, adding a row and 
column corresponding to each new element that appeared in the interior of the table.
They continued this process until there were no new elements to append to the table.
This process is entirely legitimate for any finite group and with any number of 
generators. Furthermore, whenever the process stops, the resulting set is necessarily a 
subgroup.
In summary, the students used operation tables, reasoning about the operations, and the 
identity, closure, and inverse properties when constructing subgroups. Not surprisingly, 
associativity was not a consideration. It is legitimate, o f course, to assume associativity 
when the operation considered on the subset is the same as the operation on the set as a 
whole, but often that was not the case.
Summary. The students’ concept images o f subgroup may be characterized as subsets 
that are groups. Their reasoning about subgroups was dominated by the identity and 
inverse, closure properties, as embodied in operation tables, and without sufficient
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attention to distinguishing among various operations called addition. For most students, 
overcoming this tendency “addition is addition” required multiple sources o f evidence, 
including, for example, operation tables as well as careful reasoning about the operation.
Regarding the main interview question, these data provide additional insight into the 
finding in the literature that students believe Z3 is a subgroup of Z&. There seems to be a 
strong belief that Z3 should be a subgroup o f Ze and, similarly, that they are both 
subgroups o f Z, because they are subsets that are groups o f their own right. Furthermore, 
this belief is strong enough to overpower any suspicion that the operations should be 
acknowledged as different. As for the inappropriate use o f Lagrange’s theorem to 
establish that Z3 is a subgroup of Z& (Hazzan & Leron, 1996), the data and analysis 
suggest that this phenomenon may not be a matter of confusing a theorem with a 
converse but rather a matter o f grasping a seemingly relevant theorem to support a 
previously held conviction.
Isomorphisms
Isomorphism was the theme o f the second interviews, but Robert’s and Carla’s second 
interviews focused on other topics. Nonetheless, the concept of isomorphism arose in 
interviews with all the key participants, thereby providing sufficiently broad data. Again 
this section begins with a conceptual analysis followed by detailed analysis o f Wendy’s 
second interview, which was particularly rich, and where, once again, the themes are use 
o f language and use of the operation table. The discussion then is broadened to include 
other students.
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It is through the concept o f isomorphism that students begin to gain a sense of abstract 
groups. Thus, this discussion provides a way then to discuss students’ concepts of groups 
and the nature and role of abstraction in such conceptions.
Conceptual Analysis
As discussed above, Wendy noticed during her first interview that sometimes a group’s 
operation table can be made to look like another group’s table by renaming the elements. 
This can happen, of course, only when the groups have the same structure, because, once 
again, it is the operation that gives a group its structure, and the names o f the elements 
are structurally unimportant. When two groups have the same structure, they may be 
considered “essentially the same,” and the groups are said to be isomorphic.
Furthermore, both groups may be seen as instantiations o f the same abstract group.
It is a hard problem, in general, to determine whether two groups are isomorphic, 
although it is often possible to see quickly that they are not, such as when they do not 
have the same number of elements. When two groups are represented by operation tables 
and if  one believes that the two groups might be isomorphic, the naive approach is to 
attempt to rename the elements of one group and perhaps reorder the elements in the 
operation table until the table is identical to the table for the other group. The 
formalization of this naive idea is somewhat involved. The renaming and reordering are 
accomplished via a one-to-one function from one group onto the other. Then the task of 
comparing the two structures involves comparing two kinds of calculations:
( 1 ) performing the operation on the elements in the first group and sending the result 
through the function, and (2 ) sending the elements through the function individually and 
combining their images under the operation in the second group. If  the results of the two
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calculations are the same for all pairs o f elements in the first group, the function is called 
an isomorphism. Formally, an isomorphism is a one-to-one function/from  a group G 
onto a group G1, with operations * and respectively, such that for all a and b in G, 
J[a*b) = f(a)*[f(b). Two groups are said to be isomorphic if such a function exists. 
Depending on the manner in which the groups are presented, it may be a very difficult 
task to find a function that works.
The formal definition o f isomorphism, although necessary, obscures the intuitive notion 
that the two groups G and G' are essentially the same and thus are examples of the same 
abstract group. The formalization has other negative consequences as well. The idea that 
two groups are isomorphic is symmetric, in that if  G is essentially the same as G', then 
clearly G' is essentially the same as G. In contrast, the formal definition is asymmetric, 
in that one o f the groups must be chosen as the domain o f the function.
The core idea, once again, is that groups that arise in different contexts might actually be 
different representations of the same group. This point o f view provides an opportunity 
for profound insight into the nature of groups. For example, although there are countless 
representations o f groups with three elements, all of them are isomorphic and thus all 
represent the same abstract group. It is in this sense that it is legitimate to talk about Z3 as 
representing the abstract group with three elements, or, more simply, to talk about the 
group of order three.
Dr. Benson and I had as a goal for this course that students would begin to develop an 
understanding of such abstract groups, so that they might begin to “see” an abstract group 
“through” a representation. Once again, the only access to abstract objects is through
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representations or, more to the point, through multiple representations. An abstract 
object emerges in a student’s thinking when he or she begins to see a symbol as a 
representation rather than a thing-in-itself, but that is unlikely to happen “unless there are 
other symbols that can be regarded as signifying the same entity” (Sfard, 2000, p. 79).
For small finite groups, an obvious mode o f representation is an operation table. Thus, to 
pave the way for these ideas in class, the students had been asked on the take-home 
portion of the first midterm exam (Appendix B) to “fill out all possible operation tables 
which make the set {e, a, b, c} a group,” where e was assumed to be the identity. The 
students had found four such tables . 10 W endy’s tables are provided in Figure 11. It turns 
out that first three tables in Figure 11 are isomorphic and thus represent the same abstract 
group. The fourth table, on the other hand, is not isomorphic to any o f the first three and 
thus represents a different abstract group. In this way, there are exactly two abstract 
groups of order four, just as there is only one group of order three.
Figure 11. Wendy’s tables for {e, a, b, c}
* e a b c * e a b c * e a b c © * e a b c
e e a b c e e a b c e e a b c e e a b c
a a c e b a a e c b a a b c e a a e c b
b b e c a b b c a e b b c e a b b c e a
c c b a e c c b e a c c e a b c c b a e
To provide additional grounding for the concept of isomorphism and the ideas behind it, 
the class spent several days renaming and reordering tables to show that they were the 
same as other tables. For groups with four elements, they were asked to determine 
whether they got one of the four operation tables they had identified on the midterm 
exam (see Figure 11) and, if  so, which one. Our hope was that, when asked to show that
10 To be precise, there are exactly four such tables only if one assumes that the elements are to be presented 
in a particular order. Because all students used the order e, a, b, c, this imprecision did not present a 
problem.
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Z\, for example, was isomorphic to one o f these four tables, the students would choose 
different ones, and indeed they did. Then when one student showed that Z4  was 
isomorphic to Table 1 in Figure 11 and another student showed that Z4  was isomorphic to 
Table 2, they might conclude that Table 1 must be isomorphic to Table 2. Dr. Benson 
and I thought that conclusions such as this would be obvious to students, based on their 
intuitions about renaming and reordering, and indeed students did make such 
conclusions . 11
During this work in class, a student had suggested the word congruent to describe the 
relationship between two groups that could be made the same via renaming and 
reordering elements in the operation table. This term suggests the intuitive idea that 
establishing a correspondence between elements of two groups and comparing the 
operations is, in a way, analogous to establishing a correspondence between vertices of 
two geometric figures and then comparing the figures. Dr. Benson introduced the word 
isomorphic to give a standard name to the naive concept o f congruence that was 
emerging in the class, and he indicated that the term congruent would be acceptable as 
well. At the same time, he gave formal definitions o f isomorphism and homomorphism 
(see chapter 6 ).
Wendy and Isomorphisms
Wendy’s second interview took place just after the session in which Dr. Benson had
introduced the term isomorphic. I had planned to discuss the concept o f isomorphism in
the context of the several groups o f order 4 that the class had been investigating. I was
getting ready to ask a question when Wendy put forward her own question:
11 It is possible to formalize this kind of reasoning by proving that isomorphic is an equivalence relation, 
but this would have required a formal version of isomorphism, which had not been introduced yet.
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10 Wendy: What exactly does the word isomorphic mean? Iso- meaning like, one? Does it 
mean one?
11 Brad: Well, the etymology of the word, iso- means “same.”
12 Wendy: Same.
13 Brad: And -morphic means “having to do with form.”
14 Wendy: Okay. Same form.
15 Brad: Same form?
16 Wendy: Okay, [inaudible] I don’t like using a word if  I don’t know what it means.
17 Brad: Right. But on the other hand, understanding what the word means, “same form” 
and understanding how it relates to this stuff here, that’s ...
18 Wendy: It really relates.
22 Wendy: Because you can reorder.... The way I explained it to the class today.... I am 
kind o f getting a hold on this. [Laughs] (Wendy 2)
Dr. Benson’s introduction o f the term isomorphic apparently had not been enough for 
Wendy. Her initial confusion followed by her response “It really relates” seems to 
indicate that my description of the etymology of the word was both necessary and 
sufficient for her to attach the word isomorphic to the idea that she had been developing. 
As is shown below, however, understanding isomorphic as “same form” was not really 
sufficient.
Wendy then described how she was thinking about the reordering (rearranging) process.
2 4 Wendy: Well, the way that I do it.... Because people have.... One person in class kept
on putting up, asking a question that didn’t make much sense to me, but I explained my 
way o f saying, well, say we have Table 1 and Table 2 [see Figure 11], which we kept on 
saying were the same.
2 6 Wendy: Okay? And we wanted to show that 2, Table 2 is like Table 1. But what she
kept on saying, was, “Well, can you rearrange it anyway you want?” And in a sense you 
can, there are different ways to rearrange it to get it to look like Table 1. But you can’t 
rearrange it anyway you want to make it look like Table 1, because the way I know how 
to rearrange it is that you have to look at the diagonal.
2 8 Wendy: There might be another way, but this is the way that always works for me. By 
looking at the diagonal you see that there.... And the reason why you can tell that it’s 
different from this group altogether is because if  you look at the squared ...
2 9 Brad: From your Table 4.
3 0 Wendy: From my Table 4, is that if  you look at the squared elements, all the squared
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elements, e, a, b, and c squared equal the same thing. But in these three tables [Tables 1 
through 3], two elements equal the identity e, and two elements don’t. That’s why these 
three can be arranged to look like each other. (Wendy 2)
So, for Wendy, the differences in the diagonals indicated a fundamental difference 
between the groups that the tables represented. Furthermore, she saw that the appearance 
o f the diagonal constrained the ways that one table could be rearranged to look like 
another.
It is worth noting that Wendy’s approach is correct and insightful: The squares— in 
particular the number o f them and how often they each appear—provide essential 
information (in the sense o f “essence”) about the structure o f a group. In the case of 
groups of order 4, merely counting the number of squares is an accurate and efficient 
discriminant between the two groups o f order 4. The approach is somewhat general in 
that if  the number and multiplicity o f the squares is different between two groups, then 
the groups are not isomorphic, although the inverse is not always true.
At this point, Wendy had a sense that the groups presented by Tables 1 through 3 were 
isomorphic. But actually showing they are isomorphic requires finding an isomorphism, 
which for Wendy was a reordering and renaming that would make the tables identical, or 
as Wendy said, “in the same form.”
3 4 Wendy: But to rearrange them, if  you want to see whether they are the same or not, you
want to get it in the same form, hence being isomorphic. Same form. So if you want get 
[Table] 2 to look like 1, if you look at.... e1 is always equal to e, so you really, you can 
leave e where it is. But in the first table you have a2 = c ,b 2 = c, and c2 = e. That means 
you want to make a2 and b2, or these two elements in the middle o f the table, their squares 
to be the same element where the last, the last element in the table you want to equal e2.
35 Wendy: And if  you look at the second table. These two elements, their squares equal e2, 
but you don’t .... You want, you want this square to equal the nonidentity square. A 
nonidentity square. You know what I mean?
3 6 Brad: So you want a2 to be other than the identity?
3 7 Wendy: Other than the identity. And you want a2 to be in this position because that’s
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where it is in the first table.
3 9 Wendy: So by this case you know that a and c have to switch. But as Steve [Benson]
pointed, as we figured it out in class today, that you don’t necessarily.... What I did, is I 
switched a and c, so the table would have, the new table to rearrange and rename to make 
it look like Table 1 would be e, c, b, a.
Wendy’s language in the statement “you want to get it in the same form” (line 34) 
suggests that, for her, the form depended on the arrangement o f the elements in the table. 
Rearranging a table would put it into a different form, and the goal was to get two tables 
into the same form, “hence being isomorphic.” Wendy’s concept o f isomorphism was 
dominated, at this point at least, by her notion of same form. Thus, her concept of 
isomorphism depended on the particular arrangement o f elements in the table.
Wendy used the table not only to determine which groups could be rearranged to be the 
same but also to determine how to accomplish a reordering that would work. By 
focusing on the fact that the two middle elements in Table 1 (a and b) had nonidentity 
squares and the fact that a2 = e'm  Table 2, she knew that something other than a in Table 
2 must map to a in Table 1. One way to accomplish that was by switching a and c, but 
Wendy saw there were other possibilities.
41 Wendy: But if  you look at this table, e, b, c, a works, and that is because you can take out
a, the a row on this table and slide it up. And that way the diagonal would be e, a, a and 
if you place a down at the bottom, if  you kind o f take it out, slide these up and put it back 
on the bottom you’d get e, b, c, a and that works too. You can do it that way. So there 
are two ways to do it.
4 3 Wendy: e, b, c, a works, and so does e, c, b, a.
Wendy’s explanations were partly based on manipulations of the table, such as switching 
rows and removing a row and sliding others up. Her written work from class 
demonstrates the e, b, c, a reordering and renaming process (see Figure 12). She 
reordered Table 2 and then used a “renaming function” in order to end up with names that 
were easier to compare with Table 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
Figure 12. Showing Table 2 is like Table 1
©
©
* e a b c
e e a b c
a a c e b To show (2) is like (1)
b b e c a
c c b a e
reorder rename
* e a b c * e b c a * E  A B C
e e a b c e e b c a E E A B c
a a e c b = >  b b a e c = > A A C E B
b b c a e c c e a b B B E C A
c c b e a a a c b e C C B A E
f l e) ~ E ab = c
m = _ A . j w m  =/(c) =j\ab)
./(c) — B /  / =  renaming function 
Aa) = C iJ homomorphism
The work in class had led Wendy to several insights about renaming and reordering 
tables. She also had begun to ask more general questions and to sense possibilities for 
broader conclusions.
4 7 Wendy: We can do it more than one way. And that was interesting for me. But what he
[Dr. Benson] was saying today that I really haven’t thought much about was that all you 
have to show, to show that they are isomorphic, is one way, and that makes sense. You 
don’t have to show all of the different ways that it’s isomorphic.
4 8 Wendy: But, I wonder how many different [inaudible] ways. Like, say you have Table 3,
which has a , b, or e, b, e, b in the diagonal, and you want it to look like the first one. I 
wonder how many different ways to reorder it before you rename there are. You know, 
like, there were two ways to reorder 2 to look like 1 before you rename it. I wonder how 
many there are for 3. I don’t know.
Thus, Wendy was concerned not only about whether a table could be rearranged and 
renamed to be the same as another table but also about the number o f ways that it could 
be done, despite the fact that Dr. Benson had indicated that this was not necessary in 
showing that two groups are isomorphic. Wendy’s question demonstrates noteworthy 
mathematical instinct, for finding and counting the different ways to reorder and rename 
a group is the key idea behind the set o f automorphisms o f a group— a topic that we did 
not explore in class.
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As the interview continued, I asked Wendy to write out operation tables for two familiar 
groups to see whether they were the same. In particular, I wanted her to compare the 
rotations in £ > 4  and a group the class came to call the military group, which consisted of 
the commands “stand as you are,” “left,” “right,” and “about face,” abbreviated S, £, R,
A, where the operation was following the first command by the second. I was interested 
in how she would approach this task because, from a certain perspective, these groups are 
obviously isomorphic, in that the former consists o f rotational symmetries of a square and 
the latter consists of the same rotations o f a person as viewed from above.
Before I told her the two groups I had in mind, she was concerned that she was going to 
have to think o f the examples. And even when I named two groups, she preferred to 
copy the table from her notes rather than reconstruct it, suggesting that her reasoning was 
largely external and based in the table. As she copied the military group from her notes, 
she considered reordering it as part o f the copying:
5 9 Wendy: Do you want them in any particular order? I presume not because w e’re going to
rearrange it anyway. But it also makes it interesting, while I am just copying this 
[inaudible], is that like, you.... It depends on how you set this up. You know what I 
mean? Like what if  I give like.... I don’t know, [inaudible] You can write the table 
down this way or in this way. Rearrange ...
60 Brad: You mean as S, A, L, R or as S,L,A , R.
61 Wendy: Yeah, and that is going to make a difference to how you are going to have to 
rearrange it to make it look like something else.
62 Brad: Okay. But is i t ...? Whether you write it down as S, A, L, R or S, L, A, R are they, 
are these different operations here? Are these different systems?
63 Wendy: No, it’s the same operation. But say for some reason m y.... We are doing the 
rotations in Z)4. Maybe if  I wrote it this way, I wouldn’t have to rearrange it. It might 
turn out to be the same. Or if  I wrote this one, it might turn out to be the same. Do you 
know what I mean?
Wendy anticipated that in her copying she had an opportunity to choose an order that 
could make it unnecessary to reorder the table again. And even though she preferred to
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look at the tables, she saw them as representing something that was independent of the 
order that elements were listed.
Wendy began filling out the table for the rotations in £ > 4  and quickly noticed a 
connection:
64 Wendy: Okay, the rotations of DA are rotate 0, rotate 90, rotate 180, and rotate 270. 
Rotate 90 and a 90 is rotate 180. Rotate 270, rotate 0. [Begins writing out Figure 13, 
Table 1.] This is like an addition table.
65 Brad: Oh, really?
6 6 Wendy: I think so [inaudible] because you just.... Do you know what I mean when I say
it is like an addition table? Like if this was 0, l ,2 ,a n d 3 ;0 , 1, 2, and 3, this is .... R0 is
the identity. And then it kind o f rotates 1, it like moves up one.
67 Brad: Why don’t you write it down? What the table would be if  you call them 0, 1, 2, 3 
just like that?
68 Wendy: Under addition?
6 9 Brad: Well, however you are thinking about it.
7 0 Wendy: I am thinking about it like an addition table. 0, 1, 2, 3. [Begins writing out
Figure 13, Table 2.] Uh oh. I am thinking about it mod 4, a Z4 addition table.
71 Wendy: You know how you always kind o f ...? When you are filling out a table if  you
pick up a pattern, if  it clicks with something else? Like this is how it clicked with me. 
And that’s how I know how to fill out my table.
Figure 13. Wendy’s connection: Rotations in D4 as Z4
Ro R90 Riso R270 © + 0 1 2 3
Ro Ro R90 Riso R270 0 0 1 2 3
R90 R90 Riso R270 Ro ----- ► 1 1 2 3 0
Riso R180 R270 Ro R90 2 2 3 0 1
R270 R270 Ro R90 Riso 3 3 .0 1 2
Wendy noticed the connection while working in the table, not by reasoning about the 
rotations or addition modulo n or abstractly about the groups. This point becomes clearer 
as the excerpt progresses. She noticed how the elements rotated and moved up one 
position in the interior o f the table (line 6 6 ). Furthermore, her surprise in line 70 
indicates that it was not until she was carrying out this rotation process to construct the
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addition table for {0, 1, 2, 3} that she realized that the operation was not addition, but 
addition mod 4.
To get some clarity on her thinking, I asked her why she switched to addition mod 4.
7 5 Wendy: It wouldn’t be closed if I turn it, if I didn’t switch it to mod 4.
7 6 Brad: Okay, but .. .why is the connection here?
7 7 Wendy: Because with addition, modulo addition, when you have, the first row is always
going to be the identity. Row or column is always going to be the identity. And then
when you fill out the next row, it always increases by one, the following row, it almost 
like cycles. It’s almost like a turn [inaudible]. Almost like when we did the 
permutations. Let’s see if I can remember the forms. I mean the notation kind of screws 
me up. It’s like that notation. Permutation notation. Right?
7 8 Brad: Okay. How, what?
79 Wendy: So, 1 goes to 2, 2 goes to 3 .... Well, I have.... It should be 0, 1, 2, 3, but if  we
are going to look at this case. But, same difference. 0 goes to 1, 1 goes to 2, 2 goes to 3,
3 goes to 4, 4 goes to 1. Same thing as if  you wrote Ro, R9Q, Rm , and R27o- Same thing.
R always goes to .... R goes to .... If you look at the rows and columns, Row 0 goes to 
Row 90, Row 90 goes to 180, Rotate 170 [270] would go back to zero, and it does this in 
all o f the columns. Like, rotate 90 goes to rotate 180. It kind o f moves up.
Wendy’s explanation supports the point that she was reasoning from the table, for her 
description was about how the elements move around the rows and columns o f the table 
and included no discussion of the meanings o f the operation in D 4  or the structural 
aspects o f the group. Wendy’s statement “the first row is always going to be the identity” 
(line 77) suggests, however, that Wendy may have thought of the whole row as actually 
being the identity, rather than indicating how the identity acts on the elements of the 
group. Wendy’s comparison with permutation notation is problematic, based perhaps 
only on notational similarities between the rows in the operation table and one o f the two 
methods the class used for representing permutations. On the other hand, the idea of 
elements o f the group acting on the group as a whole is yet another seed of an important 
mathematical idea. Furthermore, developing the connection more fully requires strong
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connections with permutations, once again demonstrating Wendy’s good mathematical 
instinct.
Moments later, when Wendy compared these tables to the table for S, A, L, R, she first 
wondered whether she had made a mistake in copying the table but soon suggested that 
switching things around might make it work.
8 9 Wendy: Because if  you noticed in these two tables [Figure 13, Tables 1 and 2], you can 
write the same permutation notation because if  you look at the diagonal again, it has the 
same form. These are in the same isomorphic form. They’re iso-.... I don’t know how 
to use the word right yet, but.... These have the same form right now. The way that 
these two are set up, D4 and, I don’t know, military— I don’t know what you want to call 
it—this military form. It’s not cut up in the same form, yet, that’s the table.
Thus, for Wendy the form was the table, a perspective that may have made it difficult for 
her to separate the notion o f isomorphism from the particular table (and its arrangement) 
used to represent a group. She had a sense that there was something that stayed the same 
under rearrangement, but she did not yet have the language for it.
As the interview continued, Wendy reaffirmed that her key to whether two tables were in 
the same form was first to look at the diagonals, and her goal was to try to get the 
diagonals to look the same. I asked her to do that with the military group, to try to make 
its diagonal look like the diagonal o f the rotations in D4.
101 Wendy: Well, I see that rotation 0 is the identity in this table, and it goes.... In this 
diagonal, I am going to try to set this diagonal up to look like this diagonal and see if  
everything else will fall into place. In here it’s identity, rotation 180, identity, and 
rotation 180. So am going to see, since S is the identity in this table, I am going to see if  I 
can get the same thing: the first and third squared elements to equal the identity. Like 
here it’s the second. So I am going to try to see if  I switch A and L, i f  I can make the 
tables look the same.
As Wendy tried to carry out this plan, she stumbled for a moment because she tried to 
switch the row and the columns at the same time but then completed the rearrangement 
(Figure 11, Table 3).
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Figure 14. Wendy’s tables for other groups of order 4
Ro Roo Riso Rno
* 0 Ro R90 R\so Rno
Rw R90 R180 Rno Ro
Riso R180 Rno Ro R90
Rno Rno Ro R90 R180
( D  * S A L R ®  * S L
S S A L R S S L
A A S R L — ► L L A
L L R A S A A R
R R L S A R R S
®  * E A B C
E E A B c
-► A A B C E
B B C E A
C C E A
y
B
A R © * E
\
A B C
A R E E A B c
R S A A B C E
S L B B C E A
L A C C E A B
She next renamed Table 3 to E, A, B, C, yielding Table 4. Throughout this process, she 
paid careful attention to the diagonals, frequently checking the correspondence along the 
diagonals and often filling out the diagonal o f the table first.
Her process began by making each calculation and then each translation, but as she 
continued, the process became increasingly abbreviated. She also introduced a function/  
to describe the renaming from Table 3 to Table 4:
116 Wendy: I am saying that there is a function almost that puts this table to this table. And I 
am going to call that function.... And the function brings S.... Let’s call it the renaming 
function, and it puts S to E, L to A, A to B and R to C. And what I realized as I was filling 
up this table, that when, if  you have S times L for instance it is going to equal L, and 
instead of figuring out.... All you have to do is look at the function of L, which is A, to 
figure out, to rename it, to this ...
I asked her to explain how this function helped her abbreviate the procedure:
124 Wendy: So the function that w e’re calling the renaming function is up here. So R brings, 
R is renamed to C. So almost J[R) is going to equal C. So that’s why I was just saying R 
is going to be equal to C.
It took Wendy a long time to say this, and she had trouble articulating the way that the 
function supported the sense o f equality between the groups. In particular, saying 
“almost J(R) = C” is redundant, whereas saying “R = C” omits the role of the function
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entirely. A more accurate description would be “almost R = C.” The function establishes 
the “almost” precisely: flR )  = C.
She completed her calculations and described the result:
12 6 Wendy: So that’s the new form [Table 4] after I reordered it and renamed it. So reorder
and then rename.
127 Wendy: Here [Table 1] I am just going to rename. And this I am going to use as my 
function. So rotate 180 is equal to B. Good, it’s working. [Both laugh] Rotate 270 is
equal to C, rotate 0 is equal to E. Rotate 270 is C, rotate 0 is E, rotate 90 is A, rotate 180
is B, rotate 0 is E, and rotate 90 is A. And these two [inaudible] the same. By renaming, 
by just renaming Z)4 and by reordering and renaming the military one you can get them to 
hold the same form.
12 8 Brad: That’s nice.
12 9 Wendy: Isn’t that nice?
Thus, Wendy described Table 4 as the “new form” o f Table 2 and immediately went on 
to rename Table 1 to create Table 5. Upon completing this process, she summarized the 
relationship between D4 and the military group and also expressed some satisfaction in 
what she had shown.
At this point, Wendy still thought o f the form as the particular arrangement of elements in 
the table. The group did not have a form that was independent o f the table, but rather the 
groups could sometimes be made to “hold the same form” by the processes of renaming 
and reordering. In other words, the form was not a property o f the group but something 
you could do with the group.
Wendy explained further:
134 Wendy: Because if you are looking at the table, the table is like a very specific form.... 
Like.... You know how we said that these are kind o f alike, before we really started 
asking this isomorphism stuff. There are different arrangements you can have o f the 
same table. Like these two [Tables 2 and 3] we are calling the same table, but they are 
just different arrangements o f the same table. So, technically these would be the....
These are different arrangements o f the same.... Like these have different forms, but 
they are really the same operation. So this takes form into account, this permutation.
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So the operation and the table are independent o f the arrangement and they take form  in 
particular arrangements of the table. The permutation “takes form into account” by 
specifying the necessary rearrangement to get tables into the same form.
I asked Wendy whether the groups represented by the tables in Figure 13 and Figure 14 
were all the same.
138 Wendy: Yeah, they are the same because you can rearrange them to be the same. They 
are definitely the same. But when you have it, if you have the original military one, the 
original, and this is Z)4, they are different.... These [Tables 1 and 2] are in different 
forms o f the same, what would you call it, the same group. Like it has the same.... Or 
actually, I don’t know how you’d say it. They have the same form. They are iso-.... I 
don’t really know.... I have to make this.... I think this is going to be the.... Once I 
make this statement right here I’ll totally understand what I am doing.
Wendy saw that many o f the groups o f order 4 were essentially the same. As she tried to 
describe this, however, her use o f language evolved from “different forms o f the same,” 
to “same group,” to “same form.” She almost said “isomorphic” but held back and 
instead revealed personal insights about the relationship between her language and her 
understanding. Perhaps she had a sense that the word isomorphic should be about the 
group and not about the particular order in which the elements are listed. In any case, 
this seems to have been a significant moment, for her attention turned from the processes 
o f renaming and reordering to resolving her language difficulties.
13 9 Wendy: What I am trying to understand right now is whether or not these have the same
form, or if  these have the same form [Tables 1 and 2 versus Tables 1 and 3]. Can you say
that these two have the same form, or can you say that these two have the same form? 
‘Cause I understand that these two [Tables 1 and 2] are the same tables once you 
rearrange it and rename it, but without rearranging it and renaming it, do they have the
same form? They don’t. Well, they do because you can rearrange it to have the same
form. But I just don’t know if  you can say that when they’re not the same yet.
14 0 Brad: When it’s not obvious.
141 Wendy: When it’s not obvious. Do you know what I mean? So what can you say about 
these two tables and then what about these two tables? [Tables 1 and 2 versus Tables 1 
and 3.] These two [Tables 1 and 3] have the same, they’re in the same form, right there 
and then. So can you still say these two [Tables 1 and 2] have the same form? I guess
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you can because they do have the same form it is just not in it yet. It’s just disguised. 
Wendy saw that Tables 1 and 3 had the same form, demonstrating that that the form (and 
hence the abstract group) was independent o f the names o f the elements. She was 
conflicted, however, as to whether the arrangement o f the elements determined the form. 
She saw renaming and reordering as different processes with different consequences. 
Renaming left the form intact, whereas reordering seemed to change the form. Wendy 
was uncomfortable with this point o f view, however, perhaps because she had a sense 
that the order in which elements were listed in a table ought to be unimportant.
142 Brad: Here is a question to ask about it. D oes...? You might ask whether the tables have 
the same form, is one way o f asking it. But another is to ask sort o f  more abstractly, do 
the groups have the same form?
145 Wendy: See, the tables don’t have the same form. That’s what I was trying to get at, but 
the groups do. Like they’re, they definitely, these elements under their operations have 
the same form, because it’s just the way you made up your operation table that you 
disguised it and made it look like it didn’t have the same form. But if you take it and 
erase it, like we did, and like reordered it and renamed it, it really does have the same 
form. You can see it.
The distinction between the form of the group and the form o f the table was helpful to 
Wendy. At this point it seems as though she wanted the phrase same form  to be tied to 
the group but not to the particular arrangement in the table. But then she became 
concerned about her work on the midterm exam.
147 Wendy: Like we were saying with any 4-order table in our take-home exam, we had, we
had that there are 4 different.... I don’t . ... Do you remember how, what exactly the 
question is that he asked us? Because I am curious to know whether we actually 
answered the question right on the exam or not.
14 8 Brad: The question was something like, “Assuming you have four elements, e , a, b, c 
where e is the identity, write down all the group tables that you can.”
14 9 Wendy: All the.... So it was right that we wrote all the different arrangements, because
there are four different arrangements of this group table. Like these are all group tables 
you can fill out.
151 Wendy: But we figured out that this one is different. These, all three of these are the 
same, can be rearranged to hold the same form, if  you rearranged them and renamed 
them.
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Wendy was reassured that her work on the midterm exam had been correct, but she had a 
sense that there was a deeper question that would also incorporate her sense that three of 
the four tables were the same.
153 Wendy: But, if you really look at the form and see which ones are actually different.... 
But I want to know what question.... And I think maybe he asked this. Which, what 
would you ask to get the answer, to get the two different forms?
154 Brad: You mean.... On the, the way the midterm was worded the answer was four 
different tables. Here they are.
155 Wendy: Right, different arrangements. What would you ask...? How many congruent 
or...? What question would you ask to only get...? I want to try to figure out what 
question you would try to ask to only get two.
Again, the interview took a new direction. Wendy knew an answer for which she could 
not formulate a question. In referring to the “two different forms,” she was talking about 
abstract entities that are independent o f both the names o f the elements and the order in 
which they might be listed.
She continued trying to formulate the question:
157 Wendy: These are all little links now. I am trying to figure out exactly what’s going on.
So what is this actually called? Like, what are we actually doing? Like, maybe list all. 
List the different forms.... List the tables.... [inaudible] Maybe ...
15 9 Wendy: Show the different tables o f different forms? Or [inaudible] form o f order 4....
Of a group o f order 4.
I asked Wendy what if  the question on the exam had been to write down all the groups of 
order 4 and began recalling some of the many groups of order 4 we had discussed in 
class. Wendy interrupted:
163 Wendy: I think there is an ... like endless amount of tables you could write down, 
[inaudible]
164 Brad: Endless, i f ...
165 Wendy: If you consider all o f the different operations, the different.... I am sure there are
tons o f different 4-like element groups.
168 Brad: The idea of having to write down this many is kind o f annoying, maybe.
169 Wendy: Yeah, because there are all the same, most of them are the same thing.
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170 Brad: They are the same in what sense?
171 Wendy: It breaks down to two forms. Like, if  you look at any, every single one of those 
4 ordered tables, there are only two forms that they can have. This form or pick any one 
of those three forms. Because you can.... There are only four different arrangements of 
those four.... This is what we figured out in the exam. If you take any 4-ordered group, 
it has to hold one o f these arrangements. Okay? But, so, we realized when we started 
working with isomorphic groups that these are just different arrangements.... Like you 
can.... Say you wrote down this form, you can arrange any o f these to look like this one. 
So really these three are the same, have the same form. And so if  this is one form and 
this is one form because there is no way you can make it look like this because it has 
different elements in the diagonal. But you.... It has to .... Any 4 element, 4 ordered 
group will either hold this form or this form.
It is readily apparent that Wendy had developed some conviction about the idea that there 
are two groups o f order 4. Furthermore, her use o f the word form  was becoming less tied 
to the to the table and more associated with the abstract groups o f order 4.
I asked how she might reword the question from the exam:
173 Wendy: List all o f the arrangements of a 4-ordered group ... which have different form? 
Which have a different form? Would that narrow it down?
She considered using the words isomorphic and congruent but eventually stuck to the 
word form.
18 9 Wendy: Or you could even say, How many forms are there? [inaudible] And what are 
they? And then it could be any combination of these 2.
190 Brad: You mean Table number 4 and ...
191 Wendy: Any one o f those [Tables 1 through 3],
Thus, by the end o f this episode Wendy had a firm conviction that there are two groups of 
order 4. A glance back at the beginning o f the interview reveals, however, that she 
already had a sense o f this when the interview started. What had she learned during the 
interview? She had changed her use o f the word form  so that it was no longer tied to the 
particular arrangement of elements in the table, but it is hard to point to any other 
learning.
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During the interview, the word isomorphic had not been very helpful to Wendy, although 
it seems likely that she would still say that isomorphic means “same form.” She 
preferred to use the word form , perhaps because neither the terms isomorphic nor 
isomorphism provide appropriate syntax for what she saw as the essential idea. When 
one says that two groups are isomorphic, what is it, then, that the two groups have in 
common? The answer is something like “their essence” or “their form” or “their 
structure.” The term isomorphic is not necessarily helpful.
During this interview, Wendy was simultaneously developing concepts o f the two 
abstract groups o f order 4 and developing language to talk about them. This process 
involved separating her concept o f the groups from the names o f the elements and also 
from the order in which elements were listed in the table. She spent most of the interview 
generalizing her use o f the word form  to accommodate this abstraction. It appears that 
these processes can take a good deal of time and mental effort.
Mathematical habits of mind. The most prominent feature o f Wendy’s second interview 
is that she had noticed a profound mathematical idea: There are essentially two groups of 
order 4. During this interview, she had a sense that this idea was separate from the names 
and arrangement o f the elements in the tables, but her reasoning was so tied to the tables 
that she had trouble making the separation. Furthermore, she was going a step beyond 
this observation and in doing so adopted an inherently mathematical point o f view. She 
wanted to know what question to ask in order to get the answer, “There are two groups of 
order 4.” In other words, she not only saw the mathematical elegance o f this statement, 
she also wanted to be able to talk about it.
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In retrospect, perhaps I should have been more helpful in her struggle, for it is highly 
unlikely that Wendy would have been able to phrase the question in anything like the 
conventional mathematical way: “Up to isomorphism, how many groups of order 4 are 
there?” (see Fraleigh, 1989, p. 112; Hungerford, 1974, pp. 76, 82). The subtlety and 
difficulty in the idea are perhaps underscored by the fact that the phrase “up to 
isomorphism” is not an obvious metaphor.
This episode is noteworthy for another reason: It illustrates some inherently mathematical 
habits of mind. Throughout Wendy’s interviews, her calculations were sometimes slow 
and seemingly unaided by mathematical insight. At the same time, she often showed 
good mathematical instincts and asked deep mathematical questions that sometimes led 
to important insights. For example, she decided that 0 could not be an element o f a group 
if  the operation was multiplication . 12 She focused on the squares o f elements in a group 
as an indication o f something essential about the group. She demonstrated interest not 
only in how to rearrange an operation table but also in counting the number o f ways that 
it could be done. After concluding that Z3 is not a subgroup o f Z&, she looked at other 
possibilities, including Z2 . She chose a useful name, 2 Z3 , for a subgroup of Z(, and then 
decided to investigate whether 4 Z3 was a subgroup. She sought to understand the 
meaning o f specialized terms, such as isomorphism, and was conscious of her language 
difficulties. In a later interview, she noted, “If  you operate any two-cycle groups that 
don’t equal the identity, it is going to equal a three-cycle” (Wendy 4, line 481), 
demonstrating seed o f a good idea here: In £3 , the product o f any two (distinct) two-
12 Wendy did not distinguish among various kinds of multiplication.
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cycles is a three-cycle. Furthermore, the observation generalizes to S„, although it is 
necessary to add the hypothesis that the two-cycles overlap.
Habits of mind such as these ought to be cultivated. They might be missed, however, in a 
traditional class that does not encourage students to articulate their nascent ideas. From 
the ways that students are typically assessed and from the ways that mathematics texts are 
written, the implicit message is that in mathematics what is valued is the result of 
thinking, not the process o f thinking. The case o f Wendy suggests the potential of 
changing the message.
Other Students and Isomorphisms
As described above, the concept o f isomorphism was introduced informally as a process 
o f renaming and reordering operation tables, and the formal version was introduced later. 
The interviews and the students’ exams together provide evidence that the connection 
between the formal and informal conceptions was not made very well. The students in 
general had a good intuitive sense o f when two groups were isomorphic, though they 
were often drawn to other language, such as “similar,” “corresponding,” “the same as,” 
“equal,” and, particularly, “congruent.” Their concept images were dominated by 
patterns and relationships they saw in operation tables and in renaming processes, which 
they were sometimes also able to imagine without operation tables. The formal concept 
definition, in contrast, was rarely evoked. In a nutshell, the students demonstrated 
shallow understanding of “isomorphism” as a function with particular properties but rich 
understanding o f “isomorphic,” including the ability to see two different operation tables 
as being the same abstract group. To illustrate this result, I describe below the definitions
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the students provided on their final exams and the ways in which they used the operation 
tables to support their informal understandings.
Definitions. On their final exams, the students’ definitions o f isomorphism were not very
close to the formal definitions that had been provided in class. In particular, although
Carla and Robert noted that an isomorphism is a function, none o f the key participants
explicitly included a condition such as J[a*b) = f(a)*'f{b). Instead, most students gave
approximate informal definitions o f isomorphic, using phrases such as “congruent” and
“renaming and reordering.” Lori’s definition was the least formal:
f) isomorphism Two groups are isomorphic to each other, if  the groups are 
similar or congruent. This means that there are two totally different groups that 
can be renamed and possibly reordered to be represented exactly the same. The 
two groups have the same number of elements, they have an identity element that 
acts similarily and they have elements that have similar inverses. In other words, 
the two groups are completely congruent after renaming and reordering.
Robert’s definition, in contrast, was essentially correct, although different from what had 
been presented in class:
f) An isomorphism is a special kind of homomorphism. It is a 1-1 and onto 
function. Things that are the same after renaming and reordering are said to be 
isomorphic to each other. Note: a homomorphism does not need to be 1-1.
In class, the concept o f homomorphism had been introduced as a generalization o f the 
formal version o f isomorphism. Robert had reversed the relationship, making possible a 
very simple definition of isomorphism. Furthermore, his definition combined formal and 
informal descriptions clearly and correctly. In fairness, all key participants except Lori 
provided answers elsewhere that suggest they knew that an isomorphism is a one-to-one 
and onto function that is a homomorphism. Only Robert demonstrated such clarity when 
asked to provide a definition o f isomorphism.
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Renaming and reordering. The act o f rearranging the table was procedurally difficult to 
carry out and fraught with possibilities for error. For example, it was tempting to try to 
reorder the columns and rows at the same time without coordinating the two. Renaming 
and reordering were particularly difficult when the two sets o f names overlapped. To 
overcome this difficulty, some students preferred to rename both groups to some neutral 
representation, although this approach brought the new difficulty o f determining which 
element “acted like the identity.”
Renaming sometimes presented conceptual difficulties as well. I asked Robert, for 
example, whether he could rename the {0, 2, 4} table, just as he had the {0, 3} table.
27 9 Robert: Yeah, we could maybe call the.... But the thing is, if I had renamed these 1 ’s in 
this one, then we wouldn’t have had a group under mod 6, like addition under mod 6.
But if  I was going to do something similar to that, I would just call this 0, 1,2.
Thus, renaming can present cognitive obstacles when the operation has a meaning 
because the meaning of the operation must change to accommodate the new names. This 
obstacle is related, o f course, to Wendy’s concern about attaching the name 2 Z3 to the 
subgroup {0, 2, 4} in Z6. In mathematical discourse, one talks about isomorphisms (and 
homomorphisms) as preserving the group operation, and abstractly that is accurate.
There is a sense, however, in which renaming modifies the operation, or at least the way 
one must think about it.
Seeing form in the table. Tables were very present in the students’ concept images of 
isomorphism, particularly for groups of order 2, 3, and 4. Without prompting from me, 
the students often noticed, usually based on patterns in the table, that a group given by 
one table was isomorphic to another group. Carla noticed, for example, that both a group
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whose elements were the sets {1,3} and {5, 7} and the subgroup {0, 2} in Z4  could be 
renamed to what she might have called the {e, a} group (see Figure 15).
97 Carla: So if  we rename {1, 3} to e, the set {1, 3} as e, and the set {5, 7} as a, we will
create a table that looks like e along the diagonal that goes like this, and a along the 
opposite diagonal, which is a group because that’s . ... Well, for one thing it is one of the 
tables we came up with when we talked about possible groups for a two element set. And 
for another thing, we see that each o f the elements appears only once in each row or 
column, which tells us it’s a group. And we see that it contains the identity, that a is its 
own inverse, e is its own inverse.
116 Carla: So again if you rename 0 to e and 2 to a, you end up with e ’s on the diagonal and 
a’s on the opposite diagonal, just like the table o f the left coset.13
Figure 15. Carla’s groups of order 2
X {1, 3 } {5, 7 } 0 2 e a
{1, 3} {1, 3} {5, 7 } 0 0 2 e e a
{5, 7} {5, 7} { 1, 3} 0 2 0 a a e
From the way Carla discussed the diagonals, it appears that she was noticing visual 
patterns in the tables. When she noticed these patterns, she did not use the word 
isomorphic, yet when I asked her what was the relationship between the first two tables in 
Figure 15, she responded immediately and firmly, “They are isomorphic.... Yeah. 
Congruent” (lines 118, 120).
For Wendy, the diagonal of an operation table was a distinguishing feature in groups of 
order 4. The diagonal was particularly salient for other students, as well, particularly 
when it contained only the identity element. Carla was momentarily convinced, for 
example, that a group of order 3 should have the identity along the main diagonal, which 
is impossible for a group o f order 3, although it is necessary for groups o f order 2 and 
works for one of the two possible groups of order 4 . 14
13 Carla’s use of the phrase “the left coset” is explored in detail in chapter 6.
14 These statements assume that elements are listed along the rows in the same order as along the columns.
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Diane noticed similar relationships in her fourth interview, pointing out that two groups 
were isomorphic to the group she called e, a. At the end o f the interview, as she gathered 
her papers, she looked at two operation tables and said, “Oh, wait, wait, wait. These are 
isomorphic!” (line 551). When I asked her to think also about Z2, she asserted, “It has 
only one possible table for all groups with 2 elements.... So anything o f order 2 will be 
isomorphic to each other” (lines 561, 563). Thus, Diane had begun to develop a concept 
o f the abstract group of order 2 .
Robert naturally renamed group elements to representations that were more familiar, and 
he did this even in his first interview, before there had been any explicit attention to the 
idea of renaming. For example, while he was considering whether {0, 3} is a subgroup 
of Z(>, he noted in passing that “You couldn’t call it Z2” (line 189). Because his comment 
suggested he saw a connection, I asked him what Z2 looks like.
193 Robert: Just replace all these 3’s by 2 ’s. Oh no, what am I saying? Replace all of these
3’s by l ’s. So that’s what it would look like.
When I pursued this connection again later, he disagreed that the subgroup {0, 3} was 
“like” Z2. Instead, it had reminded him o f Z2 only because it had two elements (lines 
220-225).
Robert also eventually renamed the table for the subgroup {0, 2, 4} in Z6 as {0, 1, 2} and 
noticed that the table was then the same as Z3 . The process led him to a more general 
conclusion:
318 Robert: All right, cool. Well, I am thinking now that if  you have a 3-element set, no 
matter what we call the elements, you get the same type o f table.
It seems likely that Robert was seeing the form in the table. He frequently noticed 
symmetries, “cycling,” and other patterns in the operation tables, as did all the students.
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Robert was alone, however, in calling such features “geometric,” and saw even more 
surprising connections, such as analogizing tables to matrices and renaming to 
performing row operations. Independent o f Robert’s unusual associations, it is clear that 
patterns in the tables were involved in his emerging concept of abstract groups.
I interviewed Diane and Lori on the concept o f isomorphism the day before I interviewed 
Wendy and before the word isomorphic had been introduced. Nonetheless, their work in 
class had provided sufficiently rich experience for me to investigate how they were 
thinking about the ideas. They were convinced from their work on the midterm exam 
that their four tables exhausted the possibilities for tables with four elements. 
Furthermore, from their work renaming and reordering other tables with four elements, 
their conviction had become deeper:
5 Lori: Right. These are the only four, no matter what ... [inaudible]. No matter what
group o f order 4 you make a table of, it’s going to be congruent to one of these four after 
renaming them and reordering, I think.
Based on this knowledge, they tended to fill in tables based on the patterns and 
sometimes provided justification for their actions. At the start of the interview, however, 
they were skeptical as to whether any o f their tables were “similar” or “congruent” to 
each other. Nonetheless, they proceeded to rename and reorder tables, eventually 
showing, correctly, that three were isomorphic. I asked them what they thought about the 
three tables that they had shown to be isomorphic.
411 Diane: I think they are the same table. They could be the same table. Like they came 
from the same abstract table.
413 Diane: Well, I mean, just because you rename and reorder something doesn’t change 
what it means, what it defines. Like you can call number 1 a, you can call it whatever 
you want to, but it still stays number 1.
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So for Diane, neither the names o f the elements nor the order mattered for what the table 
“means, what it defines.” Through or in each o f the three tables, she saw the same 
abstract table, where what matters is “the value that [the elements] hold” (line 431).
The abstract group. The fact that several students used the {e, a) group as a canonical 
representation o f a group with two elements conflicts with my suggestion that that the 
metaphor “Z3 is the abstract group with three elements” (Lakoff & Nunez, 2000, 
chapter 3) is backwards. For these students it may be that they were noticing 
isomorphisms not with the abstract group with two elements but with the {e, a} group.
In order to notice an isomorphism, however, they must have had some notion o f the 
abstract group, yet it is possible that what they were seeing was patterns in the table 
rather than the abstract group.
On the one hand, using {e, a) as the canonical representation o f the two-element group 
makes perfect sense because then the letters can be anything. One could argue that the 
letters are the names of the elements, but some students saw the letters as variables that 
can take on any “values.” On the other hand, the representation {e, a} does not provide 
any support for thinking about the underlying binary operation. In fact, it is hard to 
imagine an underlying mechanism that would give meaning to an operation on elements 
that themselves seem to carry no meaning. In contrast, Z2 , as {0, 1}, brings plenty of 
meaning for the operation. In fact, Z 2 brings so much baggage from operations on 
integers that it is hard to think of {0 , 1 } as representing something else.
Another explanation is that it may be easier to see (and remember?) {e, a} as an object. 
Diane demonstrated this possibility by calling the group “e, a, a, e,” listing all the entries 
in the interior o f the table (Interview 4, line 559). The table clearly supported object
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conceptions, for the students thought o f it as something that could be acted on as a whole, 
compared as a whole with something else, and manipulated as a whole (via renaming and 
reordering) in ways that do not change its fundamental nature.
Comparing this result to the findings about the concept binary operation reveals a 
contradiction. On the one hand, Dr. Benson and I introduced diamond to represent a 
generic (particular but unspecified) operation, intending that it would stand for any 
operation. We found that the students saw it as a new operation, distinct from whatever 
addition and multiplication might make sense on the set. Yet, on the other hand, we also 
introduced a new group on the letters {e, a), notationally distinct from familiar groups, in 
hopes that students might notice that it is “essentially the same” as some of those familiar 
groups. We found that students treated it, in a sense, as a generic group, capable of 
representing any o f a number of specific groups.
So who is right? What is the difference between a generic object in a category and a new 
unfamiliar object in that category? Are the two cases different? In the case o f the 
abstract group with 2 elements, is there a way to represent it generically? Is it better to 
consider Z2  or {e, a} as the canonical representation o f the abstract group with 2 
elements? The data and analysis above suggest that it might be most profitable to 
imagine the abstract group with 2  elements as something that lies in a coordination 
between Z2  and {e, a}. That way, both process and object conceptions are supported, 
and, more importantly, neither representation is seen as the group.
Summary
The students developed rich, nuanced, and largely informal concept images of 
isomorphism, based on processes of renaming and reordering operation tables. They
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used operation tables to see when two groups were isomorphic and to construct 
isomorphisms. These processes supported the emergence o f concepts o f abstract groups, 
independent o f the names o f the elements and the order that elements were listed in the 
operation tables. Through these experiences, students came to see that there is one group 
o f order 2, one group of order 3, and two groups o f order 4. These results suggest that the 
operation table provides a viable experiential root for the concept of isomorphism.
Students had considerable difficulty, however, articulating formal versions o f the concept 
o f isomorphism. No doubt, this result stems partly from the manner in which the 
concepts were introduced (first informally, then formally), but it seems unlikely that it 
would be productive to introduce the formal definition without having developed some 
sense of what was being formalized. Thus, the pedagogical problem is what might be 
done to help students connect these informal understandings with the formal version. 
Among the concepts investigated in this study, the concept o f isomorphism is perhaps the 
most striking example o f the general problems o f connecting formal and informal 
conceptions, learning to use quantifiers, and learning to reason from definitions. I return 
to these issues in the chapter 8 .
Groups and Abstraction
Most of the analysis above discusses the students’ understandings of the groups Z„ and 
groups given via operation tables. As was mentioned in chapter 4, the students in this 
class also had experiences with U„, D„, S„, as well as other standard and nonstandard 
examples. There were less data on the students’ understanding of these classes of groups 
than on Zn. Nonetheless, there were sufficient data to support a few observations.
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Regarding the groups U„, the observations are similar to what was detailed above about 
the groups Z„. The students had a tendency to view the elements o f Un as though they are 
integers, whereas a more sophisticated point o f view is that they are equivalence classes 
o f integers, or that they are merely arbitrary names for an abstract group. The students 
often were not immediately sure o f the operation in U„ and carried properties of the 
elements as integers over into U„.
Students often had trouble writing down the elements o f the dihedral groups £ > 3  and Da 
and were even unsure o f how many elements there should be. Robert, for example, 
described 12 elements o f Da, not realizing that he had listed 4 elements twice. This was 
particularly true when the groups were represented as geometric transformations, using 
letters, such as R9 0  for a 90-degree rotation and H  for a reflection about a horizontal axis. 
The students also had difficulty when the groups were represented as permutations o f the 
vertices, although, in this case, the difficulty seemed to have more to do with the 
permutation notation.
The students took a long time to become comfortable with the cycle notation for 
permutations in S„ and openly expressed frustration early in their learning. Wendy, for 
example, complained, “This notation drives me nuts.... It scares me. Do you see how 
intimidated I am right now?” (Interview 2, lines 218-220). The students had trouble 
maintaining the distinctions between the meanings of the array and the cycle notations, 
and the notational confusions were sometimes compounded by the similarities between 
the array notation and the rows of an operation table. As the course progressed, however, 
all the key participants used the cycle notation fluently and with few errors in finding 
subgroups, cosets, and quotient groups in D 3 during their fourth interview.
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The data and analysis suggest that with growing fluency, students’ expectations are more 
often fulfilled, in the sense that they know ahead o f time what the operation table ought 
to look like, whether a subset is likely to be a subgroup, or whether two groups are 
isomorphic. This idea makes good theoretical sense and seems to fit the data in this 
study, although it would be hard to verify empirically because expectations often remain 
implicit. This observation suggests that the literature on the learning of abstract algebra 
would benefit from a notion called something like group sense, analogous to number 
sense (Greeno, 1991; Markovits & Sowder, 1994) or symbol sense (Arcavi, 1994), to 
describe particular kinds o f fluency and proficiency that students might develop as they 
gain familiarity with the examples, notations, language, and results o f group theory and 
the objects and properties that they are supposed to represent.
The difficulty that the students experienced with the standard examples o f groups 
presents another pedagogical dilemma. On the one hand, abstract algebra is about 
abstraction, intended to rise above specific examples to see generalizations that apply to 
whole classes o f mathematical systems. On the other hand, the students spent much of 
their time in this class making sense o f specific examples, such as Z6 and D3 , and, more 
generally, classes o f examples (Z„, U„, D„, Sn) that were not available to them previously. 
The number systems o f school mathematics (natural numbers, integers, rationals, reals, 
complex numbers) do not seem diverse enough for students to develop rich, robust, and 
sufficiently abstract concepts of group, subgroup, and isomorphism. Yet if students 
spend most o f the course developing an understanding of these new classes of groups, 
they are similarly unlikely to develop sufficiently rich and abstract concepts. Dr. Benson
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solved this dilemma by covering less material than is covered in some abstract algebra 
courses. What kind of balance makes sense?
Main Themes
In the preceding discussion o f the students’ concept images of group, isomorphism, and 
related concepts, two main themes emerge. First, the students’ use o f language and 
notation was often imprecise, as they blurred distinctions between closely related 
signifiers and the ideas they are intended to signify. In particular, the students confused 
associativity with commutativity and inverse with identity, and they did not distinguish 
among various operations called addition. Furthermore, although their informal 
understandings were often rich, the formal definitions they provided often lacked 
quantifiers and were otherwise imprecise.
Second, much o f students’ reasoning and the procedures they used were based in 
operation tables. Tables served to mediate abstraction in that the students could work 
with a concrete representation in order to gain access to abstract objects and their 
properties. Using tables allowed the students to develop procedures for checking the 
group axioms and for constructing subgroups. They could see isomorphisms from the 
patterns present in various tables. Tables served a metaphorical role in the sense that 
thinking about the table helped students think about the group it represented.
Sometimes the students’ reasoning seemed to be largely external and based in the table 
rather than in thinking about the processes underlying the operations, suggesting that the 
students’ internal representations were rather limited. In such cases, the table often 
served a metonymic role in that it was the group, rather than a representation. This kind
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of thinking was limited in that it hindered the students’ abilities to see subgroups 
composed o f nonadjacent elements in the tables and to see the operation independent of 
the order in which elements were listed in the table. As the students gained experience 
renaming and reordering tables, they began to overcome these limitations by separating 
the table from the group— the signifier from the signified—thereby developing concepts 
of abstract groups.
The theme of language use is an example of a larger issue of making distinctions between 
related ideas and being precise. The theme of reasoning from the table is an example of 
the larger idea of managing abstraction. These themes are further developed in the 
chapters that follow.
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HOMOMORPHISMS, COSETS, AND QUOTIENT GROUPS
The chapter details the students’ concept images o f homomorphisms, cosets, quotient 
groups, and related concepts, which were the focus o f the third and fourth interviews.
The organization is by mathematical content. The bottom-up analysis o f these interviews 
revealed a number o f themes that are presented in this chapter. The most prominent 
among these themes was the issue o f naming—that is, the relationship between a concept 
and its name. A related theme was the students’ use o f notation, particularly regarding 
the distinction between a set and one o f its elements. In several episodes, notational 
issues were central, and results from these episodes are collected together as a separate 
section following the section on cosets. Another prominent theme is that the students had 
developed considerable proficiency with many of the concepts. Their calculations were 
often guided by correct expectations, they continued to use operation tables to support 
their thinking, and they were comfortable with many o f the processes and objects.
Because these themes are well illustrated by Carla’s interviews, the chapter is based on 
detailed analyses o f her concepts, names, and notations for the topics o f homomorphism, 
coset, and quotient group. The chapter also includes a number of shorter episodes that 
amplify and clarify some of the issues raised by the analysis of Carla’s interviews. In 
many of these episodes I intervened during the interview, trying to encourage standard 
language or notation. Thus, the analysis o f these episodes provides insights into the
222
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learning that is required to make new distinctions and to change one’s use o f language or 
notation.
Homomorphisms
The common core o f the third interviews consisted o f determining whether a particular 
function was a homomorphism and finding the cosets of its kernel. This section begins 
with a short analysis o f the concept of homomorphism, which is followed by an analysis 
of Carla’s concept o f homomorphism. The discussion is then broadened to include other 
key participants, focusing on their definitions and the manner by which they verified that 
a function was a homomorphism.
Conceptual Analysis
A homomorphism is a function/ from a group G to a group G' , with operations * and 
respectively, such that for all a and b in G,j{a*b) = f{a)*'f{b). The idea is that the 
function preserves the group operation (and hence some of the group structure) in the 
sense that it does not matter whether the operation occurs in G and the result is sent 
through the function or, alternatively, the elements are sent individually through the 
function and their images are combined under the operation in G'.
In the class that provided the context for this study, the concept o f homomorphism was 
introduced as a generalization o f the formal version of isomorphism, accomplished by 
dropping the requirement that the function be one-to-one and onto. An isomorphism 
completely preserves a group’s structure. A homomorphism, in contrast, may preserve 
some of the structure and collapse the rest. Structure is collapsed by mapping elements in 
the domain to the identity in the codomain. The set o f these elements is called the kernel
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of the homomorphism. The structure that remains is the range o f the homomorphism, 
which is the image, j{G ) = \j{g) g  e G], o f the entire domain. Because such structural 
relationships may be further explored via the concepts o f coset and quotient group, the 
concept o f homomorphism provided some of motivation and context for these more 
advanced concepts.
A typical task involving the concept o f homomorphism is verifying that a given function 
is a homomorphism. For the third interview, I chose a function / from U% to Z4, given by 
X I) = 0,X3) = 0,X5) = 2, a n d /7 )  = 2, where U% is {1,3, 5, 7} under multiplication 
modulo 8  and Z4  is {0, 1, 2, 3} under addition modulo 4. When the function is given 
formulaically, the verification that it is a homomorphism is an exercise in symbol 
manipulation. Without a formula here, however, the students needed to verify that 
J(a*b) =fia)*[f{b) for all 16 pairs o f elements a, b from U%.
Carla and Homomorphisms
I began the third interview by asking Carla to explain what homomorphism means. She 
gave a reasonably complete definition:
4 Carla: Okay. A homomorphism is a function from one group to another, may not be the 
same group, and what makes it a homomorphism is, say, you have a and b in the first 
group. Then f(a*b), which is just whatever function makes that a group, that has the 
same value as / / ) * ' / / ) ,  and *' is the operation that makes the second group a group.
Although the necessary quantifiers for a and b were not explicit, it became clear later that 
she intended them to be “arbitrary” (line 16). In saying, “whatever function makes that a 
group,” she may have meant “whatever operation” and merely misspoke. On the other 
hand, she may have been confusing/w ith the group operation, a possibility that seems
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more likely after analyzing more o f the interview. I asked her to give an example of a 
homomorphism.
8 Carla: Well, we were just talking about in class a few minutes a g o ,/o f  Z to Z4.
1 0  Carla: We know that the integers are a group under addition, so our * is going to be
equivalent to adding. And we know that Z4 is a group under addition mod 4, so we know 
that *' is addition mod 4. So if  we pick an a and a b in the set o f integers— let’s say a is 4
and b is 10— then j{a*b) is the same thing as sa y in g /4  + 10), which equals/14).
11 Carla: So when we find / 14), because we are going from Z to Z4, we want to separate Z
into little subsets, to know what maps to what. And we know An, where n is an integer, 
always maps to 0, An + 1 maps to 1, An + 2 maps to 2, and An+ 3 maps to 3. So if  we 
look at 14, we can say that that is the same as An+ 2 where n is 3. So I will just write 
/ 1 4 )  as j{An + 2) just so that.... It’s easier to find what that equals. Since it’s An + 2, it 
equals 2. So by definition o f a homomorphism we should also get 2 when we do 4 of a, I 
m e a n ,/ /)* '/ / ) .
12  Carla: So that is the same as say ing /4 ) + (in mod 4 ) /1 0 ) .  We can rewrite/4) as just 
fiAri) where n is 0, and we can w rite/10) a s /4 «  + 2) because ... when n is 2, An + 2 is 
1 0 , and that helps us to look at which little subset we are dealing with, so we know what 
it maps to. So /(An) = 0, when you add mod 4 with j{An + 2) which equals 2 and 0 + 2 in 
mod 4 is 2. So we have 2 = 2, and we know it is a homomorphism.
Several issues are raised by Carla’s statements here. First, Carla specified the domain 
and codomain o f the function but not the function itself. From what follows, however, it 
becomes clear that she was assuming the canonical homomorphism from Z to Z4 given by 
x i - 4 r  mod 4 , a function that is suggestive of the group operation in Z4.
Diane, in her third interview, also specified homomorphisms implicitly in ways that 
suggest that her concept of homomorphism was severely constrained by her concepts of 
function and binary operation. The phenomenon o f implicit homomorphisms is explored 
in detail in chapter 7. A related issue is that this particular homomorphism mirrors the 
construction of Z4  and reflects Carla’s understanding of modular arithmetic, which is also 
explored further in chapter 7.
Finally, in specifying the subsets as An, An + \,A n  + 2, and An + 3, Carla was taking 
generic values to stand for whole sets, yet she allowed n to take several different values
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during her verification. Thus, she was not distinguishing sets from elements; neither was 
she distinguishing different elements from each other. This issue is discussed further 
below in the subsection entitled “Wendy and N  + N ” It is not clear whether Carla saw 
the partitioning o f the domain into subsets as defining the function or as a description of a 
function she had already defined via the ambiguous statement in line 8 .
With either interpretation, and ignoring the seemingly insignificant error in lines 11 and 
12 stating the wrong value o f n, by the end o f line 12 Carla had given the gist o f the 
verification of the homomorphism property for a specific case. I asked her whether she 
had proven that it was a homomorphism.
14 Carla: No, this is an example of.... If I was told.... Well, this isn’t proving that it is a 
homomorphism, it’s just saying that.... It’s an example of why it is a homomorphism.
15 Brad: Okay. In order to prove it what would you need to do?
16 Carla: Um, you would have to take an arbitrary, two arbitrary elements in Z, and you 
have to prove that— say, they are a and b—-fia*b) = fia)*'fib).
Here she demonstrated a good sense of both the quantifiers in the definition of 
homomorphism and also what would be involved in proving that the function/ was a 
homomorphism.
I then asked Carla to describe the relationship between her function from Z to Z4  and 
fix )  = x  mod 4, as it had been defined in class.
19 Carla: fix) = x mod 4 is just telling you that you are going to change whatever x is to a
mod 4, so you are always going to get 0, 1, 2, or 3 for your answer. And when I changed 
the integer to An, 4n +  1, An + 2 or An + 3, that was just because then I could look at 
whatever integer I am adding to An, and I know what my answer is. This is how I 
simplify. For me it makes it simpler.
2 1  Carla: Well, if  it’s small numbers, obviously, I don’t have to go through that but.... Or
especially if  I was trying to disprove something or prove that it’s a homomorphism or 
anything, I would need my An, An + 1, An + 2 or An + 3. So, it just makes ... I think in 
explaining it, it just makes it a little bit more understandable ... because you are dealing 
with things in the same kind o f context.
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Carla did not really answer my question, but her description o f the process seems to 
indicate that she thought o f her method as a simpler version o f the function from class. It 
is not clear to what extent she would have been able to consider an entirely different 
function from Z to Z4.
1 next asked Carla to identify the kernel of the homomorphism.
2  3 Carla: The kernel is 4n, where n is an integer because any integer, any multiple of 4 is
always going to map to 0, and 0 is your identity in Z4 under addition.
Because Carla did not write anything to accompany this statement, I have guessed that 
she meant n rather than N, on the basis of what she had been writing previously. With 
either interpretation, however, her statement is incorrect. There are at least two ways to 
correct the statement: “The kernel is the set {4n where n is an integer},” or “The kernel is 
4N  where N  is the set o f integers.” In any case, Carla was not distinguishing between a 
set and its individual elements. This issue has arisen several times in the results reported 
in this chapter and is treated in detail below in the section entitled “Notational Issues.”
To determine whether/ was a homomorphism, Carla first listed the elements in the 
groups and then explained her plan:
3 3 Carla: So first I am going to try an example where I am going to pick two elements that
map to the same thing, and then if  that isn’t a counterexample, I’m going to try two 
elements that map to different things.
34 Carla: So first one is going to b e .... I want to show that/ o f.... Let’s see f/ 8 is a group 
under ... [pause].... I am trying to think if  it is a group under addition or multiplication. 
But it must be multiplication, because if  it was addition then 0 would be in there.
35 Brad: Why?
3 6 Carla: Because 0 is the identity for addition. So it must be under multiplication.
Although Carla was momentarily unsure of the operation in Us, she was able to 
determine the operation quickly by reasoning from the group axioms, demonstrating 
some proficiency with the groups involved. She then verified the homomorphism
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property for two specific cases, but rather than have her verify all the cases, I chose to 
move on.
I asked Carla to identify the kernel o f the homomorphism.
5 8 Carla: The kernel is 1 and 3 because/(I) = 0 and /{3) = 0 and zero is the identity in Z4.
5 9 Brad: How do you write that down?
60 Carla: The kernel? [Mm.] It is a set. [Okay.] The kernel is the set that contains the
elements 1 and 3. [Writes { 1 ,3 } =  ker(/).] And that contains the kernel off.
Carla was correct, although her language suggests that she may not have been 
distinguishing between the elements 1 and 3 and the set {1, 3}.
On the surface, the concept o f homomorphism seemed relatively unproblematic for Carla. 
By not explicitly describing her homomorphism from Z to Z4, however, she indicated that 
her concept image of homomorphism may have been tied, in potentially limiting ways, to 
her concepts o f function or binary operation. That turned out to be a major obstacle for 
Diane, as is detailed in chapter 7.
Other Students and Homomorphisms
Almost all the key participants were able to recite a definition of homomorphism and 
describe the concept in several different ways. Furthermore, they were able to check that 
the property held for specific elements and were able to use the homomorphism property 
in proofs of other ideas, although quantifiers were often not explicit. These general 
observations are elaborated below in a description o f students’ definitions of 
homomorphism and the ways that they verified that a particular function was a 
homomorphism.
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Definitions. In the students’ definitions of homomorphism, the equation/(a*Z>) = 
fia )* ’fijb) was ever present, but few students were careful to state what a, b, and/ were 
intended to be. In the interviews, the students demonstrated varying degrees of 
sophistication in their concept images around this central equation. Carla’s definition, 
given above, was nearly complete. In contrast, consider the following responses by other 
students to the question “What is a homomorphism?” from the third interviews:
7 Diane: I think it’s like a law o f functions. It’s a mle.
8 Brad: Tell me more about what you mean by that.
9 Diane: It’s a property that we can use for functions and stuff. So if  something is a 
homomorphism, then that means that those elements can follow the rule that it’s defined 
by.
1 0  Brad: And what’s the homomorphism mle?
11 Diane: ThatJ{a*b) =J{a)*'J{b).
12 Brad: Okay. And what kind o f function does/have to be in order ...
13 Diane: I think that would be defined later. Like function, it could be any function it 
wants, but as long as it satisfies this, then it’s a homomorphism.
4 Robert: It’s a function that takes one group to another group and preserves the group 
operation.
5 Brad: What do you mean by “preserves the group operation?”
6  Robert: Well, I understand it better in symbols as likej{a*b) =j[a)*'fljb).
1 Brad: Okay, what does that mean, sort of in words?
8  Robert: It means it doesn’t matter whether you compose the functions first... compose
the elements first and then take the function o f it, or whether you take the function of 
each element individually and then compose them.
Thus, for Diane homomorphism was a rule or a law. Robert, on the other hand, had 
effectively three different definitions of homomorphism: a structural one, a symbolic one, 
and a verbal procedural one. O f the key participants, only Carla gave a reasonably 
complete characterization. The results were similar on the final exam, in that all the key 
participants gave definitions o f homomorphism that included the equation f{a* b) =
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J[a)*'f[b), but only Carla’s definition was complete, using quantifiers and specifying that 
/ was a function between groups.
Verifying homomorphisms. In the third interview, all the key participants were given the 
same function as Carla had been given and were asked to determine whether it was a 
homomorphism. Like Carla, Wendy verified the property for a few examples, described 
what would be necessary to prove it in general, and then was comfortable assuming that it 
was indeed a homomorphism when I suggested that we go on. Diane had considerable 
difficulty with the verification because of her understanding o f functions, as mentioned 
above. Below I describe the ways that Robert and Lori used the operation table to 
complete the verification, but first, I provide some general observations.
While verifying that the function was a homomorphism, the students had minor 
difficulties, such as arithmetic errors or forgetting to send a* b through f  Mistakes such 
as these are easy to make, of course, when the elements in the domain and codomain look 
the same. The students were often able to avoid or overcome such difficulties by relying 
on their proficiency with the groups involved, much as they paid attention to the names of 
elements and the group axioms to determine which group they were in. The distinction 
between * and *' in the homomorphism equation seemed to support this process.
Robert was confused at first because he did not “really understand w h a t/is” (line 16). 
After I suggested that he set aside that concern, he was able to try an example. I then 
asked whether operation tables might help, intending to explore Robert’s understanding 
of a method that had originally been suggested by another student in class. The method 
simplifies the tedious process o f checking the 16 pairs o f values a, b from U% by using
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two tables to organize the calculations ofj[a*b) andf(a)*'f(b). If  the tables match, then 
the function is a homomorphism. The method is especially appropriate for small finite 
groups in tasks such as this one where the homomorphism is not given by a formula. 
Upon completing the tables, Robert concluded, “You get the same table we got the first 
time. So that convinces me that this is indeed a homomorphism” (line 109). He was able 
to explain how specific verifications were represented in the table. And he again 
demonstrated a geometric perspective with his observation, “You could take this table 
and stick it right on top o f the other one, and you have the identical table” (line 124).
Lori, in contrast, decided on her own to use operation tables to verify that the function 
was a homomorphism, although she stated ahead of time that she was not sure she 
remembered how to do it. As it turned out, she applied the method incorrectly so that 
both her tables recordedX«)*/(^)> making equality automatic even if  the function had not 
been a homomorphism. When I pressed her to describe the process, she believed that that 
she was computing both j[a*b) and j(a)*J(b).
I constructed another function that was not a homomorphism and asked Lori to check 
whether it was a homomorphism. Much o f the rest o f the interview was spent trying to 
help her make explicit connections among the specific pairs a, b that she checked by 
hand, the results that she had recorded in her two tables, and the results in a third table 
that I suggested. By comparing the three different tables, she was able to see what was 
wrong with her previous process and was able to articulate more clearly the intended and 
procedural differences between the two tables.
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Summary
The students’ concept images o f homomorphism were dominated by the e q u a tio n ^ * 6 ) 
=J(a)*'j(b) and not always with sufficient attention to specifying a, b , f  and the 
operations. Given a function between groups, they were able to check that the property 
held for specific pairs of elements and to talk about what would be necessary to verify the 
property in general. There was the slight cognitive difficulty o f keeping track of which 
group an element was in, but the students often relied on their proficiency with the 
particular groups to manage this difficulty.
These results suggest that the concept o f homomorphism is particularly susceptible to 
procedural approaches. Typical tasks involve rule-bound symbol manipulation, but even 
the nonstandard task used in this study was vulnerable to the creation o f procedures that 
can be misapplied, as Lori demonstrated. The concept o f homomorphism itself did not 
seem to raise many issues that impeded the students’ progress with the tasks at hand. 
Instead, issues arose in connection with other concepts, particularly the concept of 
function. This observation arises again below, because the students’ concepts o f cosets 
were sometimes limited by their association with homomorphisms.
Cosets
With the concept of coset, the students’ concept images blossomed once again with 
linguistic, notational, and conceptual issues that arose and were sometimes addressed 
during the interviews. After a brief conceptual analysis below, the stage is set once again 
by Carla, who demonstrated both considerable proficiency with the concepts and 
procedures and also nonstandard language and notation. The section continues with
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analysis o f an episode from an interview with Diane and Lori, who demonstrated similar 
nonstandard language. Finally, the analysis is broadened to include other students. 
Notational issues are elaborated separately in the following section.
Conceptual Analysis
Just as a subgroup provides structural information about a subset of a group, the set of 
cosets of a subgroup reveals information about how the subgroup fits within the structure 
o f the group as a whole. Through a generalization o f modular arithmetic (see chapter 7), 
the idea is to categorize elements of a group according to their relationship with the 
subgroup. The categories are called cosets. Realization o f the structural power of cosets 
requires also Lagrange’s theorem and the concepts of normality and quotient groups.
Here I focus only on the concept of coset.
To simplify the language and notation in the following discussion, I leave the group 
operation implicit, as in ah, and call the group operation multiplication. The ideas and 
results hold for a group with any operation via simple translation. This is the power of 
the abstract concepts of group and binary operation. I in no way intend, however, to 
trivialize the cognitive requirements in making the translation to a group with an 
operation that is called something other than multiplication.
If  H  is a subgroup o f a group G, and a e G, then the left coset o f H  containing a is 
defined by the formula aH = {ah \ h e H}. Right cosets are defined analogously. 
Computing a particular coset aH  requires multiplying a particular value a from the group 
by each element in H. Computing all the cosets involves completing such calculations 
for all elements a in the group. Either of these processes may be infinite, and such
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situations carry the additional requirement o f being able to describe the results without 
actually completing the processes. For finite groups, it turns out that the cosets of a 
subgroup partition the group into subsets that each have the same number of elements. 
Lagrange’s theorem—that the order of a subgroup must divide the order of a (finite) 
group— follows immediately from this result.
Because the kernel o f a homomorphism is always a subgroup of the domain, the 
definition o f coset can be specialized as follows: If  K  is the kernel of a group 
homomorphism f .G - > G ’ and a e G, the (left) coset of K  containing a is given by aK  = 
{ak | k  e K ). Students proved on the second midterm exam ih&lfla) — fib )  if  and only if 
aK = bK. In other words, a and b have the same image under the homomorphism if  and 
only if  they are in the same coset o f the kernel of the homomorphism. As discussed 
below, this specialization o f homomorphism was quite salient in the students’ thinking.
Carla and the Left Coset
Carla’s work with cosets followed immediately from her work with homomorphisms. 
Given the function /  from U% to Z4, given by f \ )  = 0 , f 3 )  = 0 , f 5 )  = 2, and/(7) = 2, Carla 
had identified the kernel o f the homomorphism as the set {1, 3}. I moved on to cosets.
62 Brad: Okay, Let’s call that set K, and what I want to do is investigate these sets aK.
63 Carla: Okay. Left cosets. All right. So to do aK, we see what happens.... Okay. The 
set {1, 3} is always going to be on the right, and we want to work with every single 
element that is in .... Let’s see.... Every ... {1, 3} is a subset, in this case it is a subset of 
Ut .
6  6  Carla: So you are going to take out every element of Us,1 think it is. The definition is ....
I think you take every element o f t/8, and you multiply, in this case you multiply because 
that’s the operation. [Okay.] Is that right that i f  s U{! I’m not sure.... We just said this 
today, b u t... [inaudible]
6  7 Brad: Well show me what it is you are going to do here, and then maybe you can answer
your own question.
6 8  Carla: Well I am going to multiply 1, 3, 5, and 7 each individually by the, by K. So 1 x {1,
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3} gives me {1 ,3}. 3 x { l, 3} gives me {1, 3}.
For Carla, the notation aK  evoked the term coset and seems to have supported her 
reasoning: a is an element that varies through U% and AT is a set. The individual elements 
o f A-required little o f her attention, as evidenced by the fact that she did not say or write 
down intermediate calculations and quickly considered {3, 1} to be the same set as 
{1,3}. The lower-level process o f iterating through the elements of K  was essentially 
automatic. She computed the other cosets similarly and quickly (see Figure 16), 
concluding “So we have two elements in the left cosef ’ (line 70).
Figure 16. Carla’s cosets of {1, 3}
{1,3} = ker(/) = K  
aK
lx{l ,3} = {1,3}
3x{l, 3} = {1,3}
5x{l, 3} = {5,7}
7x{l, 3} = {5, 7}
From the ease with which Carla performed these calculations, it seems that she had a firm 
understanding o f the concept o f coset, but her statement “we have two elements in the left
coset” was nonstandard syntax, suggesting unusual thinking. I asked her to explain:
73 Brad: Two elements in the left coset. What do you mean?
74 Carla: Because {1,3} and {5, 7} are each of, are the two elements that result from aK.
75 Brad: Are the two.... They are elements ...
76 Carla: Well, they are sets, but if you look at them as one.... If you rename {1, 3} to a 
and {5, 7} to b then there are two elements in aK.
77 Brad: Oh, okay. So you are saying, on the one hand, we can talk about the set of cosets. 
Does that make sense? [Yup.] So how many cosets are there?
78 Carla: Two.
79 Brad: Two. But now does aK  refer to the set of cosets, does it refer to all of them, or 
does it refer to one specific one?
80 Carla: aK  tells you how you find the cosets. So that was none o f your choices. What 
were your choices?
81 Brad: Does aK  refer to all of the cosets, or just one o f them?
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8  2 Carla: aK  is the general formula that gives you all o f the cosets. Then you choose 
specific as for whatever K  you are given, and you will find all the specific cosets.
Thus, Carla had an efficient and reliable procedure for computing cosets, and the 
procedure was supported by the notation aK. Nevertheless, she did not maintain a clear 
distinction between a single value of a and the set o f all o f such values, and thus did not 
distinguish between the particular coset aK  and the set o f all cosets o f K  Instead, a 
varied as part o f a procedure specified by the formula aK, which gave all the cosets. 
Psychologically, it seems to be an easy step to then imagine that aK  is all such cosets, 
without needing to distinguish between a nonspecific one and the collection o f all of 
them.
Analysis. Carla was happy to let a vary through all the elements o f G and to construct 
the collection o f cosets aK  that result. What she did not see, however, was a need to 
distinguish notationally between the particular coset aK  and the collection of all such 
cosets. By calling the cosets elements, Carla appeared to have little difficulty seeing 
cosets as objects, suggesting that she had encapsulated the process o f coset formation. 
Furthermore, her language “the left cosef ’ for the collection o f cosets suggests that she 
had further encapsulated that collection as an object, a set o f sets, a point of view that is 
helpful in order to see the set of cosets as itself a group under the appropriate coset 
arithmetic.
Figure 17 shows schematically the objects and processes involved in coset computation 
and delineates the two levels of processes. Carla’s language suggests that her thinking 
was in the transitional process between two objects: the particular coset aK  = {ak \ 
k  e K) and the set of all cosets of K, which might be written \aK  | a e  G) . In the midst
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of the process, a is varying, so aK  denotes neither a particular coset nor all of them. For 
Carla, aK  denoted and specified the process. Thus, my question about the distinction 
(line 81) was not relevant to her.
Figure 17. Objects and processes in coset computation
A^ particular a in G ----------------------- ^ The coset aK -------------------------► The set of all cosets of K
The subgroup K  Process: process:
By letting k  vary By letting a vary
through K, calculate through G, calculate
all the products ak. all the cosets aK.
Collect them into a set. Collect them into a set.
Being immersed in the process allowed Carla some flexibility in her thinking. On the one 
hand, she could consider a particular coset by stopping the process for a moment. On the 
other hand, she could consider all the cosets by completing or imagining she had 
completed the process. From within the process she could broaden her viewpoint slightly 
and see both a particular coset and the set o f all of them as two aspects o f the concept of 
“coset.” Thus, iiaK  tells you how to find the cosets,” and together there are “two 
elements in the left coset.” Carla maintained this dual role of the term coset through the 
fourth interview, and even maintained her process orientation, saying, for example, “The 
left coset gives the set o f (23) and (132)” (line 239, emphasis added) rather than the left 
coset is that set.
Diane. Lori, and Cosets
Although Carla’s ambiguous use of the word coset was unusual and idiosyncratic, Diane 
and Lori used similar language. During their fourth interview, I asked them to find the 
cosets of a subgroup in D 3 . They each drew a triangle and labeled the vertices 1, 2, and 3 
to help themselves write down the elements of D3. Based on the geometric interpretation,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
they used the standard term rotation and the nonstandard term flip  to distinguish ( 1 ), 
(123) and (132) from (23), (13), and (12).
They had initial difficulties with the coset formation process, first multiplying each 
element o f £ > 3  by only (12) rather than the whole subgroup, {(1), (12)}. Diane explained, 
“The cosets are only going to be using the element (12) because (1) does not matter, 
because that’s the identity” (line 42). To overcome these difficulties, I then asked them 
to find the cosets of the subgroup generated by (123), and the bulk o f the interview dealt 
with this subgroup. For simplicity o f notation in what follows, I call the subgroup H, 
although Diane and Lori always wrote it out in full as {(1), (123), (132)}, sometimes 
without the enclosing braces.
Diane explained the process for calculating cosets: “You’d have to take this [subgroup] 
and multiply it by each o f the elements in D f  (line 67). Lori, on the other hand, was 
unclear on the question and asked, “Coset of D3?” (line 6 8 ). I told her I wanted a coset in 
£ > 3  of the subgroup that she had found. She was still unclear on the process:
7 4 Lori: All right, I have a quick question. Do you take every element in Z)3 and multiply it 
by the singleton (1), then take every element in £ ) 3 and multiply it by (123), and every 
elem ent...?
As they continued with their calculations, Diane expected two get “2 different cosets ... 
because the order o f this [subgroup] is 3, the order of £ > 3  is 6 , so 6  over 3 is 2” (lines 82- 
84). After computing (1 )H  and (123)// and seeing that they both resulted in H, Lori 
concluded, “The left coset is probably just going to be this alone” (line 114). But then 
Diane pointed out that they should try the calculation with something other than rotations.
Before they began those calculations, I asked Lori what she was calling the coset.
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12 0 Lori: Well, I don’t know what the whole coset is.
124 Lori: I still have to run through all o f these. I don’t know what the whole left coset is yet.
Like what Diane is saying, if we do (132), it’s just going to give us this again, so maybe 
we can skip to (23). We are going to g e t ...
12 5 Diane: If you are only looking at two elements o f the coset, and this is one, then if  we
take any one o f these we should come up with the same.
This is the first indication of unusual language. It became clear as the interview 
progressed that Lori was calling the collection of cosets “the whole coset.” Because she 
had not completed the calculations, she did not yet know what the whole coset was.
Diane had earlier predicted that there would be two cosets (line 82). Here she called 
them “elements of the coset,” demonstrating language similar to Lori’s. Diane was also 
predicting here that calculations with any o f the flips would yield the same “element.”
Diane computed (23)//, and Lori computed (13)//, and they got the same result, {(12), 
(13), (23)}, though Lori did not include braces. I asked Lori how she had computed the 
coset.
134 Lori: Um, I took the element, the cycle (13) in Z)3, and I multiplied it by the set [the 
subgroup] to get this coset.
137 Lori: For the whole left coset, it’s going to be this [FT] and this [(13)//], and that’s it.
Thus Lori was at this point clear on the process. Furthermore, she was calling (1 3 )//a 
coset, but / /a n d  (1 3 )//together were “the whole left coset.”
When I asked them how they would write it, they listed the elements in both cosets, but 
Lori merely listed the six elements from D 3 without distinguishing between the two 
cosets. I asked them how that was different from D 3 . Lori said, “It’s not” (line 143), and 
Diane said, “It is D 3 ” (line 144). Then Lori provided a connection to the computations:
14 6 Lori: You do kind of have to distinguish that these are all one when you multiply it by
these elements, and that these are all one, like Diane did. [She adds parentheses.]
14 7 Brad: Okay. So explain your notation here?
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14 8  Diane: This is the coset, the left coset, and these are the elements in it.
They had both then written ((1), (123), (132)), ((23), (13), (12)). Lori explained:
151 Lori: I know how to say it. You are always going to get like this first parentheses when 
you multiply the first three rotations in Z)3 times the cycle you wanted us, not ( 1 2 ), the 
cycles that you wanted us discussed by this one. So you are always going to get those 
first three. So that’s like the first left coset, all in one. And the second one all in one 
is .... The last three elements in Z)3 multiplied by that set.
153 Lori: So there is only two left cosets. Like...
155 Lori: Two left coset values. How do you, what do you call it?
15 6  Diane: Elements.
157 Lori: Yeah, two left coset elements.
158 Diane: There are two elements in the left coset.
During this passage, Lori was trying to adopt Diane’s language, which was to call the set 
o f cosets “the left coset” and to call each o f the cosets “elements.” Much earlier, when 
Diane had predicted that there would be two cosets, she had called them cosets (line 82). 
But this may have been a slip of the tongue, for other than this single sentence, her 
distinction between “the left coset” and “elements” was entirely consistent. Lori, on the 
other hand, seemed to be comfortable with her ambiguous language, and she was also 
willing to adopt Diane’s language.
Exploring the language. At this point in the interview, I had a clear understanding of the 
ways that Lori and Diane were talking about cosets. I chose to explore what it would 
take to change their language:
172 Brad: What if  I told you that ... this that you have computed here is actually a left coset. 
That’s one left coset right there.
173 Diane: Wait a minute, so this is a left coset, and this is a left coset, and together they 
make the left coset? So there is one ...
Diane was uncomfortable with my suggestion because adopting it would have been 
confusing alongside her language. Apparently, she had not noticed the ambiguity in
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Lori’s language, for she was describing Lori’s usage. Lori, on the other hand, was 
perfectly comfortable with this ambiguity.
181 Lori: Yeah, that was what I was going to say. There’s six left cosets because every single 
element in D 3 is going to produce a different left coset. So there is actually six left cosets 
to this subgroup, but they are the same. Like what Diane and I did, all of the rotations are 
the same, and then all of the stationary ones, or whatever you want to call them, are the 
same. So then it only comes down to two. Then we call the whole thing one left coset.
So it’s only one set.
Lori was focusing on the fact that there were six coset calculations, but because some of 
them were the same, the result was two cosets. Then the two cosets together, collected as 
a set, were called one left coset. Diane continued to insist that //w a s  an element, not a 
coset: “This whole set here is one element” (line 187). Furthermore, she did not like 
Lori’s claim of six cosets. Because the sameness o f the results o f the calculations, there 
really were only two sets.
Diane and Lori agreed that what they had written as ((1), (123), (132)) was in fact a set. I 
asked whether they could use braces to call it a set, and they both changed their notation 
to {{(1), (123), (132)}, {(23), (13), (12)}}. I asked them what that was. Diane said, “A 
set of sets” (line 196), and Lori agreed. Furthermore, it was a set with two elements, each 
of which were sets with three elements.
I asked Diane what she meant by the word coset. She responded, “This whole thing”
(line 214), pointing to the set o f cosets. Lori agreed that she had been using the word 
coset to describe the individual calculations. But then she backed off:
224 Lori: I generate six sets by multiplying D3 by this set [//]. And then I see which is similar
and which are not, and it gets put into one coset set. Maybe, yeah.
22 6  Lori: It seems like every one I have computed, there’s always ones that are similar.
227 Brad: And then you find that you have really only ...
22 8 Lori: Have one big set with all o f the different set elements that are not similar in it.
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Thus, despite my attempt to impose the standard language, Diane’s language continued to 
prevail, influencing even Lori.
I tried again to impose standard language.
22 9 Brad: What if  I told you each o f those things that you have computed is called a coset.
230  Lori: That’s what I was thinking. Like, I computed a coset. There’s another one. Just
because it’s the same doesn’t mean that it’s still not one. It is a coset; I just didn’t write 
it. That’s what I was trying to say.
Thus, Lori was comfortable with the standard language for an individual coset. But after 
completing the calculations and collecting the cosets, she explained, “There is only one 
whole set that’s called the left coset” (line 234). Lori continued to be willing to use the 
term coset ambiguously.
Diane, on the other hand, did not agree:
23 8 Diane: Yeah, I think we are having trouble with vocabulary [Okay] because I am thinking
that this is the left coset. It’s complete. You know, that’s why you call it the left coset. 
This isn’t complete yet. And this isn’t complete by itself; you have to put them together 
for them to be complete.
Diane was focusing on the completed process and was not concerned about individual 
cosets. She later agreed that it would be useful to have a name for the sets H  and (13)H, 
and Lori suggested that the name should be coset. When asked whether it made sense to 
call both individual ones and all o f them coset, Lori responded, “Sure” (line 243). Again 
Diane disagreed: “It’s just a little confusing though because if  you were to talk to 
somebody about it and explain it to them, ... they are not going to know what you are 
talking about” (lines 244-246). Diane was not comfortable with the ambiguous language.
Thus far, my interventions had been unsuccessful. Next I tried to make a clear 
distinction:
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247 Brad: Okay, well it seems to me that there are two possibilities. One is to call the big 
thing, that’s everything together, the left coset, which is what you have been saying, 
right? And come up with a different name for the individual elements here o f what you 
are calling the coset.
2 4 8  Diane: And then we are going to need a name for all the different things ... [inaudible]
24 9 Brad: Yeah, so we could come up with a different name for that. An alternative is to call
this, each one o f these things, a coset.
250  Diane: A coset. And come up with a name for this [the set o f all o f them],
Diane seemed comfortable with the distinction and with the two options I was putting 
forward. I continued:
2  57 Brad: So it seems to me we just need to decide which of those two approaches to take. 
Does that kind o f... ? Am I putting words in your mouth?
2 58 Diane: No, no. I know.
25 9 Brad: I’m sort o f boiling down what the disagreement is.
2 60 Lori: Oh, yeah, I definitely see that.
2 61 Diane: Yeah, I’ve been having problems with calling everything the same thing, and I 
want to separate it.
So it appears that Diane and Lori saw the distinction I was trying to make. Furthermore, 
Diane made clear that she had been uncomfortable “calling everything the same thing.” I 
again tried to impose standard language.
2  62 Brad: Well, here is the place where I am going to just tell you. These things here, the 
smaller things are the cosets. Each o f those is a coset. So here we have a bigger thing 
which contains what?
2 63 Lori: All of the left coset.
2  64 Brad: Sss.
2 65 Diane: Cosets.
2  69 Lori: Containing the left cosets.
Thus, after emphasizing the crucial distinction between a coset and the set o f all o f them,
I gave them the standard language, and they seemed comfortable with it. It remained to 
be seen, however, what influence that intervention would have on the language they used.
We next began talking about right cosets.
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27 9 Diane: Those are, a right coset. And you have the set of right cosets.
2 8 0 Lori: So this is a normal subgroup in these are its cosets. You don’t have to distinguish
left or right because we are going to know they are the same.
It may be that Diane’s first sentence indicated her previous nonstandard language. Her 
second sentence, however, is syntactically correct, as is Lori’s statement.
Nonstandard language continued to surface. In predicting the number of right cosets, for 
example, Diane used the formula suggested by Lagrange’s theorem:
2 96 Diane: If you get a group that’s six elements, divided by a group o f three elements, you
should get two groups of three elements each.
2 97 Brad: Two?
2 98 Diane: Subgroups o f three elements each.
So Diane called the cosets first groups and then subgroups. After some discussion, Diane 
pointed out that one o f the two cosets was not a subgroup: “It can’t be; there’s not 
identity” (line 318). Lori then concluded, “You don’t get two subgroups” (line 322). So 
Diane changed her language: “You get two sub-, cosets” (line 323). Thus, despite the 
false start, Diane was able to find the standard language. Lori, on the other hand, 
sometimes still used ambiguous language:
34 9 Lori: And there’s going to be two cosets in our whole set. We’re just calling this a set 
[inaudible] or the left coset.
Conclusion. This case demonstrates that Carla’s unusual language was not so unusual. 
Lori’s dual usage o f the term coset was quite similar to Carla’s. Although Lori was not 
as clear about the process as Carla, neither of them made a clear conceptual distinction 
between a particular coset and the set o f all of them. Diane’s language, on the other 
hand, indicated that she was making the standard conceptual distinction but had attached 
names in nonstandard ways.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Continuing the comparison, Diane’s and Lori’s work with cosets was not guided by the 
symbolism aK, as it had been for Carla, but rather involved working with particular 
groups. It is not clear what meaning Diane and Lori would have attributed to the 
symbolism, but symbolic issues were prominent and problematic in other interviews, as is 
illustrated below in the subsection entitled “Robert and What Varies.”
This case also illustrates some o f the cognitive difficulties in making new distinctions and 
renaming concepts. My initial attempts at imposing standard language were 
unsuccessful. Diane’s nonstandard language continued to prevail, and Lori’s language 
retained its ambiguity. The third attempt was partially successful, it seems, because I 
first clearly set out the conceptual distinction I wanted Diane and Lori to make. Yet even 
then, Diane and Lori sometimes slipped into nonstandard usage. The theme o f making 
new distinctions arises frequently in this chapter.
Other Students and Cosets
In characterizing the concept images of coset for Carla, Diane, and Lori, I found the 
central issue to clearly be one o f language. By broadening the analysis to include other 
key participants, a conceptual issue rises to prominence: Many students preferred looking 
for a homomorphism and its kernel before they were willing to compute cosets, 
suggesting that the concepts of coset and kernel were closely related in the students’ 
thinking. Carla, for example, initially thought that to compute cosets she would need the 
kernel of a homomorphism. Wendy displayed similar expectations, as did Robert in both 
his third and fourth interviews. This connection is not surprising because, as mentioned 
above, cosets require a subgroup, and kernels are always subgroups. Nonetheless, the
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concept images o f cosets and kernels were so strongly connected that the students were 
sometimes obstructed in their progress on the interview tasks.
In Robert’s third interview, I asked him whether he could find cosets o f the subgroup 
generated by 3 in Zn. He calculated the subgroup as {0, 3, 6 , 9}, called it theta, and then 
looked for cosets.
27 8  Robert: All right, so I’ve got to find the kernel though o f Zn  in order to get cosets. H  is 
the kernel. Over here it’s anything that maps to 0 would be in the kernel... anything in 
here that maps to 0 in Z\2.
Thus, Robert thought he needed to find a kernel. He soon realized that in order to talk 
about the kernel he needed a homomorphism, which he said would “Take Z n  to theta” 
(line 284). A good portion o f the interview was consumed constructing a mapping and 
considering whether its kernel was a subgroup and even whether the mapping was a 
function in his sense o f the term.
Robert’s association between coset and kernel presented a significant stumbling block 
that was preventing me from learning about his concept o f coset. Eventually, I 
intervened:
370 Brad: But now let’s just say we could design a function that would be a homomorphism 
and had the kernel as this thing that I have said here. The kernel would be 3, 6 , 9, and 0. 
Let’s say we could set up a homomorphism from.... You know, I am not even going to 
tell you what group we are going to. We are going to send it from Zi2 to some other 
group— I am not telling you what— but the kernel of that’s going to be this set (3, 6 , 9, 0}.
371 Robert: And then you want me to find cosets.
My suggestion was sufficient, for Robert then calculated the cosets quickly.
Furthermore, by noticing patterns and making and revising conjectures during the 
calculations, he decided, without doing all of the calculations, that there would be only 
three cosets.
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Robert also showed a connection between coset and kernel during his fourth interview. I 
had asked him to find cosets of a subgroup in Z)3. He calculated the subgroup and then 
began to consider cosets.
114 Robert: All right. So I take any.... I got to know which things.... See, I am still not sure 
about the coset thing. You.... When you talk about h being in H, you are talking about 
things in the kernel, right?
115 Brad: Well, in order to be talking about the kernel what do you need?
1 1 6  Robert: A  homomorphism.
117 Brad: Do we have a homomorphism here?
118 Robert: No. I think that this means I can just take.... I can take all o f these elements ...
12 0 Robert: ... of Z)3, and I can operate them on the left with the elements in my set here, and
that’ll give me the right cosets. And I can operate them on the right with the elements in 
the set and have the left cosets.
Thus, during this interview, with the support of improved proficiency with the concepts
and processes, Robert was able more quickly to overcome his association between cosets
and kernels.
In both interviews, Robert demonstrated an insufficiently general concept of coset, 
suggesting that the students’ experiences with cosets o f kernels o f homomorphisms 
overpowered the more general tasks. For Robert, overcoming such a constrained concept 
image of homomorphism seemed to depend on Robert’s proficiency with the processes 
and related concepts. It seems that when a students’ concept o f coset depends upon 
having a kernel, it is not easy to generalize to cosets of arbitrary subgroups.
Summary
The foregoing analysis characterizing the students’ concept images o f cosets supports 
two results. First, the students used nonstandard language, which indicated nonstandard 
concepts that were dominated by the process of creating the cosets and which failed to 
distinguish between an individual coset and the set of all o f them. Furthermore, the
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students were resistant to attempts to impose standard language. Second, the students’ 
concept images were insufficiently general and were dependent on their proficiency with 
the concepts, processes, and examples. Other results about the students’ understandings 
o f cosets are presented below. Results concerning the ways the students used notation 
are presented in the following section. The analysis has already described ways in which 
the students considered cosets to be objects, but a deeper discussion o f the process/object 
distinction in the students’ concept images o f cosets must take into account not only these 
notational issues but also the ways the students used cosets in constructing quotient 
groups.
Notational Issues
There was considerable variation among the key participants in the ways that the notation 
supported and inhibited their concept of coset and the related processes. Carla’s 
intermediate position in the process between an individual coset and the set o f all o f them 
was strongly supported by the notation aK. Diane and Lori, in contrast, did not use such 
symbolism during their interview but seemed similarly process oriented. In this section, I 
present three kinds o f notational difficulties: confusion between set and element, trouble 
managing processes, and losing track o f the objects. Each o f these is illustrated by an 
episode related to the concept o f cosets, but the issues are more general, as is suggested 
by these descriptors.
Carla’s failure to distinguish between a particular coset and the set of all of them might 
be characterized more generally as mixing up statements about sets with statements about 
elements (see, e.g., Selden & Selden, 1978). The characterization that she was immersed
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in the process is more compelling, however, because there is no indication that Carla was 
confused. Furthermore, this notion of being stuck in the process can also explain a 
statement Carla had made earlier in the interview, but which I had not pursued: “The 
kernel is An where n is an integer” (line 23). As mentioned above, whether Carla meant 
N  or n, she was not appropriately distinguishing between a set and one o f its elements. A 
more compelling explanation, however, is that Carla saw An as the process for generating 
the kernel, which might be described as an intermediate position similar to that for her 
concept o f cosets. The subsection entitled “Wendy and N +  N “ explores almost identical 
language and notation during another interview.
The second notational difficulty is related to the set/element distinction but has to do with 
managing the process o f coset formation, thereby providing insight into the relationship 
between symbolism and processes. During her third interview, Wendy described her 
coset calculations as follows:
253 Wendy: It’s going to be all the elements times.... Like 1.... All the elements, we are
going to call them h. h are all the elements in U%. And k are going to be elements in the 
kernel. So h times {1,3} is how you are going to find it. So it’s going to be 1 times 
{1, 3}, and it’s going to be 3, 5, 7 times {1,3}.
To accompany her statement, she wrote h e  U% and k e K. Neither her words nor these
symbols distinguished the different roles played by h and k. Nonetheless, she maintained
the appropriate conceptual distinction, for she also wrote h{ 1,3} and performed all the
calculations correctly. Robert, on the other hand, demonstrated a similar use o f notation
but had considerable difficulty establishing a sufficient conceptual distinction between
the set and the element to manage the processes o f coset formation. This is illustrated
below in the subsection entitled “Robert and What Varies.”
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Finally, Carla herself showed a marked contrast between her work with particular groups, 
such as U% and Z n  and her symbolic reasoning about cosets generally, where the group 
remained unspecified. In particular, she seemed to forget that aK  and bK  were cosets and 
instead treated the letters like numeric variables from high school algebra. This point is 
demonstrated in the subsection entitled “Carla and aK  = bKZ
Wendy and N  + N
This subsection explores a failure to distinguish between a set and an element and 
provides insight into the kind o f learning that occurs as students begin to make such a 
distinction. During her fourth interview, Wendy described a function from Z to Z4  where 
x goes to x (mod 4)— the same function that Carla had described at the beginning of her 
third interview. Then Wendy listed the cosets o f the kernel o f the mapping:
5 0 Wendy: Well, we can take the generator group now, and we can find cosets a lot more
easy because if  you take ... 4x ... every elem ent... every multiple o f 4 is going to get 
mapped to 0 in x mod 4 ... in Z4 ... so 4x is going to equal the kernel. So the cosets are 
going to be 4x. Okay. 4x + 1, 4x + 2, and 4x + 3, because 4x + 4 is just going to be [the 
same as 4x].
52 Brad: Okay, and what’s x?
5 3 Wendy: x is going to be an integer.
54 Brad: Okay, now is x . ..? In these 4 cosets, is x a specific integer?
55 Wendy: No.
5 6 Brad: What do you mean?
5 7 Wendy: It can be any.... Like any integer you put in here will give you.... Any integer
you put in for x will give you 0 ... will give you 0 mod 4.
5 8  Brad: So like you could put in 2 for x.
5 9 Wendy: Yeah, you could put in anything for any of them, and this [4x] is going to equal
0. This [4x + 1] is going to equal 1, this [4x + 2] is going to equal 2, and this [4x + 1] is 
going to equal 3.
Like Carla, who had used 4n, Wendy was using 4x to denote both a particular multiple of 
4 and the set o f all of them. My language “a specific integer” did not help her make the 
distinction I was trying to make. O f course, x was not a specific integer. The question is
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whether she was imagining that it was a particular integer or the set o f all o f them. Yet, 
perhaps even this distinction would not have helped, for she was focusing on the images 
o f these integers in the codomain, Z4. And for that purpose, 4x + 1 was going to map to 1 
whether it was a particular value or any set o f values.
6  8  Brad: Okay. N ow .... But now you are talking about x as being ... you can put anything 
in there for x. Any integer, right? But now is the coset then any integer? Or is it all of 
them. Or is it one specific one? Or...? Do you understand what I am asking?
6  9 Wendy: No, not really. Is the coset one specific.... Like should we name this
something? [She writes A.]
71 Wendy: Yeah. If I call it N, it’s always, it’s going to be congruent to ... any integer N
that maps to the identity.
7 3 Wendy: So, it’s not going to be a specific, it’s going to be any multiple of 4.
7 5 Wendy: So it is not specific. You know what I mean? Like, we are going to call this
coset.... If we call this coset N, N  is infinite.
7 6  Brad: Oh. Is it a set then? Or is it a specific number?
7 7 Wendy: I f  s a set.
The letter N  denoted what she had previously called 4x and was “any integer that maps to 
the identity,” which was not specific but “any multiple of 4.” Simultaneously, N  was a 
set. Thus, Wendy was not distinguishing between any multiple of 4 and the set o f all of 
them.
When I mentioned again that the set was infinite, she said, “That is why I was calling it 
4x” (line 81). Because she could not list all the elements, I asked her to show the pattern 
o f N. She began with positive multiples o f 4 and then included 0. She included negative 
multiples of 4 only after I asked explicitly whether there would be any negatives in the 
set.
8  8  Brad: So then, when you write this thing 4x, you mean this set of all the things together,
taken as a whole. Or do you mean individual specific ...?
8  9 Wendy: Uh huh. Taken as a whole. Take as a whole.
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So just like N, 4x was simultaneously any multiple of 4 and the set of all of them. From 
the fact that Wendy used both N  and 4x, a glance at her work might have suggested that 
she was using the standard convention of using capital letters for sets and lowercase 
letters for individual elements. Wendy was making no such distinction, however. The 
two notations were identical in meaning.
I asked what could be done with the cosets. She reaffirmed that “N  = 4x, where x is all 
integers” (line 98) and renamed the other cosets to N +  l ,N + 2 ,  andN  + 3. She 
struggled for a moment over whether to add or multiply the cosets but then decided to 
add them because “integers are only a group under addition” (line 112). Then she tried to 
calculate N  + N  and N  + (N  + 1).
115 Wendy: All right. So, you are going to have, if  you have AN.... 4x plus, because N = 4x. 
It’s going to equal 8x. All right? And 8x is congruent to 4x, which is congruent to 0 mod 
4. So this is congruent to N.
116 Wendy: So N is . ... You can tell here that N is the identity element. So, you know that... 
[inaudible] when you add N plus, and N  + 1 you are going to get 2N  + 1 and that’s going 
to give you.... That’s the same thing, that is congruent to N  + 1. Now I have to figure 
out why. [Writes 2N  + 1 = N  + 1]
It seems that Wendy knew that N  + N  = N  and that N  + (N + l)  = N  + 1. Her reasoning 
was flawed, however, relying on algebraic procedures that work for symbols that stand 
for numbers but not symbols that stand for sets. Her symbol manipulation was guided 
more by her expectations about the results than about the meaning of the symbols.
I asked her what N  + N  meant.
120 Wendy: You are adding the same set together, so it is going to be the same set. You 
know like.... If you add two of the same sets together you are just going to get all 
elements ... the same elements in the set. Like if you add 1 ,2 ,3  ... the set o f {1, 2, 3} 
and the set of {1, 2, 3} you are still going to have the set {1, 2, 3}. Your elements aren’t 
going to change any?
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Wendy saw N  + N  as a sum of sets. When I asked her how to compute {1,2,3} + 
{1,2 ,3}, she did not remember at first how to do it but eventually decided that the sum 
would be {2, 3, 4, 5, 6 }. She was not happy with the result, however, because it did not 
fit her expectations.
134 Wendy: But if  you add any multiple o f 4 and any multiple o f 4, you’re going to get 
another multiple o f 4.
13 6  Wendy: So in this case it’s different. So I know that it looks like. I was like, oh well that
disproves what we are saying here, but it doesn’t because ...
137 Brad: So then is it right to say 4x + 4x = 8x? Is it right to even call it this thing 2N7
138 Wendy: Well, 4x.... You can say 4x + 4x. I don’t know about this [Crosses out 2N + 1 = 
N+ 1], But if you say 4x + 1 + 4x, you are going to get 8x + 1, which is going to be 
congruent to .... This is still a multiple o f 4, so it is still going to be equal to— congruent 
to; I don’t want to say equal to— a multiple o f 4, plus 1, which is what N+ 1 is.
Wendy clearly had some thinking that was not reflected in the symbols. Furthermore, she 
had not understood what I was implying by my question about whether 4x + 4x = 8 x was 
an appropriate calculation to verify that N  + N =  N. I suggested that 8 x looked more like 
multiples o f 8 , not multiples o f 4.
14 0 Wendy: That’s tme, it doesn’t include every multiple o f 4. But w e’re talking about mod
4. And if  you are talking about mod 4, we got this because it is 4x + 4x. All right? So if  
you have a multiple of 4 here and a multiple o f 4 here, and then you add one, it is still 
going to be.... If you add two multiples.... Like, if  you add.... 8 ’s a multiple o f 4, and 
8 ’s a multiple of 4, and that equals 16. 16 is still a multiple of 4.
141 Brad: Do the two multiples of 4 have to be the same in this way you are writing 4x + 4x?
142 Wendy: No. 8  + 12, okay? That equals 20 and that is still a multiple o f 4, so I don’t 
think so.
143 Brad: Okay, so .... But now does the way you have written it, 4x + 4x, does that handle 
both o f these cases? When they are the same and when they are different?
144 Wendy: Uh huh.
Thus, Wendy’s work with the symbols depended upon her thinking. Furthermore, she 
did not see a need to distinguish notationally between the two multiples o f 4. I pursued 
this directly in her notation.
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14 5 Brad: So by 4x you just mean ...
14 6  Wendy: A multiple o f 4.
14 7 Brad: A multiple of 4. And by this 4x you mean a multiple o f 4.
14 8  Wendy: 4y.
15 0 Wendy: This is going to be 4xy. So it’s still going to be a multiple o f 4 and then you add
1.
151 Brad: 4.xy do you mean? Or ...
152 Wendy: Plus y. So, all right. This explains it better. Do you see why this explains it
better?
It did not take much intervention to get W endy to distinguish between the two multiples 
o f  4, but even after she had made the distinction, her sym bolic m oves were problematic, 
suggesting that there were not yet strong connections between her thinking and the 
symbols. From this point on, however, her sym bolic reasoning improved dramatically:
154 Wendy: If you have a multiple of 4 and a multiple of, another multiple of 4, but where
they’re not the same multiple of 4, and then.... But this multiple.... This is.... Okay,
this is N. Like if this is your multiple of 4, you add a multiple of 4, which we are calling 
N, and you are adding it to N  + 1, you have another multiple of 4, + 1. Okay? But 
because it is not necessarily the same ... like this isn’t necessarily 8 , and this isn’t 
necessarily 9. They are not necessarily consecutive numbers. You have to have different 
values for x andy. Okay? So, we can, because they have a common factor, we can pull it 
out. [Writes 4(x + y) +1.]
15 6  Wendy: Okay, which is the same thing.... So this is still going to be 4 times.... This is
still going to be an integer. An integer plus an integer is going to be an integer. So I am 
going have to call x + y  = z so 4z + 1, so this is still going to be N  + 1. That’s how I can 
explain this.
W endy’s reasoning and sym bolic representation seemed sound at this point. I then 
attempted to learn how she had previously been thinking about the symbols.
15 8 Brad: Okay. But now here, when you are saying this 4x + 4y, are you imagining that this 
is one specific x, for now, and this is one specific y, for now?
161 Wendy: Yeah, but it would work for any x andy.
162 Brad: Okay. But are you imagining for a minute that they are fixed?
165 Wendy: It helps me think o f it better, but it doesn’t necessarily have to be. Because no
matter what x or y  you p u t... any integer you put in there, it will work. So, and these are 
all the integers, x and y  are all the integers for ... are just, are all integers. So in that case 
and since it works for all integers, you can look at it as the whole set. But yes, you were 
right, I was looking [inaudible].
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167 Wendy: ... But it doesn’t make a difference, because.... It did help me clarify at first, 
but because if  you show for a specific case it does work, and then if  you take a step back 
and say it does, it works for every case ... like x, no matter what value for integer x, or y, 
it will still work.
Thus, Wendy agreed that it helped to think o f x and y  as fixed, but any integer will work, 
“and since it works for all integers, you can look at it as the whole set” (line 165). Her 
thinking could move smoothly from a fixed value, to any value, to all values, and finally 
to the set of all values without ever a need for a clear distinction. Nonetheless, at this 
point, she had begun to articulate a distinction in her thinking: first showing that it works 
for a specific case and then stepping back to see that it works in general.
I asked her to reflect on possible differences in meaning between 4x and N, and she 
asserted that “this set and this set are going to be the same” (line 171).
173 Wendy: I was calling x and y  different, but they are not. Because x is going to be all 
integers. In this set, y  are all the integers. Like this is 4z, and this is 4z + 1. This is the 
set 4z + 1 ... all integers ...
174 Brad: By z there you mean ...
175 Wendy: All integers in z.
Thus, the distinction in Wendy’s thinking was not yet reflected in her interpretation of the 
notation. Wendy’s written work through this point included only a single lower case z, 
but her statement “All integers in z” seems to suggest that she was thinking about the set 
o f integers.
17 6  Brad: Oh, do you mean the big Z that means all integers?
17 7 Wendy: By calling it x, I think it is like making me think towards ... by sayingx ... like
we usually use that for a specific value. But.... So if you write Z ... if  you write 4Z + 4Z 
+ 1 ... 4Z is .... Go ahead. [She writes capital Zs.]
17 8  Brad: This Z ... is that the same as this z?
17 9 Wendy: Uh huh.
181 Wendy: The set Z.
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Thus, just as Wendy was not distinguishing between a single value o f x  and the set of all 
o f them, she had not been distinguishing between a single value o f z and the set o f all of 
them. After I asked whether she meant the set o f integers, however, she changed her 
notation from what appears to be a lowercase to the capital that is typically used to denote 
the set of integers (i.e., Z).
183 Wendy: All right, so if  we think of that away from x, a specific case.... I think we, when
we have x, I tend to think of i t ... and I think that is what you are trying to get to up there
185 W endy:... So if  we call it 4Z + 4 Z + 1, 4Z + 4 Z  is going to still equal 4Z, + 1. S eel
think that makes it more clear.
18 6  Brad: Although, now how do you explain to someone why 4Z + 4Z is just 4Z?
187 Wendy: Because it’s . ... Because o f the fact that it’s infinite, you’re taking every ele-,
every multiple o f 4 .... Well, you can look at that specific example. If you take an x in, 
and ay, a 4x from 4Zand you add it to 4y + 1, w e llx andy weren’t equal. 4 .... You can 
show what I was showing up there that x and y, because they are integers, because you 
took them from the set o f integers, x andy will be an integer, so 4 .... This is still going to 
be an integer.
It seems Wendy was still somewhat uncomfortable about x  being a particular value.
When I asked her to explain the sum 4Z + 4Z, she started talking about the whole set but 
then resorted to using x andy to illustrate a particular case. I asked whether she was 
beginning to see a distinction between 4x and 4Z.
190 Wendy: Uh huh. Yeah. I am a lot more so than I was when I was up here.
191 Brad: Is that helpful to make that distinction?
192 Wendy: Yeah. I don’t like calling it x now because it does, here looks like a more 
specific value, except it is not. But I think in a sense I was thinking o f it, even though I 
didn’t think I was.
193 Brad: You were thinking o f it in which way before?
194 Wendy: As a more specific value. Although I knew that I should keep in mind that it was 
a set, but I think I was still thinking of it too specifically. I think I was right to show ... 
to explain it using a specific example, but I think it was important to go back, to begin 
and to end, showing that it was the whole set.
195 Brad: So before when you were talking about this 4x + 1, were you trying to imagine both 
ways at the same time?
19 6  Wendy: Yes. I was definitely trying to .... I definitely knew that it works for all values of
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x andy, but I wasn’t really thinking o f it as a whole, as like a Z, like integers.
Wendy was seeing a conflict in her earlier work: thinking of x  as a specific value while 
also keeping in mind that it was the whole set. She stated that she had been thinking “too 
specifically” and had not really been thinking of x  as the “whole set.” Her language 
again suggests an intermediate position between a particular element and the set o f all of 
them, because “it works for all values of x  andy.”
She began to focus on the notation:
198 Wendy: For some reason just visually, if you look at this 4x + 2 [points on paper] and 4Z 
+ 2, visually, if  you look at the two, it’s easier to see one being a set and.... It’s easier to 
see 4Z + 2 being a set over 4x + 2.
2 00 Wendy: 4x + 2 looks more like a value than it does a set.
2 02 Wendy: But I think it is clearer to write, you know, like Z as, like an upper case Z, like 
writing the notation as a set for the integers. So 4Z + 2 is going to equal, obviously be a 
set, and it is not going to be a value.
2 03 Brad: So it is useful, then, you think now, to distinguish between those things that are sets 
and those things which are sort o f generic values.
2 04 Wendy: Like I use N, an uppercase N here. I think it makes more sense to use like the....
I think.... Do we use uppercase values for sets, rather than lower case?
So by the end of the interview, Wendy saw that the standard convention of using 
uppercase letters for sets could be useful in making a conceptual distinction. It seems she 
had much earlier developed a sense that uppercase letters were usually sets, though 
perhaps she had never before been in a situation where she felt a need to make a clear 
distinction between a set and an element.
Wendy seems to have learned to distinguish between a set and an element. Because this 
interview took place after the final exam, I can make no claims about the stability or 
durability o f this learning. Instead, I would like to point out what seems to have been 
required. First, Wendy did not make any distinction between a particular value and the
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set o f all values until she saw that her equation 4x + 4x = 8 x did not support the idea that 
the sum of any two multiples o f four would be a multiple of four. Yet even after she 
began to make the distinction verbally, she still did not make it notationally. And even 
after she made the distinction notationally, she had to revisit her intermediate conceptual 
position o f something that “works for all values o f x.” Then, by reflecting on the 
notation, she was able to see how the notational distinction could support her emerging 
conceptual distinction. Furthermore, it seems that I provided cognitive support by asking 
Wendy whether she was imagining x  as fixed, suggesting that this metaphor was not 
available to Wendy at the beginning o f the interview.
Robert and What Varies
O f the key participants, Robert had the most trouble negotiating the processes involved in 
computing the collection o f cosets and, in particular, in keeping track of what kinds of 
entities he was dealing with and where they were situated. During his third interview, he 
was working with the same homomorphism as Carla above and had just determined its 
kernel. I asked him to find the cosets o f the kernel.
14 0 Robert: Oh boy. Cosets ... equals the set of all ahs such that h is in H. [Writes ah = {ah \ 
h e H}.]
141 Brad: And what’s H  here?
142 Robert: Yeah, that’s what I was wondering. Good question. I am not so good with these 
cosets yet.
143 Brad: Well, is the kernel a subgroup here?
144 Robert: Yeah, it’s a subgroup o f U%.
14 6  Robert: Isn’t that one o f the things we proved on the take-home exam? That i f / i s  a 
group homomorphism then the kernel o f / i s  a subgroup o f G .
14 7 Brad: Okay. So what would be the cosets o f the kernel?
14 8  Robert: See, I am not really sure, like you say, what this H  is. These are.... Okay. H
would be 1 and 3 because those are the things that are in the kernel. So it would be the 
set {1 ,3}, and each little h would be 1, 3. So then the question is the a. Which side of
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the equation does this come from?
14 9 Brad: What do you mean “which side?”
150 Robert: Where do these as live? Do they live in U% or do they live in Z4?
Robert quickly set down a symbolic definition of coset but did not know what to do with 
it because he was uncertain as to what H  and a represented in the problem at hand. This 
first uncertainty was quickly resolved, but determining what a was proved to be more 
problematic. The homomorphism made Robert uncertain about whether a was in the 
domain or the codomain. Furthermore, his uncertainty was deeper than where a was 
located; it also involved what kind of entity a was.
153 Robert: Well, essentially what I would do is I would add 1 to all of the elements in a. I 
want to think that like a is like the generator of Z4 or something.
154 Brad: What do you mean?
155 Robert: I don’t know exactly. Could a just be all of Z4? If a was all o f Z4.
156 Brad: What do you mean by “all of Z4?”
157 Robert: 0, 1, 2, or 3. The set.
166 Brad: And is a this whole set, or just one of them at a time?
167 Robert: Well it’s just one o f them at a time but.... Oh, no, no, it’s not. It’s the whole set. 
I think it’s the whole set.
In the first sentence above, Robert talked about “all the elements in a,” suggesting that a 
was a set, but in the second sentence, a denoted a “generator” o f Z4. The latter statement 
suggests that Robert may have been considering some intermediate role for a, where it 
was neither an individual element nor the whole set. But while he considered whether a 
could be all o f Z4,1 may have pushed him toward the set interpretation by my question, 
“Is a this whole set, or just one o f them at a time?” which implicitly excluded an 
intermediate role.
I then tried to encourage him to take advantage of the common notational distinction 
between a set and its elements, using an uppercase letter for the former and the
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corresponding lowercase letter for the latter. I pointed out that he was not being 
consistent:
168 Brad: Here you have distinguished between big H, which is the set {1, 3}, and little h, 
which equals 1 ,1 guess, or 3.
169 Robert: Uh huh. But there is no big A down here. So, a is the whole set. So I would 
have two cosets.
17 0 Brad: Now, here you have written a little h.
171 Robert: Yeah, should this be a capital H  up here? [Fixes previously written equation to
readaH = {ah \ h e H}.]
172 Brad: I am asking you the question.
173 Robert; I am sure that’s the way that they define it. Okay. So that would make sense.
So, I would have two o f them. This one would be 1, 0, 3 ...
Thus, on the one hand, Robert adopted a notational distinction between uppercase and 
lowercase letters, but on the other hand, he continued to see a as the whole set.
175 Robert: I did it wrong anyway. I am adding the 1 to each element. One of the little hs 
from / / t o  each element in this set. And I get 1, 2, 3, 0. Same set. Not really anything 
different. And h, if  I am doing the addition mod 4.... I get the same thing. [He writes 
a = {0, 1, 2, 3}, ahx = {1 ,2 , 3, 0}, ah2 = {3, 0, 1, 2}.]
In making these computations, Robert took h\ = 1 and hi = ?>. He was concerned that the 
two calculations resulted in the same set, but I chose to focus on the fact that he was 
adding elements from different groups:
17 8  Brad: Okay, let me ask you.... We are looking at these things that you have written ah, 
right? Where do the things a live?
17 9 Robert: I believe they live in Z4, but I am not sure. That’s one thing I’m really not sure
about.
18 0  Brad: And where do the things h live?
181 Robert: h live in Us- The h live in t/8?
182 Brad: Is that a problem? You are talking about multiplying a thing in Z4 by a thing in Us, 
or operating on, somehow.
184 Robert: Yeah that’s a problem, isn’t it? Well, so maybe a lives in Us too. I mean, this is,
H  is the kernel o f Us, which is 1 and 3. I am pretty sure o f that. So a could be the things
living in U s, and if  they were, then we would be multiplying 1 times the set o f {1,3,
5, 7}. And 3 times {1, 3, 5, 7}.
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So Robert decided that the calculations should take place in Us, but a  remained a set in 
his thinking. Both o f these calculations again resulted in the same set, this time U%. I 
asked him to explain the notation a H  = {ah \ h e  H }.
194 Robert: Well, they are saying that ... this is like the name of the set. And this tells you
what all the sets ... the set is composed of, ahs such that h is in H. So for all of the as, 
you operate them with every h in H, and you form a set.
197 Brad: Now is that what you have done?
198 Robert: Well, my big question, I guess, is what is a? Yeah, I believe that’s what I have 
done. 1,3. Yeah here’s the hs: 1 and 3 were the only two hs we had. And I guess is a.... 
I don’t know why I think that a is a set.
205 Brad: So would you write then aH, a big H, is equal to well ... [inaudible] how you write 
it.
2 0 6  Robert: [Laughs.] a big H is equal to.... This is what, I mean, without doing the
calculations, that’s what it kind of looks like. But it doesn’t seem to make sense to have 
all of these brackets. [Writes aH= { 1(1, 3, 5, 7}, 3 {1, 3, 5, 7} }.]
2 07 Brad: Okay. But in a sense it looks like aH is a set containing two sets.
20 8  Robert: Yes. Even though they are the same set.
There are two points to make here. First, if  a = {1, 3, 5, 7}, then Robert’s calculation was 
correct, as was his notation for it. Second, although he could write appropriate set 
notation, he did not like “all of these brackets,” suggesting that the set notation did not 
support his thinking. At this point, I asked Robert to consider that a  was not the set {1, 3, 
5, 7} but instead just one of its elements.
210 Robert: So you are saying that a would be each individual element. Then we’d have ah\,
ah, ... a\h\, a2h2... hu a^h\, aAh\, aH. You could pick 1. 1x1 = 1 . 3x1  = 3. This is
kind of a trivial one.
211 Brad: This is for h ...
212 Robert: Equaling 1, h\ = 1.... This would be 7.
213 Brad: So how would you write it now...? Okay, so that’s for a, little hu what would a 
big H  look like? How did you do that?
214 Robert: It would just be the set of all of those numbers. [Writes aH = {1, 3, 5, 7}.] 
Despite my suggestion that a  be one o f the elements rather than the set, Robert still let a  
vary through all o f Us and fixed h to be one element in H. This is similar, perhaps, to the
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idea he was considering at the beginning o f this episode when he suggested that a might 
be a generator o f Z4 . Both o f these ideas— letting a vary through all its possible values 
and letting it be a “generator”— are, in a sense, intermediate between considering a fixed 
value and considering the set of all possible values, yet there is no conventional notation 
for this idea. Furthermore, because Robert’s calculations explicitly included only one of 
the elements in H, it is not clear to what extent he was distinguishing between H and h\.
At this point in the interview, I took a different tack, bringing in an idea that was more 
familiar:
2 2  4 Brad: What would 3H  be?
225 Robert: 3/7would be ... 3^? Or 3A2?
2 2  6  Brad: 3 big H.
227 Robert: 3 big//would be 3, 1. [Writes 3/7 = {3, 1}]
22 8  Brad: Now how did you do that?
22 9 Robert: Well, H  consists of hi and /i2 , which are 1 and 3, respectively, and I operated 3
with each one of those things, and I made a set. 3 x 1 is 3 and 3 x 3 is 9, which is 1 mod 
8 .
230 Brad: What would 5H  be?
231 Robert: 5 / /would be 5 , 5  x 1 , and 15 which is 7, 5H, 5 and 7. [Writes 5/7 = {5, 7}]
232 Brad: Okay. Now, what you are saying to me then is that this 3 is fixed, but you are 
letting H  do what?
233 Robert: Go through its possibilities.
Robert was able to do these more familiar calculations with ease, suggesting that his 
difficulties were largely notational and arising out of the fact that in aH  there are two 
things that can vary. The notation aH  represents a particular but unspecified calculation 
o f which 3H  is a specific example. Clearly, Robert had not made this connection. But 
after I provided supporting language about what was fixed and what was varying in 3H, 
he was able to describe his previous calculations as fixing h\ and letting the as vary.
Then I took advantage of this distinction:
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2 4 3 Brad: So I guess there is a choice here, that you can either fix the h\ and let the as vary, or 
you can fix the as and let the hs vary.
2 4 4 Robert: Okay, I see what you are saying now. And if  you were to ... if  you let the as
vary and fixed the hs you just end up with the same set you had, so that seems, like, 
inconsequential.
245  Brad: What if  you do it the other way?
24 6  Robert: Then you get a bunch o f different sets. 4 sets, I don’t know what that would be
... 3 would be 1H, 3H  we have there; 5H; 1H  is the only one we don’t have. 3 and 5, so I 
put the 5H, and so we get 1, 2, 3, 4 different sets this way, but really only two different 
sets.
2 4 7 Brad: What do you mean?
2 4 8 Robert: Well, these two sets are the same, and so are these two sets. [Draws a line from
3H =  {3, 1} to IH =  {1, 3} and a line from 5H =  {5, 7} to 1H =  {7, 5}.]
With my distinction between fixing either the a or the h, Robert was able not only to 
characterize what he had been doing but also to envision an alternative. At this point he 
had completed the calculations and had noticed that the four calculations yielded two 
cosets. To see whether Robert could see the appropriate procedure in the notation, I 
asked him to reflect on the notation:
2 54 Brad: Built into this notation, aH  is equal to the set ah such that h is in H . ... Which do
you think is implied by this notation? I said, we can fix the as and let the hs vary, or fix 
the hs and let the as vary, right?
255  Robert: It seems to be let the hs vary. I don’t know. That notation, a times h such that h
is in H. It seems as though you have to let the hs vary. But if  a was an individual 
element in the original group, then you let both of them vary, essentially. See, but there’s 
nothing there that tells you to let a vary, but there is certainly something to tell you to let 
h vary.
25 6  Brad: And yet when you first did this, which one where you letting vary?
2 57 Robert: I let the hs vary. Over here. But I considered a to be the whole set.
258 Brad: As opposed to ...
25 9 Robert: The big question for me now is, Is a the whole set, or is it the individual element 
in the set? Which, if a was the individual element in the set, it would mean that a was 
varying too. But you take each a and operate it with the varying hs versus taking the 
whole set of a and operating it with the varying hs.
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Thus, despite having completed the correct calculations and being more satisfied with the 
result of two cosets than he had been previously with the calculations that yielded {1,3,
5, 7} twice, Robert was still unsure about the interpretation o f a in the definition o f coset.
This episode demonstrates that notational distinctions do not necessarily create 
conceptual distinctions. From a mathematical point of view, the appropriate procedure 
for computing cosets follows directly from the symbolic definition. Yet the symbolism 
did not support Robert’s reasoning and seems to have been the cause o f some o f his 
confusion. Nonetheless, in the interviews and on the final exam, Robert had no further 
procedural difficulties computing cosets, suggesting that some learning had occurred 
during this episode. It is unclear, however, to what extent he had connected his 
procedure with the notation.
In computing the set o f all cosets of a subgroup, there are processes and objects at two 
levels, as described above. At the lower level, h varies, creating a particular aH, which is 
an object. At the higher level, a varies, creating the set o f all cosets aH, another object. 
Robert did not see aH  as being a description of 3/7 but instead focused on the fact that a 
was supposed to vary, thus merging or perhaps inverting the two levels. Robert did not 
make a clear conceptual distinction between what was fixed and what was varying. 
Neither did he make a notational distinction between uppercase and lowercase letters. 
Furthermore, from Robert’s first response above (line 255), it seems that he had 
previously reflected little on the notation. Thus, it may be that Robert did not distinguish 
aH  from ah or even AH, which would partially explain his merging o f the two levels.
In order to encourage Robert to make the appropriate distinctions, I emphasized 
conceptual distinctions between sets and elements and between what was fixed and what
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was varying, and I emphasized notational distinctions between uppercase and lowercase 
letters. It appears, once again, that both conceptual and notational distinctions need to be 
emphasized.
Carla and aK= bK
After Carla had completed the core tasks of the third interview, I chose to investigate her 
understanding of some o f the results for which she had given correct proofs on the second 
midterm exam (see Appendix B). Because all of the other key participants took 
considerably longer than Carla to complete the other interview tasks, comparative data 
are not available. Here I provide a few observations that shed light on Carla’s concept 
image of coset and her use o f symbols.
Problem 5 on the midterm began “Let i f  be the kernel o f the group homomorphism 
f :  G G '  and suppose a and b are elements of G.” The students were asked to prove 
several results, culminating with “/(a) -  fib )  if  and only if  a K -  bK.” In other words, a 
and b have the same image under the homomorphism precisely when they lie in the same 
coset of its kernel. I began quite generally:
133 Brad: What if, in this example here, we know that aK = bK. What can you conclude?
134 Carla: If aK  = bK, we know fia) =fib).
135 Brad: Okay. Now why do you know that?
13 6  Carla: ‘Cause we did it on the take-home. The definition of aK  is that aK, uppercase K, is 
the same as the set o f a lowercase ks such that/ . . . .  Actually we wrote this two different 
ways. It’s .... Okay, one way to write it is ak such that k is a member o f K, which is 
actually the kernel. But another way we wrote it was that it is all xs in G such that fix) = 
fia). So if we write bK  as that.... If we write the definition of bK, we have bk such that k 
is a member o f K. W e’d also have x is a member o f G such that fix) =fib). If we said 
that aK = bK, then for the two sets to be equal, fia)  has to equalX^) because they both 
equal fix).
Carla was almost correct. She first stated the major result from the exam and then 
presented, as definitions, two descriptions of aK, though she expressed concern a few
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moments later that something might be missing from one o f these definitions. The first 
definition, aK= {ak \ k  e  K}, is correct and complete, essentially independent o f where a 
and K  come from, requiring only that K  be a set and that the product ak be defined for 
each k e K. The second characterization, aK=  {x e  G |/(x) = /(a)} , on the other hand, 
was not a definition but an intermediate result from the exam. Furthermore, her 
explanation that “J(a) has to equal j{b) because they both equal/(x)” ignored the fact that 
in the second description o f aK, and likewise for bK, the variable x was not a particular 
value but rather was to vary through all possible values for the purpose o f finding those 
that satisfied/(x) =J{a).
In order to get a sense o f the meaning Carla was associating with the symbols, I asked her 
how she would write an element in aK.
142 Carla: Well it depends on what we are dealing with. Are we dealing with permutations or 
sets or what? Or just integers, or ...?
Carla had freed herself from the example we had been working with, which implies that 
her earlier statement that fia ) =f{b) required some specifications about f  a, b, and K. But 
she wanted to attach her thinking to something.
143 Brad: Well, let’s say we want to try think of it sort of in the abstract, independent o f any 
particular representation. Okay? And let’s say we have some element of aK.
14 4 Carla: All right. If it’s an element of aK, it’s also.... Well you know that k is in the 
group, because it’s in the kernel. So if  it’s in the kernel it has to be in the group. You 
know that a is in the group because when we do left cosets we take elements from the 
group, and since the group is closed ak is going to represent an element of the group.
14 6  Carla: I don’t know if that is answering your question.
So Carla took k  to be in the kernel, just as she had assum ed/to be a homomorphism, 
suggesting that notational conventions supported her thinking in implicit ways that might 
have been hard for her to articulate.
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From this point on, the interview gradually took on a noticeably different character, 
becoming more directive and less exploratory. More o f my questions required short, 
symbolic answers. During this time, Carla provided shorter answers and focused mostly 
on manipulating the symbols, similar to the work that she had done on the midterm exam. 
For example, she wrote both z = ak and z = bk (lines 148-150), not realizing that the ks 
might need to be different. At another point, she attempted to divide (line 179) rather 
than to multiply by an inverse. Her most surprising statement came after I asked her to 
verify some of her symbolic results for the particular case o f the homomorphism and 
cosets from earlier in the interview. In response to some difficulty with the symbols, she 
said:
2 0  9 Carla: See, I don’t like this business o f multiplying integers times sets. I don’t think that 
is very good.
210  Brad: Why?
211  Carla: Just ‘cause you don’t you usually do it. You usually do sets times sets.
Clearly at this point in the interview, Carla did not recognize that her earlier calculations 
o f cosets were elements times sets (see Figure 16). All o f these surprising statements, 
coupled with the fact that Carla did not use the word coset again in the interview (lines 
147-246), suggest that she had was not conscious o f the fact that aK  and bK  were 
intended to represent cosets like those she had computed earlier in the interview. 
Furthermore, she was making no substantive connection between the first and the second 
half o f the interview or, equivalently, between her example-driven procedures for 
generating cosets and her symbolic calculations related to the proofs on the midterm 
exam. One possible explanation is a profound compartmentalization between two 
activities involving the symbol aK. On the one hand, there were activities where aK  
specified the process for generating cosets, and on the other hand, there were proof
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activities that involved manipulating symbols such as aK  according to certain rules. A 
less extreme explanation is that she would not have characterized one o f the coset 
calculations in Figure 16 as an element times a set because she did all such calculations, 
which might be described as a set times a set. As for her discomfort with multiplying an 
element times a set, she softened her position the next day: “I don’t know why I said that, 
because I was thinking about it later, and 4Z is an element times a set” (Field notes, May 
3, 1996).
This episode further supports the position that that, for Carla, aK  denoted a process if  it 
denoted anything. Despite the fact that the process yielded cosets and a set of cosets that 
Carla considered to be objects, the notation aK  did not denote such objects but was 
somehow separate from them. This result suggests that at least two encapsulations are 
required in learning about cosets: one for specific groups and another for reasoning about 
cosets generically.
Summary
The common theme in the above episodes is that o f insufficient connections between 
notation and thinking. The notations 4x, aH, and aK  did not always support a student’s 
thinking even when that thinking was sound. Although Carla, Wendy, and Robert 
demonstrated different degrees o f success with the tasks involving cosets and very 
different understandings, they were similarly imprecise in their use of the notation. Carla 
and Wendy, on the one hand, were clear on the concepts and the processes, yet the 
notation was not strongly connected to their thinking. Robert, on the other hand, was 
unclear on the concepts and processes and was not able to read the intended processes 
from the notation aH.
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These episodes suggest an explanation for the problem o f distinguishing between a set 
and an element. What seems to be missing in all o f these episodes is the ability to think 
about generic objects. Reasoning with the notations as 4x and aK  as generic 
representatives o f a class o f objects seems to require imagining, metaphorically, thatx, a, 
and K  are fixed. Then a kind of encapsulation is required to see 4x and aK  as denoting 
particular but unspecified objects— a multiple of 4 and a coset. I say a different kind of 
encapsulation because there is every indication that the students could conceive of 
multiples o f 4 and cosets as objects, suggesting that something like encapsulation had 
already occurred.
These episodes also suggest the hypothesis that proper usage o f notational distinctions 
requires first the creation o f a need for a conceptual distinction. The conceptual 
distinctions and notational distinctions are not automatic, but rather each requires 
learning. They are neither simultaneous nor consecutive but rather dialectic.
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that the metaphors “suppose x is fixed” and 
“now let x vary” can provide cognitive support for learning to make such distinctions.
Quotient Groups
As mentioned above, the set o f cosets of a subgroup can reveal structural information 
about how the subgroup fits within the structure of the group as a whole. Thus, given a 
collection of cosets, a guiding question is whether those cosets can form a group— a 
quotient group. This section characterizes the students’ concept images of quotient 
groups. It begins with a conceptual analysis that details the relationships among the 
concepts of subgroup, coset, homomorphism, normality, and quotient group, describing
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important aspects o f the students’ curricular experiences regarding these concepts. The 
majority of the section consists of a detailed analysis of Carla’s concept of quotient 
group, based largely on interviews in which she again demonstrated unusual language 
alongside well-established concepts and procedures. The analysis is then broadened to 
include other students.
Conceptual Analysis
A quotient group or a factor group is a group whose elements are cosets and whose 
operation is given by extending a group’s operation to its cosets. Assuming the group’s 
operation is called multiplication, the product of two cosets involves multiplying, in the 
appropriate order, all possible pairs of elements, one from each coset. Not all cosets can 
form a group in this way, but when the left cosets of a subgroup are the same as its right 
cosets, the subgroup is said to be normal, and the cosets will form a group under the set 
operation described.
For example, the set of left cosets o f {1,3} in C/g is {{1, 3}, {5, 7}} (see Figure 16). 
Because multiplication in Us is commutative, the set o f right cosets is the same, and thus 
{1, 3} is a normal subgroup. The product o f {1, 3} and {5, 7} is computed as follows:
{1, 3} x { 5 ,  7} =  {1x5,  1x7, 3x5,  3x7}  =  {5, 7, 7, 5} =  {5, 7},  
where the products inside the braces are taken to occur in Us. All the products of pairs of 
cosets may be organized in an operation table (see Figure 15), where it is possible to see 
that the cosets form a group with two elements.
Figure 18. An operation table for {{1, 3}, {5, 7}} from Us
X { 1 , 3 } {5 , 7}
{ 1 , 3 } { 1 , 3 } {5 , 7}
{ 5 , 7 } { 5 , 7 } {1 ,3 }
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To analyze the interviews involving quotient groups, it will help to step back from 
particular objects and processes and consider them more generally. Most of the 
interviews may be described as instantiations o f the general coset activity represented in 
Figure 19. How does one make sense o f such an activity? What does one take from it? 
Figure 19 serves not only as a representation o f an activity but also as an analytical tool 
constructed to investigate these questions. It supports semiotic analysis by distinguishing 
the processes from the names and the symbols from the objects in order to discern 
meaning. Thus, making productive sense o f a coset activity requires distinguishing 
among the various components in Figure 19 and then assigning names appropriately.
The standard description o f Figure 19 is as follows: Given a group G and a subgroup H, 
the left cosets o f H  are calculated and collected. The cosets are then considered elements 
in a new structure, a set of cosets. Coset products are computed, and results may be 
organized in an operation table. Carrying out theses two processes requires some 
conceptual flexibility: first conceiving of a set or an element as fixed and letting other 
sets or elements vary, and then letting the fixed set or element vary to carry out the higher 
processes. Managing such a process, after all, was precisely the problem Robert had in 
computing cosets, as described in the subsection entitled “Robert and What Varies.”
If  the set o f (left) cosets constitutes a group under this operation o f coset multiplication, 
then the set o f cosets is called a quotient group. The construction depends upon both the 
group and the subgroup. Thus, the resulting group is called the quotient of / / i n  G, 
denoted G/H  and read “G modulo H.”
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O f course, the set o f (left) cosets does not always constitute a group, and the arrow is 
dotted in Figure 19 to indicate this potentiality. It turns out that the key issue is one of 
closure: whether the product o f two cosets is again a coset. When this criterion is 
satisfied, all the other axioms follow: In G/H, the identity element is the coset H; the 
inverse of the coset aH  is the coset aAH\ and associativity follows from the associativity 
o f the operation in G. It turns out that equality of left and right cosets is both a necessary 
and sufficient condition to guarantee that the product of two cosets will be a coset. In 
other words, the cosets o f a subgroup form a group precisely when the subgroup is 
normal.
Independent o f whether the subgroup is normal, and thus even when set of cosets does 
not form a group, structural information is provided via Lagrange’s theorem, which says, 
once again, that the order o f a subgroup must divide the order of the group. An 
immediate corollary is that the number of cosets is the missing divisor. In other words, if
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H  is a subgroup of G, then \H\ divides |G|, and the number o f cosets o f H  is given by 
\G\/\H\. There is an obvious symbolic similarity with the notation for the quotient group, 
G/H. The similarity is significant, in that the elements o f G/H  are precisely the cosets, 
which implies that \G/H\ = \G\/\H\.
This equation provides obvious potential for confusion. On the right side, the slash 
denotes a quotient of natural numbers, whereas on the left, the slash denotes a quotient 
group. Furthermore, this equation is true in the completely different but familiar context 
o f high school algebra. If  G and H  are real numbers with H ^  0, then the equation is an 
identity for the absolute value function, whose notation is that same as that for the order 
o f a group. This analogy may reinforce students’ common but mistaken impression that 
G/H  is division.
At about the time of the third and fourth interviews, the students had been investigating 
cosets of subgroups and cosets o f kernels o f homomorphisms. The guiding question, 
which built upon the students’ early work with set arithmetic was, “Is it possible to create 
a group with these cosets.” The students also explored cosets more generally, proving, 
for example, that the cosets partition a finite group into equal-sized pieces (see “Problems 
to work on the week of April 22,” Appendix B).
The students also had been investigating relationships between a group and its image 
under a homomorphism. Given a group homomorphism f .  G —> G', the students 
investigated f~ l of elements in the range o f the homomorphism, which turn out to be 
cosets of its kernel. This fact follows from the proof on the second midterm exam that 
j[a) =J(b) if  and only if  aK  = bK, where K  is the kernel o f the homomorphism. The
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students considered the operation table of the range of/  and the operation table for /  1 of 
each element in the range (see “Notes on cosets, April 29,” Appendix A). It turns out the 
two groups are isomorphic. This is the essence of the first isomorphism theorem, which 
says that the structure o f the image o f a homomorphism is identical to the structure of the 
cosets of its kernel.
Preceding all o f the fourth interviews and some o f the third interviews, Dr. Benson had 
introduced Lagrange’s theorem and the term quotient group to give standard names to 
ideas that had emerged from the students’ work on these kinds of tasks.
Carla and the Normal Group
During Carla’s third interview, she computed the cosets {1, 3} and {5, 7} in Us. I asked 
her whether she could use these cosets to form a group.
85 Carla: Well, let’s see.... We will create a table with {1,3} and {5, 7}, of course, on the 
top and on the right. Actually, we talked about this in class. If we know that the right 
coset is equivalent to the left coset, then it does create a group. I think it’s called a 
normal group, and these w ill.... I think we will have a group because I think that the 
right coset equals the left coset, because it really doesn’t matter if you multiply on the 
right or on the left.
Citing results from class, Carla was convinced that the set would be a group because, as 
she correctly observed, the left and right cosets were the same. She was essentially 
correct, except for her use o f the words coset and normal. I have already discussed her 
use o f the word coset to denote a set o f cosets. As for her use o f the word normal, it 
seems she had lost track o f the subgroup that gave rise to the cosets and was applying the 
word to the quotient group rather than to the subgroup. Furthermore, her left coset and 
normal group both named the same set o f cosets, suggesting that the set o f cosets was a 
very salient object for her.
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Carla completed the coset products easily and quickly, taking advantage of the 
commutativity o f the underlying group and organizing them in a table (see Figure 15). 
From the table, she noticed almost immediately that the group was isomorphic to the 
group on the set {e, a), where e is the identity. Later she saw that it was also isomorphic 
to the range of the homomorphism, which was the subgroup {0, 2} in Z4, as detailed in 
chapter 5.
Carla had participated in an activity depicted structurally in Figure 19 and had created 
written records similar to Figure 15 and Figure 16. She admirably negotiated the various 
kinds of processes involved in the activity and seems to have had a good sense about the 
kinds of entities (e.g., sets or elements) she was dealing with. On the other hand, Carla 
seems to have attached the names coset and normal to the objects and processes in 
nonstandard ways. This hypothesis is further explored in a detailed analysis o f her fourth 
interview.
Cosets in Zi?. Carla’s fourth interview concentrated on examples and nonexamples of 
quotient groups, which required computing cosets and paying attention to whether the left 
and right cosets were equal. When I mentioned to her, as a preface to the interview, that 
we would be discussing quotient groups, she showed discomfort:
6  Carla: I have got to figure out what they are. Quotient group.... This is one o f the things I 
haven’t.... I’ve needed to study it, but I haven’t done it yet. [Okay] What is the other 
name for a quotient group, that we gave? It wasn’t a normal group right, that’s different.
Thus, although Carla had computed a quotient group in the previous interview, she had 
not yet attached the name to the idea. I suggested we start with an example and return to 
the term later.
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To get started, I asked Carla to find the subgroup generated by 3 in the group Z\2. She 
was momentarily confused about the operation in Z \ 2 but quickly resolved that issue and 
soon determined that the subgroup generated by 3 was {0, 3, 6 , 9}. I asked her to find the 
cosets of that subgroup.
22 Carla: Okay. First we will do left cosets. Probably the left coset and the right coset will 
be the same, but w e’ll start with the left coset. So, do you want me just to use the kernel 
as the ...
2  3 Brad: Do it whatever way you think is best.
2  4 Carla: Well, I’ll start with the kernel at least because I am most comfortable with that.
The kernel is 0 because 0 goes to 0. 0 is the identity.
25 Brad: You said 0 goes to 0. What does 1 go to?
2  6  Carla: No. 1 is not in there.
27 Brad: Oh. Okay. So what does 3 go to?
2  8 Carla: I don’t think.... We haven’t really.... Well, we know 0 goes to 0 because the
identity always goes to the identity in two groups. But we haven’t really defined what the 
others [inaudible]. The other, you know, function that we are dealing with [inaudible], I 
am doing it with 0 and that’s i t ... because I know I can do it with the kernel because the 
kernel is .... Oh, wait a sec-. We do cosets.... We have to have a subgroup. And we 
have to perform an operation of the members in ZX1 on the left, for the left coset. So you 
have members o f Z\2 * with the subgroup. And I already know what the subgroup is, so 
it’s 0, 3, 6 , 9. Took me a while, b u t...
Carla momentarily thought that she needed a kernel to talk about cosets but then reasoned 
that only a subgroup was necessary. It seems from line 22 that she was still using the 
term “left coset” for the set o f cosets, just as she had in the third interview.
Carla called the subgroup S  and listed the elements o f Z\2. In describing how she knew 
the operation was addition mod 12, she talked at first about a group G', suggesting she 
had not completely abandoned the idea that there was a homomorphism involved. Then 
she went on.
3 5 Carla: Let’s just keep it simple and call S is a subgroup o f G. So S is 0, 3, 6 , 9, as I said
before. And G is Z\2. And I am going to tell the truth here: The reason I chose addition 
mod 12 is because that’s the only real operation we have right here. [Laughs.]
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Carla began the coset calculations without hesitation. Her language evolved in the course 
of doing the calculations, becoming abbreviated: “If  you are doing the operation of 0 on 
0, 3, 6 , 9 . . .” (line 37), “If  you do 1 star (which is adding mod 12) with 0, 3, 6 , 9 ... 2 
with 5” (line 41). Soon she stopped doing the calculations directly and instead reasoned 
about the results, based on a pattern.
4 3 Carla: So we can see that there is a pattern here. 0 and 3 have the same left coset. And so 
6  will and 9 will, because they are all multiples of three, because I  can see a pattern of 3 
here. So 1, the left coset, containing 1 is 1, 4, 7, 10. And that is the same as the left coset 
containing 4. So 1, 4, 7, and 10 are going to have the same left coset. So then it will be 2, 
5,8 , and 11 that will have the same left coset.
The results o f her calculations are shown in Figure 20. At first she had not recorded an 
operation in some places, such as between 2 and S, but when I asked her about the 
notation, she inserted an asterisk (*) and said that it was addition mod 1 2 .
Figure 20. Carla’s cosets calculations for {0,3, 6, 9}
5=  {0, 3, 6,9}
It co set
0*{0, 3, 6, 9} = {0, 3, 6, 9}
1*{0, 3, 6, 9} = {1,4,7,10}
2*5 2, 5, 8, 11
3*5 0, 3, 6, 9
4*5 1, 4, 7, 10
Carla went on to compute right cosets. She first listed the calculations she intended to
make, and then stopped after computing 5*0.
5 5 Carla: And right away I  see that the right coset is going to the same thing as the left coset
because we are adding mod 12 and it’s commutative. So it doesn’t matter which side your 
single element is that changes.
5 7 Carla: So we have a normal group because.... I  think it’s a normal group that says that the
left coset equals the right coset.
5 8 Brad: So what is the normal group here? When we have the left cosets and the right
cosets being the same we have this thing called normal, but I  want to know precisely what 
is normal here.
5 9 Carla: So the normal group is a set o f sets. So one of the smaller sets will be 0, 3, 6 , 9.
[Okay.] Another o f the sets will be 1,4, 7, 10. [Okay.] Another one will be 2, 5, 8 , and
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11. So our normal group consists of three sets.
Two points are to be made here. First, Carla did this work with little interaction from me,
and she noticed quickly that right coset calculations would yield the same result as the 
left coset calculations she had just completed. Second, her usage o f the terms coset and 
normal group was consistent with her usage in the third interview. For Carla, the 
construction of the normal group required that the left coset equal the right coset. When I 
asked in what sense it was a group, she began by stating that the identity would be {0, 3,
6 , 9}. To explain this, she decided to construct a table (Figure 21).
Figure 21. Carla’s normal group with {0, 3, 6, 9}
{0, 3, 6, 9} {1,4, 7, 10} {2, 5, 8, 11}
.{0, 3, 6,9} {0, 3, 6, 9} {1,4, 7, 10} {2, 5, 8, 11}
{1,4, 7, 10} {1,4, 7, 10} • {2, 5, 8, 11} {0,3 6 9}
{2, 5, 8, 11} {2, 5, 8, 11} {0,3 6 9} {1,4, 7, 10}
While filling in the table, Carla at first performed the set addition by listing aloud all the 
pairs to be added. As she continued, she filled in the table according to what she believed 
it should look like. She used abbreviated procedures, partly to check her expectations, 
and she described much o f her thinking aloud:
7 9 Carla: All right. So I know that this is a normal group, so I.... Because I know it’s a
group, I know it’s going to create a group table. So I can.... I have a pretty good idea 
what this table is going to look like. It’s going to have 1, 4, 7, 10 in the first column 
second row, and it’s going to have 2, 5, 8 , 11 in the position below that because 0, 3, 6 , 9 
is the identity, so it needs to just reflect what row it’s in because I am working on the first 
column.
81 Carla: Now I think that the middle spot in the table is going to give me 0, 3, 6 , 9. So I am
going to .... Well, but I can see that it’s not going to do that. So then I know that it’s 
going to be 2, 5, 8 , 11. The reason that I knew it wasn’t going to do that is because I saw 
1 + 1 is 2, and that’s not in it. So that cancels that right there.
8 5 Carla: Yes, [you should always get another coset in these calculations] with a normal
group. And I know that with my 3-by-3 group tables one of the options is to have all of 
the identities down the diagonal, so that’s why I automatically thought that might be the 
identity in the middle position. But then when I checked it, I realized it wasn’t. But it still 
can b e .... I can still have a group table.
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8  8  Carla: Since this is a group, I know that every element only appears once in each row or
column, so I see that 0, 3, 6 , 9 is left, for the second row. And then I can just check that 2 
+ 1 is 3, 5 + 1 is 6 , 8  + 1 is 9, 11 + 1 is 12, which is 0 mod 12.
92 Carla: Even if you just see one of the elements, you know which coset it is going to belong
to because the cosets don’t overlap.
98 Carla: It has to contain 3, and that’s the only coset that contains 3. So then I have one spot
left so I know that has to be 1, 4, 7, 10 because both the third column and the third row
lack that set.
Carla’s approach, based on patterns and facts, was reasonably efficient and included 
some redundancy, which she used to catch errors. She knew every pair of cosets would 
produce another coset (line 85). She knew the result would be a group, so she had 
expectations about the patterns in the table (line 79), and she used the fact that in group 
tables every element appears exactly once in each row and column (lines 8 8 , 98). She 
knew the cosets did not overlap (line 92), so she used representative calculations to 
determine which coset should appear in a cell and to check errors. She believed, for 
example, that, as a 3x3 group table, it would have the identity along the diagonal (lines 
81, 85). That is incorrect, although both 2x2 and 4x4 tables can have the identity along 
the diagonal. This error of memory did not cause much trouble, however, because on the 
basis o f a representative calculation she quickly realized that her belief was not correct.
Exploring the language. Carla had previously stated that the result would be a normal 
group, but I wanted to get some clarity on how she was using the phrase. When I asked 
her what the resulting table was and what it had to do with the word normal, she 
responded that it was a group table that had “everything to do with the word normaP’
(line 102). She continued:
105 Carla: Well, the thing that it has to do with is that this table is a demonstration o f the 
group o f those three sets— that they are a group.
10 9 Carla: The normal part of it just says that you got it because you had left and right cosets
that were equal to each other.
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111 Carla: That’s how you know. That’s how it differentiates from just any old group.
So the normal group was a group, as demonstrated by the table, and it was normal 
because there were left and right cosets that were equal to each other. These associations 
of the words normal and group are essentially correct. In particular, when the left and 
right cosets are equal to each other, the word normal applies. But the term is supposed to 
point back (see Figure 19) to the subgroup that led to the particular set of cosets not 
forward to the quotient group.
I next explored whether Carla could make any connection to the subgroup:
112 Brad: But these were left and right cosets of what?
113 Carla: Of S.
114 Brad: O f S. So does the word normal have anything to do with S?
115 Carla: I am not sure what you mean. Normal group, like just as far as words in the 
English language, doesn’t really have any meaning to me, that’s just what it’s called.
116 Brad: Okay, what what is called? That’s what I really want to get at.
117 Carla: Oh. The normal group is the group of cosets where the left and right coset o f S are 
equal.
I take this last statement to be Carla’s definition of normal group. She recognized that it 
was the subgroup that led to the cosets but did not see any reason to attach the word 
normal to the subgroup. Furthermore, she stated moments later that if  the left and right 
cosets of S  had not been equal, she would not have gotten a group.
At this point in the interview, it was clear that Carla had the right ideas but was using the 
words coset and normal in unconventional ways. I then explored what she would do with 
the conventional language:
121 Brad: Does the phrase normal subgroup, would that mean anything?
122 Carla: My guess would be that a normal subgroup would be a subgroup of a normal group.
12 6 Carla: If that’s true, then a normal subgroup of this normal group that we are talking about
could be this set {0, 3, 6 , 9} because that’s in the kernel. That is .... Well, actually I am
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mixing things here. I know it could be 0, 3, 6 , 9 because that’s just the identity, so it’s 
obviously closed and has its own inverse and ...
In response to my suggestion, Carla held on to her notion o f normal group and applied 
her concept o f subgroup to that. As the interview continued, she proposed {0, 3, 6 , 9} as 
a one-element subgroup o f her normal group because it was the identity of that group.
She went on to legitimize this group by noting that there is no “rule against” a one- 
element group and that the group axioms were satisfied. I then decided to be more 
explicit about the term quotient group:
164 Brad: Now what if  I were to tell you that the thing you have actually created here, this
table with an operation table— I mean a group table for these three cosets— that’s a 
quotient group.
165 Carla: Oh. Maybe the quotient group is.... My only guess would be that the.... The 
quotient.... I don’t know if  we ever defined it, actually. But my guess would be that the 
quotient group would b e.... Well in this case the quotient group equals the normal 
group.... Do you see what I’m saying? I mean, it’s the same ...
16 6 Brad: What if I were to tell you that the thing that you have been calling the normal group
is the thing that is called the quotient group?
167 Carla: [Laughs.] Oh, okay. What is a normal group then?
Carla was willing to accept the term quotient group but was reluctant to let go o f her 
usage of normal group. Despite my direct statement, she at first was still trying to figure 
out what a quotient group was (line 165) and only gradually came to decide that it was 
the same as her normal group, though perhaps only in this case. She had not yet detached 
the term normal group from her previous meaning. My next statement (line 166), 
however, seems to have caused her to consider a different meaning for normal group.
As the interview continued, Carla said, “I guess I have a problem with names” (line 171).
I suggested that the idea was already there and that the issue was sticking a name on it. 
Then I encouraged her to connect the word normal to the subgroup:
178 Brad: But in order to talk about cosets you need to have what?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
282
17 9 Carla: A subgroup.
18 0 Brad: Right, so this word normal tells us something about the subgroup that led to those
cosets. Now let’s see if  that can make any sense.
181 Carla: Maybe it’s when the subgroup is the kernel? I  don’t know. Because that’s the only 
thing that I  can think of that w e’ve been talking about that kind o f sets the subgroup apart. 
Like that’s the only more specific characteristic o f a subgroup that I  can think o f right now 
that we have talked about. The other subgroups were just subgroups, but if  you have a 
subgroup that contains only the elements that map to the identity, then that’s more 
specific.
182 Brad: Okay. But in order to have ...
183 Carla: We don’t even have a homomorphism here. So, there goes that theory.
Even when I told her directly that the word normal applied to the subgroup (line 180),
Carla was not able to make the appropriate gluing. The suggestion she made about the 
kernel, it should be mentioned, is correct in principle, in that the kernel o f any 
homomorphism is a normal subgroup and any normal subgroup is kernel of a 
homomorphism. This is a pretty sophisticated view, however, and one that would 
ordinarily have required consideration o f some major results, such as the first 
isomorphism theorem, that were not yet available.
Cosets in Dy. I next turned to the group D 3 , which has both normal and non-normal 
subgroups. To begin, I asked Carla how she would write down the elements of £>3 . She 
acknowledged the possibility of representing them as rotating and flipping triangles but 
chose to use permutation representations instead, which she also called the “ 123 way.”
She wrote down the six elements quickly. I asked her for the subgroup generated by (12), 
and she immediately responded that it would be just ( 1 ) and ( 1 2 )
202 Carla: Because any subgroup has to have the identity, so that’s (1). That’s why (1) is in 
there. And then if  you.... And (12) obviously has to be in there because it’s generated by 
it. So if  you operated (1) on (12) you just get (12). So it’s in there so we are all set. And
(12) operated with (12) just gives you (1). Another way you can think of it is that the 
order o f (12) is 2. So if you call alpha (12), then the subgroup is only going contain alpha 
to the 0  and alpha to the 1 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
283
Here Carla described two approaches and provided a hint of the extent of the proficiency 
she had developed both with the group D 3 and with the creation of subgroups more 
generally. She carried out six coset calculations (see Figure 22), making one small error 
that was quickly corrected. She saw that she got only three cosets as a result and 
suggested that the right cosets would be different because here “the order that you do that 
in does matter” (line 222). When computing the right cosets, her calculations were 
guided by expectations that grew from noticing which elements were paired with other 
elements in the cosets, an approach that implicitly took advantage o f the fact that cosets 
do not overlap.
Figure 22. Carla’s cosets of {(1), (12)} in D3
S = { ( 1 ) , ( 1 2 ) }
Lt Co sets Rt Cosets
(!)*{ (!). (12)} = {(1), (12)} S *(l) = 5
(12)*S = S S*( 12) = S
(23)*S = {(23), (132)} S*(23) = {(23), (123)}
(13)*S = {(13), (123)} S*(13) = {(13), (132)}
(123)*S = {(123), (13)} S*(123) = {(123), (23)}
(132)*S = {(132), (23)} S*(132) = {(132), (13)}
Upon completing the calculations, Carla noted that the left cosets were not equal to the 
right cosets and claimed that with these cosets, an operation table would be a mess. I 
asked her to try to make an operation table with just the left cosets. Before computing the 
product o f {(1), (12)} and {(23), (123)} she predicted the result would be a “four element 
thing” (line 246), demonstrating some proficiency with set arithmetic with non-normal 
subgroups. When her prediction turned out to be correct, she noted, “It’s not closed”
(line 256), because the product o f the two cosets was not another coset. (See Figure 23 
for the partial table.)
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Figure 23. Carla’s table for the cosets of {(1), (12)} in Z>3
0 ) .(1 2 ) (2 3 ),(1 3 2 ) (1 3 ),(1 2 3 )
(1 )(1 2 ) (1 )(1 2 ) (2 3 )(1 3 2 )(1 2 3 )(1 3 )
(2 3 )(1 32)
(1 3 )(1 2 3 )
Note: Carla included no braces fo r  the sets and omitted commas below the top line.
1 next asked Carla to consider the subgroup generated by (123). She responded 
immediately:
2  63 Carla: The subgroup generated by (123) is (1), (123), and (132). The reason that I know
that’s because I remember (123) and (132) are inverse of each other, from working with 
them before.
She seems to have known by recall that (132) and (123) are “inverse o f each other,” and 
yet moments later she did not remember what (123) squared was. She called the 
subgroup S  again and computed the left cosets (123)*S and (132)*^ quickly (see Figure 
24), reasoning from the fact that S  is closed. For the other cosets, her calculations were 
guided by expectations based, for example, on the fact that cosets do not overlap. By the 
time she was computing the right cosets, her procedure had become quite abbreviated, 
demonstrating increasing proficiency with coset calculations and with Z)3.
Figure 24. Carla’s cosets of {(1), (123), (132)} in Z>3
5=  {(1), (123), (132)}
Lt Cosets Rt. Cosets
(1)*£ = £ £*( 1) = £
(123)*£ = £ £*(123) = £
(132)*£ = £ £*(132) = £
(12)*£ = {(12),(23),(13)} £*(12) = {(12),(13),(23)}
(13)*£ = {(13),(12),(23)} £*(13) = {(13),(23),(12)}
(23)*£ = {(23),(12),(13)} £*(23)
After completing the calculations, Carla noted that the left and right cosets were the 
same. She then reflected on the fact that, while order mattered in Z)3, the order did not 
seem to matter in these coset calculations:
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303  Carla: Right, but we had the right combination o f things so that.... Where the order
mattered.... Because the elements o f the sets can be in any order.... So where the order 
mattered it covered up for it because you had the right combination o f elements.
314 Carla: Well, we just see that the subgroups in case of the subgroup generated by (12), we
didn’t have the right combination of elements ... or “right” as in to make the cosets equal, 
the right combination o f elements so that they were equal. And in this case we did have 
the right combination o f elements.
318 Carla: Well, one thing that might have helped us is that this subgroup has more elements
in it. So it might cut down on the error.
Rather than just ascribing the differing results to the original subgroups, Carla looked 
inside the subgroups to determine what might have caused the results.
Exploring the language again. Equipped with these additional examples, I pursued the 
language again:
32 0 Brad: Do you suppose we could use the word normal to help us out here?
321 Carla: [Laughs.] I don’t know.... Well, which one is normal? Can you tell me that? I
don’t, I have no idea what normal is. I thought I knew about it. I have no idea.
322 Brad: Well, you were saying before that you have a situation kind o f called normal when
you have left and right cosets being the same, right? You said something like that, didn’t
you? So where are left and right cosets here?
32 3 Carla: Well, left and right cosets are the same here. Maybe it has something to do with
their inverses. Because this one (123) and (132) were inverses of each other, whereas in 
this one each element is its own inverse. That probably didn’t answer your question. I 
was kind o f half listening. What was it?
Carla recognized that she was not sure about the use of the word normal, and she 
recognized that the two subgroups were somehow different in that one led to left and 
right cosets that were the same and the other did not. Rather than merely using (and not 
using) the label normal to distinguish between them, she was looking for something 
deeper: some differing characteristics of the subgroups that would explain the differences 
in the cosets. As a result, she did not hear my question, so I repeated it:
32 4 Brad: Before you said that normal had something.... You used the word normal as having
something to do with when the left cosets and the right cosets are the same.
325 Carla: Yeah. But I wasn’t right on that ‘cause that was quotient group.
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32 6  Brad: Ah, well now, but what was quotient group?
327 Carla: Quotient group is one by, the set o f cosets where the left and right cosets are equal.
I guess.
This last statement is almost identical to Carla’s previous definition o f normal group (line 
117), suggesting that she had substituted the new name for the old idea. As for the 
differences between the subgroups, she was still trying to find a reason:
33 9 Carla: Well, yeah, but the only thing that I see ... the only difference that I really see
between, at least right now, between them, is the thing about the inverses. I’m not seeing 
any other ... unless it is just normal because it’s generated ... [inaudible] doesn’t make 
sense. I don’t know. It doesn’t.... If a quotient group is the set that you get when, from 
the cosets, if  the left and the right cosets are equal, then maybe the normal group is the 
group that you use to get the left and right cosets in that case.
34 0 Brad: What do you mean?
341  Carla: Is the normal group the group that is always going to be your S , when you find your 
left and right cosets in the way we do the quotient group?
342 Brad: Oh, so you mean the subgroup we started with?
343 Carla: Yeah.
351  Carla: So I would say that this subgroup is a normal group. If, well, if  my guess is right, 
this subgroup is a normal group, and that one isn’t. [She points first to the subgroup {(1), 
(12)} and then to {(1), (123), (132)}.]
It seems that at this point in the interview she had at last made the desired connection 
between the word normal and the subgroup that determined whether the left and right 
cosets were the same. The only remaining difficulty, it seemed, was that she was calling 
it a normal group rather than a subgroup.
352 Brad: What about saying “normal subgroup”?
353  Carla: [Laughs.] Well, that kind o f would be doing left and right cosets of left and right 
cosets, I would think. You know. Go another step into it.
354 Brad: What do you mean?
355 Carla: Well, I would think a subgroup is usually a smaller group. So I would think that a 
normal subgroup, you have to get that from a quotient group. And that it would have to 
give you a different quotient group.
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Carla gave meaning to term norm al subgroup  in a way that indicated that for her the term 
norm al was still strongly connected to the quotient group, maintaining some of its 
previous meaning. Yet a few moments later, she reconsidered:
3 63 Carla: Right. So, well, then maybe we were a l l ... we only talked about normal subgroups 
and not normal groups. Is that what you’re saying? Because I’m fine with calling it a 
subgroup. I really don’t care. Because if  you don’t really talk about normal groups and 
you only call them normal subgroups, you’re just focusing on the fact that they are 
subgroups.
While thinking about the terms used in class, Carla relaxed the tie between the word 
norm al and the quotient group and was willing to consider alternatives. She realized that 
she may have been remembering the wrong term and that if  the correct term was normal 
subgroup  then perhaps it made sense to apply it to the subgroup that led to the cosets. I 
closed the interview by checking on how she labeled the various objects and the 
connections among them.
364 Brad: So, which is the subgroup here? Which is the normal subgroup?
365 Carla: S.
366 Brad: And it’s a subgroup of what?
367 Carla: D3.
368 Brad: And it’s normal because ...
369 Carla: It is what you use to get left and right cosets which are equal.
370 Brad: And this subgroup here, generated by (12) ...
371 Carla: It’s not a normal subgroup.
372 Brad: Okay. But it is a subgroup o f ...
373 Carla: Z)3.
374 Brad: D 3 still. So here we have one subgroup o f Z) 3 which the left and right cosets were 
different. So we say its ...
375 Carla: Not a quotient group. And S is not a normal subgroup.
376 Brad: Well, you don’t get a quotient group.
377 Carla: Right. This set o f these is not a quotient group.
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From Carla’s correct usage o f the term normal subgroup in the above exchange, it is clear 
that some learning had occurred. Because this exchange required only short answers 
from Carla, however, it is not clear to what extent she had changed her meaning and 
usage of the word normal. On the final exam, she did use the term correctly, writing, for 
example, “H  is not a normal subgroup o f G because It. cosets *  rt. cosets” in response to 
the question, “Is H a  normal subgroup of G? Explain” (problem 9d). It would be 
interesting to know how she would have responded to a more open-ended question such 
as, “Compute the left and right cosets of H. What can you say on the basis of your 
calculations?”
Analysis. The schematic diagram in Figure 25 is an expanded version o f Figure 19, 
showing a few more of the processes and objects involved in activities related to quotient 
groups. The core o f the activity is depicted vertically along the center o f the diagram. 
Given a group and a subgroup, compute the left and right cosets. Compare the set of left 
cosets with the set of right cosets. If  they are the same, then designate the original 
subgroup as a normal subgroup. Calculate the various products o f left or right cosets. If 
the sets of left and right cosets are the same, identify the set of cosets (with their 
products) as a quotient group.
This core activity may be enlarged in two ways. First, the group and the subgroup may 
be identified as the domain and kernel, respectively, of a homomorphism between two 
groups. This is similar to Fraleigh’s (1989) treatment, in that the concept of quotient 
group is introduced as the group of cosets o f the kernel of a homomorphism. The second 
way to enlarge the core coset activity is to ask, once the quotient group has been 
calculated, whether the quotient group is isomorphic to a familiar group. Several
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students did this naturally on the basis of the patterns in the table, as discussed in 
chapter 5.
Figure 25. Quotient group activity






3  o1- Right CosetsLeft Cosets
Sets of Cosets
i
Products of Cosets 
V
Quotient Group ► Familiar
isomorphic group
Note: Arrows indicate processes. The dotted arrows denote designation 
processes that are legitimate only if  the left and right cosets are the same (the 
result o f  an implicit comparison process on the sets o f  right and left cosets).
These extensions are useful in the analysis because for Carla these extensions were 
sometimes natural parts of the activity. In particular, in one task she at first wanted the 
subgroup to be the kernel, demonstrating a connection between the core activity and the 
concepts of kernel and homomorphism (Carla 4, line 28). And after completing the 
group table for {1, 3} and {5, 7}, she went on to show, without any prompting from me, 
that the group was isomorphic to a familiar group with two elements.
The extensions are also useful for mathematical reasons because the entire diagram can 
be tied together with the first isomorphism theorem, which says that, given a group
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
homomorphism, the quotient of the domain and the kernel o f the homomorphism is 
isomorphic to its image. This is illustrated in the isomorphism that Carla noticed 
between the quotient group {{1, 3}, {5, 7}} and the subgroup {0, 2} in Z4 .
Building on the analysis above, it seems that for Carla, the entire center of Figure 25, 
from just below “Subgroup” to “Sets of Cosets,” was essentially one concept: coset. 
Although within that concept she could distinguish between left and right cosets, she did 
not distinguish vertically between the processes and objects. Regarding her use of the 
word normal, she correctly associated the word with the comparison of the cosets, but 
rather than reaching backward in the activity to attach the label to the subgroup, she 
reached forward and attached it to the quotient group. This labeling is not surprising 
when one realizes how distant the subgroup is when one is comparing the sets of right 
and left cosets. Furthermore, once the name normal was attached to the quotient group, it 
was very difficult for Carla to make any connection between it and the subgroup.
What is important in the diagram in Figure 25 is not the names o f the processes and 
objects but the structure— the relationships among the various components. Just as 
learning group theory requires abstracting from the particular names o f the elements and 
the operations, thinking about the learning of group theory requires abstracting from 
particular names o f the objects and processes. This conclusion alone is not very 
surprising, as it is obvious that different languages use different terms for concepts. The 
above analysis, however, suggests more. First, to learn group theory requires not only 
attaching names but also carving the activity into concepts. Second, making new 
distinctions and changing one’s language both require accommodation in the sense of
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reorganizing one’s conceptual structures. These ideas are elaborated in the next 
subsection.
Diane. Lori, and Quotient Groups
Diane and Lori’s fourth interview took place the same day that Dr. Benson had 
introduced Lagrange’s theorem and the term quotient group. Diane and Lori were able to 
compute an operation table for a quotient group, but whereas Carla had a nonstandard 
name for the quotient group, Diane and Lori had no name at all. Instead, their concepts 
o f coset and quotient group were aided and obstructed by vague connections with 
Lagrange’s theorem.
While computing cosets of a subgroup in £>3, Diane stated that there would be two cosets, 
“because the order of this [subgroup] is 3, the order o f £ > 3  is 6 , so 6  over 3 is 2” (line 84). 
The calculation is correct, by Lagrange’s theorem (see the subsection Conceptual 
Analysis above). I asked them for justification.
8  8  Lori: Probably the definition came up in class.
90 Lori: That’s like Lagrange’s theorem, wasn’t it?
92 Lori: I don’t remember it, because I just learned it [inaudible],
9 3 Diane: Well, if  this is a subgroup ...
9 5 Diane: ... then we know that it’s a normal group o f this and we got the subgroup o f that.
9 6  Lori: It’s the order o f the group divided by the subgroup. Like order G divided by H.
9 7 Lori: Yeah, it was order G divided by H, but that was G mod ...
9 8  Diane: Well, they’re similar; they are the same definition G mod H.
Rather than a clear justification, Diane and Lori provided vague associations with a 
number of phrases and symbolizations: Lagrange’s theorem, normal group, order G 
divided by H, and G mod H. Many of these words could be part of a correct justification, 
but some o f the phrases are nonstandard. The data are insufficient to provide a sense of
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what Diane meant by the term normal group, but because she does not use the term later 
to describe a group o f cosets, it seems unlikely that she was using the term as Carla had.
The phrase “order G divided by H" is ambiguous because o f the lack o f parentheses in 
everyday speech: Did Lori mean \G\/Hor \G/H\? The former is mathematically 
problematic; the latter is standard notation only when the quotient group G/H  is defined, 
which requires that the subgroup be normal. In that case, it is numerically though not 
logically correct as a way to count cosets because G/H  and the set o f cosets o f Hare 
identical as sets.
The issue o f the meaning o f G/H  came up again later in the interview. Diane had again 
called upon the calculation 6  divided by 3 to justify that there would be 2 cosets. 
Recalling that we had proved this result in class, I asked them what about the proof 
implied that 6  divided by 3 made sense?
2 91 Lori: That was the quotient group definition; Lagrange is a little different. Lagrange, 
like, stems from it. Is that correct? You actually had G divided by H  under the whole 
quotient group definition. I remember that.
2 92 Brad: Right, but remember G is a group, and H is a group....
2 94 Brad: So a group divided by a group is a little different than a number divided by a
number. I mean, you are doing 6  divided by 3.
2 95 Lori: Well, we are doing the order o f G.
2 9 6  Diane: If you get a group that’s 6  elements, divided by a group of 3 elements, you should
get 2 groups o f 3 elements each. [Lori writes G/H.]
Diane’s phrase “divided by a group o f 3 elements” suggests that her work with cosets and 
with Lagrange’s theorem had become something like quotitive division: 6  elements -r
3 elements per group = 2 groups. This statement would be almost correct if  she had used 
the term coset rather than group. But again she did not provide justification.
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From what Lori wrote and said, it appears that she was considering only the orders o f the 
groups in her division, so she did not see a problem of meaning in either “G divided by 
H ” or “the order o f G divided by H.” As the interview continued, she seemed more 
concerned with what to write down than with its meaning:
32 6  Lori: Yeah, isn’t it like the order of G divided by HI [Okay.] Or the order of both, which
is it? I am not clear on the definitions.
32 7 Brad: Well, clearly if  we talk about G the group divided by H  a subgroup, and write it 
that way ...
32 8  Diane: If you’re taking the orders ...
The way Diane interrupted me suggested that she too was thinking mostly about the 
orders of the groups.
I again distinguished between dividing groups and dividing their orders and stated that 
the quotient group was written as G/H, which Lori described as “no order” (line 332).
334 Lori: [Writes “quotient: G /#.”] Did you even right this on the board or am I jumping
ahead? Just because I remember this. Did we talk about this today?
33 6  Diane: We did something with order.
337 Lori: Then this must be Lagrange’s theorem. It must be like this. [She changes earlier 
G/H to \G\/H. See line 296.]
338 Diane: No, it was on the left board. It wasn’t near Lagrange. Cause Steve wrote 
Lagrange, and Steve wrote something else. He had something like G, order G, and 
something like order o f K, I think it was. [pause] Yeah. Because K  is the subgroup and 
this is a subgroup. So you take G, which is this, and divide it by the order o f K. I think 
that was it. [Lori changes |G y#to \G\/\H\.]
Thus, for Diane and Lori, the concepts, processes, and notations for Lagrange’s theorem 
and quotient groups were mixed together in a jumble o f vague memories from class. 
Moreover, the way that Lori moved flexibly from G/H  to \G\/H to \G\/\H\ suggests that the 
vertical bars did not carry much meaning for her and reinforces the point that the 
symbolizations were about the orders o f the groups and not the groups themselves.
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After we had determined that the subgroup was normal, we were ready to talk about 
quotient groups. I asked what could be done with normal subgroups.
3 6 8  Lori: Maybe figure out something with quotient groups?
37 3 Lori: So quotient group is just G divided by H.
374 Brad: Well that’s the notation for it.
375  Lori: That’s not the definition.
37 6  Diane: No.
377  Lori: Can I see the definition? I am not too clear on it.
37 8  Diane: No, I am not too clear.
Thus, for Lori and Diane, quotient group  had little meaning beyond the symbolism G/H, 
further supporting the idea that they had been dividing not groups but orders o f groups all 
along.
I asked several questions about what they typically might do with the set of cosets but did 
not get much o f a response until I asked whether it would be possible to create a group.
Diane began making some calculations. Lori did not see what she was up to, so I asked
Diane to explain.
405 Diane: I am multiplying each elem ent...
407 Diane: ... of one set with each element of another, o f the coset. Take (1) divided by each 
element, (123) divided by each, multiplied by each element and then (132) multiplied by 
each element. I think w e’re going to get a [group].
They completed their calculations and saw that it was a group with two elements that
were sets, where one o f  the sets acted like the identity. I asked them what to call it.
443 Diane: A group of cosets? No. A group generated by cosets?
445 Lori: I am sure it has another name, though.
446 Diane: ... [If] you say a group o f cosets, then you can say any cosets you absolutely want 
to. It has to be a little more.
448 Diane: A group of cosets under Z)3.
450 Diane: The elements of D3 generated by ...
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452 Diane: ... generated by (1), (123), (132)?
Diane’s suggestion o f “a group o f cosets” was a good start, but she had a sense that she 
needed to provide a more precise description. Lori later likened it to a subgroup but saw 
that it was not a true subgroup, because “things are like sectioned o f f ’ (line 460).
They continued suggesting names:
4 62 Diane: Probably something so obvious. A group o f cosets.
4 63 Lori: Group coset. Coset groups?
4 64 Diane: Normal subgroup. Normal group? Normal coset group.
Again, they provided good suggestions, but they were not connecting with the language
that had been introduced that day in class. I asked them what other words had been used 
in class and they suggested isomorphism and kernel. With that, they noticed that their 
group was isomorphic to the {e, a) group. I reminded them that the left and right cosets 
had been equal, and they pointed out that H  was a normal subgroup.
4 9 9 Diane: It’s two [cosets] together, and since this is the table generated by it [the normal
subgroup] maybe this is the normal group.
500 Lori: Normal subgroup group.
The strong connection with normality provided some reasonable yet nonstandard 
language that was, in fact, identical to Carla’s language, suggesting once again that 
Carla’s unusual language was not so unusual after all.
I decided to intervene :
52 4 Brad: What about quotient group? What do you suppose a quotient groups is?
525 Lori: This is a “divided by” it’s not like a contained in some little subgroups [inaudible].
It’s G divided by H.
52 6  Brad: Well, that’s the notation for it.
527 Lori: Okay. Steve said he liked to think o f it as a remainder, like in the Z4 case.
52 8 Diane: I think this would probably be more of a quotient group, because you want to say
that this group is only generated by this element, and you would only get this table right
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here because you’re not taking into consideration this element.
52 9 Lori: Right, and when I said that this normal subgroup, when I said that this generated 
this table ...
531 Lori: ... it didn’t really, because if you just had it how would you come up with this set? 
So this is the normal subgroup, and this must be the quotient group, generated by that 
normal subgroup.
They both were uncomfortable about the idea of saying the normal subgroup “generated” 
the other cosets. Nonetheless, they eventually both pointed to the operation table they 
had created for the cosets and decided that it must be the quotient group. Lori, for 
example, said, “I ’m thinking, by definition, this must be the quotient group” (line 540).
Thus, in the end, both Lori and Diane were able to compute and recognize a quotient 
group. They had no trouble making the calculations, once they got started, but they 
associated neither the process nor the result with the term quotient group. While trying to 
find a name for the group o f cosets they had created, they had several good suggestions, 
including Carla’s term normal group, but they decided to call the group a quotient group 
only after I brought up the term.
Other Students and Quotient Groups
An overriding theme in the analysis of the interviews above was the problem of attaching 
names and notations to processes and objects with which the students had developed 
some proficiency. In this section, I elaborate on this theme. The section opens by first 
returning to the previous discussion o f the process/object distinction in the students’ 
understanding o f cosets and then broadening the discussion to include the concept of 
quotient group. There was a strong sense in which the students understood cosets and 
quotient groups as both processes and objects, and yet there were ways in which their
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conceptions were incomplete, as evidenced by significant linguistic and notational 
difficulties.
The linguistic difficulties manifested themselves primarily in the strong connection 
between the concepts of normality and quotient group, because, after all, they both 
depend upon left and right cosets being the same. Thus, I next discuss the students’ 
understanding o f the concept o f normality followed by a presentation o f the various ways 
that students tried to name the quotient group. The section closes by bringing together 
the issues o f naming, notation, processes, and objects by considering the metaphor of 
gluing names to ideas.
Processes versus objects. Although a few o f the key participants experienced initial 
difficulties computing cosets, they all were eventually able to manage the process, some 
of them with considerable proficiency. Thus, all the students developed process 
conceptions o f cosets. After computing the cosets of a subgroup, all the students were 
willing to talk about cosets as being elements of a larger structure, a set of sets. They 
could compare left and right cosets and notice whether they were the same or different. 
They could perform coset arithmetic, even in the case of Z)3, and could talk about whether 
a pair of cosets produced another coset. Thus, metaphorically, cosets were also objects. 
Nonetheless, the students had difficulty using notation to support their thinking, and they 
sometimes used language ambiguously in ways that suggested that their thinking was 
immersed in the process o f computing all o f the cosets.
To begin their computations o f quotient groups, the students often needed a direct 
question such as, “Can we make a group out of these cosets?” With that question, the 
process for creating such a group seemed obvious and natural to everyone except Lori,
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although she was quick to latch on to what Diane suggested. Operation tables served 
both to organize the students’ calculations and to help them see that the result was or was 
not a group. Operation tables helped them think o f cosets as objects that can have 
inverses or that can function as the identity. With the operation table they saw 
isomorphisms between the quotient group and other familiar groups. Thus, 
metaphorically, quotient groups were objects as well. Nonetheless, the students had 
trouble with the term quotient group and with the notation G/H.
A brief characterization o f the students’ concept images is roughly as follows: Cosets 
were objects, but aH  was a process. The term coset applied both to an individual coset 
and to the set o f all o f them. When the left and right cosets were the same, the “left 
coset” could form a group, which was called “the normal group.” Both of these were 
objects. Coset arithmetic was a process, and the resulting operation table was an object, 
yet the terms quotient group and the notation G/H  referred to neither o f these.
Clearly the hierarchical process/object distinction is insufficient to explain these results. 
What does it mean to say that a student thinks of quotient groups as objects when the 
student does not call those objects quotient groups? What does it mean to say that a 
student thinks o f cosets as object when the notation aH  is not part o f that understanding?
I reconsider the process/object distinction in chapter 8 .
Normality. The students’ concept images o f quotient group were very closely tied to 
their concepts o f normality. The common thread among the students’ uses o f the word 
normal is captured by Carla’s statement, “You had left and right cosets that were equal to 
each other” (Interview 3, line 109). This characterization applies both to standard and
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nonstandard uses, including Carla’s “normal group.” All o f the students gave such a 
characterization of the word norm al at some point during their interviews.
What was different among the students’ conceptions was the object to which the word 
norm al applied: to the group of cosets or to the subgroup. When one determines that the 
left and right cosets are the same, the standard language points both back to the subgroup 
and forward to the group o f cosets, attaching the names norm al subgroup  and quotient 
group, respectively. All o f the key participants except Carla were able to point back to 
the subgroup to call it normal, although they demonstrated varying degrees o f certainty. 
Diane and Lori were willing to point forward while searching for a term to describe the 
group of cosets, suggesting terms such as norm al group  and norm al coset group, thereby 
supporting the reasonableness of Carla’s language. The terms quotient group  and norm al 
and the ideas they represent are so strongly connected perhaps it should not be surprising 
that the terms are sometimes confounded.
The students also demonstrated strong connections between normality and 
commutativity, often concluding correctly that the left and right cosets were the same 
when the group was commutative. Robert’s concept image of normality was strongly 
connected to the word Abelian, a label applied to groups in which the operation is 
commutative. In his fourth interview, for example, when comparing left and right cosets 
o f a subgroup, he said, “It does not look like this thing is Abelian as I predicted” (line 
148). In his explanation, he focused on whether the elements themselves commuted with 
each other and then whether the left and right cosets were the same. Later, he seemed to 
be thinking that when the left and right cosets were the same, the resulting quotient group
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should also be Abelian, a prediction that is true for all o f the groups the class investigated 
in detail but false in general.
Naming the quotient group. All o f the key participants demonstrated some difficulty 
attaching the standard name quotient group to the group that they created from cosets.
For example, after completing an operation table for some cosets, Robert said, “I’d 
describe it as a normal subgroup. But actually, no. It’s a group somehow that’s like 
generated by a normal subgroup” (line 351). Later, he provided another formulation: “I 
formed a group o f ... an Abelian group using cosets generated by (123)” (Interview 4, 
line 391).
During her third interview, Wendy called the result “the coset group ... because it’s a 
subgroup o f coset elements” (lines 309-313). I asked her for clarification on the word 
subgroup, and she rephrased her response: “So it’s the group o f all o f the elements in the, 
all of the cosets elements” (line 315). By her fourth interview, Wendy had attached the 
term quotient group in the standard way. She explained that “a quotient group is the 
operation table of the cosets ... elements” (line 6) and later, after computing an operation 
table for the quotient o f 4Z  in Z, she characterized the quotient group as “the group 
containing all the cosets” (line 219).
Thus, all the students came up with names for quotient group that indicated reasonable 
conceptual connections and that demonstrated a good informal sense o f the concept. The 
connections to words normal and coset were particularly strong. Wendy was the only 
key participant who was able to give a characterization of the term quotient group 
without my intervention. Wendy’s fourth interview took place after the final exam, 
however, so I hesitate to draw conclusions from this comparison with the other students.
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In any case, Carla’s insistence on calling a quotient group a “normal group” is not really 
surprising.
Gluing. The diagram entitled “Quotient Group Activity” (Figure 25) does not paint a 
sufficiently detailed picture o f the conceptual complexity o f what there is to leam. If  the 
figure were to be augmented to include various symbolizations and Lagrange’s theorem, 
however, it would become unwieldy and defeat its purpose. Thus, rather than 
constructing another figure, I state more simply that the overriding issue regarding the 
concept o f quotient group was the confusion among the following:
• names
o Lagrange’s theorem 
o quotient group 
o normal [group or subgroup] 
o coset group
• symbolizations
o G/H  
o G mod H  




• processes and objects
o counting cosets by dividing the orders of the groups 
o calculating the products of the cosets 
o the resulting group [given by its table]
o the subgroup that gave rise to the cosets
Each o f the above is a signifier o f some aspect o f the students’ activity regarding the 
concept of quotient group. Some of them are standard signifiers; others were invented by
the students. The list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather is intended to demonstrate
the complexity of making the standard connections among the various signifiers. Clearly 
learning the concept o f quotient group is more complicated that is suggested by the 
metaphor of gluing names to ideas (see, e.g. Hewitt, 2001).
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Perhaps some of the confusion was caused by the fact that the standard names, notations, 
and processes were introduced at about the same time. This explanation is probably 
insufficient, however, for the notation G/H  seems to be very easily interpreted as division 
of natural numbers, and that was not the only confusion. Because the students were able 
to carry out the processes adequately and appropriately and were able to talk about the 
results as objects, a more plausible explanation is that there is considerable cognitive 
work to be done in attaching the names and notations to the objects and processes.
Summary
Once again, the overriding issue regarding the concept of quotient group was one of 
language and notation. The students were happy to consider the cosets as elements of a 
larger structure. They often knew that in order for the cosets to form a group, the left and 
right cosets needed to be the same. Despite the fact that many o f them needed some 
prompting about coset arithmetic, they seemed to regard the procedure as reasonable and 
even natural. By organizing their calculations in an operation table, they were able to see 
whether the result was a group. Thus, the students conceived o f cosets and quotient 
groups as both processes and objects. Attaching language and notation to these concepts 
and calculations was problematic, however, and the students were aware of these 
difficulties. Regarding the term quotient group, other terms such as coset group and 
normal group seem to be more natural. More generally, some of their difficulties seemed 
to arise out of the strong procedural, conceptual, notational, and experiential 
commonalities between the terms, making it difficult for the students to manage the 
connections among them.
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Main Themes
Regarding the concepts o f homomorphism, coset, and quotient group, the main themes 
developed at the end o f chapter 5 also serve well for organizing the results o f this chapter. 
Once again the students’ use o f language and notation emerged as a central issue. Once 
again, the students used operation tables and other conceptual tools for managing their 
relationships with abstract ideas.
With each of the topics in this chapter, the students’ language and notation was 
sometimes nonstandard and often imprecise. Furthermore, the students sometimes had 
trouble with the concepts and process because of confusions about the language and 
notation. And even when they seemed to understand the concepts, they sometimes had 
trouble using language and notation in standard ways to support their thinking. They 
often left off quantifiers in their definitions of homomorphisms and began reasoning 
symbolically without adequately specifying their symbols. Nonetheless, at other times, 
the students’ language was nonstandard yet precise. Carla, for example, consistently 
called a quotient group “the normal group.” Furthermore, the students’ seemingly 
idiosyncratic language was often not idiosyncratic, as there were commonalities across 
students.
The students often did not distinguish adequately between a set and an element, 
particularly regarding notation but even regarding their use of the word coset. The 
notation aH  was sometimes a particular coset, sometimes the set o f all o f them, but 
mostly a process for generating cosets, although the notation did not always support the 
students’ understanding of the process. The data suggest the problem of distinguishing 
between a set and an element might be better described as a difficulty conceiving of a
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symbol as representing a generic yet particular object. For some students, symbols such 
as 4x represented neither a specific nor a particular multiple o f 4 but rather any multiple 
of 4. And if  it can represent any multiple of 4, it is a short cognitive leap to imagine that 
it represents all multiples o f 4. This kind of reasoning was characterized as being 
immersed in the process o f generating all such elements.
The metaphor o f gluing is clearly unsatisfactory to describe the cognitive requirements of 
making connections among language, notation, processes, and objects. Instead, learning 
to make standard linguistic and notational distinctions seems to require first conceptual 
distinctions and then a dialectic that supports connections among them. Thus, both 
creating and changing a student’s use of language and notation require building cognitive 
structures that support and fit the linguistic and notational distinctions.
To manage their relationships with abstract ideas, the students often used operation tables 
to support their reasoning. Operation tables served to organize the students’ calculations 
for determining whether a function was a homomorphism. Organizing their coset 
calculations in an operation table seem to help them see whether a set o f cosets formed a 
group and also helped them see the result as a group— an object—with elements that 
were sets.
With the concepts o f coset and quotient group, the students also supported their thinking 
through proficiency with the concepts, examples, representations, and related facts. For 
example, when creating tables of quotient groups, they demonstrated considerable 
proficiency with abstract groups and their representations, using facts about the tables in 
order to support their calculations and catch errors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The process/object distinction was helpful in characterizing the students’ thinking but 
was insufficient for making developmental distinctions. The students could conceive of 
cosets as objects, yet the notation aH  specified a process. They conceived o f quotient 
groups as objects, but confused the notation G/H  with Lagrange’s theorem. The data 
suggest that two encapsulations might be required for cosets: one to see a specific coset 
(say in Z u  or D 3) as an object and another to see aH  as representing such an object, 
which harkens back to the problem of imagining generic particular objects. These issues 
and themes are further elaborated in chapter 8 .
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CHAPTER VII
PRELIMINARY MATHEMATICS
This chapter includes discussion o f the relationships between the concepts in group 
theory and preliminary mathematical ideas that became prominent in my analysis of 
student understanding. While success in abstract algebra clearly requires broad and 
strong background knowledge, it was not clear a priori what background concepts would 
be implicated. The two concepts for which there were sufficient data for an analysis are 
functions and modular arithmetic. Because neither o f these topics was explicitly 
investigated in the interviews, it is not possible to provide a thorough analysis of the 
students’ understandings o f either o f them. Instead, I provide an analysis of particularly 
salient episodes that raise some interesting issues and then discuss how those issues 
played out more broadly with the other students.
Before presenting my analysis o f the students’ understanding o f functions and modular 
arithmetic, however, I make brief comments about two other concepts: exponents and 
zero. These preliminary mathematical ideas likely played a significant role in the 
students’ thinking, but little detailed data was available. The topics deserve mention here 
because o f their importance in both group theory and school mathematics and because of 
potential implications for an abstract algebra course that aims to provide opportunities for 
students to strengthen their understanding of these key ideas.
306
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Issues related to exponents came up periodically when, in unfamiliar settings, students 
were unsure what g° might mean or whether g ~4 should mean (g _1)4or (g 4)-1. In 
abstract algebra, as in school mathematics, the rules for exponents are initially defined for 
exponents that are positive integers. Those rules are extended first to allow exponents 
that are zero and then exponents that are negative integers. The guiding principles behind 
the extensions are, first, that the rules that work in the original system should continue to 
work in the extended system and, second, that the original system should be isomorphic 
to a subset of the extended system. Only with these guiding principles can the 
conclusions be adequately supported that g° should be the identity and that g ~4 may be 
either (g _1)4or (g 4 ) - 1  because they must all be equal. These extensions are identical to 
the extensions from the natural numbers to the whole numbers to the integers—  
extensions that prove to be important and difficult for primary school children (Kilpatrick 
et al., 2001). Thus, it should not be surprising that extending the rules of exponents 
requires some mathematical and cognitive work.
A more surprising set o f issues that came up from time to time, and likely had some 
influence on the students’ difficulties with exponents, had to do with the ontological 
status and properties o f zero. Some students were convinced, for example, that zero is 
neither even nor odd. Some were convinced that 0/0 = 0. Because the status of zero as a 
number presented considerable obstacles historically (see, e.g., Kaplan, 2000; Seife, 
2 0 0 0 ), perhaps it should not be surprising that zero continues to be a difficult concept for 
some advanced undergraduates. (See Nardi, 2000 for an extended discussion of the role 
of zero in advanced mathematics.)
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The concepts o f exponents and zero are important in both undergraduate and school 
mathematics. With the available data, however, I am able to say only that the concepts 
deserve more attention both in the teaching o f undergraduate mathematics and in research 
about students’ understanding o f undergraduate and school mathematics. Regarding the 
concepts of functions and modular arithmetic, this study provides more evidence and 
insight.
As mentioned in chapter 6 , Diane’s concept o f function became a significant obstacle in 
her understanding o f homomorphisms. An analysis o f her third interview revealed 
similarities with the thinking o f students who were able to complete the interview tasks 
successfully. Regarding modular arithmetic, several students used the word mod  with 
unusual syntax, but the analysis showed Carla’s syntax to be consistent and 
mathematically insightful. Other students demonstrated conceptual difficulties that may 
be explained by distinct but related uses o f the word mod in standard mathematical 
language.
Functions
The concept of function plays a role in the abstract algebra concepts o f isomorphism, 
homomorphism, and binary operation, though it is easy for its role to remain implicit for 
the concept of binary operation and for informal versions o f isomorphism. The concept 
of function figured prominently when the students were dealing with homomorphisms, as 
they tried to manage the relationship between the function provided as a potential 
homomorphism and the binary operations in the domain and codomain of the function. 
Before discussing these relationships in the students’ understanding, I provide a brief
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discussion o f two observations that suggest that some o f the difficulties identified in the 
literature on the learning o f functions continue to be difficulties for mathematics majors 
in advanced courses.
Based on the literature on the learning o f functions, it is not surprising that some of the 
students in this study wanted functions to be given by formulas (see, e.g., Vinner, 1992; 
Ferrini-Mundy & Graham, 1994). For example, when I gave the students a potential 
homomorphism by specifying the image of each element in the domain, both Diane and 
Robert wanted to know what the formula was, and Carla also strongly identified the 
function with its formula. They were willing to assume that there was a formula, 
however, and thus were able to continue with the interview and with the tasks I had 
proposed.
The students’ concepts of function were also marked by confusion between closely 
related terms and ideas. Carla, for example, temporarily confused the roles o f x andy 
regarding the real-valued function described by y = x2  when she said that when x is 3 the 
y-value would be V3 (Interview 2, line 32). A number of students in the class 
interchanged the terms range and codomain, an issue I chose to explore with Carla in her 
second interview. In the interview, she displayed connections and understandings built 
up around the terms. For example, she talked about the idea o f restricting the range o f a 
function, analogous to the way the domain of a function is often restricted in 
mathematical discourse. Carla’s “equal-handed treatment o f x andy” (Lauten, Graham, 
& Ferrini-Mundy, 1994, p. 233) seemed to contribute to a robust yet problematic concept 
image. Thus, it seems unlikely that her confusion could have been fixed by merely 
telling her she had the terms reversed.
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The remainder of the discussion on the concept o f function is intended to illustrate some 
ways in which the students’ understandings of functions mattered when they approached 
concepts in abstract algebra. I base this discussion on an episode in which Diane 
demonstrated particularly unusual understandings and then broaden that discussion to 
illustrate how similar phenomena arose with Lori and Carla.
Diane. Functions, and Homomorphisms
Diane’s third interview focused mostly on homomorphisms and functions, and we did not 
get to the tasks about cosets. The following episode illustrates three aspects of her 
understanding of functions, which together impeded her progress on the interview tasks 
and likely obstructed her understanding o f the concept of homomorphism. First, Diane’s 
concepts o f function, homomorphism, and binary operation were connected and 
intertwined in unusual ways that led to implicit (i.e., unspecified) homomorphisms. 
Second, she had trouble attaching the names o f and her associations with the concepts 
one-to-one and onto to the objects and processes under consideration. Third, she had an 
unusual concept o f function that was connected to and supported by the notation. These 
issues were revealed slowly over the course o f the interview.
When Diane provided her definition o f homomorphism, she did not mention the word 
group, which perhaps is not surprising, since students in the course almost always were 
dealing with some group or other. I asked her how groups were involved:
15 Diane: If a group is a homomorphism, that means you can do this \J{a*b) =fta)*flb)] 
with every single element and have both sides be true and a group is a homomorphism.
This appears to be merely unusual syntax, but, as will become clear below, for Diane a 
group could be a homomorphism and the group operation supplied the function.
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1 asked her to come up with an example and to show that it was a homomorphism.
19 Diane: So, from like U% I have 1 ,3 ,5 ,  7. So for a homomorphism I would have 1, 3 
would equaiyfl) and/(3) like that? [Writes/(I *3) = /( l)*/(3)-]
2 0 Brad: Okay, so what i s / f l )  then?
21 Diane:y(l) is 1, and thenJ{3) = 3. ,/[l*3) here is 3, and/[3) is 3. So it’s 3, and then 1*3
is 3.
Diane began verifying the function was a homomorphism before she had specified what 
the function was. From her calculations (lines 21 and following), however, it is clear that 
the function she had in mind was equivalent to the identity function on U%, which, as an 
isomorphism, is necessarily a homomorphism. It seems unlikely that she would have 
described her thinking this way.
1 asked Diane how she had decided thaty(5) was 5 andy(7) was 7:
2 7 Diane: Well the function here is mod 8 . So under mod 8 , 5 is 5, and 7 is 7. So the
function here is U&.
31 Diane: The function here is Ug. Is the mod 8 . Multiplication.
So for Diane, the group Us provided a function, and the signifiers Us, mod 8 , and even 
“mod multiplication 8 ” (line 41) were synonyms for that function. It is true that a group 
operation is a function in the sense that it takes an ordered pair of elements from the 
group and returns an element of the group, but Diane’s function was a function o f one 
variable, not two, and hence was not the group operation. Because she seemed to be 
concerned about doing “mod 8 ,” a better description o f her function might be/(x) = 
x mod 8 , but because the domain o f her function was the set {1, 3, 5, 7}, it is impossible 
to tell the difference between this function and the identity function /(x) = x.
Thus, Diane was confusing the concepts of binary operation, homomorphism, and 
function, all under the vague heading “doing mod 8 ,” an idea that was provided implicitly
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either by the binary operation in U% or by the construction o f its elements. This is the 
phenomenon of implicit homomorphisms mentioned in the case o f Carla in chapter 6  and 
discussed further below.
I next asked her to consider the function from C/g to Z4  that I had used with all the 
participants in their third interview:
3 4 Brad: Okay. And under this mapping, I want you to send 1 from Ug, I want you to send it
over to 0. And I want you to send 3 also to 0, and I want you to send 5 and 7 from Ug, 
both of them I want you to send to 2.
3 5 Diane: Using a homomorphism, or just send them over?
3 6  Brad: Well, send them over. Now I want that to be the mapping, and I want to call it g.
Is that a function? Call it little g. How about that?
3 7 Diane: It’s a function only if  this is true. If you can send them over using g  as a function
then it’s true.
3 8  Brad: I am not sure I understand what you mean by that.
3 9 Diane: Well, Ug and Z4 here are.... To bring this over to here is g. So if  you can bring
this over here, and it’s . ... I think if you can bring 1 and 3 over to 0, and you bring 5 and 
7 to 2. I think g  can be a function.
4 0 Brad: I am not quite sure what it is that you are saying and also what it is that you are
worried about. Explain it out loud, as much as you can, what is going through your head.
41 Diane: Well, from here I was saying that Ug was a function. Mod multiplication 8  was
the function. And you are saying that here g  is the function. But you have Ug and Z4, but 
I would think that Ug and Z4 would be the functions.
In this excerpt, Diane’s language is particularly curious and hard to understand. The 
explanation lies in her concepts o f function, homomorphism, group operation, and the 
interaction between them. It became clear later in the interview that Diane’s 
understanding o f function was based largely on a metaphor of “sending over,” which, in 
this excerpt, forms half of Diane’s distinction in line 35. Regarding her concept of 
homomorphism, this excerpt reinforces the proposition that, for Diane, the groups 
supplied functions, so that where I had suggested a single function g, Diane saw three
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functions: U%, Z4, and g, which were mod 8 , mod 4, and the function that was used to 
“send elements over.”
As Diane considered the function I had defined as g, she said did not know “what the 
function would be” (line 43), suggesting she wanted it to be given by a formula. She 
began using the concepts one-to-one and onto to support her reasoning, but she knew she 
was “fuzzy a little bit on the one-to-one and onto definitions” (line 114).
116 Diane: Well, I am remembering that one-to-one means that each element from G has at 
most 1 element in G' that it’s being mapped to. And then onto means that each element 
G has at least one element.... No, that’s not right; it’s the other way around. One-to-one 
means that G' has at most one element being mapped to it, and onto means at least one 
being mapped to it. Is that right? Now I am not even sure what the definitions mean. I 
know one-to-one is at most 1 and onto is at least 1. I am not sure where it starts.
Thus, her concepts of one-to-one and onto were guided by associations with “at most 
one” and “at least one,” respectively, but these associations were not enough to help her 
determine whether to focus on the domain or the codomain.
When the interview returned to determining whether g  was a homomorphism, Diane 
described how she was thinking about the verification process:
14 4 Diane: And, well, here you have the function g. I should put g  here. And then you take 
your two elements and put them through g  and you get an element here in Z4. So if you 
do it on the other side of the homomorphism, you take a here send it through the function 
and get your element, send b through the function and get your element, and then you put 
them together in Z4.
146 Diane: We could take like g  and 3 times 1. And in Ug, 3x1 = 3, andg(3) is 3. And g  
of. ... I don’t think I did what I said I’m supposed to do. I think I sent this over to get 
g(3) in Z4 is 3 and 3 star 1...
In her description o f the process, it appears Diane saw g(a*b) and g(a)*g(b) as two sides 
o f the homomorphism, suggesting that the defining formula for a homomorphism was the 
homomorphism itself. Furthermore, in evaluating g(3), Diane ignored my definition o f g  
altogether and instead decided that g(3) was 3.
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At this point Diane suggested we stop the interview because she was too tired and was 
not thinking clearly. I told her that it was entirely up to her but, that I would probably 
still find the interview to be useful in my analysis. She chose to continue. We returned 
to determining why g(3) = 3.
163 Diane: Okay, from here g(3), I took 3 and 1 from Ug, put them together in Ug, sent them 
over to g, then you take g(3) from here, and that equals 3 because you are in Z4.
164 Brad: I didn’t follow that. I understand that 3x1 is 3 in Ug. But then where is the sending 
over happening, and where are you writing that? That’s what I am not following.
165 Diane: Well, I want g(3), so I am taking the 3, bring it over through g.
166 Brad: Taking the 3 from?
167 Diane: From Ug. Across the function g  into Z4, and so I am now taking 3 from Z4. And it 
equals 3.
168 Brad: Okay, because 3 in Z. ... Hold off from this for a minute. What is g(5)?
169 Diane: First you take the five from Ug. 5 in Ug is 5. Bring over g(5) into Z4. So g(5) is 1.
170 Brad: And how did you do that?
171 Diane: You took the element 5 from Ug, and you want to bring it over through g. So g(5) 
is now in Z4, and 5 in Z4 is 1.
172 Brad: Oh, because ...
173 Diane: Because g  isn’t happening to any element until it passes into Z4.
174 Brad: And so what does g  do?
175 Diane: g  maps something over; it sends something over. So g  is sending the 5 over. It’s 
not doing anything to the 5 really, it’s just sending the 5 over.
176 Brad: And once the 5 gets over there ...
177 Diane: You can do the other operation to it.
Diane then explained that the other operation is “the Z4  operation” (line 181). Diane had 
completely ignored my definition o f g  and saw g  instead as sending elements over from 
one group to another. Once an element had been sent over to Z4, she did the Z4  operation 
to it (i.e., found its remainder, mod 4) to be sure that it was an element o f Z4. It is not 
clear from Diane’s description, however, whether the 5 becoming 1 was part of g  or 
something that happened after g  had completed its job.
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In this episode, Diane’s peculiar take on functions and homomorphisms was supported, in 
part, by the ease with which an element from U% could be transformed into an element of 
Z4 . I then constructed a function h from D4 to U% for which this would be impossible. In 
response, Diane used my specification without hesitation, saying, for example, “h(R0), 
that sends Ro to 1” (line 209) and later “Ro is 1” (line 213), suggesting that she had made 
an identification o f elements between the two groups in such a way that h was still doing 
the sending. When I asked her why she knew that h mapped i ? 9 0  to 3, she responded, 
“Because you said so” (line 233), implying that she was aware o f my role in the 
specification of h.
I then asked her to think about g(3) from the previous example, and she responded that “g  
maps 3 to 0” (line 235). I ask her whether that was what she had said before:
23 9 Diane: Nope. I don’t know why this would make more sense. I guess it’s because we
just did it in class or something. Of course, it shouldn’t have made a difference.
24 6  Diane: That g was just.... I didn’t think that g itself was doing anything really. So I
thought that if  I did this first, that g is actually Ug.
24 7 Brad: That g is actually U{! What do you mean by that?
24 8  Diane: Well, when I said “g(3) is 3.”... In t/g, g(3) is 3. So I think maybe that’s what I 
was doing.
Thus, at this point in the interview, her thinking had changed, but I still had not reached
much clarity on how she was thinking about the function g. I asked her to clarify:
251 Brad: So what are you thinking now g does to ...?
252 Diane: g sends the 3 to 0.
253 Brad: And the 3 is something that exists where?
254 Diane: In U%.
255 Brad: And the 0 is something that exists ...
256 Diane: In Z4.
257 Brad: Okay. Then you said g(3). ... And whenever you talk about g(3), where is that 
thing?
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2 58 Diane: Right here in the middle.
2 5 9 Brad: What do you mean by that?
2 60 Diane: I haven’t actually.... This by itself, g(3), I haven’t exactly done anything to it yet.
Diane imagined three different places where a value might exist: the domain, the 
codomain, and in the middle. This interpretation becomes clearer in the following 
explanation:
2  64 Diane: You take an element in Ug, apply the function g  to it, so now you have the
function g  of something in Ug. So now it’s no longer in Ug, because you are applying g  to 
it. [Okay.] Okay? Now as you bring it over, g  is not doing anything but mapping it 
over, just carrying it over. So, if  you are stuck—well, you’re not going to be stuck—but 
if you happen to be in the middle, you are not actually doing anything to the element. So 
it’s still going to be g  of an element in Ug. And when you bring it all of the way over to 
Z4, then you are actually doing something. So g(3) is now 0 because you are actually 
over in Z4.
Thus, 3 begins in Ug; g(3) is the process of carrying the 3 over to Z4, which exists 
between Ug and Z4  but which does not actually do anything until the 3 is brought all of 
the way over, at which point g(3) becomes 0.
The above episode illustrates three issues, which are treated in different ways in the 
discussion that follows. Diane’s implicit specification of the homomorphism from Ug to 
Ug is discussed below with reference to a similar episode with Carla. Diane’s difficulty 
attaching the terms one-to-one and onto to aspects o f the given functions can be seen as 
another instance o f the issue o f naming, which is treated in detail in chapters 5 and 6  
regarding other concepts. Her nonstandard interpretation o f function notation is 
discussed next with reference to Lori’s understandings and interpretations of functions.
Function Notation
The idea that g(3) denotes a value between the domain and the codomain is a nonstandard 
interpretation o f function notation. Lori demonstrated similar nonstandard interpretations
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during her third interview, which took place separately from Diane’s. She was working 
with the function/ from C/ 8 to Z4, given by 7(1) = 0,7(3) = 0,7(5) = 2, and7(7) = 2. 
Regarding the notation7(1), she knew that 1 was in U%. She first claimed that7(1) was in 
the codomain because it was 0. Then she changed her mind: “I ’m sorry, f(l), and that’s 
in the domain, ... but then when I take their functional values, 7(1) is 0” (line 79).
I asked her again where7(1) was.
83 Lori:7(1). Do you mean7(1) before it’s evaluated? Or7(1) after it’s evaluated.
8  4 Brad: Well, explain both.
85 Lori:7(l) is actually in the domain. But then the functional value of7(l) is 0, and that’s in
the codomain.
Thus, Lori first imagined two senses of7(l): before and after it is evaluated. But then she 
made a distinction between7 ( l) , which is in the domain, and its value 0 , which is in the 
codomain. So at first, the notation was ambiguous, but then she resolved the ambiguity 
by making an incorrect notational distinction.
As the interview continued, she decided that ‘7(1) is like 1” (line 91), which perhaps 
prepared her for a different notational distinction. I then asked her to consider another 
function g, which I did not specify, and asked her where g(3) would be. She decided 
correctly that 3 was in the domain and g(3) was in the codomain and made similar 
conclusions about7 ( 1 ).
I asked her to explain how she had been thinking o f it earlier.
115 Lori: Oh, I said that if—it’s wrong now—but I said that if,7(1) before it was sent is in the
domain, and then after it’s sent, it’s 0, and it’s in the codomain. [Okay.] That’s wrong. 1 
is in the domain, andy(l) is in the codomain, andyf 1) evaluated in the codomain is 0 .
121 Lori: 1 is before it’s sent,7(1) is after it’s sent, and 0 is after it’s sent.
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Lori’s focus on “before and after” suggests that she, too, focused on a process that 
occurred between the domain and the codomain. For D iane,/(l) was in the middle, 
whereas for Lori, /( l )  was in either the domain or the codomain depending upon whether 
it was before or after evaluation.
It appears that there is something salient about the process o f evaluating a function—  
something that led Lori to conclude, if  only momentarily, that/(1) represented both the 
before and after o f this process. Lori resolved this ambiguity first by p lacing/[l) in the 
domain. Diane, in contrast, resolved the ambiguity by creating a new abstract entity that 
existed “in the middle” between the domain and the codomain.
The idea that g(3) is a value in the middle between the domain and codomain is a 
reasonable, although incorrect, conclusion to draw from the notation and the metaphors. 
In standard mathematical usage, when g(3) = 0, the 3 is in the domain, and both g(3) and 
0 are in the codomain. But by imagining a function as a process, as a machine, or as 
something that “sends elements over,” the process or the traveling will take time, creating 
a metaphorical need to notate a value in process or in transit. The notation g(3) is an 
obvious choice because the way it is written seems to suggest that the 3 is still inside the 
function and has not yet emerged as 0. For Diane, g(3) denoted this value in the middle.
This interpretation o f the notation and the metaphors seems so obvious and natural that it 
seems likely that other students have come to similar conclusions, but the phenomenon 
has apparently not been recognized in the literature on the concept o f function. Yet, the 
fact that I was able to observe this unusual conception depended, perhaps heavily, on the 
particular line o f questions I asked. Without the particular question in line 257, Diane’s 
unusual thinking would likely have remained hidden.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Implicit Homomorphisms
Just as Diane’ s unusual interpretation o f function notation was found to have similarities 
in the thinking o f other students, her implicit specification o f a homomorphism was an 
issue that arose in Carla’s interview as well, as mentioned above. Both Carla and Diane 
began verifying that a function was a homomorphism before they had specified what the 
function was. In other words, they were working with functions defined implicitly and 
did not see a need to be explicit. On the one hand, for Carla, the function was inherent in 
the construction of Z4  and was based on her conception o f modular arithmetic, as is 
explored in more detail below. For Diane, on the other hand, the function was tied to 
mod 4, which she saw as the group operation. In both cases, the result was that their 
understandings of functions and modular arithmetic led to unexpected outcomes.
Diane’s and Carla’s conceptions raise serious questions about the prominence given to 
the canonical homomorphism f .Z  —» Z„ given by fix )  = x  mod n. On Problem 3 on the 
second take-home exam (Appendix B), the students were asked to show that this function 
is indeed a homomorphism, and the example was also discussed in class. These events 
occurred shortly before third interviews, which may explain why the function was 
prominent in Carla’s mind. The issue is that the function does not seem to do very much, 
giving the impression that the function is already part o f the codomain and has little to do 
with a mapping between two groups. A similar statement can be made about the 
canonical homomorphism f .Z  -> nZ  defined by/(x) = nx.
Another way to look at these episodes is to observe that Carla and Diane were not able to 
distinguish between a function between groups, the group operation, and the construction
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of the group. Thus, this is yet another example of a need to encourage students to 
distinguish among ideas that are closely related.
Summary
Regarding the students’ concept images o f functions, I have presented a few issues that 
became prominent in the analysis and that had particular relevance for their 
understanding o f elementary group theory. The issues seemed peculiar to Diane at first, 
but similarities with other students emerged during the analysis.
Diane’s idea that g(3) was in the middle between the domain and codomain was a natural, 
although incorrect, consequence o f the notation and the metaphors. Lori similarly had 
trouble placingXl), and although she did not suggest that it was between the domain and 
the codomain, her language suggests that the process of evaluating the function was 
psychologically salient. The dominance of the process in function evaluation has 
psychological similarities with the dominance o f process conceptions in students’ concept 
images of cosets.
Diane and Carla both specified functions implicitly when providing examples of 
homomorphisms. The analysis suggests that their concepts of function, homomorphism 
and binary operation were intertwined and that the binary operations in Us and Z4, or, 
more simply “mod 8 ” and “mod 4,” provided the functions that they were thinking about. 
Thus, it is plausible that some of their nonstandard conceptions were related to their 
understandings of modular arithmetic, which is the focus of the next section.
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Modular Arithmetic
Many students used the word mod in unexpected ways in the interviews and in class, 
suggesting that their concepts might have differed from those in the mathematical 
community. Rather than a thorough analysis o f students’ understanding of modular 
arithmetic, I focus on two episodes that provide grounding for the results. The section 
begins with a semiotic analysis o f Carla’s use of the word mod  during her first interview. 
Then I present an episode that occurred during a class early in the course when many 
students were still making sense o f modular arithmetic. The conceptual analysis is 
postponed until after the episodes and incorporated into the analysis in order to give more 
of a sense o f the phenomena that the analysis is intended to describe.
Carla and mod
All statements in which Carla used the word mod were collected for analysis. Focusing, 
in particular, on statements in which her language use seemed unusual, I constructed an 
explanation that accounts for most o f what she said. The series o f statements below is 
intended to illustrate the evolution o f this explanation. In these statements, the word mod 
is set in bold to draw attention to those phrases that were the subject of analysis. The 
series of statements is interrupted periodically with comments and working hypotheses to 
illustrate how the conclusion grew out of the data.
1 2  Carla: Because the addition wasn’t a group mod n. Something about mod n isn’t a group
with addition, because multiples of.... Something about multiples of n. Let’s see, mod n 
with addition. All right. For an identity for mod n, that would be just zero with addition.
61 Carla: S is just mod n under addition.
7 9 Carla: So the next thing to check would be associativity. But mod n is a subset of Z
because all of your elements in mod n are integers, and Z under addition is associative, so 
therefore mod n under addition is associative. So therefore mod n under addition is a 
group.
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Hypothesis: For Carla, mod n was a set. In Carla’s written work, S  denoted a set and she 
identified that set with mod n (line 61). The notion that mod n is a set, which is clear in 
lines 61 and 79, also fits Carla’s language in line 12.
9 4 Carla: Mod 5 means that a = 5q + r. Mod 5 means that you have elements called a that 
satisfy the condition 5q + r. It is kind o f a way to back up from the integer group.
9 6  Carla: Okay, because if you take an integer, you can ... To me it seems almost like it’s
simplifying because you are dealing with less elements. If you take an integer, say 18, 
you can write it in a mod, and you can express.... Say you were dealing with mod 9. 18 
is 0 mod 9, but 36 is also 0 mod 9, so it gives you a way to kind of group and simplify.
Hypothesis: For Carla, mod n was also an operation. Her statement in line 94 also 
indicates a connection to the division algorithm, but it is not clear how that relates to her 
other conceptions.
118 Carla: For example, the integer— I mean the inverse o f 2 mod 3 would be 1/2 mod 3, and
1/2 is not an integer, and it is not in mod 3, and the only elements of mod 3 are 0, 1, 2.
18 9 Carla: If you are dealing with Z3 you are supposed to add them in mod 3. So what you
are saying is that the operation is different because you are dealing with mod 3 or mod 6 . 
Yeah, I think I remember something being mentioned about that in class.
Note: For Carla, Z3 was not the same as mod 3.
196 Carla: If you are dealing with mod 3, 2, 3, 4 is the same thing as 2, 0, 1 in mod 3. So I
don’t know. I think that it could be a subset because ...
198 Carla: Well, I mean.... Actually, we already know it is a subset, I think that the mod 3 
and mod 6  wouldn’t make a difference as far as being considered different operations 
because it looks, even though the numbers are different, in the portion of the Z6 table they 
are equivalent to the Z3 table if  you are dealing with (mod 3). Even though I think that 
something was said in class about mod ... 2  mods, different mods are different 
operations.
2 00 Carla: Initially they seem the like different operations, but.... Oh, well actually we
weren’t debating really whether Z3 was a subset of Z6. We are talking about, are their 
operations different? I don’t know if  they are different. I’m not sure. I don’t think they 
are because I remember something being said about that they’re not. And I have nothing 
that would make me think that they are the same operation. Because you are doing 
nq + r, but with mod 3 you are doing 3q + r and in mod 6 you are doing 6q + r, and 
3q + r is very different from 6 q + r. So I think they are different.
Conclusion: For Carla, mod n was the set that you get from “doing nq + r." This 
explanation accommodates the set, operation, and process interpretations given above.
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On the surface, it seems Carla had a rather odd and problematic concept, but on a deeper 
level, there were some profoundly mathematical aspects o f her thinking. First, Carla was 
able to think about the concept mod n as being both an object (a set) and as a process 
(doing nq + r). Second, the set is a set o f remainders, which results from a process that 
involves stepping back (backing up) from the integers, and organizing them into 
equivalence classes, which she elsewhere described metaphorically as packages 
(Interview 1, line 98). Thus, Carla’s mod n describes precisely, without using the 
standard names, the idea, the process, and the object that are behind the symbol Z/3Z, 
which simultaneously denotes all three. The idea in the standard construction is using the 
subgroup 3Z to organize the integers into equivalence classes, the process is creating the 
cosets, and the object is the group consisting of the three cosets under the operation of 
coset arithmetic. In other words, if  Carla had instead said “Z/3Z is the set you get from 
forming the quotient (or the group o f the cosets) o f 3Z in Z,” we would have been quite 
impressed. O f course, this language was not available to her at this early point in the 
class.
I have emphasized that the students’ conceptual grids may be different from the accepted 
one, thus giving rise to concepts that do not fit the accepted grid. But here we have a 
case where the portions of the grid fit quite well but it is very hard to see the fit through 
Carla’s idiosyncratic language. Her unusual language, in this case, does not seem to 
indicate a problematic concept. On the other hand, she did seem to focus too much on 
the division in the process, making her thinking somewhat slow and laborious.
These excerpts also suggest that some learning had taken place. During the interview 
Carla came to a determination that, when “doing nq + r,” the value of n is a
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distinguishing characteristic of the related group operation: A different value of n 
indicates a different operation.
Other students and mod
I attempted similar analysis for other students and was not able to come to clear 
conclusions. Nonetheless, an episode from class provides helpful ideas for the analysis. 
During the second week o f class, after the students had been working for a while on 
problems involving modular arithmetic, Dr. Benson asked all the collaborative groups to 
spend a few minutes writing down every fact they could think o f that was related to a = b 
mod n. They had access to two definitions:
DEFINITION Modular Equations
If a and b are integers and n is a positive integer, we write a = b mod n when n 
divides a - b .  (Gallian, 1994, p. 8 )
We say a = b mod n if  a and b have the same remainder when divided by n.
(Problem Sheet 1, Appendix C)
The students used both equality and equivalence, with the corresponding symbols, to 
describe such relationships.
During the discussions in this particular class period, several issues arose. For example, 
the statement 15 = 7 mod 4 created disagreement in some groups o f students. Some 
students thought the statement was wrong; others thought that it just had not been 
simplified all the way. Wendy pointed out, “The whole point is you’re getting a 
remainder.” Another student suggested that the idea was to “Take a big problem and 
make it smaller.” More generally, students wondered whether the following statements 
were equivalent:
a = b mod n and b ~  a mod n.
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For some students, these were not equivalent because a = b mod n meant that a was 
supposed to be smaller than b and than n ; others thought that b was supposed to be 
smaller than a and n.
These notational difficulties were accompanied by more general algebraic difficulties. 
Some students, for example, were not sure whether they should write n divides (a -  b) or 
n divides (b -  a), not realizing that the statements were equivalent. In thinking about the 
common remainder interpretation, one group first wrote
a , b ,— = q + r and — = q+r
n n
where q and q' were quotients and r was the remainder. After some discussion, they 
decided that the correct expression was
a r , b , r— ~ q  + — and — = q H— .
n n n n
The groups of students spent some time considering yet not resolving, many of the issues 
raised by the class. Dr. Benson said,
Some o f you are likely thinking, “Why don’t they just tell us?” Well— and I 
don’t mean this in a sarcastic way at all— we did. The point I want to make is 
that we did tell you and still there were issues that need to be resolved. (Field 
notes, Jan. 24, 1996)
A student said, “Wait! Problem Sheet 1.” Finally, the class summarized the results on 
the board:
1 . a = b mod n
2 . b = a mod n
3. n divides a -  b
4. n divides b -  a
5. a -  b = nq for some integer q
6 . a = b + nk, where k is an integer
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7. a and b have the same remainder when divided by n
ci v b v
8 . — = q H—  and — = q'-\— , with q, q’ quotients, r remainder 
n n n n
ci — v b — v
9.  = q a n d -------- = q ' , with q, q’ quotients, r remainder
n n
Note: q, q’, and r are integers and n cannot be zero.
Several points can be made here. First, as Dr. Benson pointed out, giving the students a 
definition was not sufficient for building adequate understanding. They did not even 
think of consulting a definition until after Dr. Benson reminded them that we had told 
them.
Second, a deep understanding o f the concept of modular arithmetic should include all of 
these statements and the connections among them. In other words, all o f these (and the 
reasons for their equivalence) are desirable parts of a sophisticated concept image. But 
these representations all use traditional algebraic symbolism and say little about other 
representations that might support understanding. Carla, for example, used the metaphor 
of packages, as mentioned above, to help her think about the equivalence classes. Wendy 
used the metaphor o f the clock to help her think about the arithmetic in Z„.
Third, although the nine characterizations are algebraically equivalent, they were not 
psychologically equivalent for these students. Significant thought was required for the 
students to decide that some of these were equivalent to a = b mod n. One might hope 
that the fact that Characterizations 3 and 4 are equivalent would be obvious from the fact 
that a - b  = - ( b - a ) .  But for some of the students, this was far from obvious, perhaps 
indicating insufficient proficiency with high school algebra.
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Analysis
Can all o f the difficulties be attributed to reluctance to consult the definition and to 
insufficient proficiency with algebra? Prompted by these events, I conducted a 
conceptual analysis. What was most surprising in this episode was the students’ 
disagreements over whether Characterizations 1 and 2 were equivalent. The very notion 
of an equivalence relation implies that it must be symmetric. Just as a = b implies b = a, 
so also a = b mod n implies b = a mod n. What could be the cause o f difficulty with 
something that should be obvious?
I claim the difficulty is caused by ambiguity in the notation. Specifically, the problem is 
polysemy: related but distinct uses of the word mod. It is not often recognized that the 
symbol mod is both a type o f equivalence relation and a binary operation. The 
equivalence relation interpretation is what Dr. Benson had in mind in the episode 
described above. In other contexts, particularly in computer programming languages, 15 
mod is a binary operation: an instruction to divide and keep the remainder. In fact, 
Gallian (1994) makes this explicit:
D e fin it io n  a mod n
Let n be a fixed positive integer. For any integer a , a mod n (sometimes read “o 
modulo n”) is the remainder upon dividing a by n. (p. 7)
This definition is followed by computational examples such as “8 mod 3 = 2.”
These two interpretations of the symbol mod create ambiguity in the interpretation of the 
statement 15 = 7 mod 4. If  mod qualifies an equivalence relation, the statement is true
15 Both Pascal, BASIC and use m o d  as a binary operator. C and C++ use “%” as the symbol for modular 
arithmetic, so that “17 % 5” evaluates to 2, for example. The mathematical programming languages 
Maple and ISETL use m o d  as a binary operator. Mathematica and Mathcad, on the other hand, use 
function notation, so that Mod [ 17, 5 ] and mod (17,  5) ,  respectively, are the appropriate ways to 
calculate 17 mod 5.
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because 4 divides 1 5 - 7 .  But if  m od  is a binary operation, then the right side o f the 
equation evaluates to 3 (the remainder after dividing 7 by 4), and the statement is false 
because 1 5 ^ 3 .
At least some people in the mathematical community are aware o f  this ambiguity. The 
mathematical typesetting language TeX, for example, provides two different commands: 
“ \b m o d  is to be used when ‘m od’ is a binary operation, ... and \p m o d  is to be used 
when ‘m od’ occurs parenthetically at the end o f  a formula” (Rnuth, 1984, p. 164). Some 
texts (e.g., Fraleigh, 1989) distinguish between these two uses by adopting the convention 
that Knuth describes, but this convention is not universal (see, e.g., Gallian, 1994). Dr. 
Benson and I did not use this notational convention consistently, but other results o f  this 
study suggest that, even if  we had, the students would not have used the convention 
consistently, at least until they also had made the corresponding conceptual distinction. 
The conclusion, then, is that both the notational and conceptual distinctions should be 
made explicit in instruction, perhaps even making connections between the two uses. For 
example, the statement a = b (mod n) can be translated into a binary operation 
interpretation as follows:
a mod n = b mod n (in the sense that they both operations give the same result)
Then, with the help o f  these distinctions, the students might be more likely to see the 
equivalence o f  the various formulations o f  equivalence modulo n, such as: 
a = b (mod n) if and only if n divides a -  b
a = b (mod n) if and only if a and b have the same remainder when divided by n 
This way, the polysemy o f the word mod  might be used to support rather than impede the 
growth o f conceptual understanding.
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In summary, this analysis supports three points. First, the distinctions among the several 
uses o f the word mod  should be made explicit in instruction. Second, the various 
formulations provide different conceptual support and sources o f meaning, and several 
should be available in instruction. Third, the connections among the various formulations 
are not obvious and each connection requires some learning. What is unclear is which 
definition should be introduced first.
In fact, there is a third use o f the word mod, as in the expression a = b (modulo H), where 
H  is a subgroup o f a group. The relationship between equivalence modulo / /a n d  
equivalence modulo n is accomplished via the following generalization of the standard 
definition:
a = b (mod n) if  and only if  n divides a -  b
a = b (modulo H) if  and only if  abA e H  (or a -  b e H, if  the group is additive)
It is difficult to see the meaning behind these definitions. Thus, it is worth asking 
whether there is an alternative definition that would suggest more meaning and 
simultaneously make strong connections with equivalence modulo n. The conceptual 
root for equivalence modulo H  is the idea of remainders, but remainders cannot be 
imposed directly on a group and a subgroup, where there may be no division algorithm. 
An alternative definition may be found via equivalence classes, but because the binary 
operation carries no notion o f equivalence classes, a better route is through the concept o f 
coset.
a = b (modulo H) if and only if  a and b lie in the same coset o f H  (i.e., aH  = bH)
The results of this study suggest that the above definition should be available to students 
for the meaning and understanding it might provide. Furthermore, this definition could
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provide opportunities for students to deepen their understanding o f modular arithmetic, 
cosets, and the connections between them. Again, however, it is not clear whether this 
definition should be introduced before or after the standard definition.
Summary
This section explains some nonstandard uses o f the word mod  that occurred during 
Carla’s interview and during a class early in the course. For Carla, mod n was the set the 
you get from “doing nq + r ” Conceptually, Carla’s nonstandard usage seems to carry the 
same meaning as the more standard statement that Z„ is the set you get from calculating 
the quotient group Z/nZ  and choosing representative elements. The class had 
disagreements about the correctness of several formulations o f a = b (mod n). Some of 
the difficulties that Carla and other students had with the term mod  are explained by the 
fact that the word is used ambiguously, both as a binary operation and as a type of 
equivalence. It is suggested that the various uses o f the word mod, the various 
formulations o f equivalence modulo n and equivalence modulo H, and the connections 
among them should be explicit in instruction.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to describe the students’ understandings o f preliminary mathematics 
as those understandings came into play in their learning of group theory. The students’ 
understanding of preliminary mathematics was not a specific focus of any o f the 
interviews. Nonetheless, there were episodes demonstrating that the concepts of function 
and modular arithmetic are crucial and that sometimes the students’ nonstandard 
conceptions appeared to obstruct their progress on tasks and concepts in abstract algebra. 
Regarding the key concepts of function and modular arithmetic, the analysis shows that,
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just as in the previous chapters, students’ understandings are intimately tied to issues of 
language, notation, and metaphor. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that students’ 
understandings may be strongly influenced by the particular examples and particular 
definitions chosen.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This exploratory study sought to describe students’ understanding in abstract algebra in 
the context of an undergraduate course. Using Tall and Vinner’s (1981) notion of a 
concept image, which is the entire cognitive structure associated with a concept, the study 
identified prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images for 
central concepts in group theory, up to and including the concept o f quotient group.
The setting for the study was an abstract algebra class for mathematics majors, covering 
many of the standard topics from group theory but in which lectures were replaced by 
collaborative and individual work on problem sets designed to promote connections 
between students’ prior and emerging understandings and the concepts o f group theory. 
The analysis and the ensuing results are based largely on interview data with five students 
from the class. Other data sources, such as field notes and students’ written exams, 
provided corroborating and contrasting evidence.
The research questions were as follows:
• What are the prominent characteristics and components of students’ concept images 
as they are learning the fundamental ideas of group, subgroup, and isomorphism?
• What are the prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images 
as they are learning the more advanced ideas of homomorphism, coset, and quotient 
group?
• How do students’ understandings of prior mathematics come into play as they are 
learning elementary group theory?
332
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Detailed results for each of these questions, organized according to mathematical 
concept, are found in chapters 5-7. This chapter presents a synthesis o f the findings, 
along with conclusions and implications.
What was initially most salient in the data and the results was that the students used and 
interpreted language and representations in nonstandard and unexpected ways that were 
not readily explained by available theoretical and conceptual perspectives on advanced 
mathematical thinking. On the conviction that the students’ understandings were 
reflected in their language and actions, I endeavored to describe and explain the meaning 
behind their utterances and their use o f representations. Through these efforts, 
characterizing students’ concept images became a process o f theory generation. 
Specifically, through an analysis of language, the goal was to understand students’ 
representations and to represent their understandings. In this sense, this study was about 
the interplay among mathematics, language, and representations.
The results o f the study derive from three types o f analysis: detailed analysis of the 
interview transcripts, global analysis of the students’ use o f words and notations, and my 
own conceptual analysis of the mathematical content. The methods o f analysis emerged 
through the analysis itself, and the research questions evolved as part o f the process. The 
detailed analyses generated preliminary hypotheses that were refined through continuing 
analysis and synthesis. The global analyses involved searching the data for words and 
notations to confirm and refute the emerging hypotheses. The conceptual analyses served 
to make explicit the ways in which the students’ use of language was compared with 
standard usage in the mathematical community. These analyses were performed
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iteratively so that emerging results could continually inform other types of analysis. The 
analysis and synthesis produced two main findings.
The first finding concerns issues of language and notation; it is described below as 
making the vague more precise. In short, language use that at first had seemed 
idiosyncratic and ambiguous was found to have common threads across students. The 
students confused related words and had trouble attaching names to their experiences in 
standard ways. This finding supports the position that attaching names to experience is 
not simply a process of gluing labels to pre-existing, “self-identifying” concepts but first 
requires cutting up experience and organizing it into concepts. Students do not 
necessarily make the same distinctions as those made by mathematicians and 
mathematics educators, and thus they cut up experiences in different ways, both 
indicating and further establishing a collection o f concepts that are substantially and 
structurally different from concepts that are used in the mathematical community.
The second finding has to do with issues o f representation and abstraction; it is elaborated 
below as making the abstract more concrete. In order to gain access to abstract ideas, the 
students relied on representations, metaphors, and other conceptual supports in order to 
manage their relationships with unfamiliar abstractions. Representations both provided 
and obstructed the students’ access to abstract mathematical ideas and thus both supported 
and constrained their understandings. The result is well illustrated by the phenomenon I 
call reasoning from  the table, in which the group operation table serves metaphorically as 
the group, supporting students’ thinking and reasoning. The operation table is a 
representation that mediates abstraction, giving students access to and ways to think 
about abstract ideas but sometimes also impeding their progress toward an abstract view.
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The conclusions continue with the suggestion that the two findings are distinct and 
fundamental aspects o f mathematical activity. Learning advanced mathematics is a 
matter of making distinctions and managing abstraction, and language and 
representations are the tools. Mathematics is a complex interplay between logic and 
intuition, between precision and initially vague abstractions.
Following the synthesis o f the findings, the chapter discusses some general implications 
for mathematics teaching and teacher education. The central theme is the importance of 
encouraging students to make their thinking explicit as a way to build their understanding 
and also to identify the distinctions and abstractions they are and are not making. The 
chapter closes with a discussion of implications for theoretical and empirical work in 
mathematics education.
Making the Vague More Precise
Learning advanced mathematics involves learning concepts, processes, language, 
notation, and the relations among them. That learning can be uneven, and what is learned 
can be connected (and disconnected) in surprising ways. A main finding of the study was 
the seeming independence between the students’ ideas and the language of abstract 
algebra. Sometimes the students’ nonstandard language was close to standard usage, as 
when they interchanged two closely related terms: using range for codomain, 
associativity for commutativity, or identity for inverse. At other times the students used a 
term more broadly than was appropriate— ’’the left coset” for the set o f  cosets—thereby 
introducing apparent ambiguity into their language.
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In some cases, such ambiguity may lie mostly in a superficial interpretation of the 
students’ utterances, for they actually used their idiosyncratic language precisely and 
consistently, as when one student used the phrase normal group for the quotient group 
that may be constructed when a subgroup is normal. Some students resisted attempts to 
impose standard usage, particularly when it seemed to contradict their own usage. Other 
students, in contrast, seemed to be much less precise in their use o f language and also less 
bothered by ambiguity.
O f course, the use o f standard language is not necessarily an indication o f understanding. 
For example, although many o f the students stated on the final exam that a subgroup is 
(or is not) normal because the left and right cosets are (or are not) the same, some of 
those same students did not compute the cosets correctly.
Mathematical discourse depends for its effectiveness on subtle distinctions in notation 
and syntax that are established by convention. These distinctions, however, are not 
necessarily apparent to students. Furthermore, mathematical discourse is not without its 
own ambiguity. The word mod, for example, is used both as a binary operator and as a 
modifier of an equivalence relation, thereby creating ambiguity in statements such as 
15 = 7 mod 4.
One way in which teachers and researchers can deal with such problems of ambiguity 
may be to focus explicitly on linguistic, notational, and conceptual distinctions, probing 
beneath the surface whenever possible. This idea is elaborated below along with other 
implications. In this section, I elaborate the linguistic, notational, and conceptual issues 
that arose in this study.
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Naming Concepts
Although lacking the rigor and specificity o f a true instructional method, the “discovery 
method” exists, in name at least, in the literature and in some mathematics classrooms 
(see, e.g., R. B. Davis, 1990; Dean, 1996; Mahavier, 1997; Morriss, 1998; Touval, 1997). 
In fact, the instructor for the class that provided the setting for this study characterized the 
class this way (Benson, in press). A description of the discovery method would likely 
include the following features: Give the students a rich problem situation to explore.
They will discover patterns and relationships, develop ideas and concepts, and create 
objects and processes. Then simply give the students the commonly accepted 
terminology, and with some metaphorical glue (Hewitt, 2001), they will attach standard 
names to established objects or properties unproblematically. Leron and Dubinsky 
(1995), for example, suggest that “except for the new name, the students can really feel 
that the instructor merely summarizes what they have found in their investigations” (p. 
238).
This study showed that the final step of naming is not necessarily routine and 
unproblematic. Learning mathematical vocabulary and its appropriate syntax is 
sometimes a complicated process with much potential for a misstep. What might explain 
the difficulties students have with the seemingly trivial process of attaching a name to an 
idea? I identified three kinds of naming difficulties, each with its own explanation.
The first kind of naming difficulty is that two words are sometimes confused when they 
involve closely related ideas. A person says one thing but means another, as when the 
students in this study swapped identity for inverse, commutativity for associativity, 
multiplication for addition, and range for codomain. Sometimes such errors are mere
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slips of the tongue; at other times the ideas themselves have become somewhat muddled. 
In either case, these results are consistent with the observation from linguistics and 
cognitive science that such whole-word substitutions occur when words are semantically 
related (Hotopf, 1980; Stillings et al., 1995). Cognitive science provides an explanation 
that fits with its models o f long-term memory: Metaphorically, closely related words are 
stored in close proximity and thus are sometimes confused and hard to keep apart 
(Stillings et al., 1995). This study demonstrates that even when the boundaries between 
related concepts are relatively easy to draw, such as between the identity and inverse 
properties, the distinction between the corresponding words is sometimes hard to 
manage. When the boundaries are harder to draw, the distinctions can become quite 
problematic.
The second kind o f naming difficulty seems to be caused by the name itself. In such 
cases, learning the name requires building some cognitive structure around the name to 
support its meaning and use. Sometimes, as in the terms cycle and identity, the name 
carries an everyday meaning that is somewhat different from the mathematical meaning 
(see, e.g., Lajoie & Mura, 2000; Pimm, 1987). Other terms have multiple meanings 
within mathematical discourse (Zazkis, 1998; Durkin & Shire, 1991). In this study, such 
polysemy was noted for the words mod and congruent, but only the former seemed to 
cause difficulty. With still other terms, the name carries content that begs explanation. 
One student experienced just such a difficulty with the term isomorphism when 
interviewed early in the course. Perhaps the students’ difficulties with the term quotient 
group may be explained similarly.
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The first two kinds of naming difficulty are not particularly novel; both appear in the 
literature. The third is rarely recognized, however, at least in the mathematics education 
literature. Furthermore, it is o f a different character from the other two because it is more 
epistemological than cognitive. The difficulty is as follows: The linguistic, notational, 
and conceptual distinctions that students make are not necessarily the same as those made 
by mathematicians and mathematics teachers. Some o f the distinctions that teachers 
make are neither apparent nor relevant to their students. And students make some 
distinctions that their teachers do not make. Making distinctions, delineating concepts, 
and assigning names are, as Foucault (1971) noted, a matter o f imposing order on 
experience:
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner 
law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and 
also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an 
examination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces o f this grid that order 
manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the 
moment o f its expression, (pp. xix-xx)
Foucault came to this conclusion through an historical analysis o f two great 
discontinuities in the nature o f knowledge in the seventeenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, yet this perspective seems particularly apt for describing many of the 
discrepancies observed in this study between students’ language and what I take to be 
standard mathematical usage.
In this study, the students used grids that did not fit with standard mathematical 
discourse. Some students, for example, did not make clear linguistic distinctions between 
a particular coset and the set o f all cosets. To her, these objects and the process that 
connected them were all part of a single concept. In contrast, another student, discussing 
the meaning ofg(3) = 0, not only distinguished between the value 3 in the domain and
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the value 0 in the codomain but also saw g(3) as a value that was “in the middle.” Thus, 
in situations where a mathematician might see two ideas, the first student saw one, and 
the second saw three.
A problem in naming that involved several related concepts occurred when one student 
expressed many o f the key ideas about normality and quotient groups but had not yet 
attached the standard names to those ideas. When the left and right cosets were the same, 
all the students knew that the word normal applied in some way. But what was it that 
was normal? The resulting group, the subgroup, the generator o f the subgroup, or the 
cosets? And from the symbolic equation aH = Ha, there was also a sense that the word 
Abelian should apply.
In developing language to describe a particular area of study, constructing definitions and 
meaning is a matter o f carving the area into a collection o f related concepts, which 
requires imposing a structure on the area o f study and a grid on the various activities.
This imposition is, in principle, arbitrary, although it is guided by historical and cultural 
precedent and by Occam’s razor, a principle that has its roots in Plato’s suggestion that 
we carve the universe at its joints (Plato, 1998, 265e) and that was eloquently interpreted 
by Einstein: “Make your theory as simple as possible, but no simpler.” When students 
try to make sense of an activity and to construct meaning for the various words, they, too, 
impose a grid on the activity, but constructing the standard grid requires that they see the 
joints that are implicit in the standard distinctions, some o f which are historical accidents. 
The results of this study indicate that students do not necessarily see such joints and thus 
do not use the standard conceptual grid.
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Returning to the issue that opened this section, the results o f this study imply that the 
discovery method underestimates the cognitive complexity o f naming and, more 
specifically, that the metaphor o f gluing names to ideas is too simplistic. The gluing 
metaphor implies that the experience is cut up into concepts that are naturally and 
unproblematically identified and, thus, that naming is a matter o f assimilating standard 
names into well-defined cognitive structures that have been created by the experience. 
This study suggests, in contrast, that cognitive structures are still being created during the 
process o f naming. I am claiming not that the process o f naming always requires 
building new cognitive structures but rather that sometimes assimilation is insufficient to 
describe what is involved in learning to use the standard language. And in any case, the 
resulting concepts may not fit with those of a teacher or researcher, not to mention the 
possibility of problems o f fit among teachers and researchers.
During several interviews, after I had developed a good sense o f the student’s 
nonstandard language, I intervened and tried to encourage the student to use standard 
linguistic conventions and distinctions. In general, these interventions were not 
successful until the student had made the corresponding conceptual distinctions and thus 
had developed a psychological a need for the standard linguistic or notational 
conventions. Even then, learning standard usage seemed to depend upon a dialectic 
between the conceptual and the linguistic distinctions. These results suggest that learning 
new language and particularly changing one’s use o f language may be better seen as 
accommodation rather than assimilation. Therefore, it is necessary, at the very least, to 
pay attention to the distinctions that students make and to make standard distinctions 
explicit in instruction. These ideas are explored further below.
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The three naming difficulties described here have distinct explanations. In practice, 
however, they are by no means distinct but rather operate simultaneously. After one 
carves one’s experience into concepts, the concepts and words may be very closely 
related and hence difficult to keep separate. At the same time, the available words may 
carry other meanings or may present other challenges.
I am not saying that language creates reality. Far from it. Rather, I  am saying 
that what counts as reality— what counts as a glass o f water or a book or a table, 
what counts as the same glass or a different book or two tables— is a matter of 
the categories that we impose on the world; and those categories are for the most 
part linguistic. And furthermore, when we experience the world, we experience 
it through linguistic categories that help to shape the experiences themselves.
The world doesn’t come to us already sliced up into objects and experiences; 
what counts as an object is already a function o f our system o f representation, 
and how we perceive the world in our experiences is influenced by that system of 
representation. The mistake is to suppose that the application o f language to the 
world consists o f attaching labels to objects that are, so to speak, self-identifying.
On my view, the world divides the way we divide it, and our main way of 
dividing things up is in language. (Searle, quoted in Magee, 1979, p. 184)
Searle’s point, along with the results o f this study, put a subtle spin on linguistic 
determinism. Language is simultaneously a social and a personal construction. The 
language that an individual experiences both influences and constrains the reality that the 
individual creates. The language that an individual uses influences and constrains that 
reality more fundamentally. These two languages are unlikely to match and might not 
even fit, however, for the individual and the community do not necessarily divide things 
up in the same ways, and thus their meanings can be substantively different.
Learning Notation
As with names, students’ use of notation does not necessarily incorporate the same 
distinctions as in standard mathematical discourse. Thus, much o f the above discussion 
about names applies to students’ notation as well. In particular, the students in this study 
did not always distinguish between sets and elements, between the two different notations
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for permutations, between distinct elements in the same set, and between variables and 
names of elements.
These issues are examined further below as part o f the discussion o f the ways that 
notation can help manage abstraction. Here I point out only that many mathematical 
distinctions are maintained by notational conventions. Sets, for example, are denoted by 
uppercase letters, elements by lowercase letters. Functions are/ and g ; variables are x 
andy. The identity element in a group is e. Experience suggests that these conventions 
support thinking in the sense that it takes some psychological adjustment to think about a 
function x(f) or, as demonstrated in this study, to recognize that a letter other than e might 
represent the identity. The psychological support provided by these conventions is not 
often discussed in the literature. Yet, students do not necessarily adopt these 
conventions, making it difficult sometimes to interpret their work. And even when they 
do adopt the conventions, one cannot necessarily conclude that they have made the 
corresponding conceptual distinctions and abstractions.
Using Definitions
The students’ definitions in this class were a blend o f formality and informality.
Although the nature and role o f mathematical definitions was not an explicit focus o f the 
class, definitions were periodically introduced, and the instructor and I regularly worked 
with students, both individually and collectively, to help them get better at using 
definitions. Thus, I took a broad view of definitions in the analysis for this study, 
allowing both formal definitions that the students provided on exams as well as informal 
statements that they provided when asked what a word meant. This approach was
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intended to increase the possibility o f insight into the meanings that the students 
imagined words to hold.
The students’ formal definitions often lacked quantifiers and were otherwise imprecise. 
Their informal definitions were of varying degrees o f correctness and bore varying 
degrees o f resemblance to the formal definitions.
Some of the students’ definitions were informal and either vague or missing important 
features:
• Subgroup means a subset that’s a group.
• Z6 means mod 6
• Z6 means {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
• Isomorphism means congruent, same form (with renaming and reordering).
• Identity means the do-nothing element.
Some of their definitions were informal but largely correct and potentially supportive o f a 
correct formal version:
• Group means it’s associative, it has an identity, it has an inverse, and it is closed.
• Kernel means the elements that are mapped to the identity.
• Homomorphism means a function that preserves the operation.
• Coset means aK or aH.
• Normal means the left and right cosets are the same.
• Quotient group is the group of the cosets when the left and right cosets are the same. 
Other definitions were similar to formal definitions but were missing quantifiers or 
specification of notations:
• Associative means (a*b)*c = a*(b*c).
• Homomorphism means j{a*b) = j{a)*'j{b).
• Closure means for all a and b in G, a*b is also in G.
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The students had trouble stating some o f the formal definitions, particularly regarding the 
use o f quantifiers, but their informal definitions served them well in much of their work 
and reasoning.
Because informal definitions were often helpful in guiding the students’ intuitions, it 
seems counterproductive to suggest that their informal characterizations should have been 
discarded in favor o f more precise formal versions. Further, as I argue below, both 
precision and vague intuition are necessary in mathematical activity.
It is worth exploring whether potential confusion arising from the absence o f quantifiers 
and other imprecision can be reduced through instruction that makes explicit connections 
between carefully chosen informal definitions and the associated symbolic expressions. 
For example, some informal definitions have quantifiers built in:
• A function is a homomorphism if  it preserves the group operation.
Many of the students not only could state this informal definition but also associated the 
word homomorphism with the formulaJ[a*b) =fia)*'fib). Articulating the formal 
definition, then, is a matter o f connecting the informal idea with this formula in ways that 
make the quantifiers explicit. This seems a promising approach because it acknowledges 
the importance o f intuition as well as the need for precision.
Generalization Versus Distinction
This study has shown through many examples that students cut up experience in ways 
that do not necessarily fit with standard mathematical discourse, leading to surprisingly 
novel or confounded concepts and to unconventional use o f language and notation. This 
phenomenon is fundamentally about making distinctions and generalizations, which
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involves paying attention to some differences and ignoring others. In this way, making 
distinctions is the opposite of generalization.
Sometimes the students were too general in their use o f language and notation and were 
insufficiently precise, failing to make important distinctions. Some, for example, 
inappropriately generalized the notion that associativity is a “global” property—a 
property that applies to any subset when it applies to a group as a whole—and concluded 
that addition in Z„ is associative because Z„ is a subgroup o f Z. Preventing or overcoming 
this generalization requires making a distinction between addition in Z and addition in Z„. 
Conversely, at other times, the students were not general enough, making unexpected 
restrictions or distinctions, such as in considering g(3) to be “in the middle” between the 
domain and the codomain.
It would be disingenuous and unproductive to suggest that students need to pay better 
attention to differences, because many differences in notation and language are not 
significant. Sometimes small differences in a signifier denote large differences in the 
signified, as in the common convention of denoting sets by uppercase letters and 
elements by lowercase letters. Conversely, large differences in the signifier sometimes 
denote small differences in the signified. This is, after all, the idea behind the concept of 
isomorphism: noticing that two seemingly different representations are essentially the 
same and thus may be considered to represent the same abstract object. The problem is 
knowing which differences merit attention.
Making such distinctions is a problem both for students trying to leam mathematics and 
for teachers and researchers trying to understand and analyze students’ thinking. Only by 
paying careful attention to language was I able to leam that for at least one student g(3)
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was “in the middle” between the domain and the codomain. Similarly, only by paying 
attention to the subtle distinctions between the words coset and cosets was I able to 
conclude that some students’ concepts o f coset were categorically different from the 
standard concept, in the sense that they did not adequately distinguish between a 
particular coset and a set of cosets. Simultaneously, however, I had a sense that other 
students’ concepts o f coset were not general enough, because they insisted that the 
process o f calculating cosets must begin with the kernel o f a homomorphism. 
Generalizing the coset idea to subgroups required letting go o f something (the kernel) 
that seemed central to the process as it had been introduced.
Making the Abstract More Concrete
The students in this study demonstrated at least three ways in which they managed 
abstraction: metaphor, reification, and increasing proficiency. The students gained access 
to groups via operation tables, using the operation tables metaphorically to support their 
thinking about the groups. They gained access to cosets, quotient groups, and properties 
of binary operations by focusing on the processes associated with these concepts. 
Eventually, through increasing familiarity, some o f these processes were reified as 
objects. Also through familiarity, abstract objects and properties became more concrete 
as the students developed proficiency with the concepts, procedures, and examples, and 
gained a better sense of what to expect. These strategies are discussed in turn in the 
sections that follow.
Philosophically, it is possible to create abstract objects, properties, or categories by using 
a definition, a description, a process, or a representation, or by noticing a pattern or
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common properties. Notationally, it is possible to discuss abstract categories by choosing 
a generic member of the category. Psychologically, however, it seems there is much 
more involved.
Many of the results in this study can be viewed as examples o f ways student reduce the 
abstraction level (Hazzan, 1999) o f a concept. But what do strategies such as metaphor 
and reification imply about the psychological processes called abstraction! Frorer, 
Hazzan, and Manes (1997) assert that are three different kinds o f abstraction. Sometimes 
abstraction is about ignoring the pesky details. At other times, it involves thinking in 
terms of properties. At still other times, it is about one’s relationship to an idea (see also 
Wilensky, 1991). This last kind of abstraction is most helpful in explaining the results of 
this study. The first two kinds seem to require enough familiarity to be able to imagine 
generic objects that have particular properties or whose details can be ignored. This 
problem of imagining generic objects is elaborated below in the section about managing 
abstraction and trying to be general.
Operation Table as Metaphor
Operation tables served to mediate abstraction for the students in this study in that they 
worked with a concrete representation to gain access to abstract objects and their 
properties. A group’s operation table makes the group more concrete by making aspects 
o f its form directly visible. Furthermore, by squinting one’s eyes or coloring the 
operation tables by elements or by cosets, the abstract group— of which the particular 
table is an instantiation— can almost become visible. Abstracting the essence of a group 
from an instantiation seems a quintessential example of an activity that requires reflective 
abstraction— abstraction based on action (i.e., operations) alone. With the help of the
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operation table, however, perhaps only empirical abstraction is required. Thus, the table 
becomes both a tool for reasoning and an object o f reflection. Under Wilensky’s (1991) 
view o f abstractness as a measure o f one’s familiarity with a situation, the table serves to 
increase one’s familiarity, thereby making the abstract more concrete.
Operation tables served a metaphorical role for many students in that the tables supported 
their reasoning and helped them think o f groups as objects. For some of the students in 
the study, the table was the group rather than a representation— a metonymic substitution 
o f the concrete for the abstract. Their reasoning seemed to be largely external, in the 
sense that it was based in the table and in procedures that required that the operation table 
be present rather than in reflection on the binary operation. The cancellation laws (e.g., 
ab = ac implies b = c), for example, became embodied in the requirement that each 
element appears exactly once in any row or column. One student went so far as to 
describe the geometry o f the table, suggesting that for him the table was a geometric 
object with geometric properties such as symmetry. The geometric object was a 
metaphor that supported the class’s use o f the word congruent in discussing group 
isomorphisms. In fact, a congruence between two geometric figures requires specifying a 
correspondence between parts, just as a group isomorphism requires specifying a 
correspondence between the elements o f groups.
The table served also to heighten the students’ sense o f anticipation about the way the 
calculations should turn out, similar to Boero’s (1993) observation about the role of 
anticipation in algebraic manipulation. One student, for example, expected {5, 7} to be 
its own inverse. Many students came to expect certain patterns in their operation tables
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and likened those patterns to cycles, which caused some potentially problematic 
connections with the cycle representations o f permutations.
The students in the study could see isomorphisms by looking at operation tables. Some 
of them were especially drawn to the squares of elements in the group, as the squares 
appeared on the diagonal o f the table. They were able to see important differences 
between groups on the basis o f the number o f elements appearing on the diagonal.
The table as metaphor is not without its limitations, however. First, it becomes 
cumbersome for large groups, and extending the metaphor to infinite groups requires 
some sophisticated patterning abilities since it is not possible to write out the whole group 
table. Second, the students expected subgroups to occupy a comer o f the table, probably 
because o f an overly literal Groups-Are-Containers metaphor. Third, writing down a 
group table requires one to choose an order for the elements, which sometimes made it 
difficult for the students to recognize isomorphisms and to think of the order as 
nonessential. Nonetheless, through experiences in renaming and reordering operation 
tables, the students began to separate from the table from the group— the signifier from 
the signified— and thus began to develop concepts of abstract groups.
The results o f this study suggest that the operation table can play a useful metaphorical 
role in students’ thinking about group theory because of the conceptual support that the 
metaphor can provide. Still, it is important to make the metaphors explicit and to be 
aware of their limitations.
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Processes and Objects
In the literature, the process/object distinction is usually portrayed as developmental and 
hierarchical, with an object conception being the more sophisticated (see, e.g., Dubinsky 
et al., 1994; Sfard & Linchevski, 1994). The present study suggests, however, that this 
portrayal may be too simple. There were three concepts for which the process/object 
distinction was particularly relevant: group, coset, and quotient group. This study 
demonstrated that in all three cases that the emergence of an object conception was not 
necessarily an indication of a well-developed process conception.
Regarding the concept o f group, all the key participants in this study demonstrated a 
strong object conception, often based in the operation table. Not all of them, however, 
demonstrated a strong process conception. When the students focused on the operation 
table, they took it to be an object—a whole with pattern and symmetry. Furthermore, 
subgroups were imagined as portions of the table— as subobjects in a sense— although 
this view was sometimes constrained by the arrangement of the elements in the table. 
When the students focused on the processes involved in carrying out the operation, they 
were able to see that addition mod 6  is different from addition mod 3, although this 
distinction was sometimes overwhelmed by the sense that “addition is addition.” The 
data give the impression that the process conception was more powerful and more 
sophisticated. Was the developmental trajectory reversed in this case?
One possible explanation is that the tables were not objects but pseudo-objects for these 
students (Sfard & Linchevski, 1994; Zandieh, 2000). When they were focusing on the 
table, there was a noticeable “externality” in their relationship to the group and its 
operation in that they sometimes needed to see the whole table before they could reason
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clearly, as mentioned above. Finding the inverse of a in Z„, for example, requires looking 
for 0, the identity, in the a row o f the table. This process is easier to carry out when the a 
row is complete. Those students whose reasoning was based on the operation, on the 
other hand, were able to find the inverse o f an element without consulting the table, 
sometimes even coming to the general conclusion that the inverse o f a would b e n - a .
Regarding the concepts o f coset and quotient group, the results o f this study are 
consistent with the finding in the literature that in order to construct quotient groups, one 
must be able to conceive of a coset as an object (Dubinsky et al., 1994). When the 
students were able to compute quotient groups, they seemed to consider cosets to be 
objects. Contrary to the literature, however, conceiving of cosets as objects was not very 
problematic for these students, even for the student who found the process o f constructing 
cosets difficult to manage. The students were perfectly happy to talk about sets o f cosets 
and about a binary operation on cosets, both o f which might be taken as hallmarks of 
object conceptions. They found it relatively easy to compute quotient groups in both 
Abelian and non-Abelian cases and seemed to see the calculations as rather natural. 
Furthermore, after completing such computations and organizing them in an operation 
table, they saw the quotient group, and hence the set of cosets, as being an object, 
probably because their object conception o f groups was supported by the operation table.
Nonetheless, as discussed above, many students found it quite difficult to use standard 
language to describe what they were doing. Moreover, regarding the concept o f coset, 
there was a sense in which some students were stuck in the process, failing to distinguish 
either notationally or linguistically between a particular coset and the set of all cosets.
For these students, the notation aH  signified the process for calculating the cosets.
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In short, the students in this study conceived of cosets as objects but did not necessarily 
think of aH  as representing one such object; they saw the operation table for a quotient 
group as being an object, but they had trouble calling it a quotient group. This result adds 
a subtle distinction to the previous finding that students have trouble seeing cosets as 
objects (Dubinsky et al., 1994). It is possible that this study yielded a different result 
partly because the analysis, with its particular attention to language and notation, was 
more sensitive to such a distinction. It is also plausible to conclude that the different 
result was caused partly by the introduction of “arithmetic o f sets” early in the course.
By the time the students were asked to try to create groups out o f sets of cosets, 
performing an operation on two cosets seemed completely natural and unproblematic for 
many of them. By actually computing products o f cosets, the students were able to see 
that it was desirable that the product o f cosets be another coset. They also saw cosets as 
elements of a new structure, although most o f them did not call it a quotient group during 
their interviews. Leron and Dubinsky (1995) suggest that the computers can support 
students’ calculations with cosets so that they may begin to see cosets as objects (p. 240).
I agree and would add that this study suggests that hand calculation is also beneficial. 
Taken together these two approaches suggest that proficiency with procedures helps turn 
vague ideas into objects. That is, both approaches support reification.
The inclusion o f set arithmetic in the course may be supported for mathematical reasons 
as well: Coset multiplication is a special case of set arithmetic that has applications 
throughout abstract algebra. Thus, it makes sense to use these ideas to support each other 
rather than to keep them separate. Furthermore, by spending some time computing coset 
products that are not again cosets, students gain some experience with the mess that is
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created when a subgroup is not normal. They have an opportunity to appreciate the 
usefulness of the concept of normality and to explore the concept o f closure in an 
unfamiliar situation. At the same time, they may begin to look for the kinds of 
regularities that support normality and their relationship with the overall group structure. 
In other words, set arithmetic in general and coset arithmetic in particular can provide an 
experiential base on which to build an understanding o f the more formal aspects of 
abstract algebra.
What, then, do the results o f this study say about the process/object distinction? Is the 
process/object distinction truly developmental? One might argue in support of the 
developmental process/object distinction by stipulating that a student’s thinking should 
be classified not as an object conception but as a pseudo-object conception unless it is an 
encapsulation o f a process, conceived with generality and fullness. This solution seems 
problematic, however, because it guarantees that the distinction is developmental, in the 
sense that “object conception” would really mean “object and process conception,” which 
would provide no theoretical room for object conceptions that are weakly supported by 
the underlying processes.
Alternatively, one might acknowledge that the process/object distinction is too blunt an 
instrument. After all, even for a specific concept, not all encapsulated processes are the 
same. Instead, researchers could try to characterize various kinds o f process conceptions 
and also various kinds of object conceptions. Given the results o f this study, however, 
this approach seems the more promising one, although it implies that there is 
considerable theoretical work to be done.
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I do not have a satisfactory solution for this dilemma. I do suggest, however, that 
researchers remain cautious about attributing object conceptions to students on the basis 
o f object-like language and, more importantly, about making developmental claims on 
the basis o f such language. Certainly an object and process conception is a desirable goal 
for many mathematical topics, independent o f the developmental trajectories that might 
be followed along the way.
Concept Proficiency
Early in the course, the students were tied to particular representations, such as the 
operation table, and tied to the processes. As mentioned above, the students’ concepts 
became more abstract and more flexible as they moved away from the operation tables 
and began to think of processes as objects. These changes demonstrate the usefulness of 
metaphor and reification in managing abstraction. These phenomena alone, however, do 
not account for another prominent method of managing abstraction, namely, through 
increased proficiency with a concept. Again, by proficiency, I mean not only fluency 
with the procedures but also the ability and disposition to use understanding to reason 
about and solve problems with the concepts (see Kilpatrick et al., 2001).
This characterization was particularly noticeable in the phenomenon I called operation 
confusion. In the early interviews, some students were unsure of the operations in Z3 and 
Z(, and spent much o f their time determining the operation. In later interviews, they were 
still sometimes unsure o f the operation, but, in contrast, they were able to determine the 
operation quickly by relying on the group axioms and familiarity with the elements in the 
group.
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As the students became more familiar with concepts and associated representations, 
processes, and examples, their concept images became richer and more flexible and 
efficient. Their work was more often guided by correct expectations, and even when 
their expectations were incorrect, they were increasingly able to notice errors and resolve 
inconsistencies by relying on multiple ways o f thinking about the concepts. If 
abstractness is regarded not as property o f a concept but rather as one’s relationship to the 
concept (Wilensky, 1991; Frorer et al., 1997), then increasing proficiency is a way to 
reduce abstractness.
Balancing Precision and Abstraction
Thus far, the results of this study have been discussed under two themes: issues of 
language and notation and issues o f abstraction. Elaborating and synthesizing these 
themes has led to the theoretical proposition that the themes are not separate but are 
fundamentally intertwined in mathematical thinking and learning. On the one hand, 
precise definitions, notation, and language are necessary for the precise thinking that 
allows careful distinctions to be made among objects. On the other hand, there is a 
fundamental human cognitive need to reduce the operative models—to abstract and 
generalize so that many diverse phenomena can be particular instantiations o f a single 
idea. The results o f this study suggest that mathematical activity might be considered a 
carefully orchestrated balance between two opposing tendencies: making distinctions 
among things that seem the same and blurring the distinctions among things that seem 
different. In other words, mathematical insight occurs not only when we realize things 
we thought were different are the same, but also when we realize that things we thought 
were the same are different.
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Advanced mathematical thinking includes not only precise definitions and logical 
deduction (Tall, 1992) but also significant abstraction and generalization (Dreyfus, 1991). 
Although teachers expect students to reason with sufficient precision and with sufficient 
generality and abstraction, in fact these are opposing expectations. Being sufficiently 
precise requires using rigorous definitions and careful notation to maintain important 
distinctions. On the one hand, some o f the students in this study did not make important 
distinctions between set and element and between addition in Z and addition in Z6 . Being 
sufficiently general and abstract, on the other hand, requires blurring distinctions among 
things that were thought to be different. Building a deep understanding of the group Zs, 
for example, requires that -1  be considered the same as 5. The very concept of 
isomorphism is about blurring representational distinctions in order to gain access to 
abstract mathematical objects that “lie behind” all o f them.
Mathematical learning involves building intuition, creating mathematical objects, and 
making distinctions among them. Each introduction of a name, symbol, or definition, 
raises the possibility o f making unusual abstractions and nonstandard generalizations and 
distinctions, for the standard distinctions are not pre-existing in the world of 
mathematical objects (wherever that is). Clearly there are more and less effective ways 
of maintaining the balance between precision and abstraction, but the best solutions are 
rarely clear a priori. Thus, students should be expected to make unusual distinctions 
regularly as part o f the learning process.
My argument about the balance between making and blurring distinctions echoes 
Poincare’s (1946) observation that logic and intuition play complementary roles in 
mathematics. Guided by intuition alone, one defines mathematical objects vaguely.
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Intuition cannot bring certainty and can even deceive, so rigor is necessary. Rigor 
requires logic and begins with definitions, but logic can create nothing new. Thus, logic 
and intuition are each indispensable.
Building on Poincare’s argument, logic is about precision, making careful distinctions, 
and reasoning from rigorous definitions and axioms. But formal definitions alone are 
empty. Instead, there must be something to formalize, some intuition that is being made 
precise. Definitions themselves do not create mathematical meaning. Instead, they allow 
for distinctions among objects that have been or might be created by other processes. 
These propositions imply not that intuition must precede definitions but rather that 
definitions must be populated with mathematical objects before there can be any 
meaning.
Intuition, on the other hand, is guided by abstractions and generalizations that are well 
supplied with examples. Yet, intuition alone is vague and ambiguous, and meaning 
remains confused until the intuitions have been carefully delimited and distinguished 
from related ideas. That, o f course, requires logic and precise definitions.
Effective mathematical communication requires that both the speaker and the hearer (or 
the writer and the reader) have constructed abstractions and distinctions that are 
somewhat comparable, in the sense o f fit. Effective mathematical learning involves 
building such abstractions and distinctions. When and how does this happen? It is a 
wonder that it happens at all, given that so much of it is implicit.
Poincare’s argument suggests that in the history of mathematics, precise definitions were 
the result o f a slow evolutionary dialectic between logic and intuition. That suggests the
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hypothesis that one way of improving students’ abstraction and distinctions, along with 
their intuition and use o f definitions, is to make this dialectic explicit.
Managing Abstraction and Trying to be General
In elaborating and synthesizing the results o f this study, I saw the students’ use of 
notation at first as an issue that was mostly about imprecision and ambiguity. It now 
appears, however, that notation is simultaneously a tool for mediating abstraction. The 
claim that notation is used both to manage abstraction and to impose precision may be 
seen as a rephrasing o f a guiding principle of semiotics: that a sign is not meaningful in 
itself but rather is meaningful within a system o f signs. This point becomes particularly 
apparent when comparing the students’ use of notation with standard usage.
In introducing and discussing the concept o f binary operation, the instructor used a 
diamond or a star, intending to denote a generic operation, which might be any familiar 
or unfamiliar operation but which is imagined to be particular but unspecified. The 
generality is that in any problem (or proof) setting the diamond may denote any operation 
that satisfies the context, and thus any reasoning and results apply to all such operations. 
This generality leads to an abstraction, which is the creation of a new concept—binary 
operation—that is the set o f all possible binary operations, familiar and unfamiliar, 
known and unknown, specified and unspecified. In this study, the students sometimes 
saw neither the generality nor the abstraction, but instead saw the diamond as another 
specific operation, distinct from both addition and multiplication. Furthermore, some of 
the students decided that the diamond was to be used when the elements were a and b, 
which we “don’t know how to add.”
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Similarly, the instructor provided the students access to the set o f all finite cyclic groups 
through the notation Z„. The notation is general in the sense that it can stand for any such 
group, but it depends upon an abstraction: the set o f all such groups. Once again, some of 
the students did not see the generality and abstraction, as evidenced by their statements 
that Z3 and Z6 were subgroups of Z„. Unfortunately, the data are not sufficient regarding 
this phenomenon to provide a clear picture o f the object that they were calling Z„. The 
data do suggest, however, that these students saw Z„ not as a particular but unspecified 
group but rather as another specific group, and, furthermore, that “any Z group” (except 
perhaps Z itself) might be considered a subgroup o f Z„. I use the students’ language “any 
Z group” here because the standard language and notation yields a sentence that is 
striking in its ambiguity: “For any n, [what is commonly called] Z„ might be considered 
a subgroup o f [what these students called] Z„.” Again, it is not clear what object the latter 
Z„ denotes. Either the students were not aware of their ambiguous use o f the symbol Z„, 
or they were not particularly concerned by it.
The students’ ambiguous use o f notation proved to be an indicator of issues with both 
abstraction and precision. In the case o f diamond and Z„, the students were not making 
the intended abstractions, thereby introducing ambiguity into their use o f the notations.
In other cases, students used notation ambiguously when they did not make important 
distinctions, such as with the notation aH, which for some students represented both a 
particular coset and all such cosets. Similarly, some students used a symbol such as 4x to 
denote both a particular multiple of 4 and all multiples o f 4. One student also used 4x to 
denote two (possibly distinct) multiples o f 4.
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Actually, it should not be surprising that students use notation ambiguously, for standard 
mathematical discourse uses notation that might appear to students to be ambiguous. 
Notational precision is not in the notation itself, but is implied by the surrounding text. 
Compare the following typical phrases that might come from an abstract algebra class:
• Suppose G is a group and a, b e G.
• An operation * is commutative on a set G i f  a*b = b*a for all a, b g  G.
• Suppose G is a group with 3 elements, e, a, and b, and suppose e is the identity.
This study suggests that some, perhaps many, students would call a and b variables in 
these statements, yet that label may obscure subtle but important distinctions revealed by 
the differences in syntax. In the first statement, a and b represent unspecified but 
particular elements o f G. Unless stated otherwise, they cannot be assumed distinct. 
Generality may come later, in that whatever is argued about a and b will hold for any pair 
a, b in G. In the second statement, a and b are pattern generalizers. We imagine that a 
and b vary through all possible pairs in G, and in any such pair a and b are not 
necessarily distinct. The generality is in the statement itself. In the third statement, a and 
b are specific elements o f the group G. They are names o f the elements of G, and they 
are necessarily distinct. The generality comes later, and only as part o f another 
abstraction: that there is only one group of order 3.
So what does this discussion imply about the relationship between generalization and 
abstraction? Sometimes it is hard to separate them. General reasoning seems to require 
abstractions. Commutativity, for example, requires imagining all possible pairs of 
elements from a set. General reasoning about a binary operation requires ability to 
imagine a generic operation. Is it necessary to construct the abstraction that is the set of
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all binary operations? Is it possible to imagine / :  iR —> 91 to be an arbitrary function 
without imagining the set o f all o f such functions? I say yes, although one needs to be 
able to imagine a wide range o f diverse possibilities. In other words, general reasoning 
about a concept requires a significant psychological step toward the mathematical 
abstraction that is the set o f all instances of that concept.
For some mathematical concepts, there is no simple and standard notation to distinguish 
between a particular thing and the set of all of them. Does/(x) = x2 denote a generic
function value or the set o f all such values? What about /(a) = a2 or /  (x0) = Xq ? In most
contexts the abbreviated formX*) = x2 is taken to denote the entire function, despite the 
misleading metonymy—in this case, substituting a generic pair for the set of all such 
pairs. The literature on the learning of functions suggests, however, that students have 
difficulty making the transition from x being a particular value to being a variable that 
takes all values in the domain.
By treating aK  both as a specific coset and as representing all o f them, some of the 
students demonstrated that they had applied a similar metonymy in a context where it is 
not often done. This ambiguity and flexible use o f notation is not surprising when one 
considers that there is no common notation for the set o f all cosets o f a subgroup when 
the subgroup is not normal. O f course, in some contexts it is easy to make notational 
distinctions between a generic value and the set of all such values, such as in 4x + 1 and 
4 Z + 1 .
From a psychological point o f view, it is easy to see why students have trouble making 
distinctions between a generic value and the set of all such values. If  a symbol can
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represent any suitable value, it is a short conceptual leap to considering all of them. To 
better portray the relationship between the mathematical and psychological distinctions, 
the relevant distinctions are superimposed in Figure 26.
The important mathematical distinction is usually between the generic value and the set 
o f all such values, and the distinction may be managed metaphorically by first imagining 
that a value is fixed and then imagining that it varies through all such values and the 
result is collected in a set. Mathematicians do not make an ontological distinction 
between a specific value, a generic value, and any such value, but the mathematical status 
o f “all such values” is problematic unless those values are collected in a set. Thus, there 
are essentially two kinds of mathematical objects on this continuum, and mathematicians 
use notation and context as a way of managing the distinction between them.
The students in this study, in contrast, were often thinking simultaneously of any and all 
values, so that the important mathematical distinction was neither apparent nor relevant. 
When they talked about all values, they sometimes did not bother to collect the values in 
a set, suggesting that this distinction was also irrelevant. A specific value was 
psychologically distinct from the idea of any value, but the idea of a generic particular 
value seemed to be unavailable to them.
Thus, there are important mathematical distinctions between a generic value and the set 
o f all such values, and standard notation conventions provide inconsistent and sometimes 
ambiguous support. But when and how might students learn such conceptual and










the set of all 
such values
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notational distinctions? Such distinctions seem to depend also on careful interpretation of 
the text that surrounds the introduction o f the notation and on metaphors such as 
“imagine x is fixed.” I suspect that many difficulties with quantification may be partially 
explained by this result.
Implications
The preceding sections have included many implications about the teaching and learning 
of abstract algebra in particular and mathematics more generally. In this section, I focus 
on what I see as this study’s most important implications for teaching, teacher education, 
and research. Most o f these implications grow out of the dialectic between making 
distinctions and managing abstraction.
Teaching
The results o f this study make clear that students do not necessarily make standard 
conceptual, linguistic, and notational distinctions; in fact, the standard distinctions might 
not even be relevant or apparent to students. This finding has implications for teaching 
because of the potential for failure o f communication when the teacher and the students 
are using conceptual grids that do not fit with one another. To overcome this obstacle, 
teachers must become aware of the distinctions that students are and are not making.
This awareness is possible only by encouraging students to make their thinking explicit. 
Then, informed by knowledge of the students’ thinking, teachers may help them make 
important conceptual distinctions and encourage them to make more o f the standard 
distinctions in their language and notation.
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The teaching of advanced mathematics must be sensitive to language, notation, and the 
important conceptual distinctions that the linguistic and notational distinctions are 
intended to convey. Consequently, language and notation should periodically be given 
explicit attention in instruction. This suggestion for teaching is consistent with and 
provides additional support for the communication and representation standards proposed 
by the NCTM (1989, 2000). Thus, one could suggest that mathematics teachers at all 
levels should ask open questions that allow students’ linguistic, notational, and 
conceptual difficulties to become apparent. Students should be supported through 
instruction to translate early and often among the various signifiers o f a mathematical 
object or property, including names, definitions, symbols, and other representations. 
Furthermore, students should be encouraged to articulate their thinking, for it is only 
through such articulation that nonstandard conceptions might be noticed.
The interview data collected for this study are noteworthy for their richness and for the 
fact that the students were often able to talk for long stretches with little intervention 
from me. The design o f the study did not permit any attribution o f the cause o f this 
richness, but a plausible contributing factor was that, in this course, the students were 
often expected to articulate their thinking not only in their collaborative groups but also 
during office hours and on their written work. This interpretation implies that 
cooperative work can support learning by encouraging students to make their thinking 
explicit, even if  they are not equipped to notice unusual conceptions and are not yet fluent 
in the standard vocabulary and syntax. Such work can also provide instructors with a 
window into students’ thinking.
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Asking students to make their thinking explicit can serve to also inculcate habits of mind 
that may be important to mathematics learning, such as asking the questions, “What does 
it mean to say th a t ... ?” or “What would we need to do to show th a t ... ?” Furthermore, 
by articulating their thinking, students who are not yet strong conceptually or 
procedurally can demonstrate important mathematical habits o f mind that deserve to be 
supported by instruction.
Preparation of Teachers
Part o f the rationale for conducting this study was that a course in abstract algebra is 
often required in the preparation of secondary school teachers. Thus, it makes sense to 
ask whether the study has implications for that preparation. A thorough investigation of 
the role and relevance o f abstract algebra in the preparation o f teachers would require a 
very different set o f studies that would, of necessity, include significant work in 
secondary school mathematics classrooms to determine which ideas from abstract algebra 
are useful in teachers’ instruction, planning, and reflection. Nonetheless, this study 
supports three observations.
First, abstract algebra could be a setting in which preservice teachers develop a deep 
sense of the nature and role of definitions and proof in mathematics. If  secondary 
teachers are to develop in their students a sense o f mathematical reasoning and proof, as 
is currently recommended (NCTM, 2000), then the teachers must themselves understand 
how definitions and proof support mathematical reasoning. These were secondary goals 
of the class that provided the setting for this study, the primary goal being that the 
students develop an intuitive and experiential sense of the concepts. Thus, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the students’ proofs and definitions were more uneven in quality than,
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say, their computations of cosets and quotient groups. It would be worth designing an 
abstract algebra course for preservice teachers in which intuition and rigor were twin 
goals and explicit foci o f instruction.
Second, it is important that preservice teachers come to have a sufficiently abstract view 
o f the concepts o f inverse, identity, and binary operation, and to be able to see many 
examples as instantiations of the main ideas. Because the secondary mathematics 
curriculum includes the concept o f inverse functions, for example, teachers need 
sufficient sense o f the more abstract concept o f inverse to be able to treat inverse 
functions in ways that are faithful to the abstract concept. Although cosets and quotient 
groups are certainly good candidate topics for teaching the roles of definitions and proof, 
this research has not convinced me that cosets and quotient groups are necessary 
background for high school mathematics teachers, because there are few obvious 
connections with high school mathematics. For preservice teachers who are to learn 
about quotient groups, the results of this study suggest paying particular attention to the 
structural relationships between Z and Z„, for that is where the teachers can gain a firm 
and subtle sense o f the relationships between addition o f integers and addition modulo n.
Third, the results o f this study suggest that sensitivity to conceptual, linguistic, and 
notational distinctions should be an explicit focus of the pedagogical preparation of 
teachers. As mentioned above, there is good reason to believe that secondary 
mathematics learning will be enhanced if  students are often encouraged to make their 
thinking explicit. For that to happen in secondary school mathematics classrooms, 
preservice teachers should be encouraged not only to reflect on their own language and 
notation and to make their thinking explicit but also to reflect on such experiences as a
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way to help them see the pedagogical benefits of mathematical communication and the 
importance of making careful distinctions.
Empirical and Theoretical Research
Many of the conclusions and implications in this chapter carry messages for research. In 
particular, the themes of making distinctions and managing abstraction can be seen as the 
beginning of a theoretical construct that takes seriously both logic and intuition. In this 
section, I make additional comments about some o f the other theoretical constructs that 
informed this research and make suggestions for additional research.
First, the results o f this study suggest that concept image may be a problematic construct 
if  it is take to suggest a prescribed way o f cutting up experience into concepts. The data 
and analysis demonstrate that students do not necessarily make standard conceptual, 
linguistic, and notational distinctions. To accommodate this emergent result, the analysis 
for this study depended upon a flexible notion o f a concept image that allowed conceptual 
boundaries to migrate in order to explain the data. That flexibility was accomplished via 
a semiotic conceptual framework, which allowed consideration o f the standard concept, 
the extent to which a student had mastered the concepts and processes, and the meanings 
that the student associated with the names and notations. In particular, by paying careful 
attention to the students’ use o f language and notation by separating names, symbols, and 
definitions in the analysis, I was able to characterize their concept images in ways that 
explained their nonstandard use o f language and notation. Any viable notion o f concept 
image must maintain similar flexibility that does not require that the name o f the concept 
be the organizing determinant.
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Second, as discussed in detail above, the results of this study suggest that the 
process/object distinction is more subtle and nuanced than is commonly portrayed in the 
literature. In particular, it appears that sometimes the developmental hierarchy can be 
circumvented when a representation supports an object conception without requiring a 
robust process conception. Many questions remain, however. For example, when is it 
advantageous to inject into instruction representations that support object conceptions 
before students have developed a robust process conception?
It might be profitable to acknowledge that not all process conceptions and not all object 
conceptions are the same. Even without comparing two different individual learners, it is 
clear that constructing an object conception is not the completion o f a learning process 
but rather the beginning o f a new phase of learning about the concept. In other words, an 
object conception creates new possibilities. Some o f this might be captured by 
acknowledging the gradual development of conceptual proficiency, which might be 
described as increasing richness in one’s process conception, increasing applicability of 
one’s object conception, and increasing ability to move between the two.
This study suggests that much is to be gained by paying attention to the ways that 
students manage abstraction, particularly their use o f metaphors and representations. 
Although it is clear that the students in this study did not necessarily make the standard 
distinctions between any object o f a kind and all such objects, it appears that the idea of a 
particular unspecified object was not available to some o f the students. I hypothesized 
above that metaphors such as “imagine it is fixed” may help, but many questions remain 
about the psychological requirements for imagining a generic object. Furthermore, there
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may be many more as-yet-unidentified metaphors that both support and constrain 
thinking in abstract algebra in particular and advanced mathematics more generally.
I f  we take Poincare’s dialectic seriously, it is fair to say that this study focused on 
intuition at the expense o f logic. I studied mostly students’ informal definitions, and 
proof was not an explicit area of investigation. This decision made sense given the 
context, the available literature, and my particular interests. My intent was to study the 
meanings that students construct for the various concepts in group theory and to 
characterize those understandings. It is now quite clear, however, that the logical side 
needs equal attention, for that is the way that students begin to make more careful 
distinctions that are necessary for clear thinking and for effective participation in 
mathematical discourse. The semiotic perspective makes clear, after all, that signs have 
meaning not in themselves, but within a system o f signs. Thus, many questions remain 
about how students learn to use definitions, notation, and language precisely, and to use 
such rigor in the service o f reasoning, proof, and communication and to support further 
development of intuition.
For the continued investigation o f learning in abstract algebra in particular and advanced 
mathematical thinking more generally, the conceptual and analytic framework developed 
here can offer a good starting point. The framework was developed in order to 
characterize students’ understandings, focusing on meaning and intuition. Because it 
supports identification of distinctions that students do and do not make, the framework 
seems equally applicable to investigating not only the logical side of mathematical 
thinking but also the relationship between logic and intuition.
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Perhaps future research in advanced mathematical thinking could take advantage of the 
dialectic between intuition and logic. Beginning with logic, one might ask, What does it 
take to build stronger connections between symbolic proofs and the examples to which 
the proofs are intended to apply and the intuitions the proofs are intended to formalize? 
Beginning with intuition, one might ask, What does it takes to encourage students to 
make distinctions that are not apparent to them? An extended research program could 
ask, What does it take for students to come to sophisticated understandings of the nature 
and role of definitions and proof in mathematics?
Research in advanced mathematical thinking is still a young field with many open 
questions, many challenges, and many opportunities. This study has explored linguistic, 
notational, and conceptual issues for undergraduate students in a particular abstract 
algebra class and has provided detailed results about the students’ learning o f particular 
concepts. Some of the conceptual issues and theoretical explanations are of sufficient 
generality to suspect that they may be useful in describing advanced mathematical 
thinking more generally. Thus, the study has also provided insights about some of the 
theoretical constructs commonly used in research on advanced mathematical thinking. In 
addition, the study has put forward and elaborated the theoretical proposition that 
mathematical thinking and learning may be viewed as a balance between precision and 
abstraction and has suggested that balance is needed in both the research on advanced 
mathematical concepts and the practice of teaching advanced mathematics. I hope the 
empirical and theoretical results presented here will influence the research agenda and 
ultimately will serve to improve the learning of mathematical concepts that historically 
have been among the most challenging in the undergraduate curriculum.
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Math 761, Spring 1996 
Abstract Algebra
MWF Kingsbury 308 and Th Kingsbury M309 
Textbook: Contemporary abstract algebra by Joe Gallian 
Instructor: Steve Benson Office: KN M331 Phone: x-2684
Office hours: MWF 1:30-2:30; TuTh 11-12 (and by appointment)
TA: Brad Findell Office: KN M333 Phone: x-2674
Office hours: M F 11-12; WTh 3-4
This course will most likely be very  different from your previous mathematics classes, 
both in content and in instructional style. However, the choices w e’ll be making are 
based on a significant amount o f research on teaching and learning, as well as on our own 
experience as students and teachers of mathematics (specifically abstract algebra). It 
might be a little hard to get used to, at first, but I really  believe that this is the best way to 
get us to our goal, developing an understanding of, and facility with, abstract algebra 
concepts and their applications. We will be taking a discovery approach  in this class, 
which means that, during class time, you  will be doing mathematics, rather than watching 
m e do mathematics. O f course, there may very well be occasions, during class 
discussions for instance, that I might clarify some points or explain some details or define 
some terminology. As part of the discovery approach, we will often be working in KN 
M327 (the computer lab in Kingsbury) or the M orse H all computer lab (a.k.a. Spicerack) 
using a variety o f software packages designed for abstract algebra This software will be 
useful both for learning and for applying the concepts w e’ll be learning. Although we 
won’t be following the book in “lock-step” fashion, we will be using it as a supplement to 
what we do in class. I find Gallian’s book to be very readable with lots of nice examples, 
problems, and references.




Classwork will involve class participation and work (done individually or in groups). 
Most of this work will be collected, some o f it will be graded, but all collected work will 
be looked at and commented on (a preposition is a terrible thing to end a sentence with). 
Homework is self-explanatory, I suppose. Like classwork, most, if not all, o f it will be 
looked at and some will be assigned a grade. Sometimes, the grade will depend only on 
whether you made a reasonable attempt to solve the problem, while other times the 
homework will be graded in a more “traditional” way. In addition to regular homework, 
there will be occasional “projects” which will be designed to pull together some of the 
key concepts w e’ve dealt with in class. These projects might involve both group and 
individual work, depending on the particular project, and you’ll typically be given several
days to complete them. Since you have a little extra time, it will also be important for
you to be sure that you write up your work carefully and completely. Being able to solve  
a m athem atical prob lem  is ju s t  p a r t o f  the m athem atical process. It's also important that
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yo u  be  able to explain yo u r w ork an d  its justifica tions to others. O f course, you should 
also write up your homework carefully, but I realize you won’t have as much time to 
work on it! There will be two midterm exams during the semester (times to be 
announced during the first two weeks o f class). There will be both in-class and take- 
home components to these exams, as well as on the final exam.
Brad and Steve will divide up the task o f looking at, and making comments on, the 
homework, but Steve will do the actual grading. In addition, Steve will be the grader of 
the projects and exams (lucky him!).
In order to learn mathematics, one must do mathematics, not sit idly by while someone 
else does it. An analogy might be helpful: Learning mathematics is like learning to drive 
a car. While you may very well pick up some pointers while watching someone else 
drive, the things you learn are mainly p rocedu ra l (where to put your h^nds, use one foot 
(unless there’s a clutch), etc.). However, when you first sit behind the wheel and begin to 
accelerate, you realize that there’s a lot more to it than in that class video simulation.
Even once you’re an experienced driver, you’ll often make a wrong turn, forcing you to 
do a U- turn or even pull off the road and check the map. Sometimes, you even have to 
go back home, make a phone call, and start over, but you still eventually make it to your 
destination. Doing mathematics is like that, too. We often make false starts and 
mistakes, but if  we keep at it, we can  solve the problem, or learn the concept, or prove the 
Theorem. At the risk of stretching this analogy to the breaking point, isn’t it usually very 
difficult to remember directions to a location you’ve only been driven to (pardon the split 
infinitive), and never driven yourself? Until you’ve actually driven somewhere yourself, 
it’s hard to find your way back, especially if  you have to take a detour which takes you 
off o f the usual path. If  you just sit and watch the teacher, even if  you understand why 
everything he, or she, does is correct, you may very well still have a lot of difficulty 
remembering how to do the exact same thing at a later time. And it might seem 
impossible to use these ideas from class to solve new problems in the homework or test 
situations (sound familiar?).
Mathematics is like a video game; if  you just sit and watch, 
you’re wasting your quarter (or semester).
I ’m really looking forward to this class. I really like the material you’ll be learning and I 
hope that you will also have a good time. It will be a lot of work, but if  we work together 
, I know that everyone can be successful.
As a final suggestion, I recommend that you keep your work in a notebook to which you 
can often refer. In particular, keep your “scratch work”, examples an notes from class, 
definitions, theorems, and your own questions and conjectures in the notebook. If  you 
like, think o f the notebook as a class journal. Occasionally, I w ill be asking you to 
provide examples, questions, and conjectures concerning class material, so this will be 
good practice. I also think it will be a useful study device as you prepare for classwork, 
homework, and exams. At the end o f the semester, I would like to see your notebooks, if  
you’re willing to share them with me. However, the notebooks will not be graded. In 
future class discussions, I will talk more about these notebooks and why I think they’re 
important.
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Please provide the following information. Also, be sure to check the box if  you’re willing 
to share your phone number and email address with the class.
1. Name:
2. Major/concentration:
3. phone number May I share your number with the class?
4. email address May I share this with the class?
5. past classes:
6. future plans:
7. questions, goals, hopes, concerns you have about this class, or 
mathematics in general:
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M a th  761 —( a r i th m e t ic  o f  s e ts  d isc u ss io n  a n d  p ro o fs )
D e f in it io n . I f  A  and B  are subsets o f the integers, then A  +  B  is the set {a  +  
b | a e A , b e  B } .  (W hen necessary to  avoid confusion, we will specify tha t the sum  
is in Z . ) Furthermore, i f  n  is a positive integer, then n A  =  {na \ a e  A }  and 
A  + n  = {a + n \  a e  A }.
For example, the  sum of {1 ,3 ,4} and {2,6} in Z  is { 3 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,9 ,1 0 } , 2A  — 
{2 ,6 ,8}  and A  + 2 =  {3,5,6}.
As another example, le t’s consider some infinite subsets. Recall th a t the Divi­
sion A lgorithm  guarantees th a t every integer can be expressed (uniquely) in the  form 
3q, 3q +  1, or 3q +  2, for some integer q. In  other words, every integer is in exactly 
one of the sets 3Z , 3Z  + 1 , or 3Z  +  2. I ’m  curious, then: W h a t’s (3Z  + 1 ) +  (3Z  +  2)? 
L e t’s choose several elements from the two sets to  see if we can make a guess at 
w hat their sum  is. The integers 1 ,-2 , 4, and 10 are all elements of 3Z  +  1, and 2, 
— 1, —4, an 5 are all elements of 3Z  + 2. Therefore, the  sum  of the two sets contains 
1 +  2, l  +  (—4), —2 +  5, 4 +  (—1), 10 +  5, and l  +  (—4). T h a t is, 3, —3, an 15 are all in 
(3Z  + 1 )  +  3Z  +  2. W hat do you notice about these elements? They are all multiples 
of 3, bu t does th a t necessarily mean th a t the  sum contains just multiples of 3? And, 
if th is is the case, are all of the multiples of 3 in the  sum? Investigating further, 
we see th a t the  following integers are also in the sum  in question: 10 +  (—4) =  6 , 
4 +  5 =  9, and 4 +  (—4) =  0. I ’m alm ost convinced, bu t not quite. How can we 
convince ourselves, and others, th a t (3Z  +  1 ) +  (3Z  +  2 ) =  3Z?
Is it OK to  use the familiar rules involving addition to  prove this? In particular, 
is it “legal” to  ju s t say (3Z  +  1) +  (3Z  +  2) =  3Z  +  3Z  +  1 +  2 =  3Z  +  3 Z  +  3? 
Then, since “multiples of 3” +  “multiples of 3” give you m ultiple of 3, we’re done. 
There are a  few things “fishy” about these statem ents. F irst of all, how do I know 
the familiar rules apply? We just defined how to  add sets and haven’t  checked 
th a t all of the  properties still hold. I fact, we might be a little  dubious, since we 
weren’t  terrib ly  certain  this was the “right” way to  define the  sum of sets. Also, 
the statem ent th a t we alluded to  above (3Z .+  3Z  =  3Z )  isn’t  so obvious, either.
L et’s try  a slightly different approach. It does seem sort of obvious th a t if you 
add an integer which is 1 more than  a m ultiple of 3 to  an integer which is 2 more 
th an  a multiple of 3, you’ll get an integer which is 3 more th an  a multiple of 3. B ut 
if a num ber is 3 more than  a multiple of 3, then it m ust be a multiple of 3, itself. 
This is a fairly convincing argum ent th a t (3Z  +  1) +  (3Z  +  2) is a subset of 3Z, 
bu t it doesn’t  convince me th a t every m ultiple of 3 is in the sum. In addition, i t ’s 
entirely possible th a t someone might not be convinced by the intuitive argument, 
above. L et’s see if we can make it a little  more “rigorous” (tha t is, le t’s leave no 
room for doubt).
We want to  eventually show th a t (3Z  +  1) +  (3Z  +  2) =  3Z . For the sake 
of brevity, le t’s let A  =  3Z  +  1 and B  =  3Z  +  2. We want to  show, then, th a t 
A  + B  = 3Z. A technique th a t often comes in handy when attem pting  to  show th a t 
one set equals another is to  show th a t they are both  subsets of one another. T hat
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is, we’ll show th a t A  + B  C 3Z  and 3Z  C A  + B .
First, suppose th a t x  e A  + B . T hen x  =  a + b, where a e 3 Z  +  1 and b e 3 Z  +  2, 
so a =  3g +  1 for some integer q and b = 3k  +  2 for some integer k. Therefore, 
x  =  ( 3 g + l)  +  (3&; +  2) =  3q + 3k + 3 =  3(g +  fc +  l) ,  which is an element of 3Z ,  since 
q, k, and 1, and therefore their sum, are all integers. We have succeeded in showing 
th a t any element of A  + B  is an element of 3 Z ,  so we have proved A  +  B  C 3 Z .
We’ll now attem p t to  prove th a t 3Z  C A  + B . To th a t end, let y  be an element 
of 3Z  (there’s no reason not to  call this element x, bu t we don’t  want to  cause any 
undue confusion and there are a lot of letters in the  alphabet!). Then y — 3n  for 
some integer n. In  order to  show th a t y  is also an element of A  + B , we need to  show 
th a t y  can be expressed as the  sum  of one element from A  and one element from
B . T hat is, we need to  show th a t y =  (3g + 1) +  (3k +  2), for some integers q and k. 
Well, we can always rew rite 3n as 3(n — 1) +  3 =  3(n — 1) +  1 +  2, which is alm ost 
w hat we want. B ut now, notice th a t y = 3n = 3(n — l)  +  l  +  2 =  3n +  3(—l)  +  l  +  2 =  
(3n +  1) +  (3(—1) +  2), and we see th a t y  is an element of A  + B . Thus, we have 
succeeded in showing th a t every element of 3Z  is also an element of A  + B . T hat 
is, 3 Z C A  + B.
We may therefore conclude th a t A  + B  =  3Z,  and our conjecture is proved.
How would th a t proof have appeared in a textbook? Here’s one possibility. 
P ro p o s i t io n .  (3Z  +  1) +  (3Z  +  2) =  3Z.
Proof. Let 3g +  1 and 3k: +  2  be elements of 3Z  +  1 and 3Z  +  2, respectively. 
T hen (3 g + l)  +  (3fc +  2) =  3(fc +  g + l )  e3Z ,  so (3Z + l)  + (3Z + 2) C 3Z.  Conversely, 
if 3n e 3Z,  then  3n =  [3(n — 1) +  1] +  [3(—1) +  2] e (3Z  +  1) +  (3Z  +  2), showing th a t 
3Z  C (3Z  +  1) +  (3Z  +  2), and the proposition is proved.
W hat are the  main differences between these two proofs? W hich is the “b e tte r” 
proof? Is one more correct th an  the other? In my mind, these proofs are identical, 
logically. Their main difference is th a t the  first proof goes further in explaining each 
of the  steps, sometimes even “talking you through” the thought processes involved 
in solving the  problem. In this respect, the  first proof is “b e tte r” if you want to 
know how and why, while the second proof is best if you just want to  be convinced 
th a t the proposition is true. In general, the  purpose of a proof is to  convince you, 
the reader, th a t a statem ent is true. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the raison d ’etre 
of a proof is to  convince, not necessarily to  enlighten. I ’d like to  suggest th a t we 
w rite our proofs w ith bo th  goals in mind. After all, if we really want to know w h a t’s 
going on, we want to  know more th a t ju s t w hat is true; we also want to  know why 
things are true  (knowing why things are true  often helps us remember th a t they are 
true).
E xercises:
1. S tate and prove conjectured values of the sums 3 Z + (3 Z + 1 )  and (3Z+ 2)  + 3Z.
2. Complete the addition table for 3Z,  3 Z  +  1, and 3Z  +  2.
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Math 761 (selected answers to the homework and other problems)
Proposition. The se t  3Z  is a  group under integer addition.
Proof. We need to show that the four group axioms hold for 3Z (recall that 3Z = 
{3z | z  € Z}, so the statement “x is an element o f 3Z” means that x = 3a for some integer 
a.). First, o f all, let’s confirm that the associative law holds. If  3a, 3b, and 3c are in 3Z 
(notice that this means a, b, and c must be integers), then 3a + (3b + 3c) = (3a + 3b) + 3c, 
since 3a, 3b, and 3c are all integers and addition is associative in Z. Therefore, addition 
is associative in 3Z. (That is, the associativity of addition in 3Z is inherited from the 
associativity o f addition in Z). To see that 3Z is closed under addition, let 3a and 3b be 
elements o f 3Z and note that 3a + 3b = 3(a + b), by the distributive law (in Z). But a and 
b are integers, so 3(a + b) is an element o f 3Z. Thus, 3Z is closed under addition. Now, 
we need to determine whether 3Z contains an identity element. I t’s true that 0 + 3a = 
3a + 0 = 3a for each 3a in 3Z, since 0 is the identity element o f Z  and 3Z is a subset of Z, 
but we also need to show that 0 is an element of 3Z. But 0 = 3(0), so 0 is an element of 
3Z (since 0 is an integer), and we may conclude that 0 is the identity element of 3Z. The 
last property we need to confirm is the “inverse property.” I t’s true that if  3a is an 
element of 3Z, then 3a + (-3a) = 0 = (-3a) + 3a, so (-3a) is the inverse of 3a in the 
integers but how do we know that -3a is an element o f 3Z? Well, -3a = 3(-a), and if a is 
an integer, then so is -a, so -3a is, indeed, an element o f 3Z, and w e’ve been successful in 
proving that every element o f 3Z has an inverse in 3Z. W e’ve now shown that all o f the 
group axioms hold for 3Z under addition, so 3Z is a group under addition.
Notice that several o f the properties for 3Z follow directly from the fact that Z is a group 
under addition. Specifically, the fact that addition was associative in 3Z was a direct 
consequence o f the fact that the associative law held for all integers, and therefore must 
hold for our specific subset o f Z. Also, the identity o f 3Z was the identity of Z and the 
inverse of each element was just its inverse from Z. However, we still had to check that 
the identity, the inverse o f each element, and the result o f every addition were in 3Z 
(these are the local, or locational, properties).
Many of you noticed that the set {a + b i \ a , b e  Z } is not a group under complex number 
multiplication, since the element 0  = 0 +0 / does not have an inverse (if such an inverse 
a + bi existed, then w e’d have 0  = 0 (a + 6 /) = l, which is impossible, since 0 + 1 ). 
However, many o f you also stated that the set {a + bi \ a, b e Z  and a2 + b2 + 0} is a 
group under multiplication. First, notice that this set is the original set with 0 removed. 
However, the set is still not closed under taking inverses, since 1 + 2/ is in the set, but 
( 1  + 2 / ) ' 1 = ~ + =^i , which is clearly not in our set, since neither y nor ~  are integers.
Notice that we have to omit a lot of the elements of the set S  = {a  + bi \ a, b e Z} in order 
to end up with a group. In particular, the only complex numbers in the set S  that have 
multiplicative inverses in S  are 1,-1, /, and -/. The proof o f this fact is left to you.
We finish this handout with a discussion o f the importance of understanding set notation. 
Many of the group properties involve determining whether the set (which we’re trying to 
determine is, or isn’t, a group) contains certain elements (e.g. an identity, inverses for 
each element o f the set, the “product” o f set elements). For example, suppose that we
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know that the set G is a group under its operation 0. Given an element a o f G, we define 
the subset Sa = {a 0 g  0 a'1 \ g  e G}. That is, Sa consists of elements that can be 
expressed as a 0 g  0 a'1 for some g  in G, where the element a is always the same. That is, 
if  x, y, and z are elements of G, then a 0 x  0 a '1, a 0 y  0 a '1, and a 0 z 0 a'1 are all elements 
o f Sa. I ’m getting really tired o f writing the symbol 0, so I ’m now going to write xy to 
denote x 0 y. Notice that we know that Sa is a subset o f G, since aga'1 will always be in 
G whenever a and g  (and thus g"1, too) are in the group G, which is defined to be closed 
under its operation and under taking inverses.
As we decided in class, in order to determine whether Sa is a group under G’s operation, 
we need only check that the following properties hold: (1) The identity of G is in Sa. (2) 
For each x in Sa, x '1 is in Sa, too (that is, Sa is closed under taking inverses). (3) For each 
x andy in Sa, xy is in Sa , too. Since each o f these properties involve elements being in Sa 
, it’s important for us to know how to determine whether a given element is in Sa. By the 
definition o f Sa, we know that an element X is in Sa if  and only if  X = aga4 for some g  in 
G. With this in mind, let’s proceed. First, let’s show that the identity o f G is in Sa. That 
is, if  e is the identity o f G, we need to find a g in G so that e = aga'1. How can we find 
such a g? Let’s work backwards. Suppose we had found g. Then w e’d know that e = 
aga'1, so we can solve for g  by “multiplying” (actually, w e’re 0-ing) by a ' 1 and a on the 
left and right sides of each equation. Therefore, a' 1 ea = a'\aga~x)a = (a'1a)g(a'1a) = 
ege = g, so w e’ve found that g  = a ' 1 ea = e. But by solving for g, we had to suppose that g  
existed, and that’s part o f what w e’re trying to prove, so we need to make sure that this g 
really works. Clearly, though, if g  = e, then aga ' 1 = aea ' 1 = e, so the identity e is an 
element of Sa.
Now, let’s show that Sa is closed under taking inverses. To that end, suppose that x is an 
element o f Sa. Then x = aga'1 for some g  in G, so x ’ 1 = (aga'1)'1. But is x ' 1 in Sal  It 
might help to figure out exactly what (aga'1)'1 is. We know that (aga'1)'1 is the element b 
o f G so that (aga'x)b = b(aga']) = e. But if  b(aga']) = e, then b = agAa' 1 (to see this, 
carefully solve the equation for b), which is an element of Sa , since g ' 1 is in G. 
Therefore, whenever x is in Sa , we’ve shown that x" 1 is in Sa , too.
Finally, we need to show that Sa is closed under the operation of G. If  x and y  are in Sa, 
then x = aga'1 andy = aha'1 for some g  and h in G, so
xy  = (aga'l)(aha'1) = ag(a'1a)ha'1 = a(gh)a~\
which is an element of Sa , since g  and h (and therefore gh) are in the group G. W e’ve 
succeeded in showing, then, that Sa is closed under the operation o f G.
Since we’ve shown that the set Sa satisfies the required properties, we may now conclude 
that Sa is a group under the operation of G.
Now, how would a “textbook” proof look?
Theorem. I f  G is a group, a e G, and S  = {aga'1 \ g  e G}, then S  is a group under the 
operation o f  G.
Proof Notice that if  e is the identity o f G, then e = aea'1 e S. Similarly, if aga'1 is in S, 
then (aga'1 )"’ = ag~la~1 is in S, since g ' 1 is an element o f the group G (as the inverse o f an
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element o f the group G). Finally, if  ag a 1 and aha'1 are in S, then {agaA){ aha'1) = agha'] 
is in S, since gh is in G (as the product o f elements o f the group G). Therefore, S is a 
subgroup of G.
A definition is in order here, don't you think? A subgroup of a group G is a subset o f G 
which is itself a group under G’s operation. In order to prove the above Theorem, we 
used the fact that the associativity law automatically holds in S, since it holds in all o f G. 
Similarly, we didn’t need to check whether e satisfied the identity property, nor did we 
need to check whether the elements o f S had inverses or satisfied the inverse property, as 
these properties were already known to be true in the whole group G. To summarize, we 
used the following Theorem, the proof o f which depends on the arguments o f this 
paragraph.
Theorem. A subset S of a group G is a subgroup of G if and only if the identity o f G is in 
S, S is closed under the operation o f G, and if the inverse of each element of S is in S.
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Math 761 Notes on Cosets 
April 29, 1996
We began by stating that /  : Z§ —> D% was a homomorphism with /(0) = (1) and / ( l )  =  
(123). From the fact that /  was a homomorphism, we calculated /(2) = (132), /(3) = 
( l) ,/(4 )  =  (123), and /(5) =  (132).
Below is the operation table for the range of / .  If we consider / _1 of each element of 
the range we get another operation table.
(1) (123) (132) +6 {0,3} {1,4} {2,5}
(1) (1) (123) (132) r i {0,3} {0,3} {1,4} {2,5}
(123) (123) (132) (1) —* {1,4} {1,4} {2,5} {0,3}
(132) (132) (1) (123) {2,5} {2,5} {0,3} {1,4}
The operation table for Z% can be rearranged with elements reordered according to their 
images in D3 under / .  Consider coloring the reordered table so that two elements have the 
same color if they have the same image in D$.
+6 0 1 2 3 4 5 +6 0 3 1 4 2 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 0 3 1 4 2 5
1 1 2 3 4 5 0 3 3 0 4 1 5 2
2 2 3 4 5 0 1 reorder 1 1 4 2 5 3 0
3 3 4 5 0 1 2 4 4 1 5 2 0 3
4 4 5 0 1 2 3 2 2 5 3 0 4 1
5 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 2 0 3 1 4
The operation table for the cosets of K  where K  = ker / .
+6 K 1 + K 2 + K
K K 1 + K 2 + K
1 + K 1 + K 2 + K K
2 + K 2 + K K 1 + K
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Math 761 Notes (cont.)
April 29, 1996
If g : D± —> U 8 is a homomorphism with g(H) =  3 and 5 (Ago) =  5, we can calculate the 
other values of g as follows:
g(R  0) =  1
g{Ri8o) = g{R9o)g(R9o) =  5 -5  =  1 
ff(A27o) =  3 (A 9o)_1 =  5 "1 =  5 
g(V) = g(H )g(R180) = 3 -1  =  3 
9 ( D )  =  9 ( H ) g ( R 9 o )  =  3 -5  =  7
g(D’) =  g(R90 )g(H) =  5 -3  =  7
Below is the operation table for the range of g, which in this case is all of U8. If we 
consider g~~l of each element of the range we get another operation table.
•8 1 3  5 7
1 1 3  5 7CO 3 1 7  5
5 5 7 1 3
7 7 5 3 1
1 9 1
{A o, A iso } {H ,V } {Ago, A270} {D ,D '}
{Ro, Also} 
{H ,V }  
{Ago, A270} 
{D,D>}
{A o, A iso }  
{B ,V }  
{Ago, A270} 
{D ,D '}
{ R ,v }




{.D ,D ' } 




{H ,V }  
{A o, A iso}
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Please record your answers and their explanations on a separate sheet of paper. 
This sheet is yours to keep.
You may, if necessary, use the fact(s) that the sets Z, Q, R, and C  (the integers, 
rational numbers, real numbers and complex numbers) are groups under addition. 
and the nonzero elements of Q, R, and C, respectively, form multiplicative groups.
1. a) Explain how we know that there are no integer solutions to 3x = 8  (mod 90)
b) Find all integer s x  so that 0 < x < 9 1  and 3x = 8  (mod 92).
(you may fin d  it helpful to notice that 3-31 = 1 (mod 92).)
2. Write complete definitions of the following phrases. That is, carefully describe 
exactly what each phrase means.
a) e is an identity o f the set S  under the operation 0.
b) The operation 0 is associative on the set S.
c) The operation 0 is commutative on the set S.
d) In the group G, x' 1 = y.
e) The set S  is a group under the operation *.
3. As you might expect, y  Z  is defined to be the set { j z \ z e Z j .
a) Confirm that -j Z is a group under addition.
b) Is j  Z a group under multiplication? Explain.
4. a) Construct the multiplication table for {4, 8 , 12, 16} in Z 2 0 .
b) Determine whether {4, 8 , 12, 16} is a group under multiplication (mod 20).
5. The following operation table is not a group table. Which properties fail? Explain. 
You may use the fact that you know that this isn’t a group table in your explanation.
* a b c d e f
a a b c d e f
b b c d e f a
c c d a f b e
d d e f a c b
e e f b c a d
f f a e b d c
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Math 761
Midterm #1 - take home portion, Due Friday, March 8
Be sure to justify your responses to the following problems. You may talk to Brad 
and Steve about these problems, and you may use your book and class notes, but 
please work alone.
1. The set {e, a, b, c, d} is a group under the operation which is given in the table below. 
Unfortunately, I only had time to copy down part o f the table. Fill out the rest o f the 
table and check to see that we get a group. Explain how you know that your choice 
for each entry is the only possibility. Then use Exploring Small Groups to confirm 
that you have, indeed, created a group table.
* e a b c d
e e
a b e
b c d  e
c d  a b
d
2. Fill out all possible operation tables which make the set {<?, a, b, c} a group. You 
may assume that e is the identity of each group. In the process, be sure to explain 
your decisions and prove that the set is a group under each of the specified 
operations. You may use the computer to check the associative property, but you 
must justify all o f the other properties “by hand”. You don’t have to provide a 
formula for the operation, but explain each decision you make while filling out the 
table. For example, explain how we know that the first row and column is the same 
for each possible table. What are the possibilities for a2? Are there any that don’t 
work (that is, that won’t allow the set to be a group)? In a particular table, once 
you’ve “chosen” a2, does this “force” some (or all) o f the other values in the table? 
Why can’t we have be = b l Is it possible to fill out the table so that the set is a 
nonabelian group?
3. Recall that the funny addition operation * on the set R of real numbers is defined by 
a*b = a+b+ab. Show that * satisfies the associative property .
4. Prove of disprove: If  x, y, and z are elements of a group G, then (xyz' 1) ' 1 = xAy Az.
5. Prove or disprove: If  x, y, and z are elements of a group G, then (xyzA)A = zyAxA.
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Math 761
Take-home exam #2 due Monday, April 29
1. Are the following statements true, or false? Prove or find a counterexample.
a) If  G is an abelian group, then the set {g e  G \ g2 = e} is a subgroup o f G.
b) If  G is a group, then the set {g e  G | g 2 = e) is a subgroup of G.
2. Find the subgroup generated by the given element(s) in the specified group G.
a) The subgroup of S 4 generated by (134).
b) The subgroup o f Ss generated by (124)(35).
c) The subgroup o f S 4 generated by (14) and  (124). Additional question: Is 
there an element a  in S 4 so that the subgroup you just found is generated by 
a?  Explain.
3. Let the function/:  Z  —» Z 4  be defined by j{x) = x  (mod 4).
a) Show th a t/is  a homomorphism. Is/one-to-one? Is /on to?
b) Find the kernel off  Recall that the kernel o f a homomorphism f:  G —> G' is 
the set ker(/) = {g e G \g 2 = e'}, where e' is the identity of G'.
4. Suppose f:  G -»  G' is a group homomorphism.
a) Prove that ker(/) is a subgroup o f G.
b) Prove that if  g  is an element o f G, then (/(g) ) ’ 1 = /(g ’').
c) Prove that /(G ) is a subgroup o f G'. Recall that/(G) = {/(g) | g  e G}.
d) Prove that if  G is an abelian group, then/ (G) is an abelian group.
5. Let K  be the kernel o f the group homomorphism f :  G —> G' and suppose a and b are 
elements o f G.
a) Show that if  b is in the set aK  = {ak \ k e  K}, then/(fr) = a.
b) Show that if  j{a) =J{b), then there exists an element & in AT so that b = ak by 
following the steps below.
i) First, explain how we know that there is a & in G so that b -  ak.
ii) Now show that the k  you found in part i) is in K .
c) Explain why we may now conclude that aK= {x e  G \f{x) = f(a)}, and 
therefore fia ) =J{b) if  and only if aK  = bK.
6 . Prove that i f / i s  a group homomorphism, th e n /is  one-to-one if and only if 
ker (/)={e}.
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M ATH 761 N A M E ____________________________________
Final Exam  
Friday, May 10








g) the order of the element a in the group G




3. Describe the following sets in words AND using set notation.
a) the kernel of the group homomorphism f  : G  —* G ' .
b) A  +  B  (where A  and B  are subsets of the integers)
c) A  *  B  (where A  and B  are subsets of the group G, under the operation *)
4. Let a  be the permutation of {1, 2,3,4} defined by 1 —► 2, 2 —> 3, 3 —» 1, and 4 —> 4, and let (5
be the permutation defined by 1 —> 4, 2 —> 3, 3 —> 2, and 4 —> 1. Find the order of a(32 a ^ 1.
5. Let /  : Z —> 2Z be defined by f ( z )  =  2z.
a) Determine whether /  is a homomorphism.
b) Determine whether /  is one-to-one.
c) Determine whether /  is onto.
d) Determine whether Z is isomorphic to 2Z.
6. Recall that if g is an element of G, then the cyclic subgroup of G generated by g is defined to 
be the set (g) =  {gn \ n  € Z}.
a) How does the order of (g) compare to the order of gl  Provide a brief explanation.
b) If G has finite order and g is an element of G, can g have infinite order? Explain.
c) Recall that Lagrange’s Theorem states that if H  is a subgroup of a finite group G, then the 
order of H  is a divisor of the order of G. With this in mind, finish the following statement:
Lagrange’s (other) Theorem: If g is an element of a finite group G. then the order of g is 
Provide a brief explanation of why the Theorem is true.
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7. Let G be a group and define the set S  as follows: S  = {x  € G \ x A = a;}
a) Carefully state what it means for a to be in S.
b) Carefully state what it means for b not to be in S
c) Suppose G =  Dz  and S  is defined as above. Note that the table for D 3 is at the bottom of 
the page.
(i) Is (123) in 5?
(ii) Is (13) in 5?
d) Now let G be an arbitrary group. Is S  a subgroup of G1 If so, prove it. If not, which of the
properties fail? Under what circumstances will S  be a subgroup of G? Prove that, under
these circumstances, S  is a subgroup of G.
8 . Find the cyclic subgroup of Z15 generated by 5.
a) List the left cosets of 77 in Z15, where 77 is the subgroup you found above.
b) Is 77 a normal subgroup of Z15? Explain.
c) Provide the table for the quotient group Zis/77.
9. Let 77 =  {(1), (25)} and G =  {(1 ), (245), (254), (24), (25), (45)}. The table for G is provided 
below for your viewing pleasure.
a) Confirm that 77 is a subgroup of G
b) Find the left cosets of 77 in G.
b) Find the right cosets of {(1), (25)} in G.
c) Carefully compute (24)77(254)77.
d) Is 77 a normal subgroup of G? Explain.
10. Extra credit:
a) Is Z4  a subgroup of Z?
b) Is Z4  a subgroup of Zs?
c) When working on the problem “do the elements a and b commute?”, your friend says “I 
think that a does, but b doesn’t.” Can your friend be right? How do you respond to their 
comment?
(1) (245) (254) (24) (25) (45)
(1) (1) (245) (254) (24) (25) (45)
(245) (245) (254) (1) (25) (45) (24)
(254) (254) (1) (245) (45) (24) (25)
(24) (24) (45) (25) (1) (254) (245)
(25) (25) (24) (45) (245) (1) (254)
(45) (45) (25) (24) (254) (245) (1)
(1) (123) (132) (12) (13) (23)
(1) (1) (123) (132) (12) (13) (23)
(123) (123) (132) (1) (13) (23) (12)
(132) (132) (1) (123) (23) (12) (13)
(12) (12) (23) (13) (1) (132) (123)
(13) (13) (12) (23) (123) (1) (132)
(23) (23) (13) (12) (132) (123) (1)
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SAMPLE PROBLEM SETS AND HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENTS
• Problem sheet 1, January 17
• Assignment 1
• Problems, February 12: Definition o f group
• Introduction to Exploring Small Groups, March 8
• Guiding questions, April 11
• Problems, April 22
• Final assignment
• Review problems, May 6
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M ath 761. A bstract Algebra 
Problem Sheet 1 
January 17, 1996
1 N u m b e r T h eo ry
Abstract algebra has roots in number theory, in geometry, and in methods of solving equa­
tions. The first few assignments are designed to explore these roots. Perhaps the most 
famous number theory problem is Fermat’s last theorem1 (or, more accurately, Fermat’s 
conjecture) which states that there are no non-trivial2 integer solutions to the equation 
xn +  yn = zn when n is an integer greater than 2. Investigation of this question alone has 
led to incredible achievements in the development of the fields of algebra, number theory, 
and algebraic geometry. We cannot consider the question here, but instead consider related 
questions.
1. Euler proved in 1770 that x 3 + y3 =  z3 has no non-trivial integral solutions. In order 
to gain an understanding of this problem, we might first ask whether x 3 + y3 is ever 
divisible by 3? If so, what can you conclude about x  and y. If not, why not?
Hint: A useful way to explore this equation is through modular arithmetic, sometimes 
called arithmetic of remainders. We say a =  b mod n if a and b have the same 
remainder when divided by n. For example, 3 = 24 mod 7 because both have a 
remainder of 3 when divided by 7.
2. Investigate solving equations of the form ax = b mod n for n =  5 and n = 6, where
a and b are constants. For example, does 3x = 5 mod 6 have a solution? Try several
different values of a and b. Be sure that you have found ALL solutions. Summarize 
your results.
3. Investigate a +  x = b mod n for n = 5 and n =  6.
4. Investigate x 2 + 3x + 2 = 0 mod n for n = 5 and n = 6.
2 A rith m e tic  w ith  se ts
1. If A = {1,3,4} and B  = {2,6}, can A  +  1 make sense in a way that pays attention to 
arithemetic of integers? What about A + B, AB , 2A, and A  +  A? What about 2Z  
and 2Z  +  1, where Z  is the set of integers? Are there any choices to be made? If so, 
what are the advantage and disadvantages of each alternative. If not, why not.
2. Now suppose A  is the set of even integers and B  is the set of odd integers. What can 
you say about A  +  B? A + A? Try all possibilities. Describe, as completely as you 
can, arithmetic with these sets.
3. Compare the sets 3Z, 3Z  T 1, 3Z  T 2, 3Z  + 3, 3Z  + 4, 3Z  T 5, 3Z  4- 6, and 3Z  T 7. 
Describe, as completely as you can, arithmetic with these sets.
1At the joint meeting of the AMS and the MAA in Orlando last week, Andrew Wiles of Princeton 
University gave a series of lectures on his proof of this theorem.
2There are obvious solutions if x, y,  or z are zero, but as these solutions are not very interesting, they
are called “trivial.”
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M A T H  761
A ss ig n m e n t # 1
D u e  M o n d ay , J a n u a r y  22
1. Read pages 3-4, om itting the  last paragraph of page 4, and pages 7-9 (on 
m odular arithm etic). In particular, carefully read through the proof of the 
Division Algorithm  (on page 4) until you feel th a t you’d be able to  explain it 
to  someone else.
(a) Rewrite the  proof of the  division algorithm , being sure to  fill in all of the 
details th a t you feel are missing.
(b) Explain the  W ell-Ordering Principle, in a way th a t a high school student 
would understand.
2. Work through problem # 2  from the  first handout. Com pare the cases n =  5 
and n  =  6, using a t least 4 different choices for a and b. S tate a conjecture 
based on w hat you find. Are there generalizations th a t seem to  be true  for all 
n, a, and 6?
3. Work through problem  # 3  from the  handout. Compare the  cases n  =  5 and 
n  =  6, using a t least 4 different choices for a and b. S tate  a  conjecture based 
on w hat you find. Are there generalizations th a t seem to  be true for all n, a, 
and bl
4. W ork through problem  # 4  from the handout. Compare the  cases n  =  5 and 
n  =  6, S tate a conjecture based on w hat you find. Are there generalizations 
th a t seem to be true  for all n?
5. Investigate the values of n 3 (mod 6). Make and prove a  conjecture based on 
your “d a ta” .
6. Do # 2 7  on page 19 of the textbook. Explain how you know you’ve found all n  
th a t satisfy the specified condition.
7. W o rk  o n , b u t  d o n ’t  t u r n  in . Prove th a t x 3 +  y 3 is divisible by 3 if and only 
if x + y  is divisible by 3.
Read the rest of pp. 3-13 (up to, bu t not including, equivalence relations).
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Group problems for Monday, February 12 (and beyond)
Definition of group (and its consequences)
As we defined in class, a set S, along with an operation 0, is a group if the following properties 
are satisfied:
1. For all a and b in S, a 0 b is in S.
We then say that S is closed under the operation 0.
2. For all a, b, and c in S, (a 0 b) 0 c = a 0 (b 0 c).
We then say that 0 is associative on S.
3. There exists an element e in S so that e 0 a  = a 0 e  = afor each a in S.
We then say that e is the identity element of S.
4. For each a in S, there is an element a 1 in S so that a 0 a' 1 = a' 1 0 a = e (where e is the identity
element of S). We say that a 1 is the inverse of a in S.
Problems for group discussion:
1. Determine whether the subset {2,4,6,8} of is a group under multiplication (in Z)0).
In earlier problems with operation tables, we noticed that in some rows and columns of some 
tables, not all elements of the set occurred. For example, consider the multiplication table for Zi0. 
Several of the rows and columns have repeated elements, so some elements have to be left out; 
for example, 1 is not in the “2 row”.
2. In an earlier problem, you were asked to determine whether ab = ac implies b = c for a 
variety of sets and associated operations. Is this cancellation law true for groups? That is, if 
S’ is a group under the operation 0 and a 0 b = a 0 c, then is it necessarily true that b = cl In 
other words, is it possible to cancel the a from both sides of the equation?
3. The above version of the cancellation law is often called the left cancellation law, since the a 
is canceled on the left. Determine whether the right cancellation law is true for groups.
4. What do the right and left cancellation laws imply about whether the rows and columns in a 
group’s operation table have any repeated elements?
5. Show that each row and column in a group’s operation table contains every group element 
exactly once. For example, to show that the element c occurs in the “a row”, we need to 
show that the equation a 0 x = c has a solution in the group. Show that this is true, explain 
why it shows that c is in the “a row”, and show that c also occurs in the “a column”.
6. Suppose that (S, 0) is a group with identity e. If a 0 x = a for some a and x in S , what can 
you conclude about x? What if x 0 a = a ? That is, what kinds of elements can act like an 
identity in a group?
7. How many inverses can an element in a group have? That is, if a is an element of a group S 
with operation 0 and identity e, and ifx 0 a  = e o r a 0 x  = e, what can you conclude about x?
8. If S is a group with operation 0 and identity e, and a and b are elements of S so that a' 1 = b'1, 
what can you conclude about a and bl
Additional terminology:
Let S be a group under the operation 0. If a 0 b = b 0 a for all a and b in S, then we say that 0 is 
commutative on S  and that S  is an abelian group. If S is not abelian, we say that S is nonabelian.
9. Show that the “mixed” cancellation law is true for abelian groups. That is, prove that if the 
groups, with operation 0, is abelian and if a 0 b = c 0 a, then a = c.
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Math 761 
Introduction to the Exploring Small Groups software package
1. Sit down at one o f the IBM clones (one o f the planets) in the M227 computer lab. If  
the machine isn’t on, turn it on. If  the screen saver is on, “jiggle” the mouse.
(Note: if  you’re working on Jupiter, you might need to press the spacebar in order 
to “wake it up”.)
2. Start up Exploring Small Groups. If  you’re in Windows, double-click the “Groups” 
icon in the Mathematics Software folder. If  you’re in DOS, type 
cd  . . \m a th \g r o u p s \e s g  followed by <RETURN> (or <Enter>), then type 
s t a r t  followed by <RETURN>. If  this doesn’t work, type e s g  then <RFTURN>.
3. At some point, it will be good to read the information provided when you start up the 
program, but today, w e’ll hit <RETURN> until w e’re at the Table Generation 
Menu, which I ’ll usually refer to as the Main Menu. From the Main Menu, we can 
choose to create our own operation table, or use one o f the “canned” tables which the 
software “knows”. If you want to exit the program, you need to get back to this 
menu. In order to do that, hit the F10  button until the computer asks you if you 
want to return to the table generation menu. Typey and you will be back at this 
menu. You can then type 5 to exit the program.
4. W e’ll first try some o f the tables the software already knows. Type 34 then 
<RETURN> to see the “commutative loop”.
The operation table now appears before you, along with a variety o f commands that you
can use. Your screen should look something like:
1. Check Commutative Property 5. Check Subset Closure
2. Check Associative Property 6 . Check Group Axioms
3. Check Identities and Inverses 7. Table Alterations
4. Check Cancellation Property
* A B C D E F
A A B c D E F
B B C D E F A
C C D A F B E
D D E F A C B
E E F B C A D
F F A E B D C
It’s fairly easy to use the software, but you’ve got to be sure to read the instructions on 
the screen. Sometimes, you’ve got to hit the spacebar (or some other button) to continue. 
In addition, you often have the choice o f stepping through various calculations. For 
example, let’s check to see if  the associative law holds for the set {A, B, C, D, E, F} 
(notice that it’s not too hard to see that the set is closed under the operation, that A is the 
identity o f the set, and that A ' 1 = A, B ' 1 = F, C 1 = C, D ' 1 = D ,F 1= E, and F ] = B).
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5. Choose to check the associative property by typing 2. You can choose to step 
through the calculations, or just check to see whether the property holds, or not.
6 . O f course, if  you’re just interested in whether or not the set is a group under the given 
operation, we can just check the group axioms by typing 6 . Not surprisingly, the 
associative law fails to hold.
7. One o f the nice features o f ESG  is that we can change the table (the order of elements 
and the names o f elements). To see this, type 7. When the table alterations menu 
appears, type 2 so that we can rename the elements. Replace the elements A, B, C, D, 
E, and F  with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6  (in that order). Be sure to hit <Retum> after each 
new element is entered, then type N if  the new elements are entered as you intended.
8. Now, we want to return to the main menu. Type F10 a few times, then Y, when 
asked whether you want to go back to the table generation menu. Then, type 3 so that 
we can define an operation table ourselves. I want to look at the operation table for 
C/ 9  under multiplication (mod 9), so we need to create a table for {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 }. 
Therefore, type 6 , since our set has 6  elements. We then want to change the name of 
the elements, so we can tell that C/9 is, in fact, the set w e’re talking about. Do this, 
then fill out the rest o f the table. Have the computer check that this is, indeed, a 
group. Having done this, you will be able to use the Group properties menu.
9. By choosing the Powers and orders option (#1), you can compute the powers of 
elements much more quickly than is possible by hand. Use this option to compute the 
powers and orders o f each element of the group. What are the different orders of the 
elements o f the group?
10. Get back to the main menu and choose the Sample Library (#1), then choose to view 
the operation table for C/2 0 . Again, find the order of each element, after checking that 
the group axioms hold, so that we may gain access to the Group properties menu. 
While you’re doing this, find the sets {g2 \ g  e C/2 0 }, {g3  I g  e C/2 0 }, and {g4 \ 
g  e C/2 0 }, the collections o f squares, cubes, and fourth powers in C/2 0 .
11. Use the table alterations menu (option #7) to focus on the set {g2 \ g  e U2o}. Accept 
the “restrict to a closed subset” option to see whether the set is closed under the 
operation. After this is done, hit the F10  key to get back to the group properties 
menu. Check to see whether the group axioms hold. That is, determine whether 
{g2  I g  e G) is a group.
12. In order to check whether {g3 1 g  e C/2 0 } and {g4 | g  e U2o} are groups, you’ll have to 
repeat steps 10 and 11. In particular, you’ll need to get back to the main menu, then 
choose the operation table for C/2 0 , then restrict the table to the specified set, etc.
There is no better way to learn how to use Exploring Small Groups than to just start
using it. The following exercises have been designed with this in mind.
Problems
1. Determine whether the subset {AD, BC, ~A, ~B, ~C, ~D} (of set #30 in the 
Sample Library) is a group. By choosing the table alterations menu (option 7),
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then the “restrict to a closed subset option (4)” we can choose to focus only on the 
above listed elements.
2. List any o f the following elements that exist: an identity for the above set and
each element which has an inverse (with its inverse).
3. Create an operation table for the set {e, a, b} so that the set, along with the
operation, forms a group (I’ll bet you’ve already guessed which element we
should choose to be the identity). While it’s possible to create the table without 
the use o f the software, I ’d recommend using the computer to check the 
associative law, at least. In order to do this, choose the user defined table 
command from the main menu, then ask for a table for a 3 element set. Accept 
the option to change the names o f the elements so that your table starts off 
looking like the one below.




In determining how to fill out the table, recall that a number o f group properties 
come directly from the operation table. For instance, we know what to put in each 
entry of the e row and column, right? Be sure to explain each o f your choices for 
table entries. When you’re done, check to see whether you’ve created a group, or 
not.
4. Once you’ve created a group, determine whether it is possible to make any 
different choices and still end up with a group? Explain.
5. For each o f the following group operation tables, determine whether the set 
{g2 1 g  e G} is a group (follow 11 and 12 above). Does there seem to be a way to 
predict when the set will be a group? Check tables 0602, 0802, 0804, 0901 ,0902, 
and 1204 from the Group Library and 12 and 18 from the Sample Library.





You now have many examples of groups: permutation groups, dihedral groups, the 
groups Z„ and Un, groups involving matrices, and also groups involving the integers, 
rational, real, and complex numbers. In order to understand these groups, it is useful to 
ask:
What are the easiest groups to describe and understand?
For these groups, and especially for the more complicated groups, it is useful to break the 
groups down into smaller pieces. We can ask:
What are all the subgroups o f  a given group?
Some of you have noticed that the subgroup of S4  generated by (1432) looked a lot like 
Z 4 . We might ask whether it is essentially the same as Z 4 . Or we might ask the 
following more general question:
Given a group (or a subgroup o f  a group), is it “essentially the sam e” as 
another more fam iliar group?
In order to show that two groups are essentially the same, we must set up a 
correspondence between them. Such a correspondence can be given by a function which 
maps one group to the other.
Can we specify a function which shows that two groups are essentially the 
same?
But there must be more than just a correspondence between the elements of the two 
groups. The function must also show a relationship between the operations o f the two 
groups.
What properties must such functions have in order to show a relationship 
between the group operations?
When groups are not essentially the same, they might still have important similarities. So 
given two groups, we might ask:
Given a function which maps one group to another, what kind o f  
relationship does the function establish between the arithmetic o f  the two 
groups?
This last question sounds quite abstract, but in fact it is just a generalization o f the 
question, “How is addition in Z related to addition in Zn?”
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Math 761
Problems to work on the week of April 22
Suppose that G and G' are groups under the operations * and respectively. Recall that 
a function f:  G —» G' satisfying the property that for all x andy in G ,/x*y) = /x ) * 'fly), is 
called a (group) homomorphism. I f / i s  also one-to-one and  onto (or, as the French are 
wont to say, injective and surjective), then we say th a t/is  an isomorphism and that G is 
isomorphic to G'. We further d efine /G ) = {f[g) \ g  e  G} to be the image of G under /  
(That is , /G )  is the set o f all possible outputs from/ arising from inputs in G).
The kernel o f / i s  defined to be the set {g e G | / g )  = e'}, where e' is the identity of G' 
and is often abbreviated as ker(/). Note also that, even though the kernel typically refers 
to a homomorphism, we’ll use the word to denote the elements o f G which/ sends to e' 
even i f / i s  not a homomorphism.
1. Determine whether the following functions are group homomorphisms. Which, if 
any, are isomorphisms?
a) /  Z 5 —» Zio defined b y /x )  = x (mod 10).
b) /  Z 5 —» Z 5 defined b y /x )  = x2.
c) / :  I >3 —» D 3 defined b y /x )  = x2.
d) / :  Zg —» Zg defined b y /x )  = 2 x.
e) / :  Z —» Z 5 defined b y /x )  = x (mod 5).
f) /  Z  —» 2Z defined b y /x )  = 2x.
2. For which o f the above/is  ker(/) a subgroup o f the domain of/?
3. Partially definef  Z& -»  D3 b y /0 )  = (1) a n d /1 )  = (123). In order th a t/b e  a 
homomorphism, how should we d e fin e /2 ) = / l  +1)? / 3 ) ?  / 4 ) ?  / 5 ) ? / 6 ) ?
4. Suppose/ :  G -»  G' is a group homomorphism and g  is an element of G.
a) Prove that if  n is a positive integer, th en /g ") = f(g)n.
b) Prove that if  n is an integer (not necessarily positive), th e n /g ”) = / g ) ”.
c) I f  g  is an element of G and the order o fg  is 6 , must the order o f /g )  be 6 , as 
well? Hint: see 1. d) above. What can you say about the order o f /g )?
5. For each o f the following groups G, determine whether the function/  G —> G, 
defined b y /x )  = x2  is a homomorphism. For which, if  any, G is /a n  isomorphism?
a) G = Z.
b) G = Z;
c) G = Z(
d) G = D
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Math 761
Problems to work on the week of April 22
6 . Use Exploring Small Groups to find all o f the subgroups o f Z>3 and D4. Note that 
while many o f the subgroups o f a given group are generated by a single element, 
some groups have subgroups which are generated by more than one element. For 
example, {(1), (12), (34), (12)(34)} is a subgroup of S 4 but it is not generated by a 
single element of S4. It is, however, generated by (12) and  (34). Make a conjecture 
about the order of any subgroup of a finite group.
7. Suppose G is a finite group, H  is a subgroup of G, and a is an element of G. Recall 
that aH  is defined to be the set {ah \ h e H}. In this context, we call aH  the left coset 
of H  containing a.
a) Explain why it makes sense to say that “aH  contains a.” Therefore, every 
element of G is in at least one left coset of H.
b) Show that \aH\ = j/7| by showing that if  x ^ y ,  then ax ^  ay. Therefore, every
left coset of / /h a s  |77j elements.
c) Show that c is in aH  if  and only if  cAa is in H.
d) Suppose that c is in aH  n  bH. Show that aH = bH  by showing that a'lb is in
H. Therefore, if  left cosets overlap, they are identical. Therefore, every 
element of G is in at most one left coset o f H.
e) W e’ve thus shown that every element of G is in exactly one left coset o f H  
and that each left coset has \H\ elements. That is, the left cosets of / / i n  G 
“partition” G into disjoint, equal size pieces. Explain how we may now 
conclude that \aH\ is a divisor |G|.




One o f the central tenets of this class has been that you, the students, should come to 
some personal conviction and some group consensus about definitions, questions and 
answers. One consequence o f this approach has been that sometimes consensuses have 
come slowly and sometimes they haven’t come at all. Still, in order to participate in 
discussions about the ideas in this course, it is important to reach consensus on many of 
the basic facts.
The following activities are designed to bring the class toward greater consensus. They 
will help you prepare for the final exam and will also help Steve and Brad make up the 
final exam. In the activities below, you are asked to write a list o f questions. Some of 
the questions you write will appear on the final.
Responses to each o f the following activities are due at the last class meeting. During 
that class we will discuss and consolidate your responses.
1. Write a list o f questions about “basic facts” that you believe everyone who completes 
this course should know. These questions might take one o f the following forms:
What is _ _ _ _ _  ?
What is meant b y _________ ?
How many w ays__________ ?
How do y o u __________ ?
Include answers for each o f these questions.
Example:
Q: What is Z„?
A: You decide. [Did you think we might slip and give an answer?]
2. Come up with a list o f questions about the big ideas o f the course. These questions 
should necessarily be more general (and abstract) than the questions above.
Example:
Q: Why do the rules for exponents make sense? Are the any differences 
between positive, negative, and zero exponents? What assumptions must 
be made in order to begin? Explain.
A: Again, you decide.
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M ath 761. A bstract Algebra  
R eview Problem s 
M ay 6, 1996
1. From your take-home exams, it seems that some students are unclear about proper 
use of set notation. Determine which of the following items are the same as which 
others. Assume G  is a group and e is the identity.
(a) {g £ G  | g2 =  e)
(b) {g2 \ g e  G}
(c) {x | x £ G,  x 2 =  e}
(d) h £ G  where h2 =  e
(e) g2 where g £ G
(f) { k2 \ k £  G,  k2 =  e}
(g) { x 2 =  e | x £ G}
(h) {g2 £ G  | g2 =  e}
(i) The squares of the elements in G.
(j) The elements in G  whose squares are the identity.
(k) The squares of the elements in G  whose squares are the identity.
(1) An element in G  whose square is the identity 
(m) The square of an element in G.
2. You should find that you know how to do each of the following problems, once you 
understand what the question is asking.
(a) Let H  be the subgroup of S'4 generated by (1432). Find the left cosets of H  in 
S4 . How many should there be? Is H  a normal subgroup?
(b) Make an operation table for the quotient group ^ 12/(9 ) -
(c) Compute the left cosets of (4) in Ui§. Is the subgroup normal? Why or why not? 
If so, make an operation table for the quotient group.
(d) In a group of order 18, what are the possible orders of elements in the group?
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IRB Protocol #1694 - Learning in Abstract Algebra
Dear Mr. Findell:
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research has reviewed the 
protocol for your project as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 46, Subsection 
46.101 (b)(2). Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. If you decide to 
make any changes in your protocol, you must submit the requested changes to the IRB for review and 
approval prior to any data collection from human subjects.
The protection of human subjects is an ongoing process for which you hold primary responsibility. In 
receiving IRB approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the project in accordance with the ethical 
principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects in research as described in 'The Belmont 
Report." Additional information about other pertinent Federal and university policies, guidelines, and 
procedures is available in the UNH Office of Sponsored Research.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to the IRB upon project completion unless you 
experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation of human subjects. 
Please report these promptly to this office.
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact Kara Eddy, Regulatory Compliance 
Officer (for the IRB), at 862-2003. Please refer to the IRB # above in all future correspondence related 
to this project. We wish you success with the research.





cc: Karen Graham (advisor), Mathematics
Sincerely,
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Learning in Abstract Algebra is a dissertation in mathematics education. The aim of the 
dissertation is to describe how students think about the concepts in abstract algebra. It is 
hoped that this dissertation will lead to better teaching and learning in undergraduate 
mathematics.
You may participate in this Study in any, all, or none of the following ways:
• by allowing copies of your written work to be included as data;
• by allowing your discussions to be audiotaped during regular classtime;
• by allowing your discussions to be videotaped during regular classtime; or
• by participating in videotaped interviews with the researcher.
Because the interviews will require time outside o f class, you will be paid $6/hour for 
that time. Approximately four interviews of about one hour each will be scheduled 
during the semester.
Many students who participate in research of this type typically find the process to be 
helpful in their own learning. They benefit because in order to communicate with the 
researcher and with other students, they reflect upon and deepen their understandings of 
the mathematical concepts involved.
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AND RESPOND AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE.
1 .1 understand that the use of human subjects in this project has been approved by the 
UNH Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in 
Research.
2 .1 understand the scope, aims, and purposes of this research project and the procedures 
to be followed and the expected duration of my participation.
3 .1 have received a description o f any potential benefits that may be accrued from this 
research and understand how they may affect me or others.
4 .1 understand that my consent to participate in this research is entirely voluntary, and 
that my refusal to participate will have no effect on my grade in Math 761.
5 .1 further understand that if  I consent to participate, I may discontinue or modify my 
participation at any time with no effect on my grade in Math 761.
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6 .1 confirm that no coercion of any kind was used in seeking my participation in this 
research project.
7 .1 understand that if  I have any questions pertaining to the research or my rights as a 
research subject, I have the right to call Dr. Van Osdol (862-2690) or the UNH Office of 
Sponsored Research (862-2000) and be given the opportunity to discuss such questions in 
confidence.
8 .1 understand that I will be paid $6/hour for participation in interviews to be conducted 
outside o f classtime. I further understand that there will be no financial compensation for 
other participation.
9 .1 understand that anonymity and confidentiality of all data records associated with my 
participation in this research, including my identity, will be fully maintained to the best 
o f the researcher’s ability.
10. I understand that data from this study may be used in presentations for audiences of 
researchers and teachers.
11. I agree to respect the confidentiality and anonymity o f the other participants to the 
best o f my ability
12 .1 certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose of this research project and 
its risks and benefits for me as stated above.
I , _________________________, CONSENT to participate in this research project in the
following ways. (Initial all that apply.)
 by allowing copies o f my written work to be included as data;
 by allowing my discussions to be audiotaped during regular classtime;
 by allowing my discussions to be videotaped during regular classtime;
 by participating in a videotaped interview with the researcher.
I , _________________________, DECLINE to participate in this research project.
Signature of Student Date
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Learning in Abstract Algebra is a dissertation in mathematics education. The aim o f the 
dissertation is to describe how students think about the concepts in abstract algebra. It is 
hoped that this dissertation will lead to better teaching and learning in undergraduate 
mathematics.
Data collected as part o f this research project will be held strictly confidential. I will use 
videotapes and audiotapes primarily to develop written transcripts. When using excerpts 
from these transcripts in research papers and presentations, I will use pseudonyms to 
protect your anonymity. When using actual videotape rather than transcripts in a 
research presentation, however, it is not always possible to maintain anonymity. Thus it 
is important that I request specific permission for such use o f video.
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AND RESPOND AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE WILLING TO ALLOW USE OF VIDEO DATA.
1 .1 understand that the use o f human subjects in this project has been approved by the 
UNH Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection o f Human Subjects in 
Research.
2 .1 understand the scope, aims, and purposes o f this research project and the procedures 
to be followed and the expected duration o f my participation.
3 .1 have received a description of any potential benefits that may be accrued from this 
research and understand how they may affect me or others.
4 . 1 understand that my consent to the use of video in presentations is entirely voluntary, 
and that my refusal to participate will have no effect on my grade in Math 761.
5 .1 further understand that if  I consent to the use of video in presentations, I may 
withdraw my consent at any time with no effect on my grade in Math 761.
6 .1 confirm that no coercion o f any kind was used in seeking my consent to the use of 
video in presentations.
7 .1 understand that if  I have any questions pertaining to the research or my rights as a 
research subject, I have the right to call Dr. Van Osdol (862-2690) or the UNH Office of 
Sponsored Research (862-2000) and be given the opportunity to discuss such questions in 
confidence.
8 .1 understand that there will be no financial compensation for my consent to the use of 
video in presentations.
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9. I understand that any video data from this study may be used in presentations for 
audiences of researchers and teachers.
10 .1 certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose o f this research project and 
its risks and benefits for me as stated above.
I , _________________________ , CONSENT to the use in presentations o f video of me
gathered as part o f this research project.
I , _________________________ , DO NOT GIVE CONSENT to the use in presentations of
video o f me gathered as part o f this research project.
Signature of Student Date
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